v. CAUNT. 1903 was the owner. HAMPSTEAD apportioned in the year 1891, and in that year a demand for CORPORATION payment had been made upon the then owner of the premises, but the amount had not been paid. The defendant became the owner of the premises on November 20, 1896, and a demand of payment was made upon him on December 19, 1898. The amount was claimed under s. 105 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (1), as amended by s. 77 of the Metropolis Management (Amendment) Act, 1862. (2) This action was commenced on January 20, 1903. The work had been done and the expenses (1) 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 105: "In case the owners of the houses forming the greater part of any new street laid out or made, or hereafter to be laid out or made, which is not paved to the satisfaction of the vestry or district board of the parish or district in which such street is situate, be desirous of having the same paved, as hereinafter mentioned, or if such vestry or board deem it necessary or expedient that the same should be so paved, then and in either of such cases, such vestry or board shall well and sufficiently pave the same, either throughout the whole breadth of the carriageway and footpaths thereof, or any part of such breadth, and from time to time keep such pavement in good and sufficient repair; and the owners of the houses forming such street shall, on demand, pay to such vestry or board the amount of the estimated expenses of providing and laying such pavement (such amount to be determined by the surveyor for the time being of the vestry or board); and in case such estimated expenses exceed the actual expenses of such paving, then the difference between such estimated expenses and such actual expenses shall be repaid by the said vestry or board to the owners of houses by whom the said sum of money has been paid; and in case the said estimated expenses be less than the actual expenses of such paving, then the owners of the said houses shall, on demand, pay to the said vestry or board such further sum of money as, together with the sum already paid, amounts to such actual expenses." (2) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 77: "Where any vestry or district board shall, under the powers given by the one hundred and fifth section of the firstly recited Act, have paved or be about to pave any new street, the owners of the land bounding or abutting on such street shall be liable to contribute to the expenses or estimated expenses of paving the same, as well as the owners of houses therein, provided that it shall be lawful for the vestry or district board to charge the owners of lands in a less proportion than the owners of house property, should they deem it just and expedient so to do; and any such costs or expenses including the cost of paving at the points of intersection of streets, and all other incidental costs and charges, shall be apportioned by the vestry or board, and shall be recoverable either before the work shall be commenced, or during its progress, or after its completion; and it shall be lawful for the vestry or district board at their discretion to accept payment of the amount apportioned or charged in respect of each house or premises by instalments spread over a H. Courthope-Munroe, for the plaintiffs. The two sections, 1903 s. 105 of the Act of 1855 and s. 77 of the Act of 1862, must be HAMPSTEAD read together, and the effect is that "the present or any future CORPORATION v. owner" of a house or of land in the new street is liable to CAUNT. pay upon demand, and an action to recover the amount after demand will lie against the owner of a house as well as against the owner of land. The matter of complaint is not complete until demand. The demand must be made upon the owner from whom the amount is sought to be recovered, and, therefore, where there has been a succession of owners, even though a demand may have previously been made upon a former owner, if it is sought to recover the money from his successor, a fresh demand must be made upon the successor. Statute of Limitations (21 Jac. 1, c. 16), if it applies at all, does not begin to run until a demand has been made upon the owner from whom the amount is claimed: see Grece v. Hunt. (1) That statute, however, does not apply to a case like this: Wortley v. St. Mary, Islington. (2) [He also cited Blackburn Corporation v. Sanderson. (3)] The Chester Jones, for the defendant. The demand required by s. 105 is to be made only upon the first owner, and, when it has been made, the amount is recoverable from him or any succeeding owner. When a demand has been once made the amount becomes a charge upon the property: Plumstead Board of Works v. Ingoldby (4); and each successive owner becomes liable as soon as he succeeds to the ownership. The statute begins to run from the date when a person becomes owner, and this action was not commenced until more than six years after the defendant became owner. (5) An action can be brought period not exceeding twenty years, and any such amount shall be recoverable from the present or any future owner of the premises either by action at law or in a summary manner before a justice of the peace, at the option of the vestry or board." (1) (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 389. (2) (1886) 51 J. P. 166. (4) (1872) L. R. 8 Ex. 63. (5) Semble, that if any Statute of Limitations applies to this case, it is 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 3, and the period of limitation is not six years but twenty, as in respect of an action founded upon a specialty: see Cork and Bandon Ry. Co. v. Good", (1853) 13 C. B. 826; Shepherd v. Hills, (1855) 11 Ex. 55. (3) [1902] 1 K. B. 794. 1903 only under the provisions of s. 77, and therefore cannot be HAMPSTEAD brought against the owner of a house, who is dealt with by 8. 105. CORPORATION V. CAUNT. Courthope-Munroe, in reply. There is no charge on the land, but only a personal liability on each successive owner: Egg v. Blayney. (1) WRIGHT J. This is an action against the owner of a house to recover expenses of paving a new street. One question is whether an action lies at all under s. 77 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1862, against the owner of a house as distinguished from the owner of land, or whether the right of action is not confined to the persons newly made liable by that section. The other question is whether, assuming that an action would lie, it is barred in this case after the lapse of six years by the ordinary Statute of Limitations. The latter question depends apparently upon whether it was necessary to make a fresh demand upon the defendant. It seems to me to be plain that s. 105 of the Act of 1855 and s. 77 of the Act of 1862 must be read together. Sect. 105 says in effect that the owners of the houses in a street which has been paved shall on demand pay to the vestry the amount of the expenses estimated by the surveyor for the time being. It seems to me to be clear that, as regards the owners of houses who are made liable by that section, no liability exists until the demand has been made, for the simple reason that the vestry could not by merely arriving at the result in their own office make an owner liable; the result must be communicated to the owner when it is a matter to be estimated by the officer of the vestry. Where the amount has to be estimated by the officer of the vestry, it would be ridiculous to suppose that any liability could arise until that estimate had been made and communicated to the owner. Then comes s. 77 of the Act of 1862, which says that where paving is done under s. 105 of the earlier Act, not only the owners of houses, but also "the owners of the land bounding or abutting on such street shall be liable to contribute to the expenses or estimated expenses as well as the owners of houses." (1) (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 107. CORPORATION v. CAUNT. Wright J. Stopping there, it seems to me that I ought to give effect to 1903 that provision as if it were read into s. 105 of the earlier Act as HAMPSTEAD an amendment, and that all the provisions of s. 105 ought, so far as they are applicable, to be applied to owners of land, and, amongst other things, that the provision requiring a demand ought to be read into s. 77. Then s. 77 proceeds: "and any such costs and expenses. . . . shall be apportioned by the vestry.... and shall be recoverable either before the work shall be commenced, or during its progress, or after its completion; and it shall be lawful for the vestry. . . . at their discretion to accept payment of the amount apportioned or charged in respect of each house or premises by instalments "—that seems to me to require some demand-" and any such amount shall be recoverable from the present or any future owner of the premises either by action at law" or summarily. There "such amount" seems to me to mean the amount apportioned or charged in respect of each house or premises, and that must include the amount apportioned or charged against the owner of a house under s. 105 as well as the amount apportioned or charged against the owner of land under s. 77. If so, an action can be brought in respect of either amount. I think, therefore, that an action lies, and that, as in my opinion the cause of action was not complete until there was a demand, the Statute of Limitations (21 Jac. 1, c. 16), if it runs at all, does not begin to run until the date of the demand. There must, therefore, be judgment for the plaintiffs. Judgment for plaintiffs. Solicitor for plaintiffs: A. P. Johnson. Solicitors for defendant: Shaen, Roscoe, Massey & Co. J. F. C. Revenue FARMER v. GLYN-JONES. Recomm Stamp Duty-Medicinal Preparations · A retail chemist who purchases a preparation of medici the manufacturers or from other persons, and himself a bottles in which he retails it a label recommending it a certain specified human ailments, is not the " owner, pr original or first vendor thereof" within the meaning of 52 Schedule-Special Exemptions; and if the preparation at he so purchased it was exempt from stamp duty, the fact of the said label will not deprive it of the exemption. CASE stated by a metropolitan police magistrate. An information was laid by the appellant, an office revenue, under s. 2 of 52 Geo. 3, c. 150, against the for selling a bottle containing a preparation to be medicine for the prevention and cure of certain di wit, "Ammoniated Tincture of Quinine. B. P.," label bearing an inland revenue stamp. On the hear information the following facts were proved or admit The respondent was a registered chemist and druggi on business at 159, East India Dock Road, Poplar. served a regular apprenticeship. He held a licence for medicines liable to duty under the Medicines Stamp I On April 8, 1902, the respondent, at his place of above mentioned, sold to Mr. T. P. M. Powning, an inland revenue, a bottle of ammoniated tincture of q which was affixed a label as follows: AMMONIATED TINCTURE OF QUININE. B. P. A well-known and highly recommended remedy FOR INFLUENZA AND COLDS. Dose. One teaspoonful in water every four hours until relieved. GLYN & Co., CHEMISTS, 15A, East India Road, E. |