Book IV. diverfity of opinions, fince we cannot reasonably expec that any one fhould readily and obfequioufly quit his own opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind refign. tion to an authority, which the understanding of ma acknowledges not; for however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reafon, nor blindly fubmit to the will and dictates of another. If he, you would bring over to your sentiments, be one that en mines before he aflents, you must give him leave at hi deifure to go over the account again, and recalling who I is out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to fee en which fide the advantage lies; and if he will not think our arguments of weight enough to engage him a-new in fo much pains, it is but what we do often ourselts in the like cafe, and we fhould take it amifs if other fhould prefcribe to us what points we should ftudy; and if he be one who takes his opinions upon truft, hor can we imagine that he should renounce thofe tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind, the he thinks them felf-evident, and of an unquestionable certainty, or which he takes to be impreflions he has received from GOD himself, or from men fent by him: How can we expect, I fay, that opinions thus fetka fhould be given up to the arguments or authority of a ftranger, or adverfary, efpecially if there be any fufp cion of intereft or defign, as there never fails to be where men find themfelves ill treated? We should do well to commiferate our mutual ignorance, and ende> vour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of infor mation, and not instantly treat others ill, as obftinat and perverse, becaufe they will not renounce their ow and receive our opinions, or at least those we would force upon them, when it is more than probable, that we are no lefs obftinate in not embracing fome of theirs For where is the man that has inconteftible evidence et the truth of all that he holds, or of the falsehood of a he condemns, or can fay, that he has examined to the bottom all his own or other mens opinions? The ne ceflity of believing without knowledge, nay, often upon very flight grounds, in this fleeting state of action an 157 blindness we are in, fhould make us more bufy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others; at least, those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, muft confefs they are unfit to prefcribe to others, and are unreafonable in impofing that - as truth on other mens belief, which they themselves have not fearched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which they: fhould receive or reject it. Thofe who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got pait doubt in all the doctrines they profefs, and govern themfelves by, would have a jufter pretence to require others to follow them; but these are so few in number, and find fo little reafon to be magisterial in - their opinions, that nothing infolent and imperious is to be expected from them; and there is reafon to think, that if men were better inftructed themselves, they would be lefs impofing on others. § 5. Probability is either of Matter of Fact, or Specu- BUT to return to the grounds of affent, and the feveral degrees of it, we are to take notice, that the propofitions we receive upon inducements of probability, are of two forts; either concerning fome particular existence, or, as it is ufually termed, matter of fact, which failing under obfervation, is capable of human teftimony; or elfe concerning things, which being beyond the difcovery of our fenfes, are not capable of any fuch testi mony. 6. The concurrent Experience of all other Men with ours, produces Affurance approaching to Knowledge.. CONCERNING the first of thefe, viz. particular matter of fact, First, Where any particular thing, confonant to the conftant obfervation of ourfelves and others in the like cafe, comes attefted by the concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as eafily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reafon and act thereupon with as little doubt, as if it were perfect demonstration. Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occafion to mention it, fhould affirm that it froze in Book IV! England the last winter, or that there were fwaller feen there in the fummer, I think a man could almost a little doubt of it, as that feven and four are eleven. The first therefore, and highest degree of probability, is, whe the general confent of all men, in all ages, as far as r can be known, concurs with a man's conftant and neva. } failing experience in like cafes, to confirm the truth t any particular natter of fact attefted by fair witneset fuch are all the ftated conftitutions and properties of bot dies, and the regular proceedings of caufes and effects in the ordinary courfe of nature. This we call an arge ment from the nature of things themselves; for whe our own and other mens conftant obfervation has found always to be after the fame manner, that we with reakt conclude to be the effects of steady and regular caules, though they come not within the reach of our know. ledge: Thus, that fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changed the colour or confiftency in wood or char coal; that iron funk in water, and fwam in quickfilver; thefe, and the like propofitions about particular facts, being agreeable to our conftant experience, as often a we have to do with thefe matters, and being generally fpoke of (when mentioned by others) as things found conftantly to be fo, and therefore not fo much as controverted by any body, we are put past doubt, that a relation affirming any fuch thing to have been, or any predication that it will happen again in the fame maniner, is very true. Thefe probabilities rife fo near to In tainty, that they govern our thoughts as abfolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief thus grounded rifes to affurance. $7. Unquestionable Teftimony and Experience for the moft part produce Confidence. SECONDLY, The next degree of probability is, when I find by my own experience, and the agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be for the moft part fo, and that the particular inftance of it is attefted by many and undoubted witneffes, v. g. hiftory giving us fuch an ac 159 count of men in all ages; and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to obferve, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to the public. If all hiftorians that write of Tiberius, fay that Tiberius did fo, it is extremely probable; and in this cafe, our affent has a fuificient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call confidence.. 8. Fair Testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces alfo confident Belief. THIRDLY, In things that happen indifferently, as that a bird fhould fly this or that way; that it fhould thunder on a man's right or left hand, &c.; when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent teftimony of unfufpected witnetles, there our affent is alfo unavoidable. Thus, that there is fuch a city in Italy as Rome; that about 1700 years ago, there lived in it a man called Julius Cafar; that he was a general, and that he won a battle against another called Pompey; this, though in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor against it, yet being related by hiftorians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid = believing it, and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof he himfelf is a witnefs. § 9. Experiences and Teftimonies clashing, infinitely va ry the degrees of Probability. THUS far the matter goes caly enough. Probability upon fuch grounds carries fo much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or difbelieve, as a demonftration does whether we will know or be ignorant. The dif ficulty is, when teftimonies contradict common expe rience, and the reports of hiftory and witneffes clath with the ordinary courfe of nature, or with one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactnefs is required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the affent to the different evidence and probability of the thing, which rifes and falls, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. coinmon obfervation in like cafes, and particular teftimonies in that particular inftance, favour or contradict it. These are liable to it! great variety of contrary obfervations, circumstances, reports, different qualifications, tempers, defigns, ova. fights, of the reporters, that it is impoffible to r duce to precife rules the various degrees wherein me give their affent. This only may be faid in general, thi as the arguments and proofs pro and con, upon due a amination, nicely weighing every particular circum ftance, fhall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, : in a greater or lefs degree, to preponderate on eitha fide, fo they are fitted to produce in the mind fuch different entertainment, as we call belief, conjecture, gu doubt, wavering, difruft, disbelief, &c. § 10. Traditional Teftimonies, the farther removed, the lefs their Proof. THIS is what concerns affent in matters wherein teltmony is made ufe of; concerning which I think i may not be amifs to take notice of a rule obferved in the Jaw of England, which is, that though the attefted & py of record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy ver fo well attefted, and by never fo credible witness, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This s fo generally approved as reasonable, and fuited to the wildom and caution to be used in our inquiry after mate rial truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions di right and wrong, carries this obfervation along with it, viz. that any teftimony, the farther off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has. The be ing and existence of the thing itself, is what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof; but if another equally credible do witness it from his report, the teftimony is weaker; and a third that attefts the hearfay of an hearfay, is ye defs confiderable; fo that in traditional truths, each re move weakens the force of the proof, and the more hands the tradition has fucceflively paffed through, the les ftrength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought neceflary to be taken notice of, because I find amongit fome men the quite contrary commonly prac |