C. A. 1903 GIBLAN of breach of contract with the plaintiff. In order that Quinn v. Leathem (1) may apply, the plaintiff must shew that the defendants endeavoured to prevent persons from employing him with intent to injure him. The powers of the executive committee depend upon the construction of rule 14. In that LABOURERS' rule the word " movement" means a movement among the GREAT men; not a movement of the executive committee, but one BRITAIN AND of which they may approve. It has not been suggested that it V. NATIONAL MATED UNION OF IRELAND. was the policy of the union to prevent its members from working with non-union men; there is nothing in the rules about that. There is no proof of a conspiracy on the part of the union. [ROMER L.J. In Quinn v. Leathem (2) Lord Macnaghten said that "a violation of legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action that it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognised by law if there be no sufficient justification for the interference." If two persons conspire to prevent a man from obtaining any employment and they succeed in doing so, would it be a legitimate justification or excuse that he owed them money and they desired to compel him to pay what he owed?] Consider It is submitted that that would be a good excuse. ing what the plaintiff had done, the action of the defendants was legitimate. The defendants do not dispute that a conspiracy to injure or with intent to injure, and carried on by coercion or molestation, is actionable; but there has been no finding here bringing the case within that proposition. The object of the defendants Williams and Toomey was simply to punish the plaintiff for not paying up what was due in respect of his defalcations: there was no conspiracy between those defendants at all, nor any illegal act whatever. The act of Williams or of Toomey cannot be differentiated from that of Allen, the trade-union delegate, in Allen v. Flood. (3) [STIRLING L.J. That was not a case of conspiracy.] Quite true. The act of neither of these men was an illegal act; calling men out is not an illegal act. (4) (1) [1901] A. C. 495. (2) [1901] A. C. 495, at p. 510. (3) [1898] A. C. 1. (4) [1898] A. C. at pp. 116-7. [STIRLING L.J. Do not the acts here amount to "intimidation, molestation, or the procuring of people to break their contracts," within Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.? (1)] C. A. 1903 GIBLAN V. NATIONAL MATED UNION OF IRELAND. In that case there was injury to the plaintiffs, the object being to destroy their competition, yet it was held that the injury was not actionable. Here the act itself is not an illegal LABOURERS' act; and, if not, it does not become illegal through a combination to do it by a number of persons (2): Allen v. Flood. (3) BRITAIN AND The plaintiff must therefore fail unless he can bring himself within Quinn v. Leathem. (4) Now in that case the defendants' combination was, not for any purpose of furthering their own interests as workmen, but for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff in his trade. (5) In Allen v. Flood (6) Lord Herschell points out that a representation or statement by which pressure is exercised is lawful; and then he says: "The law cannot regard the act differently because you choose to call it a threat or coercion instead of an intimation or warning." That dictum is right and covers the present case. It is true that in Quinn v. Leathem (7) Lord Lindley disagrees with that dictum; but even assuming Lord Lindley's view to be right, and that Quinn v. Leathem (4) did not come within Allen v. Flood (8), yet in the present case there was justification for the threat to strike, even if the threat were illegal; that is to say, the object of the threat was the lawful one of recovering what was due in respect of defalcations. Thus there was a legal object sought to be attained by means which were not illegal ; but even if the means were illegal they were justified by the legal object. Intention should not be regarded, for intention is immaterial if the acts themselves are not unlawful: Kearney v. Lloyd (9), a case which was cited and not disapproved in Quinn v. Leathem (10); Huttley v. Simmons (11), cited and approved in Quinn v. Leathem (12); Boots v. Grundy. (13) C. A. 1903 GIBLAN v. NATIONAL AMALGA¡MATED UNION OF [VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.J. referred to Grainger v. Hill (1), Heywood v. Collinge (2), Addison on Torts, 7th ed. p. 31, Williams on Bankruptcy, 7th ed. p. 46, and Cotterell v. Jones. (3)] Those authorities are dealing with an abuse of the process of LABOURERS' the Court, such as an action maliciously brought for purposes of extortion. An abuse of the process of the Court is a wrongBRITAIN AND ful act per se: Pollock's Law of Torts, 6th ed. p. 216; Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, p. 523. GREAT IRKLAND. Then a further question is this: Supposing the acts of the defendants Williams and Toomey are illegal, are they to be deemed illegal acts on the part of the union? In other words, Do those acts bind the union? The action is for conspiracy between the union, Williams, and Toomey to injure the plaintiff; but no such cause of action is made out by the pleadings. Neither Williams nor Toomey had any authority from the union, nor was it within the scope of their authority, to commit what was a criminal act; nor is it to be implied from the rules of the union, or from the course of business, that such an act was within the scope of their authority. It is now suggested for the first time that because a man stands in a representative capacity for certain individuals and himself commits a wrongful act, the doing by him of that act involves the conspiracy in it of those individuals. The learned judge apparently treated Williams as being in fact the union, or as one of a number of individuals constituting the union, so that his act was really an act done by him in concert with the union and therefore there was a conspiracy. [STIRLING L.J. If an unlawful act is committed by an agent in the course of his employment and for his principal's benefit, it is not necessary to prove direct authority by the principal.] This is an act which the union itself could not have committed within its rules. The jury in their findings did not find that there was an authority by the union to Williams to do (2) (1838) 9 Ad. & E. 268, 274. (3) (1851) 11 C. B. 713. (1) (1838) 4 Bing. N. C. 212. this act, nor did they find any ratification by the union of the act. [VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.J. referred to Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1) as to the right to sue a trade union for injury done by its members in -concert.] C. A. 1903 GIBLAN ". NATIONAL LABOURERS' IRELAND. Here there was no wrong committed by a body of persons acting in concert; and there is no evidence of any conspiracy BRITAIN AND on the part of the union. A master is not answerable for a wrong committed by a servant unless it arises from an act done under the master's actual or implied authority: Pollock on Torts, 6th ed. pp. 87, 89. [ROMER L.J. The whole question seems to me to be whether what was done by Williams, the general secretary, was done within the scope of the authority of the union.] To see what that authority is, it is necessary to look at the rules of the union, the all-important rule being rule 14. There was no movement " here for the purposes mentioned in sub-rule 1, nor any order by the executive committee under sub-rule 2. There is no evidence that the union knew of anything that was done at the Newport branch, or that they had given their authority for what was done there. The union can no more go outside its rules than a limited company can go outside its memorandum of association: Trade Union Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 31), s. 4; Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche. (2) As to acting within the scope of authority, in Lyons v. Martin (3) it was held that a master was not liable for damage arising from an act of his servant which was itself unlawful and not proved to have been authorized by the master. And in Poulton v. London and South Western Ry. Co. (4) a railway company was held not to be liable for an act done outside it powers by one of its stationmasters. Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. (5), there cited, is a different case from the present. In Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Ry. Co. (6) the wrongful (1) [1901] A. C. 426, 439. (2) (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 653. (3) (1838) 8 Ad. & E. 512; 47 R. R. 637. 2 T 2 (4) (1867) L. R. 2 Q. B. 534. (6) (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 415. 2 C. A. 1903 GIBLAN V. NATIONAL MATED LABOURERS' IRELAND. act done by the defendants' servant was held to have been done in the course of his employment as servant, so as to make the company responsible. Here the assumed illegal act of Williams was not an act authorized by the union, or one which the union could intra vires have ordered. Francis-Williams, K.C., in reply. The plaintiff relies upon the statement of the law by Lopes L.J. in Temperton v. BRITAIN AND Russell (1), the decision in which was approved in Quinn v. Leathem. (2) All the elements in Temperton v. Russell (1) are comprised in the findings of the jury in the present case as constituting a good cause of action. There can be no stronger evidence of conspiracy than the passing by the executive committee of the union of the resolution of April 29, 1901, ratifying all that had been done by Williams and Toomey. The present case is stronger than either Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. (3) or Dyer v. Munday (4), where the defendant was held liable for the act (a personal assault) of his servant. There was no express authority by the master in that case to do the act, and there is none here. Of course, no trade union would so frame its rules as to authorize its agents, in express terms, to commit an illegal act such as joining in a conspiracy. It is enough if the agent does the illegal act in the course of the union's business. Williams' object was to protect the funds of the union, and what he actually did was merely accessory to that. Cur. adv. vult. Aug. 11. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.J. After stating the objects of the action, the "particulars" of the plaintiff's complaints, and the findings of the jury at the trial, and reading the observations of Walton J. thereon, and the judgment pronounced by the learned judge, proceeded :—The plaintiff appeals against the judgment in favour of the union and Toomey: there is no appeal by Williams, but this does not debar the union or Toomey from saying that the judgment against Williams is wrong on the findings and admitted facts. Now, (1) [1893] 1 Q. B. 715, 731. (3) 1 H. & C. 526. |