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case is looked at, that the covenants contained in it are unusual and onerous covenants. That being so, it is well settled, and it is common sense, that the onus is imposed on the vendor of disclosing the existence of such covenants to the purchaser. The vendor may discharge himself from that onus in several ways. He may prove that the purchaser had notice aliunde of the existence of the covenants; or he may prove that he gave express notice of them to the purchaser; or that he has handed the lease to him and that he has actually seen it; or he may shew that the events which have happened are such as to prevent the purchaser from being heard to say that he had not notice of the covenants in the lease; in other words, that something in the nature of an estoppel has taken place. I think that the doctrine of law on this subject must now be treated as being nearly, if not quite, confined within the limits contained in the 3rd section of the Conveyancing Act, 1882. Upon the terms of that section the question involved in this case appears to be what inquiry and inspection, if any, under the circumstances the purchaser, or some one on her behalf, ought reasonably to have made. The facts are these. December 12 the house agent acting for the plaintiff, who had not got in his possession the lease of the premises in question, produced to the defendant's solicitor a lease of other premises on a printed form, which was in common use for leases of premises forming part of that estate. The defendant's solicitor appears to have said that he was busy and could not look at it then. I think he was quite right in not doing so. At that date the parties were not at one, and negotiations were still going on as to the terms of the proposed contract. It is not at all clear that the solicitor, if the contract had afterwards gone off, could have charged his client for perusing the lease at that time. I think it would be going beyond what is reasonable to say that he was bound to peruse, not the lease, but another lease said to be in similar terms, when the parties had not yet come to terms, and the occasion was not ripe for examination of the lease. I do not think that we are in any way impairing any of the authorities on the subject in holding that the defendant ought not in this case to be prejudicially affected by

On

C. A.

1903 MOLYNEUX

V.

HAWTREY.

Cozens-Hardy

L.J.

C. A.

1903

MOLYNEUX

V.

HAWTREY.

notice of the terms of the lease, and that there was not such a reasonable opportunity given of examining it as to estop the defendant from saying that she was not aware of its contents.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitor for plaintiff: A. J. Schweder.
Solicitors for defendant: Valpy, Peckham & Chaplin.

E. L.

C. A. 1903 July 15.

[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]

THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF THE ORMS-
KIRK UNION v. THE GUARDIANS OF THE
POOR OF THE CHORLTON UNION.

Poor Law-Settlement-Irremovability-Residence-Hospital-Poor Removal
Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 66), s. 1.

An institution partially endowed by a private person and founded with the object of providing a home and medical treatment, together with suitable employment and recreation, for persons suffering from epilepsy, the main part of the expenses being defrayed by payments of the inmates, is a "hospital" within the proviso to s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846. Judgment of the Divisional Court, [1903] 1 K. B. 19, affirmed.

APPEAL from a decision of a Divisional Court upon a special case stated by consent and by order of a judge in pursuance of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 11. (1)

The question for decision was whether one Harold Coxon, a pauper, had, on the facts stated in the special case, acquired a legal settlement in the Ormskirk Union by reason of his residence for three consecutive years in a home for epileptics situate within that union, and whether this home was a "hospital" within the meaning of the Poor Removal Act, 1846, s. 1, which provides that the time during which a person shall be "confined. . . . as a patient in a hospital" shall be excluded from the computation of the period which

(1) [1903] 1 K. B. 19.

renders a pauper irremovable. The facts stated by the special case were as follows:

C. A.

1903

UNION

v.

On January 10, 1902, the guardians of the poor of the ORMSKIRK Chorlton Union obtained an order of two justices of the peace for the city of Manchester adjudging the settlement of Harold CHORLTON Coxon, a pauper, to be in the township of Maghull in the Ormskirk Union.

On February 8, 1902, the guardians of the poor of the Ormskirk Union gave notice of appeal against the order to the general quarter sessions of the peace for the city of Manchester, and the appeal was at the said quarter sessions entered and respited.

Coxon was about twenty-four years of age, and was admitted as a patient into an institution called the Home for Epileptics at Maghull on April 4, 1893, suffering from the disease of epilepsy, for the purpose of receiving cure and treatment, and, if possible, of obtaining a cure of such disease, and he remained continuously receiving care and treatment in the home from the date of his admission until January 8, 1902, when he was discharged as incurable. Thereupon he became an inmate of the Chorlton Union workhouse. Whilst Coxon was in the home his relations paid 7s. 6d. a week for his maintenance and treatment therein. Coxon had never resided or dwelt in the Ormskirk Union for any period of time whatever during which he could acquire a settlement therein except during the period and for the purpose above mentioned.

The Home for Epileptics was established in 1888 by one Henry Cox, deceased, and was partially endowed by him with the sum of 20007. It consisted of buildings, farm buildings, and five acres of land, farmed by the committee which governed the home. It was supported by donations, annual subscriptions, and payments made on behalf of the patients under treatment therein. Its object was the care and treatment of persons suffering from the disease of epilepsy. The home was situate at Maghull, a village in the country about seven miles from Liverpool, in the Ormskirk Union. The site was chosen to permit the patients to have the benefit of the hospital treatment in combination with healthy outdoor life, regular

UNION.

C. A. 1903

There was

habits, suitable employment and recreation. attached to the home a medical staff, a lady superintendent, ORMSKIRK three matrons, and twelve nurses. The number of patients UNION on December 31, 1901, receiving care and treatment for CHORLTON epilepsy was 123. Annexed to the case was a pamphlet

v.

UNION.

relating to the history and constitution of the home, and the annual report and balance-sheet for 1901. It was stated in this pamphlet that it was considered necessary that each patient should be paid for so as to make the institution as far as possible self-supporting; the patients were therefore divided into three classes, paying two guineas, one guinea, and 7s. 6d. a week respectively, with the intention that, while the third class of patients paid only for their food, the charge for the first and second class would leave a profit to defray the expenses of the establishment, nursing, &c. It appeared from the balance-sheet for 1901 that the income of the institution was 50751., of which 41577. was derived from payments by patients and 2381. from donations and subscriptions.

The question stated for the opinion of the Court was whether or not, on the facts above set out, Coxon had acquired a legal settlement in the township of Maghull aforesaid under the provisions of s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846, and s. 34 of the Divided Parishes Act, 1876, by reason of his continuous residence for three consecutive years and upwards in the Home for Epileptics. If the Court should be of opinion in the affirmative, the order of the justices was to stand; otherwise the same was to be quashed.

The Divisional Court (Lord Alverstone C.J., and Wills and Channell JJ.) were of opinion that the home was a "hospital" within the meaning of s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846, and consequently that there were no grounds for the removal of Coxon to the Ormskirk Union workhouse, and allowed the appeal. (1) From this decision the guardians of the Chorlton Union appealed.

R. Cunningham Glen, and Morsby White, for the appellants. The facts of this case are not sufficient to justify a finding that (1) [1903] 1 K. B. 19.

C. A.

1903

ORMSKIRK
UNION

V.

UNION.

Coxon's residence in this institution complied with the requirements of these sections: Guardians of Holborn v. Guardians of Chertsey. (1) This home was a convenient place of residence for a person suffering from this disease, and during his residence Coxon paid for his board; in fact, no one is admitted to this CHORLTON institution without payment. The nature of a public hospital was considered in Horner v. Lewis. (2) This institution is a home, not a hospital; it is a place for long and permanent residence. Coxon cannot be said to have been "confined" in this home; he was under no compulsion either mental or bodily; he went there of his own free will, and continued to reside there for many years. [St. Olave's Union v. Canterbury Union (3) was referred to.] The fact that in the Act hospitals are grouped with places like prisons and lunatic asylums shews that the residence contemplated was involuntary residence; and for this reason there is a special provision in the Habitual Drunkards Act, 1879, s. 32, that the time during which a person resides in a retreat is not to be counted under s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846.

[STIRLING L.J. Because such a retreat is clearly neither a prison" nor a "hospital."]

The character of this institution is entirely different from ordinary "hospitals": it is almost entirely supported by the payments of the patients; it is called a "home," not a “hospital,” and medical treatment is not its main object.

Macmorran, K.C., and Clavell Salter, for the Ormskirk Union, were not called upon.

VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.J. Everything that can be said on behalf of the appellants has been pressed upon us in this case; but in my opinion the decision of the Divisional Court is quite right. The question turns upon s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846, and what we have to decide is whether this man Coxon has been residing in this institution in such a way that his residence there comes within the proviso in that section, so as to be excluded from the computation of the period of residence (1) (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 76. (2) (1898) 67 L. J. (Q.B.) 524. (3) [1897] 1 Q. B. 682.

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