C. A. 1903 SANDERSON v. BLYTH THEATRE COMPANY. in the subject-matter of the suit ought in general to be made parties as plaintiffs or defendants, so that the Court might be enabled to do complete justice by deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested: see Mitford on Pleading, p. 164. Order LXV., r. 27, regulation 37, directs that the rules, orders, and practice of any Court whose jurisdiction has been Stirling L.J. transferred to the High Court of Justice relating to costs existing prior to the commencement of the Judicature Act, 1873, shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the principal Act and the rules, remain in force and be applicable to costs of the same or analogous proceedings. The mode, therefore, in which the Court of Chancery dealt with the costs of defendants to Chancery suits affords an analogy which, in my opinion, ought to guide the Court on the present occasion. Now in suits where persons were made defendants for the purpose of complying with the rule just stated, the Court of Chancery had full jurisdiction, when disposing of a suit on its merits, to deal with the costs of such parties and to decide by whom they should be borne. If the Court was of opinion that their costs ought to be borne by a co-defendant, the ordinary practice was to direct the plaintiff to pay them in the first instance, and then to add them to his own, and to have them over against the defendant who was to bear them: see, for example, Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp. (1) Where, however, a suit was instituted by the Attorney-General ex officio, the practice was different, for, as the Attorney-General could not be ordered to pay costs, costs were ordered to be paid directly by one defendant to another: see Attorney-General v. Corporation of Chester. (2) After the Judicature Acts came into operation this practice was altered by the Court of Appeal in Rudow v. Great Britain Mutual Life Assurance Society (3), and it was laid down that the proper form of order was to order the defendant liable to costs as between himself and his co-defendant to pay them to the co-defendant. Jessel M.R. said that the machinery which had been adopted by the Court of Chancery was no longer either necessary or useful, but was (1) (1850) 12 Beav. 568, at p. 588. (2) (1851) 14 Beav. 338. (3) 17 Ch. D. 600, 607, 608, 610. mischievous. I understand this to mean that it was no longer necessary, because under the Judicature Acts and rules the Court had full power to order one defendant to pay costs to another, and that it was mischievous because the plaintiff who was ordered to pay costs in the first instance, and then to have them over against a defendant, ran the risk of losing them if the defendant proved to be insolvent. The change of practice appears to me, if I may be allowed to say so, to be perfectly proper, and I think that the new practice ought to be adhered to wherever it is practicable to do so. It appears to me that this practice is not applicable to a case in which a judge holds that there is not good cause to deprive a defendant of costs against the plaintiff under the last clause of Order LXV., r. 1, and yet is of opinion that the costs so occasioned ought properly to be borne by another defendant. In that state of things it seems to me that, for the attainment of justice, recourse may and ought to be had to the old practice. It is to be observed that when the Court of Chancery ordered the costs of one defendant to be paid by the plaintiff and added to his own, and the whole to be borne by another defendant, the Court was not giving substantive relief by way of indemnity or damages or otherwise, but was simply exercising its jurisdiction over the costs of a pending suit. This particular form of order was, as Jessel M.R. calls it, "machinery" for properly disposing of the costs, and this is shewn by the change in the form of order when, as in the case of the AttorneyGeneral, the plaintiff could not be ordered to pay costs. Having regard to this and to the express directions of Order LXV., r. 27, regulation 37, I think that the term "costs" in s. 5 of the Judicature Act, 1890, ought to be read as including costs which a particular party may be ordered to pay in the first instance and then to have over against another. For these reasons I think that the learned judge had jurisdiction to make such an order as he has made. It is said, however, that the learned judge did not properly exercise the jurisdiction. To this there appear to me to be two answers. In the first place it is well settled that the Court of Appeal will not review the discretion of the judge of first C. A. 1903 SANDERSON V. BLYTH THEATRE COMPANY. Stirling L.J. C. A. 1903 instance, even although he has given leave to appeal, unless there has been a disregard of principle or a misapprehension SANDERSON of facts: see In re Gilbert (1); Young v. Thomas. (2) In the present case I am not satisfied of the existence of either. Secondly, the defendant Hope has not been made a party to the present appeal, and in his absence it appears to me to be impossible to do complete justice. V. BLYTH THEATRE COMPANY. Stirling L.J. For these reasons I think that the appeal ought to be dismissed. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.J. I concur in the judgments of my learned brethren, because I think there is jurisdiction under the old Chancery practice for ordering recoupment of costs directed to be paid by another litigant. It may be necessary to exercise this jurisdiction in a case like the present, where there are claims against alternative defendants, and the issues are tried by a jury. But generally I think that under the Judicature Act this jurisdiction should only be exercised in exceptional cases; and in the present case I cannot help doubting whether the learned judge had present to his mind either the question whether he ought to deprive Hope of costs or whether, as between Hope and the theatre company, the company ought to pay Hope's costs, or whether the defence and conduct of the company were not reasonable and proper having regard to the statements made to the company by Hope, their architect. The result does not seem to me very satisfactory, but I suppose it cannot be helped. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors: J. E. & H. Scott, for W. Charlton, Blyth; Gibson & Weldon, for Hannay & Hannay, South Shields. (1) (1885) 28 Ch. D. 549. (2) [1892] 2 Ch. 134. W. L. C. [IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.] GLAMORGAN COAL COMPANY, LIMITED, AND OTHERS v. SOUTH WALES MINERS' FEDERATION AND OTHERS. Cause of Action-Interference with Legal Right-Procuring Breach of Contract day." An intentional interference with the legal right of another person, e.g., the procuring of the breach of a contract with him, is an actionable wrong, unless there be sufficient justification for the interference. The circumstances which will constitute sufficient justification cannot be satisfactorily defined, and it must be left to the determination of the Court in each case whether there is sufficient justification for the interference. Per Romer L.J.: In analyzing or considering the circumstances regard may be had to the nature of the contract broken; the position of the parties to it; the grounds for the breach; the means employed to procure it; the relation of the person who procures the breach to the person who breaks the contract; and the object in procuring the breach. In the case of a contract between master and servant it is not sufficient for the person who procures a breach by the servant to shew that he had no personal animus against the master, or that it was to the interest of himself and the servant that the contract should be broken. Per Vaughan Williams L.J.: In the case of an intentional interference with the contractual rights of other persons there is a legal presumption of malice on the part of the interferer; but he may rebut the presumption by proof of circumstances raising a duty on his part to advise a breach of the contract. The person injured by the breach may, however, neutralize the proof of a duty by shewing express malice on the part of the adviser. The miners employed at the collieries in South Wales, without giving notice to their employers and in breach of their contracts with them, abstained from working on certain days, called "stop-days." In so doing the miners acted (as the majority of the Court held) under the direction or order of a federation of the miners, given by their executive council. The object of procuring this breach of contract was to keep up the price of coal, upon which the amount of the miners' wages depended. In an action by the employers against the federation and their officers : : Held, by Romer and Stirling L.JJ. (Vaughan Williams L.J. dissenting), C. A. 1903 July 2, 3, 4; Aug. 11. C. A. 1903 GLAMORGAN V. SOUTH WALES that the defendants were liable in damages, there being no sufficient justification for their interference. Held, by Vaughan Williams L.J., that the defendants only advised the breach of the contract, and that there was sufficient justification for their action in the duty which they owed to the miners. Decision of Bigham J., [1903] 1 K. B. 118, reversed. APPEAL by the plaintiffs from the decision of Bigham J. (1) The action was brought by the Glamorgan Coal Company, Limited, and seventy-three other plaintiffs, owners of collieries in South Wales, against the South Wales Miners' Federation, its trustees, its officers, and a number of members of its executive council, claiming damages for wrongfully and maliciously procuring and inducing workmen employed in the plaintiffs' collieries to break their contracts of service with the plaintiffs. In the alternative the plaintiffs sued the defendants for wrongfully, unlawfully, and maliciously conspiring together to do the acts complained of. The plaintiffs claimed both damages and an injunction. The defence consisted of denials of the material allegations in the statement of claim, and of a plea that the acts complained of were done, if at all, with reasonable justification and excuse. The trial of the action was commenced with a special jury; but ultimately the jury was discharged, and all questions of law and fact, as well as the ascertainment of the damages, if any, were by consent left to the determination of the learned judge. The facts were thus stated by the learned judge in his written judgment: "The plaintiffs are seventy-four limited liability companies associated together for the protection of their own interests under the style of the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners' Association. They work upwards of 200 collieries in the South Wales district, and in these collieries they employ about 100,000 men. The defendants are, first, the men's federation, a body registered under the Friendly Societies Acts; secondly, the trustees of the federation; thirdly, Mr. Brace (the vice-president), Mr. Onions (the treasurer), and Mr. Richards (the secretary of the federation); and, lastly, six men who are members of the executive council of the federa (1) [1903] 1 K. B. 118. |