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To many Americans the attempt to regard one bandit rather than another as the rightful Government of Mexico was a hopeless farce, and in any event to flatter Carranza by treating him as an equal, a scandalous lapse of dignity. But quite apart from his resolution to pursue the difficult path of conciliating Latin-American opinion, the President's motives were far deeper than his critics imagined. He had become aware of the presence of a new and insidious factor in the Mexican imbroglio. "I came from the South," he said in the course of a private conversation in June 1916, "and I know what war is, for I have seen its wreckage and terrible ruin. It is easy for me as President to declare war. I do not have to fight, and neither do the gentlemen on the Hill who now clamour for it. . . . I will not resort to war against Mexico until I have exhausted every means to keep out of this mess. . . . The gentlemen who criticize me speak as if America were afraid to fight Mexico. Poor Mexico, with its pitiful men, women and children, fighting to gain a foothold in their own land! Some day the people of America will know why I hesitated to intervene in Mexico. I cannot tell them now, for we are at peace with the great power whose poisonous propaganda is responsible for the present terrible condition of affairs in Mexico. Germany is anxious to have us at war with Mexico, so that our minds and our energies will be taken off the great war across the sea. She wishes an uninterrupted opportunity to carry on her submarine warfare, and believes that war with Mexico will keep our hands off her and thus give her liberty of action to do as she pleases on the high seas. It begins to look as if war with Germany is inevitable. If it should come-I pray God it may not I do not wish America's energies and forces divided, for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany.' "1

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These words carry us back to the problem that had been developing since August 1914. In the midst of the first stages of a programme of domestic reform that would certainly require a full term of office to carry through, the President was increasingly called upon to concentrate his attention upon the world-crisis. In August 1914 the Mexican situation was still menacing, though Huerta had been driven out. The President was not slow in seeing the terrible strain that the war was sure to put upon the cohesion and loyalty of certain 1 Tumulty," Woodrow Wilson as I know Him," pp. 158-9.

large elements in the vast mixed population of the United States. He was, as ever, ready to exert himself in favour of peace, and on 5th August, sitting beside the death-bed of his wife, he drafted a circular to all the belligerents offering his good offices, in accordance with the Hague Convention, in favour of peace either now or at any other time that might be thought more suitable, as an occasion to serve you and all concerned in a way that would afford me lasting cause for gratitude and happiness.'

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He immediately issued a declaration of neutrality, and refrained from any protest against the invasion of Belgium. His silence has been strongly condemned, but it is sufficient to note that in this matter he was supported by his great antagonist, Theodore Roosevelt, and that it was the considered opinion of Lord Bryce that to expect a different attitude on the part of a neutral power not a party to the violated treaty, was to expect something for which there was no precedent.2 Looking back, one is inclined to agree with that great friend of the Allies, Walter Page, that the only precedent to justify such an expectation "was found in Hysteria."

The whole nation supported the President at this critical moment. He had, as we have seen, to face the possible menace to the internal peace of the State constituted by large bodies of unabsorbed aliens from many of the belligerent countries, Germans, Austrians, Russians, Poles, Finns. As the war rolled on, he had to bear in mind that national public opinion was tending to fall into two geographically determined groups -the East and the Middle and Far West. He had to remember that he was not only President of the vocal and interested East, but of the Union. And a fact to be constantly remembered is that the West was profoundly pacific. The idea of war was hateful to men absorbed in developing those vast lands. The issues of the desperate struggle in Europe were remote and half-understood. They did not for long come home to men's business and bosoms.

Since his inauguration as President, Dr Wilson had emphasized the quality of national leadership inherent in the Chief Executive of the United States. He had always been the exponent of the Lincoln school in this matter, and as the country had become accustomed to the firm expression of his views by the President, they expected a statement on Quoted Ford, “ Woodrow Wilson: The Man and his Work," pp. 247-8.

2 Hendrick,

The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," p. 165.

the war and its issues. On 18th August 1914 he issued an appeal to the citizens of the United States to refrain from personal partisanship, to cultivate a detached and truly neutral attitude. Partisanship, however natural, would endanger the national unity: "Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another." They must first and last be Americans, only so could they hope when opportunity offered to be of service in the restoration of peace.1

This endeavour to cultivate detachment was viewed in England at the time, and later, as curiously if not offensively academic. But the acute anxiety of the President to avoid the outbreak of a debate that might turn the nation into a pandemonium, is his complete justification. By succeeding he established for himself an unrivalled leadership at a moment when leadership was above all things necessary. That he did succeed is sufficiently proved by the delightfully acid comments of Walter Page on the spirit he found prevailing at Washington in the summer of 1916: "The Vice-President confessed to his neighbour at a Gridiron dinner, that he had read none of the White Papers, or Orange Books, etc., of the belligerent Governments-confessed this with pride-lest he should form an opinion and cease to be neutral! Miss X, a member of the President's household, said to Mrs Y, the day we lunched there, that she had made a remark privately to Sharp [American Ambassador in Paris], showing her admiration of the French. 'Was that a violation of neutrality?' she asked, in all seriousness.

"I can see it in no other way but this: the President suppressed free thought and free speech when he insisted upon personal neutrality. . . The mass of the American people found themselves forbidden to think or talk, and this forbidding had a sufficient effect to make them take refuge in indifference. It's the President's job. He's our leader. He'll attend to this matter. We must not embarrass him. 1 Scott, "President Wilson's Foreign Policy," pp. 67-8.

On this easy cushion of non-responsibility the great masses fell back at their intellectual and moral ease-softened, isolated, lulled."1 German propaganda was very active, but the success of the President's appeal is a sufficient testimony to the ascendancy he had established. In accord with a long tradition, on 8th September 1914 he issued a proclamation designating Sunday, 4th October, as a day to be devoted to prayer for peace.2

It was not long before it became obvious that American interests were vitally affected by the progress of the tremendous struggle which, after the Marne, the President felt could only end in a draw of some sort. Very early the British blockade measures inaugurated a prodigious correspondence on the rights of neutrals between U.S. and Great Britain, which was followed by the graver crisis caused by the German counter-blockade of Great Britain, proclaimed in February 1915. All ships entering a certain area were liable to be sunk at sight. The American Government at once informed the German Imperial Government that it could not recognize the validity of such measures, and would hold Germany to a "strict accountability." This declaration of principle was shortly followed by news that a German submarine had torpedoed and sunk the "Lusitania" on 8th May 1915, off the South of Ireland, thereby drowning 1260 persons, among whom were 107 American citizens. A wave of horror passed over America, but the President refused to precipitate matters. In a few days he summoned Germany, in a dignified note, to make reparation, disavow the crime, and give guarantees against the repetition of such outrages. The German Government was inclined to argue, and the situation became menacing. Firmly determined to resist the outcry of the New England States for an immediate declaration of war, the President had resolved not to shrink from it if the German Government refused to yield to his patient though insistent demands. As a result the Secretary of State, W. J. Bryan, a doctrinaire pacificist, though a powerful influence in the Democratic party, resigned in June 1915, and was succeeded by Robert Lansing. The "Lusitania crisis was

complicated by the sinking of the " Arabic" on 19th August, off the coast of Ireland. For a few days war seemed inevitable, but on 1st September 1915 the German Government gave the

1 Hendrick," The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," ii., p. 175.
2 Ford, "Woodrow Wilson: The Man and his Work," pp. 248-9.

general undertaking that "liners will not be sunk by submarines without warning, and without ensuring the safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." Such an undertaking was a serious handicap on the efficacy of the submarine, and as a result was constantly broken. Within a few days of the assurance the Allan Liner " Hesperian" was torpedoed without warning. So serious was the position, and so insistent was the able German ambassador in the United States, Count Bernstorff, that war was inevitable unless Germany retreated, that he was instructed in October to disavow the Arabic outrage, and to announce that the German Government declared its regret, and was ready to pay an indemnity.

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His success in moderating the orgies of the Germans encouraged the President to continue his twofold policy of clearing up the submarine issue by securing respect for international law, and, if this were reconcilable with his chief endeavour, of keeping the United States out of the war. The path was beset with incredible difficulties. In September 1915 he discovered that the Austrian ambassador, Dr Dumba, was engaged in fomenting sabotage in American factories engaged in the manufacture of munitions for the Allies. He at once demanded his recall; and when the Austrian Government began to argue the case of its envoy, ordered the ambassdor to leave the country. In December he peremptorily ejected the German naval and military attachés, Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen, for a similar abuse of their diplomatic position. It became evident that the President could not be trifled with, a discovery that was to receive further confirmation.

Early in 1916 a controversy arose as to the status of armed merchantmen. The Germans contended that an armament recognized as defensive against a cruiser was offensive against a submarine. The pro-German elements in Congress tried to meet the situation by introducing a resolution to request the President to warn all Americans against travelling on such vessels, which Germany now announced she would sink at sight on the ground that they were really auxiliary cruisers. Senator Stone, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, addressed a letter on the subject to the President, who seized the opportunity of defining his position to the new, though as yet unsubstantial, threat: "We covet peace," he wrote, " and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honour.

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