in and belongs to its being from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to and received from the fame fource. This eternal fource, then, of all being, muft alfo be the fource and original of all power; and fo this eternal Being must be alfo the most powerful.

$5. And most knowing.

AGAIN, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step farther; and we are certain now that there is not only fome being, but fome knowing intelligent being in the world.

There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been alfo a knowing being from eternity. If it be faid there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all understanding, I reply, that then it was impoffible there fhould ever have been any knowledge; it being as impoffible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, fhould produce a knowing being, as it is impoffible that a triangle fhould make itself three angles bigger than two right ones; for it is as repugnant to the idea of fenfelefs matter, that it should put into itself fenfe, perception and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones.

6. And therefore GOD.

THUS, from the confideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own conftitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, moft powerful, and most knowing being, which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this idea duly confidered, will eafily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought to afcribe to this eternal Being. If, nevertheless, any one should be found fo fenfelefsly arrogant, as to fuppofe man alone knowing and wife, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the uni

verfe acted only by that blind hap-hazard; I shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully, 1. 2. de leg. to be confidered at his leifure. "What can be more fillily arrogant and misbecoming "than for a man to think that he has a mind and un"derstanding in him, but yet in all the univerfe be"fides there is no fuch thing? Or that those things, "which with the utmost stretch of his reafon he can "fcarce comprehend, fhould be moved and managed "without any reafon at all?" Quid eft enim verius, quam neminem effe oportere tam ftulte arrogantem, ut in Je mentem et rationem putet ineffe, in cœlo mundoque non putet? Aut ea quæ vix fumma ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet?

From what has been faid, it is plain to me, we have a more certain knowledge of the exiftence of a God, than of any thing our fenfes have not immediately difcovered to us. Nay, I prefume I may fay, that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing elfe without us. When I say we know, I mean there is fuch a knowledge within our reach, which we cannot mifs, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to feveral other inquiries.

§ 7. Our Idea of a most perfect Being not the fole Proof of a God.

How far the idea of a most perfect being, which a man may frame in his mind, does or does not prove the exiflence of a God, I will not here examine; for, in the different make of mens tempers, and application of their thoughts, fome arguments prevail more on one, and fome on another, for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth, and filencing atheists, to lay the whole ftrefs of fo important a point as this, upon that fole foundation, and take fome mens having that idea of God in their minds (for it is evident fome men have none, and fome worse than none, and the most very different) for the only proof of a Deity; and out of an over-fondness of that darling invention, cafhier, or at leaft endeavour to invalidate all other

arguments, and forbid us to hearken to thofe proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence, and the fenfible parts of the univerfe, offer fo clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impoffible for a confidering man to withstand them. For I judge it is as certain and clear a truth as can any where be delivered, that the invifible things of God are clearly feen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. Though our own being furnishes us, as I have fhown, with an evident and inconteftible proof of a Deity, (and I believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it as to any other demonftration of fo many parts) yet this being fo fundamental a truth, and of that confequence, that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I fhall be forgiven by my reader if I go over fome parts of this argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them.

8. Something from Eternity. THERE is no truth more evident than that fomething must be from eternity. I never yet heard of any one fo unreasonable, or that could fuppofe fo manifeft a contradiction, as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing; this being of all abfurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and abfence of all beings, fhould ever produce any real exiftence.

It being then unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude that fomething has exifted from eternity, let us next fee what kind of thing that must be.

§ 9. Two forts of Beings, cogitative and incogita

tive.

THERE are but two forts of beings in the world, that man knows or conceives.

First, Such as are purely material, without fenfe, perception or thought, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails.

Secondly, Senfible, thinking, perceiving beings, fuch as we find ourfelres to be, which, if you pleafe, we

will hereafter call cogitative and incogitative beings; which to our prefent purpofe, if for nothing elfe, are perhaps better terms than material and immaterial.

10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogita

tive.

IF, then, there must be fomething eternal, let us fee what fort of being it muft be. And to that, it is very obvious to reafon, that it muft neceffarily be a cogitative being; for it is as impoffible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative matter fhould produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing fhould of itfelf produce matter. Let us fuppofe any parcel of matter eternal, great or fmall, we fhall find it, in itself, able to produce nothing: For example, let us fuppofe the matter of the next pebble we meet with eternal, clofely united, and the parts firmly at reft together, if there were no other being in the world, muft it not eternally remain fo, a dead inactive lump? Is it poffible to conceive it can add mction to itself, being purely matter, or produce any thing? Matter, then, by its own ftrength, cannot produce in itfelf fo much as motion: the motion it has muft alfo be from eternity, or elfe be produced, and added to matter by fome other being more powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itfelf. But let us fuppofe motion eternal too; yet matter, incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought: Knowledge will ftill be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing, or non-entity, to produce; and I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was no fuch thing as thought or an intelligent being existing. Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a fort of fpiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it), vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please, a globe, cube, cone, prifm, cylinder, &c.

whofe diameters are but 1,000,000th part of a gry", will operate no otherwife upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than thofe of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce fenfe, thought and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, grofs particles of matter, as by thofe that are the very minuteft that do any where exift; they knock, impel, and refift one another, juft as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that if we will fuppofe nothing first, or eternal, matter can never begin to be; if we fuppose bare matter, without motion, eternal, motion can never begin to be; if we fuppofe only matter and motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be; for it is impoffible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could have originally in and from itself fenfe, perception and knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then fenfe, perception and knowledge, must be a property eternally infeparable from matter and every particle of it; not to add, that though our general or specific conception of matter makes us fpeak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any fuch thing existing as one material being, or one fingle body that we know or can conceive. And therefore if matter were the eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and diflinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and beauty, which is to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever is the firft eternal being muft neceffarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things, must neceffarily contain in it, and actu

A gry is 1-10th of a line, a line 1-10th of an inch, an inch 1-10th of a philofophical foot, a philofophical foot 1-3d of a pendulum, whofe diadroms, in the latitude of 45 degrees, are each equal to one fecond of time, or 1-60th of a minute. I have affectedly made ufe of this meature here, and the parts of it, under a decimal divifion, with names to them, because I think it would be of general convenience that this fhould be the common meafure in the commonwealth of letters.