lation to action or change), as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind foever, when attentively confidered, does not? For our ideas of extenfion, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a fecret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have fomething relative in them much more visibly; and fenfible quali ties, as colours and fmells, &c. what are they but the powers of different bodies in relation to our perception? &c.; and if confidered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? all which include fome kind of relation in them. Our idea, therefore, of power, I think, may well have a place amongst other fimple ideas, and be confidered as one of them, being one of thofe that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of fubftances, as we fhall hereafter have occafion to, obferve.

4. The clearest Idea of active Power had from Spirit. WE are abundantly furnished with the idea of paffive power by almost all forts of fenfible things. In molt of them we cannot avoid obferving their fenfible qualities, may, their very fubftances to be in a continual flux; and therefore with reafon we look on them as liable ftill to the fame change. Nor have we of active power (which is the more proper fignification of the word power) fewer intances, fince whatever change is obferved, the mind mift collect a power fomewhere able to make that change, as well as a poffibility in the thing itfelf to receive it: But yet, if we will confider it attentively, bodies, by our fenfes, do not afford us fo clear and diftinct an idea of active power as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds; for all power relating to action, and there being but two forts of action whereof we have any idea, viz. thinking and motion, let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the povers which produce these actions. 1. Of thinking, body afforde us no idea at all; it is only from reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of any ačtivě potver to move; and when it is fet VOL. I.

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in motion itself, that motion is rather a paflion than an action in it: For when the ball obeys the ftroke of a billiard-ftick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare paffion alfo when by impulfe it fets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and lofes in itself fo much as the other received; which gives us but a very obfcure idea of an active power of moving in body, whilst we obferve it only to transfer, but not produce any motion; for it is but a very obfcure idea of power which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the paffion; for fo is motion in a body impelled by another, the continuation of the alteration made in it from reft to motion being little more an action than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the fame blow is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what paffes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at reft. So that it seems to me we have from the obfervation of the operation of bodies by our fenfes but a very imperfect obfcure idea of active porver, since they afford us not any idea in themselves of the power to begin any action, either motion or thought. But if, from the impulfe bodies are obferved to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it ferves as well to my purpose, fenfation being one of thofe ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas; only I thought it worth while to confider here by the way, whether the mind doth not, receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations than it doth from any external fenfation.

5. Will and Understanding two Powers.

THis at least I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end feveral actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing fuch or fuch a particular action. This power which the mind

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219. has thus to order the confideration of any idea, or the forbearing to confider it, or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its reft, and vice verfa in any par ticular inftance, is that which we call the will the actual exercife of that power, by directing any particu lar action, or its forbearance, is that which we call vo lition, or willing; the forbearance of that action, conse? quent to fuch order or command of the mind, is called voluntary; and whatfoever action is performed without fuch a thought of the mind, is called involuntary; the power of perception is that which we call the under Standing Perception, which we make the act of the understanding, is of three forts: 1. The perception of ideas in our mind. 2. The perception of the fignifica tion of figns. 3. The perception of the connection or repugnancy, agreement or disagreement, that there is between any of our ideas. All these are attributed to the underfanding, or perceptive power, though it be the two latter only that ufe allows us to fay we underftand.

§ 6. Faculties.

THESE Powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving and of preferring, are ufually called by another name; and the ordinary way of fpeaking is, that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all words should be, fo as not to breed any confufion in mens thoughts, by being fuppofed (as I fufpect it has been) to ftand for fome real beings in the foul, that performed thofe actions of underftanding and volition. For when we fay the quill is the commanding and fuperior faculty of the foul, that it is or is not free, that it determines the inferior faculties, that it follows the dictates of the understanding, &c. though these, and the like expreffions, by thote that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things than the found of words, may be understood in a clear and diinet fenfe yet I fufpect, I fay, that this way of ipcaking of faculties, has milled many into a confufed notion of fo many, diftinct agents in us, which had

their feveral provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform feveral actions, as fo many diftinct beings, which has been no fmall occafion of wrangling, obfcurity, and uncertainty, in queftions relating to them.

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$7. Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Neceffity EVERY one, I think, finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to feveral actions in himself. From the confideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arife the ideas of liberty and neceffity.

§ 8. Liberty, what.

ALL the actions that we have an idea of, reducing themselves, as has been faid, to these two, viz. thinking and motion, so far as a man has a power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, fo far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power, wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary; fo that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty, that agent is under neceffity; fo that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little confideration of an obvious inftance or two may make this clear. 16 9. Suppofes the Underfanding and Will. 12 A TENNIS-BALL, whether in motion by the ftrcke of a racket, or lying fill at reft, is not by any one taken to be a free agent If we inquire into the reafon, we fall

find it is becaufe we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and confequently not to have any volition or preference.

of motion to reft, or vice versa, and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both motion and reft come under our idea of neceffary, and are fo called. Likewise a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent; for though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling, yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the ftop or ceffation of that motion follows not upon his volition, and therefore therein he is not free. So a man ftriking himfeif or his friend by a convulfive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power, by volition or the direction of his mind, to stop or forbear, nobody thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting by neceflity and constraint.

$10. Belongs not to Volition.

AGAIN, fuppofe a man be carried, whilft faft asleep, into a room, where is a perfon he longs to fee and speak with, and be there locked faft in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himfelf in fo defirable company, which he stays willingly in, i. e. prefers his stay to going away; I afk, Is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it; and yet, being locked faft in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to ftay, he has not freedom to be gone; fo that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring, but to the perfon having the power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the mind fhall choofe or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no farther; for wherever refraint comes to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on either fide to act or to forbear acting, there liberty and our notion of it presently ceases.

§11. Koluntary opposed to Involuntary, not to Necef

Jary,

We have inftances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man's heart beats, and. the blood circulates, which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop; and therefore, in respect of these motions, where rett depends not on his choice,