C. A. 1903 V. GRESHAM SOCIETY v. BISHOP. Stirling L.J. all such costs, charges, and expenses, as shall appear to him to have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for defending the rights of any party." In the present MANCHESTER case, before the special case was settled, the draft was laid CORPORATION before the advisers of the appellants, who considered it, and SUGDEN. altered it, and the alterations were adopted by the Commissioners in part at any rate; and the taxing master before ASSURANCE whom the present case has come has certified that what was done with reference to the settlement of the case on behalf of the appellants on this appeal was such that the costs were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice." Now that being so, and it being also provided by Order LXVIII., r. 2, that, amongst other orders, Order LXV. as to costs shall apply to all proceedings on the Revenue side of the King's Bench Division, it seems to me that it became the duty of the taxing master to apply the new regulation 29 to the taxation of the present case. It is not suggested that he has come to a wrong conclusion in finding that these costs were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice. I therefore think that he had jurisdiction, and I only desire to say that in my view it does not follow from this decision that in every case the costs of perusing the proposed case will be allowed to either party. It will be for the taxing master to consider the circumstances of each case, and to form a determination as to whether or no the costs incurred are necessary or proper for the attainment of justice. It follows, I think, from our decision that the rule must apply as well to the Crown as to the subject, and no doubt in many cases the Crown will get the benefit of it. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors for Manchester Corporation: Austin & Austin, for Town Clerk, Manchester. Solicitors for Gresham Life Assurance Society: Devonshire, Monkland & Co. Solicitor for respondents: Solicitor of Inland Revenue. A. M. 1903 May 15. THE KING v. JUSTICES OF CORNWALL. Poor-rate-Appeal from Special Sessions-Jurisdiction of Quarter Sessions over Costs before Special Sessions - Parochial Assessments Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), s. 6. Where, upon an appeal from special sessions under s. 6 of the Parochia Assessments Act, 1836, the quarter sessions allow the appeal, the quarter sessions have jurisdiction to set aside the order of the special sessions giving costs to the successful party at the special sessions, and also to order that the unsuccessful party at the special sessions shall be paid the costs incurred by him at the special sessions. MANDAMUS to quarter sessions to hear an application for costs. On March 27, 1902, Jane Sandercock, who was rated as the occupier of a public-house known as the Cornish Arms, in the parish of St. Blazey, in the St. Austell Union, gave notice of appeal to the special sessions for the division comprising the said parish against a rate made on October 23, 1901, for the said parish, on the ground that she was overrated in respect of the said public-house. The appeal was heard by the special sessions on June 10, 1902, and was allowed, and the justices ordered that the assessment of the said Jane Sandercock should be reduced from 521. gross estimated rental and 417. rateable value to 351. gross estimated rental and 291. rateable value, and that the assessment committee should pay her 301. 15s. 5d. for her costs of the appeal. From that decision the assessment committee appealed to the quarter sessions. On October 14 the appeal was heard. The quarter sessions allowed the appeal with costs of the appeal to quarter sessions. Application was then made to the Court of quarter sessions for an order setting aside the order of special sessions that the assessment committee should pay J. Sandercock her costs at special sessions, and directing J. Sandercock to pay to the assessment committee their costs at special sessions. The quarter sessions, however, refused the application upon the ground that they had no jurisdiction to grant it. A rule was then obtained by the assessment committee for a mandamus to the justices to hear the application. 1903 REX บ. JUSTICES. Foote, K.C., and W. J. Lawrance, shewed cause against the rule. The quarter sessions had no jurisdiction to order Sandercock to pay the assessment committee their costs of appearing CORNWALL before the special sessions. The section which established special sessions for the hearing of appeals against rates, s. 6 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), also gave the right of appeal from the decision of the special sessions to the quarter sessions, and provided that the justices at quarter sessions, "upon hearing and finally determining such matter of appeal, shall and may, according to their discretion, award such costs to the party or parties appealing or appealed against as they shall think proper." The words "such costs as they shall think proper" refer simply to the amount which, in the absence of consent to tax out of sessions, has to be ascertained and specified by the Court of quarter sessions itself. They have no reference to costs extraneous to the appeal. Apart from special statutory direction, there is no natural jurisdiction in an appellate Court to order the payment of costs incurred in the Court below. For instance, the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857, which enables the High Court to hear appeals from justices by way of special case, provides by s. 6 that upon the hearing of the appeal the Court "may make such orders as to costs as to the Court may seem fit." But in Newman v. Jones (1) Mathew and A. L. Smith JJ. doubted whether that Act empowered the Court to give the successful appellant his costs in the Court below; and in Slaughter v. Mayor of Sunderland (2) Cave and Vaughan Williams JJ. held that it did not. With regard to the order of the special sessions that the assessment committee should pay to Sandercock her costs, it may be that the quarter sessions had jurisdiction to set that order aside, and to that extent the decision of the quarter sessions was wrong. Sect. 7 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, provides that "No order of the said justices in special sessions shall be of any force pending any appeal touching the same subject-matter to the Court of general or quarter sessions of the peace having jurisdiction to try such (1) (1886) 50 J. P. 373. (2) (1891) 55 J. P. 519. 1903 REX v. CORNWALL appeal, or in opposition to the order of any such Court upon such appeal." Which implies that where the quarter sessions allow the appeal they may reverse the whole order of the Court JUSTICES. below, including the part of it awarding costs. In Gage v. Collins (1) the Court of Common Pleas held that, under a section which provided that on an appeal from a county court the superior Court "may make such order with respect to the costs of the appeal as such Court may think proper," they had power to deal with the order for payment of costs below as accessory to the judgment appealed from. They did not, however, hold that there was any general power to make the order as to costs which the Court below ought to have made. So far as the quarter sessions refused to order Sandercock to pay to the assessment committee their costs at the special sessions they were right. Ryde, for the assessment committee, in support of the rule. The language of s. 6 of the Act of 1836 is ambiguous, but it is open to the construction that it was intended to give the quarter sessions power to order that the successful appellant should be paid the costs incurred by him in the Court below. But if so, then as it is reasonable and just that the successful appellant should have those costs, the Court ought to put that construction on the section. The cases cited on the other side, as to the want of jurisdiction in the superior Court to award costs in the Court below on allowing an appeal from justices, are not in point. There the tribunal appealed from and the tribunal appealed to are wholly differently constituted, and primâ facie a Court has jurisdiction only over the costs incurred before itself. But the Courts of special sessions and quarter sessions are not wholly differently constituted. The members of the former like those of the latter are simply county justices, the special sessions being nothing more than a committee of the larger body who sit at quarter sessions, and there is nothing to prevent the justices who sat at special sessions from sitting also on the appeal at quarter sessions. In a sense, therefore, the two sessions may be regarded as different sittings of one and the same Court. Less strong language is consequently (1) (1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 381. necessary to give jurisdiction over the costs in the Court below in the case of an appeal to the quarter sessions than in that of an appeal to the superior Court. LORD ALVERSTONE C.J. In this case a rule was moved for a mandamus to the quarter sessions to entertain an application for an order as to the costs of the hearing at special sessions of a matter which had been further appealed to them. The question raised, as to whether the quarter sessions had jurisdiction to entertain the application, is one which does not appear to have been decided before. It depends upon the construction of s. 6 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, which provides that upon an appeal being brought from special sessions to the quarter sessions, the justices at the quarter sessions, “upon hearing and finally determining such matter of appeal, shall and may, according to their discretion, award such costs to the party or parties appealing or appealed against as they shall think proper.' And the question is whether that section gives the quarter sessions power to deal, not merely with the costs of the appeal before them, but also to vary the order of the special sessions as to the costs incurred in the Court below. The language is ambiguous: it is open to either construction. And, that being so, I think it would be more in accordance with justice if we were to hold that the justices had the power to make such an order as to costs as would put the parties in the position that they ought to be in having regard to the result of the litigation. I think it must have been intended by the section to give the quarter sessions as large a discretion over costs as possible. Support is given to this view by the language of the following section, s. 7, which provides "that no order of the said justices in special sessions shall be of any force pending any appeal touching the same subject-matter to the Court of general or quarter sessions of the peace having jurisdiction to try such appeal, or in opposition to the order of any such Court upon such appeal." This would include the order of the special sessions as to costs. But if such an order is to be of no force pending the appeal, it is to be inferred that a fortiori it is to be of no force after the appeal 1903 REX ზ. CORNWALL JUSTICES. |