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or no. These are fpeculations which, however curious and entertaining, I fhall decline, as lying out of my way in the defign I am now upon. It fhall fuffice to my prefent purpose, to confider the difcerning faculties. of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with: And I fhall imagine I have not wholly mifemployed myself in the thoughts I fhall have on this occafion, if, in this hiftorical plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our underftandings come to attain thofe notions of things we have, and can fet down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of thofe perfuafions which are to be found amongst men, fo various, different, and wholly contradictory, and yet afferted fomewhere or other with fuch affurance and confidence, that he that fhall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their oppofition, and at the fame time confider the fondnefs and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the refolution and eagernefs wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reafon to fufpect, that either there is no fuch thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no fufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

$3. Method.

Ir is therefore worth while to fearch out the bounds between opinion and knowledge, and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our affent, and moderate. our perfuafions. In order whereunto, I fhall pursue this following method:

Firft, I fhall inquire into the original of thofe ideas, notions, or whatever elfe you please to call them, which a man obferves, and is confcious to himfelf he has in his mind, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I fhall endeavour to fhow what knowledge the understanding hath by thofe ideas, and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly, I fhall make fome inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion; whereby I mean that affent which we give to any propofition as true, of whose

truth yet we have no certain knowledge: And here we fhall have occafion to examine the reafons and degrees of affent.

$4. Ufeful to know the Extent of our Comprehenfion. IF by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I fuppofe it may be of use to prevail with the bufy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehenfion, to ftop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether, and to fit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of affectation of an univerfal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with difputes about things to which our understandings are not fuited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or diftinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cafes it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.

5. Our Capacity fuited to our State and Concerns. FOR though the comprehenfion of our understandings comes exceeding fhort of the vaft extent of things, yet we shall have caufe enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being for that portion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, fo far above all the reft of the inhabitants of this our manfion. Men have reason to be well fatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, fince he has given them (as St. Peter fays) πάντα πρὸς ζωής και ευσέβειαν, whatfoever is neceffary for the conveniencies of life and information of virtue, and has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable provifion for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How fhort foever their knowledge may come of an univerfal or perfect comprehenfion of whatsoever

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is, it yet fecures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the fight of their own duties. Men may find matter fufficient to bufy their heads, and employ their hands, with variety, delight, and fatisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conftitution, and throw away the bleffings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp every thing. We fhall not have much reafon to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of ufe to us, for of that they are very capable; and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are fome things that are fet out of the reach of it. It will be no excufe to an idle and untoward fervant, who would not attend his business by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad funfline. The candle that is fet up in us fhines bright enough for all our purposes. The difcoveries we can make with this ought to fatisfy us; and we fhall then ufe our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are fuited to our faculties, and upon thofe grounds they are capable of being propofed to us, and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonftration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is fufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will difbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things, we fhall do much-what as wifely as he who would not ufe his legs, but fit ftill and perish, because he had no wings to fly.

§ 6. Knowledge of our Capacity, a Cure of Scepticifm and Idleness.

WHEN we know our own firength, we fall the better know what to undertake with hopes of fuccefs: And when we have well furveyed the powers of our own minds, and made fome eftimate what we may expect from them, we fhall not be inclined either to fit ftill, and not fet our thoughts on work at all, in defpair of

knowing any thing; or, on the other fide, queftion every thing, and difclaim all knowledge, becaufe fome things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the failor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean: It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at fuch places as are neceflary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon fhoals that may ruin him. Our bufinefs here is not to know all things, but thofe which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature, put in that ftate which man is in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that fome other things escape our knowledge.

§7. Occafion of this Effay.

THIS was that which gave the first rife to this Effay concerning the Understanding; for I thought that the first step towards fatisfying feveral inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a furvey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and fee to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I fufpected we began at the wrong end, and in vain fought for fatisfaction in a quiet and fure poffeffion of truths that most concerned us, whilft we let loose our thoughts into the vaft ocean of being, as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted poffeffion of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decifions, or that efcaped its comprehenfion. Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander. into thofe depths where they can find no fure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions, and multiply difputes, which, never coming to any clear refolution, are proper only to continue and increafe their doubts, and to confirm them at laft in perfect fcepticism; whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well confidered, the extent of our knowledge once difcovered, and the horizon found which fets the bounds be tween the enlightened and dark parts of things, be

tween what is and what is not comprehenfible by us, men would perhaps, with lefs fcruple, acquiefce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and difcourfe with more advantage and fatisfaction in the other.

68. What Idea Atands for.

THUS much I thought neceffary to fay concerning the occafion of this inquiry into human understanding; but before I proceed on to what I have thought on this fubject, I must here, in the entrance, beg pardon of my reader for the frequent ufe of the word idea, which he will find in the following treatife. It being that term which I think ferves beft to ftand for whatfoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to exprefs whatever is meant by phantafm, notion, fpecies, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.

I prefume it will be easily granted me that there are fuch ideas in mens minds; every one is confcious of them in himself, and mens words and actions will fatisfy him that they are in others.

Our first inquiry, then, fhall be, how they come into the mind.

CHAP. II.

NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND.

§1. The way shown hot we come by any Knowledge, fufficient to prove it not Innate.

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T is an established opinion amongst fome men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles, fome primary notions, Kenai noa, characters, as it were, ftamped upon the mind of man, which the foul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be fufficient to convince unprejudifed readers of the falfenefs of this fuppofition, if I should only show (as I hope I fhall in the following rts of this difcourfe) how men, barely by the ufe of

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