$27. When the Variation is to be explained. BUT after all, the provifion of words is fo fcanty in refpect of that infinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to fuit their precife notions, will, notwithftanding their utmost caution, be forced often to use the fame word in fomewhat different fenfes. And though, in the continuation of a difcourfe, or the purfuit of an argument, there be hardly room to digrefs into a particular definition, as often as a man varies the fignification of any term, yet the import of the difcourfe will, for the most part, if there be no defigned fallacy, fufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it: but where that is not fufficient to guide the reader, there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what fenfe he there ufes that

term.

END OF VOLUME SECOND.

Printed by MUNDELL & SON.
Royal Bank Clofe, Edinburgh. S

PRINTED BY AND FOR MUNDELL & SON, ROYAL BANK CLOSE.

CONTENTS.

BOOK IV.-CHA P. I.

SECT.

OF KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION.

Of Knowledge in general.

1. Our Knowledge converfant about our Ideas. 2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Dif agreement of two Ideas.

3. This Agreement fourfold.

4. First, Of Identity or Diverfity.
5. Secondly, Relation.

6.. Thirdly, Of Co-existence.
7. Fourthly, Of real Existence.
8. Knowledge actual or habitual.
9. Habitual Knowledge twofold.

6. Not fo clear.

7. Each Step must have intuitive Evidence.

8. Hence the Miftake ex precognitis et præconceffis.

9. Demonftration not limited to Quanity,

10-13. Why it has been fo thought.

4. Senfitive Knowledge of particular Existence. 15. Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas are fo.

SECT.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledge.

1. First, No farther than we have Ideas.

2. Secondly, No farther than we can perceive the Agreement or Difagreement.

3. Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends itself not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.

4. Fourthly, Nor demonftrative Knowledge.

5. Fifthly, Senfitive Knowledge narrower than either. 6. Sixthly, our Knowledge therefore narrower than our Ideas.

7. How far our Knowledge reaches."

8. First, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diverfity, as far as our Ideas.

little way.

9. Secondly, Of Co-existence a very 10. Because the Connection between moft fimple Ideas is

unknown.

11. Especially of fecondary Qualities.

12-14. And farther, becaufe all Connection between any fecondary and primary Qualities is undifcoverable. 15. Of Repugnancy to co-exift larger.

16. Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little Way. 17. Of Spirits yet narrower.

18. Thirdly, of other Relations, it is not eafy to fay how far. Morality capable of Demonftration.

19. Two Things have made moral Ideas thought incapable of Demonftration. Their Complexedhefs and Want of fenfible Reprefentations.

20. Remedies of thofe difficulties.

21. Fourthly, Of real Existence, we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own, demonftrative of God's, fenfible of fome few other Things.

22. Our Ignorance great.

23. First, One Caufe of it Want of Ideas, either fuch as

we have no Conception of, or fuch as particularly we have not.

24. Becaufe of their Remoteness, or,