The heir at law has been from the time of his birth an idiot, and as to be irreat R.'s death was 21 years of age. In the year 1820, long after movable from the marriage of R. and M. the estate was mortgaged for a term of which the land the parish in 1000 years by R., to secure the payment of 100. The mortgagee lies. received from the tenant the full half year's rent, which accrued after the death of R. at Michaelmas last, out of which he paid the sum of 37. to the pauper M., and took from her the following receipt; "The 7th December 1822, received of the heir at law "of my late husband, R., deceased, the sum of 3., by the payment "of H., (the tenant,) being my third share, as his widow, of the "half year's rent of the freehold part of his estate at T. common, "in N., due Michaelmas last." R. lived in M., and after his death the pauper, his widow, resided in that parish for some months, and then hired and lived in a cottage in N., which was not on the husband's estate. Before her residence of 40 days had been completed in that parish, she became chargeable, and was removed. ABBOTT C. J. The case of Rex v. Painswick (a) was (a) Ante,pl.627. stronger in favour of the settlement claimed than the present case for there the pauper had actually resided upon the property, out of which the claim to a settlement arose. I think it is our safest course to abide by that decision. If we consider the nature of the widow's right to dower before assignment, it will be seen that she had not any right either legal or equitable to the land. Her legal right was to have dower assigned, her equitable right to have an account of the rents and profits. But in Rex v. Berkswell (b), a right of that nature was held insufficient (b) Ante,pl.659. to confer a settlement. Upon the authority of those two cases, but particularly the former, that being a case of dower, I am of opinion that the widow of R. had not any right to reside in the parish of N., and that the order of Sessions must be quashed.. Order of Sessions quashed.

conveyance was

663. Rex v. Llantillio Grossenny, E. T. 7 G. 4. 5 B. & C. 461.- A made a parol Upon an appeal against an order, whereby W. E., his wife, and agreement with children, were removed from St. P. to L., the Court of Quarter B, for the purSessions confirmed the order, subject, &c. W. E. was born in chase of a cotthe parish of L., and he also gained a settlement in the parish by den for 40%. A tage and garhiring and service. The parish of L. relied on shewing a subse- took possession, quent settlement in a third parish, namely, S. In 1816 the pauper and paid 30%. made a parol agreement with one C., for the purchase of a cottage on account, and and garden, in the parish of S., for the sum of 401. Under this resided on the premises. No contract he took possession, and paid C. 30l. on account; no conveyance was ever executed. After the pauper had been in pos- executed. session 12 months, living and sleeping in it with his wife and After A had children, he sold the property for 40l. to W., to whom he gave up been in posses. possession, and afterwards paid the remaining 10l. to C. The sion 12 months, he sold the propauper never was in possession of the premises after he had paid perty for 401. to the whole of the purchase money. W. is now in possession of the C, to whom he cottage and garden. The question for the opinion of this Court was, Whether the pauper gained a settlement in S.?-BAYLEY J. It is very desirable to adhere to the language of the act of parliament, and to the construction put upon that language in decided cases. The statute 9 G. 1. c. 7. s. 5. enacts, "That no person shall "be deemed to acquire or gain any settlement in any parish for or "by virtue of any purchase of any estate, or interest in such "parish, whereof the consideration of such purchase doth not

gave up possession.

A

afterwards paid

the remainder of the purchase-money to B: Held, that A did not gain any settlement

interest within

the stat. 9 G. 1. c.7. § 5.

(b) Ante,pl.661.

by the purchase" amount to the sum of 30l. bond fide paid." There must, thereof any estate or fore, be a purchase of an estate or interest, and by the latter word must be understood some specific definite interest, and the party contracting must become the purchaser. Rex v. Long Bennington (a) and Rex v. Geddington (b) establish, that, although an equitable estate is sufficient to give a settlement, still the purchase must be completed and that if it be not an estate, but an equitable right only, no settlement is gained. The principle deducible from those cases is, that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust must be created in order to give a settlement by the purchase. In Rex v. Geddington the agreement was to purchase an estate for 310., of which 160l. was to be paid on the 30th November, and 150l. on the 24th June then next. The latter sum was never paid; the pauper resided a year and a half, and afterwards the contract was rescinded. There, by paying 150l., a perfect equitable estate would have been acquired; but it was never paid, and, therefore, the pauper was held never to have had a perfect equitable estate. Here the pauper had paid 307., and by paying 101. more, he would have performed all he was bound to do, and would have acquired a perfect equitable estate. During the whole time the pauper was in possession, in this case, he might have been removed. He never was the purchaser of an estate or definite interest. It has been ingeniously argued that the payment of the 10l. would have given the purchaser a right to demand a conveyance, and that as it might have been made at any time, the payment, when made, related back to the time when the occupation began; and, therefore, that the estate by relation was the estate of the purchaser from the time when his occupation commenced. I think, however, that for the purpose of gaining a settlement, such a payment did not give him the estate ab initio, but only from the time when the payment was actually made. The expression of my brother Holroyd, in Rex v. Geddington, as to the vendee having acquired a settlement by having paid or offered to pay the remainder of the purchase money, must be understood in that sense. — HOLROYD J. I think there is no distinction between the cases of Rex v. Bennington and Rex v. Geddington and the present case. The pauper in this case never was in possession of the estate after he had paid the 10. He, therefore, never came to settle upon his own estate. A tender of the purchase money, perhaps, might have been equivalent to payment, on the principle that an offer to perform is equivalent to actual performance; but then, in that case, in order to give a settlement, the purchaser at the time of the tender must have had a right to continue to hold the premises. Here, at the time when the payment of the residue was made, the purchaser had no right to hold the possession of the premises. LITTLEDALE J. concurred. - Order of Sessions confirmed.

The purchase of a copyhold estate, which, with the fine and fees there. on, amount to

III. Of the Value of the Estate.

664. St. Paul's Waldon v. Kempton, E. T. 13 G. 1. Foley, 238. - A. purchased a copyhold tenement in St. P.'s, which, with the fine and fees paid to the Court, amounted to 301; and the officers of the parish of K. gave him 2. towards paying his fine and fees: it was insisted that this was fraudulent, and not a good (a) A MS. case referred to by Mr. J. Bailey, 2 B. & C. 132.

301. is sufficient

purchase within the statute of 9 G. 1. sufficient to gain a settlement. THE WHOLE COURT said, that they could not take notice for the purposes of its being fraudulent, unless the justices had adjudged it so.

of settlement, unless it be found to be a fraudulent purchase.

tage worth 57. a

year rent, upon

665. Rex v. St. Mary, Whitechapel, T. T. 8 & 9 G. 2. Burr. A lease of 50 S. C. 55. The pauper having a leasehold of 51. per annum value years, of a cotin A., for the term of 50 years, for which he paid only 6d. per year, at 6d. a annum reserved rent, he went and lived there upon it, and was a housekeeper 25 years, and then sold the remainder of his term, and all his interest therein, for 32.- THE COURT held this to be a very plain case, and that the settlement of the pauper was at M., for that the selling the leasehold made no difference.

which the purchaser resides for 25 years, and then sells the remainder

a

paid for him by friend, to gaged the premises, as a security, and who, after the expiration of

whom he mort

of the term for 321. is an estate of sufficient value to gain a settlement. 666. Rex v. Tedford, T. T. 8 & 9 G. 2. Burr. S. C. 57. — G. If a man purwas settled at T., and contracted with A. for a house and curtilage chase a house in W. for 391. which was conveyed to G. and his heirs accordingly, for 394, but and curtilage in consideration of 391. G. paid 97. and B. paid the remaining pay only 91. 30l. to A., by G.'s order. The conveyance was dated 2d May himself, the 1730, but was not executed till the 19th of May 1730. Upon the remainder being 18th of June 1730 G. mortgaged the premises to B. by demise for 1000 years, under a proviso to be void on payment of the money in a year. G. continued in possession about four years after the mortgage; and then B. entered, by virtue of the said mortgage and a release of the equity of redemption. G. being thus out of possession, was removed to T.- LORD HARDWICKE: This is a new case. The question is, Whether it is within 9 G. 1. c. 7.? and it does not appear to me to be within this act. says, that "none shall gain a settlement by virtue of any purchase, his mortgage, "whereof the consideration doth not amount to the sum of 30l. and turned out "bona fide paid, for any longer term than he shall inhabit in such the purchaser; "estate:" so that it is confined to purchases under 30l. bona fide yet this is a paid; consequently, if the vendor had such consideration of 30. 30., and will bona fide paid to him, it is not within this act. Now in the pre- gain a settlesent case the consideration was 391., and was bona fide paid to the ment. vendor; and it would be pretty hard to say that the justices had a power upon this act to inquire whether the purchaser borrowed the money or not. It is a common case to borrow money to make purchases; nothing is more frequent than borrowing a sum to make up the price. The other Judges concurred.

four years, The act entered under

667. Rex v. Stockland, H. T. 15 G. 2. Burr. S. C. 169. Spiller, the pauper, was settled in S. Salter, of C., being possessed of a house, orchard, and garden, containing an acre, in C., for the residue of a term of years determinable on three lives, which cost 40l., by indenture mortgaged the house and premises to Spiller, during the residue of the term; subject to redemption on payment of 15l. with lawful interest on a day therein mentioned, and passed in the lifetime of Salter. Salter afterwards died intestate; at the time of whose death one of such lives was dead; and there was then due on such mortgage the principal sum of 15., and 17. 10s. for two years' interest thereof. The mortgage monies being then not paid, and Salter being also indebted to Spiller, by bond and simple contract, in the sum of 187. 10s., making in all 35l., Spiller agreed with the widow of Salter, that in case she would renounce the administration, she should have

purchase of

The mortgagee

of a term for

estate, gains a
settlement by a

residence
therein of 40
days.
Str. 1162.

The sum given

for an estate is

the true criterion of its value, and 30%., no settle

if that be under

ment can be gained in re spect of subsequent improve

ments.

S. C. Black.
Rep. 596. 598.

:

the household goods; which was done accordingly and on her renunciation, Spiller took letters of administration, as principal creditor, to Salter, and thereupon entered upon such house, orchard, and premises, (which were then appraised at 257.,) and possessed himself thereof, and also of a cyder-wring, appraised at 21. The rest of the effects, which were appraised at il., he permitted the widow to keep and retain to her own house, pursuant to such agreement. Spiller then removed into the parish of C., and settled in the house and premises, and was offered 301. for the same, and continued to dwell therein eight years, when the estate determined; nevertheless, he continued in the house till he was removed. THE COURT were unanimous that he was legally settled in C. The consideration he has bona fide paid exceeds the sum of 30%., and he remained upon the estate, irremovable, 40 days. It is clearly within the words of the act.

668. Rex v. Dunchurch, H. T. 6 G.3. Burr. S. C. 553. — T: was duly certificated from D. to S., where he resided with his wife and family to the time of his death. Upon the trial of this appeal, it appeared by parol evidence of the pauper and her son only, that about 25 years since, the pauper and her husband, the said T., were joint purchasers of a house, yard, and garden-place, at S., and paid for the purchase thereof 197. and upwards; and T. laid out about 157. more to put it in repair, and built a new shop on part of the premises, and was taxed after the rate of a tenement of 301. value for the first two years after he bought it, and resided in the purchased premises till the time of his death. After T.'s death, his widow, the pauper, continued in possession of the house and premises for about 10 months, and then went to service for about five years; and during that time she let the premises to her son E. for 1. a year, but declared she could have let it for 17. 10s. a year, or more, to other persons. The pauper, when she left her service, which was about three years ago, returned to her house at S., and soon after sold the garden-place for 20l. 3s. 6d.; and about the same time, by deed of gift, gave to her son W. part of the yard, being 10 yards in length, and six in breadth, for him to build a house upon. It also appeared by indenture of feoffment, dated the 8th of November 1763, (which indenture was produced and approved,) that the pauper, in consideration of natural love and affection, and of 10., granted the residue of the said premises to her son E. and his heirs, to the uses following; viz. as to the parlour, chamber over it, and the pantry, part of the premises, to the use of the pauper for her life, sans waste; remainder to E. in fee; and as to the residue of the premises, to the use of the said E. in fee; and E. covenanted to keep the whole of the premises in repair. It also appeared by parol evidence that the pauper continued to dwell in that part of the house which was so limited to her for her life, till she applied to the parish-officers for relief; and being told by a justice that she could not be removed from that parish to D., whilst she continued to live on her own freehold, she thereupon went out of her own house, for a little time before she was removed, and went to her daughter's house, which is in the same parish, and let her house to her son for 6d., and was relieved at her daughter's house, by the parish-officers, about a week, and then removed from thence, by order of two justices, to D., as the place of her last legal settlement, notwithstanding she

then was, as aforesaid, entitled for her life to the premises she went out of, in order to her being relieved and removed by order to the parish of D.- LORD MANSFIELD: The whole question is, Whether this woman was a bona fide purchaser of an estate of 30%. value? She cannot be presumed to come to it by descent or executorship, or any such like act of law, because the contrary appears; and a presumption only stands till the contrary be proved. The case of Rex v. Benjoe (a) was adjourned, and no determination appears on the record in the office, and therefore that case is no authority. I cannot think the act of 9 G. 1. can be construed in the manner that it has been now attempted; it draws the line according to the purchase-money: the letting in any thing that is subsequent would overturn the whole act; the act takes the value of the purchase from the purchase-money actually paid. In the Tedford case, of the mortgage-money, it was, in fact, a purchase of an estate of the value of 391., though the purchaser might borrow part of the money, upon mortgage, to pay for it. WILMOT J. Here the husband and wife appear to have been joint-purchasers 25 years ago; they took jointly, and by entirety, not by moieties: if so, she can only stand in the same situation as her husband did, which is that of a purchaser. No money afterwards laid out can make the prior purchase to have been of a greater value than it really was at the time of making it. Before 9 G. 1. people purchased small interests, and they purchased collusively. To obviate these two inconveniences, the act makes the criterion to be 30l. bona fide given, be the real value more or less; surely, subsequent improvements cannot be considered with a retrospect. As to removing a person from their own, she became an object of removal as soon as she had let it to her son; therefore this case is not like that of Sowton and Sydbury (b), where the man all (6) Post,pl.675. along resided at the public-house. I am of opinion that she gained no settlement under this freehold. YATES J. We must take the whole case together; and from that it appears, that this was a joint purchase by husband and wife, and therefore we must consider her as a purchaser. The act of 9 G. 1. is as plain and clear as possible, that it must be a purchase of 30l. value at the time of the purchase; and as the statute has made this criterion, we have no authority, nor is there any reason for us to depart from it. — ASTON J. declared his concurrence. Whereupon THE COURT unanimously declared the order of the two justices removing the pauper from S. to D., and the order of Sessions, confirming the same, to be affirmed.

669. Rex v. Mattingly (c), T. T. 27 G. 3. 2 T. R. 12. - On the 18th of June 1769, the pauper, W. W., the husband of Elizabeth, and the father of Daniel, mentioned in the order of removal, came into the parish of M., with a certificate of that date acknowledging

Where A. contracted for the purchase of a copyhold estate for 391., mort