C. A. 1903 volved, as the defendants knew, the breaking of the subsisting contracts. It was followed, as the defendants wished it should be, and damage resulted to the masters; but there was no GLAMORGAN malicious intention to cause injury, no profit was gained for themselves by the defendants, and their sole object was to benefit the men, whom they were advising and directing." This statement of facts was accepted by the plaintiffs as correct, except that they did not admit that there was a request by the men for advice or direction so far as related to the "stop-day" in 1900. The learned judge said that in his opinion the circumstances disclosed no cause of action. In all the cases cited in which the action had been for damages for procuring the breach of a contract, the element of actual malice-a real intention to harm the plaintiff-had been regarded as essential. In the present case he found that the federation and all the other defendants had acted honestly and without malice, and, in ordering the stop-days, had done no more than that which they conceived to be in the best interest of the men whom they represented and for whom they were acting. He found, moreover, that they had lawful justification or excuse for what they did in this—that, having been solicited by the men to advise and guide them on the question of stop-days, it was their duty and their right to give the advice and to do what might be necessary to secure that the advice should be followed. As to the cause of action founded on conspiracy, the learned judge said that an actionable conspiracy existed when a number of men combined either to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. In his opinion the acts of the individual defendants were not unlawful, and there was good authority for saying that a combination entered into for the purpose of doing a lawful act could not constitute an actionable conspiracy. In order to give a cause of action, the combination to do the lawful act must be entered into with a malicious intention of damaging the plaintiff, and must cause him damage. Here no such conspiracy ever in fact existed, for there never was any malicious intention. The learned COAL COMPANY V. SOUTH WALES FEDERATION. C. A. 1903 GLAMORGAN บ. SOUTH WALES FEDERATION. judge accordingly gave judgment for the defendants on both branches of the plaintiffs' claim. The plaintiffs appealed. Sir E. Clarke, K.C., B. Francis-Williams, K.C., Montague Lush, K.C., and Trevor Lewis, for the plaintiffs. Accepting the learned judge's finding of the facts, it is submitted that his decision upon the law was erroneous. He apparently confused two distinct classes of authorities. It is contended that the facts as found by him bring the case within the decision in Lumley v. Gye. (1) He found that the federation ordered the stop-days. They were clothed with authority over the men, and they maliciously, i.e., with knowledge that the men had entered into contracts with the employers, ordered the men to break them. The judgment of Crompton J. in Lumley v. Gye (1) exactly applies. He said (2) that it is clear law "that a person who, wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing, with notice, interrupts the relation subsisting between master and servant by procuring the servant to depart from the master's service,. . . . whereby the master is injured, commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible at law." Bigham J. had in his mind that class of cases of which Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (3) is an instance, in which the defendants were acting within their legal rights, though what they did had the effect of injuring the plaintiffs. In Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons, &c. (4), this Court followed Lumley v. Gye (1), and the opinion of Lord Watson in Allen v. Flood. (5) If a man tries to persuade another to break his contract, it does not follow that he will succeed in so doing, but, if he does succeed, he has "procured" the breaking of the contract, and is liable for a tort, if the other party to the contract is injured. In the present case all the essential conditions of a right of action are to be found (1.) existence of contracts; (2.) knowledge of (1) (1853) 2 E. & B. 216. (3) [1892] A. C. 25. (5) [1898] A. C. 1, at p. 96. their existence; (3.) intention to procure a breach; (4.) a breach to the injury of the employers. C. A. 1903 COAL COMPANY v. SOUTH WALES The questions for decision are: (1.) Did the federation GLAMORGAN procure the breaking of the contracts? (2.) If they did, had they just cause for doing so? A trade union is an entity. An essential part of its constitution is that the men are controlled by the executive council. Here the order to stop work was really given by the council, and the men obeyed. It is not like the case suggested of advice given by a father to his child to break his contract. The federation, as they said, wished to teach the middlemen a lesson, and they thought the best way of doing that was to procure a breach by the men of their contracts by means of stop-days. They used unlawful means to effect their purpose, and in this respect the case differs from the Mogul Case. (1) Bigham J. thought it was not enough to shew an intentional procuring of a violation of a contractual right, but that a bad motive must also be shewn. It is submitted that an intentional procuring of a violation of a contractual right is an actionable wrong whatever the motive may be: Lumley v. Gye. (2) [VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.J. Suppose a person who is not a party to a contract has an interest in it in common with a contracting party, and these two persons consult together and agree that the best course would be to break the contract. Would Lumley v. Gye (2) apply to such a case?] If there is a "procuring of a breach of contract, the existence of a common interest is irrelevant. Of course the existence of a common interest may be material in ascertaining whether there has been a "procuring" of a breach of contract. It is not denied that there may be "just cause" for procuring a breach of contract, but the nature of the wrong must be considered. Suppose my neighbour contracts with a builder to pull down my house. The pulling down of my house without my consent would be a violation of my legal right, and there would be "good cause" for my procuring the builder to break his contract. [STIRLING L.J. In Read v. Friendly Society of Operative (2) 2 E. & B. 216. (1) [1892] A. C. 25. C. A. 1903 GLAMORGAN COAL COMPANY v. SOUTH WALES Stonemasons, &c. (1), the point which created a difficulty in my mind is not referred to in the report. According to the rules of the society in that case very short notice to determine the contract might have been given—a day's notice, I think— and I doubted whether anything illegal had been done. So in the present case notice might have been given by the men.] They did not wish to terminate the contracts. They wanted to leave off work and to return to it as they pleased. There can be no justification for procuring the breach of a contract unless that contract is in itself a violation of a legal right. If the injury is the direct consequence of the breach of contract, the good motive of the person who procured the breach cannot be a defence to him. It would not be a defence to an action against the man who broke his contract: how can it be a defence to the association which consists of the men? In holding that a malicious motive is a necessary part of the cause of action, Bigham J. was really departing from Allen v. Flood (2) and Quinn v. Leathem (3) as well as from Lumley v. Gye. (4) A bad motive cannot make that which is legal an actionable wrong, nor can a good motive make that which is illegal right. Yet the latter is the basis of the judgment of Bigham J. In so holding the learned judge was departing from Lumley v. Gye (4), and that case was referred to with approval by Lord Macnaghten in Quinn v. Leathem. (5) Procuring a violation of a legal right is an actionable wrong independently of motive. That, indeed, was the view taken by the federation themselves, for, for that very reason, they endeavoured to place the responsibility upon the sliding scale committee. The costs were paid out of the funds of the federation. The federation were the efficient cause of the violation of the masters' legal rights, and their funds ought to be made responsible for the injury done to the masters. The individual men would not be able to answer the damages. Rufus Isaacs, K.C., Holman Gregory, and Clement Edwards, for the federation and their trustees. The ground on which (1) [1902] 2 K. B. 732. (2) [1898] A. C. 1. (3) [1901] A. C. 495. (5) [1901] A. C. 495, at p. 510. C. A. 1903 COAL COMPANY v. SOUTH WALES FEDERATION. Bigham J. really based his decision has not been dealt with by the appellants. The learned judge held that the defendants were acting in the discharge of a duty imposed on them and in GLAMORGAN pursuance of a right, and that there was good cause for their interference. The question arises whether the mere knowledge of a man that he is inducing another to commit a breach of his contract with a third person is sufficient to give that third person a cause of action against the first. It is submitted that there is no authority for the proposition that the mere inducing another to encroach upon the legal right of a third person is an actionable wrong. The real question is, What is a sufficient justification? It is not contended that the absence of malice is alone a sufficient justification. Nor is it contended that the federation did not induce that state of mind which led the men to stop work. But it is submitted that the federation are not responsible for what the men did. The procuring of a breach of contract is no doubt an actionable wrong if it is done without just cause-without sufficient justification. Mere knowledge that you are inducing a breach of contract is not enough to give a cause of action, for the interference may be with just cause. To give a right of action, there must be an absence of just cause for the interference. The decision in Lumley v. Gye (1) has been misconceived. It is only an authority for the proposition that maliciously procuring a breach of contract is an actionable wrong. The question remains whether the procuring of the breach was malicious. The intentional procuring of a wrongful act without just cause may be malicious. Lumley v. Gye (1) was decided upon demurrer to the plaintiffs' declaration, and the decision was only that the declaration was good. In the passage in the judgment of Crompton J. which is relied upon (2) the learned judge was dealing with the question of harbouring a servant, and his language has no application to the point which arises here. And the proposition with which Crompton J. (3) sums up his judgment does not go as far as is necessary for the present plaintiffs. (1) 2 E. & B. 216. (2) 2 E. & B. at p. 224. (3) 2 E. & B. at p. 231. |