Repp, Henry, sr. et al, vs. Henry Repp, jr. et al, Semmes, George, use of James Baden, vs. James Naylor, 341 477 358 192 265 329 State, use of G. G. S. Skinner ats. Thomas A. Burgess, - 64 260 State, use of S. Hickley, adm'x of C. Hickley, vs. D. Stewart and J. 456 399 Stewart, D. and J. I. Gross, executors of J. Gross, ats. State, use of S. Washington, W. H. vs. Thomas Hodgskin, garnishee of J. T. Boteler, 353 Weems, William L. ats. H. D. Hatton, 82 Wiles, Samuel, ats. William House, 338 CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. DECEMBER TERM, 1841. SAMUEL LUCAS et al. vs. MICHAEL MCBLAIR et al.December 1841. By the act of 1838, chap. 323, commissioners were appointed by name to build a Town Hall in Baltimore, and with power, by a scheme or schemes of lotteries and sales thereof, or tickets therein, to raise the sum of, &c. These schemes were to be approved of by the Commissioners of Lotteries. By the act of 1839, confirmed in 1840, it became a part of the Constitution of Maryland, that "no new grant to authorize the drawing of any lottery, or the traffic or dealing in lottery tickets, or schemes or devices in the nature of lotteries, &c., shall be made." The commissioners of lotteries were public officers of annual appointment. By bill filed in 1841, the Town Hall Commissioners complained, that while they were endeavouring to sell the tickets in their schemes, the Commissioners of Lotteries, since the acts of 1839-40, “approved, and allowed to be availed of, (and allowed tickets therein to be sold under licenses,) schemes of lotteries for the State of Marylanu, and schemes of lotteries granted and authorised by other States than Maryland; stamped tickets in such schemes, and issued them to contractors for sale, and under pretext of licenses emanating from such Commissioners of Lotteries, that the same were largely sold, thereby violating the acts of 1839-40, also seriously interfering with the sales of the complainants, in their Town Hall schemes authorised by the act of 1838. To restrain this evil their bill prayed for an injunction against the Commissioners of Lotteries, and the persons licensed by them, in relation to the approval of tickets in the lotteries for this State and other States, and Lucas et al. vs. McBlair et al.-1841. sales of tickets therein and granting licenses therefor. Upon this it was held That considering the difficulty of obtaining adequate redress at law, and the probability that a multitude of suits would necessarily be instituted to protect the complainants' franchise, the process of injunction was a proper remedy. That as trustees, invested by law with an important public duty, they were competent, as parties, complainants, to proceed in equity in their own names, to protect the franchise committed to them from violation. The State was not necessary party to the bill in order to obtain an injunction. It was the object of the act of 1839, chap. 39, to prohibit in future, all lottery grants by the Legislature, and all grants of licenses to deal in lotteries by the lottery commissioners, so far as it could be done without affecting antecedent or prior vested rights, secured by a constitutional sanction. The difficulty of obtaining adequate redress in a court of law is one of the well established grounds for resorting to a Court of Chancery, and especially where in the pursuit of justice it may be necessary to resort to a multiplicity of actions at law. A statute privilege, in possession, of an exclusive character, not admitting of an injurious competition, may in its use and enjoyment be protected by injunction, equally essential in such cases to prevent ruinous litigation, as fraud and evasion of the right. A franchise to propose a scheme of a lottery and sell tickets for a particular object, is so far of an exclusive nature, as to be within the principle above stated. The act of 1828, chap. 129, sec. 21, recognizes the propriety of a resort to the writ of injunction in such cases. To prevent irreparable injury or multi. plicity of suits, are grounds for obtaining an injunction. This preventive remedy is now granted more liberally than formerly. Commissioners appointed by law-invested with a public trust-with means for its execution-with full power to act-must be entitled to use all the appropriate means necessary to the end in contemplation, and are regard. ed as having such an interest in the subject confided to them, as will enable them to proceed before the tribunals of the country, for the due protection of the rights entrusted to them. It is not necessary in all cases, that the cestui que trusts or parties beneficial. ly interested, should be parties to a bill in equity. Executors and administrators who may sue, or be sued, in many cases sufficiently represent creditors, legatees or distributees, for whom they are trustees. The want of a party as a defendant, is generally no ground upon which to claim a dissolution of an injunction; a necessary party may be supplied before final hearing. It is the constant aim of courts of equity to do complete justice, by deciding upon and settling the rights of all parties interested in the subject matter Lucas et al. vs. McBlair et al.-1841. of the suit, but this may be obtained by having the necessary parties before the court at any time before the final decree is passed. If all persons interested are not made parties to the suit, the court many times, upon hearing, will not for want of them proceed to a decree. The act of 1839, chap. 31, was not confined to grants of lottery privileges by the Legislature, but was intended to cover the whole system of dealing in lotteries, and to prohibit the granting of licenses by the Lottery Commis. sioners, and the sale of schemes by them, except as to existing private lottery grants; and the power the Legislature before possessed of regulating suchprivate grants, and the means by which they might be more effectually and speedily accomplished. Where the object of the Legislature in passing a statute, was the suppression of a great moral evil, the construction of it should be benign and liberal, and not so restricted as to leave much of the mischief designed to be sup. pressed, the chance of still being successfully pursued. The title and preamble of an act are, strictly speaking, no parts of it, though they may be resorted to in explanation of the enacting clause, if it be doubtful; or to restrain its generality, when it would be inconvenient if not restrained. APPEAL from Chancery. On the 4th December, 1841, Samuel Lucas, William Gwynn, Charles G. Ridgely, Oliver Holmes, George G. Belt and Chas. F. Mayer, exhibited their bill of complaint against Michael Mc Blair, George Cooke, Samuel Scribner, Henry M. Bash, William Pyfer and J. G. Gregory, and other persons composing the partnership of J. G. Gregory and Company, alleging, that by an act of the General Assembly of Maryland, passed at December session of 1838, chapter 323, entitled, An act in aid of the construction of a State Armory and Town Hall in the city of Baltimore, and the re-building and improvement of the Hanover Market House in said city. Your orators (excepting Holmes,) were appointed commissioners for the purpose of raising, by sales or drawing of schemes of lotteries, the requisite sum of money for the construction of the State Armory and Town Hall, which for the public convenience and defence, it was the purpose of said act to have erected. And your orators further show, that at their December session, 1839, chap. 52, an act supplemental to that just mentioned, was passed by said General Assembly, extending the term of operation of the original act, and of the privileges and rights |