Book IV. judge from naturally acquired ideas, are matter of reafon; with this difference ftill, that in thofe concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and fo is perfuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, which ftill admit a poffibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own know. ledge, and overturning the principles of all reafon; in fuch probable propofitions, I fay, an evident revelation ought to determine our affent even against probability. For where the principles of reafon have not evidenced a propofition to be certainly true or falfe, there clear reue lation, as another principle of truth, and ground of alfent, may determine; and fo it may be matter of faith, and be alfo above reafon; because reafon, in that parti cular matter, being able to reach no higher than proba bility, faith gave the determination, where reafon came hort, and revelation difcovered on which fide the truth Jay.

$10. In Matters where Reafon can afford certain Knowledge, that is to be bearkened to..

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THUS far the dominion of faith reaches, and that with out any violence or hinderance to reafon, which is not injured or disturbed, but affifted and improved by new difcoveries of truth coming from the Eternal Fountain of all knowledge. Whatever GOD hath revealed is certainly true, no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith: But whether it be a divine revelation or no, reafon must judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence, to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain probability in oppofition to knowledge and certainty. There can be no.evidence, that any traditional revelation is of divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the fenfe we understand it, so clear and fo certain, as that of the principles of reafon; and therefore, nothing that is contrary to, and inconfiflent with the clear and felf-evident dictates of reafon, has a right to be urged or affented to as a matter of faith, wherein reafon has nothing to do. What loever is divine revelation, ought to over-rule all our opinions, prejudices, and interests, and hath a right to be received

with full affent. fon to faith, takes not away the land-marks of knowledge; this fhakes not the foundations of reafon, but leaves us that use of our faculties, for which they were given us.

Such fubmiffion as this, of our rea

11. If the boundaries be not fet between Faith and Reafon, no Enthusiasm or Extravagancy in Religión can be contradicted.

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IF the provinces of faith and renfon are not kept diftinet by thefe boundaries, there will, in matter of religion, be no room for reafon at all, and thofe extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the feveral religions of the world will not deferve to be blamed; for to this crying up of faith, in oppofition to reafon, we may, I think, in good meafure afcribe thofe abfurdities that fill almost all the religions which poffefs and divide mankind. For men having been principled with an opinion, that they muft not confult reafon in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common fenfe, and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies and natural fuperftition, and have been by them led into fo ftrange opinions and extravagant practices in religion, that a confiderate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, and judge them fo far from being acceptable to the great and wife GOD, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offenfive to a fober- good man; fo that in effect religion, which fhould molt diftinguith us from beafts, and ought moft peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear moft irrational, and more fenseless than beafts themfelves. Credo, quia impoffibile eft; I believe, because it is impoffible, might in a good man pafs for a fally of zeal, but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by.

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CHAP. XIX.

OF ENTHUSIASM.

1. Love of Truth neceffary.

E that would ferioully fet upon the fearch of truth, ought in the first place to prepare his mind with a love of it; for he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned when he mifes it. There is nobody in the commonwealth of learning, who does not profefs himfelf a lover of truth; and there is not a rational creature that would not take it amils to be thought otherwife of; and yet for all this, one may truly fay, there are very few lovers of truth for truth-fake, even amongst those who perfuade themselves that they are fo. How a man may know whether he be fo in earneft, is worth inquiry; and I think there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. the not entertaining any propefition with greater affurance, than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of affent, it is plain receives not truth in the love of it, loves not truth for truth-fake, but for fome other byend; for the evidence that any propofition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of aflent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain all that furplufage of aflurance is owing to fome other affe&tion, and not to the love of truth; it being as impotlible that the love of truth fhould carry my alient above the evidence that there is to me that it is true, as that the love of truth thould make me affent to any propolition for the fake of that evidence which it has not that it is true; which is in effect to love it as a truth, because it is poffible or probable that it may not be true. In any truth that gets not poffeflion of our minds by the irrefiftible light of felf-evidence, or by the force of demonftration, the arguments that gain it affent are the vouchers and gauge of its probability to us; and we can receive it for no other, than fuch as they deliver it to our underflandings. Whatfoever credit cr authority we give to any

propofition, more than it receives from the principles and proofs it fupports itself upon, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is fo far a derogation from the love of truth, as fuch; which, as it can receive no evidence from our paflions or interefts, fo it should receive no tincture from them...

§2. A Forwardness to dictate, from whence.

THE afluming an authority of dictating to others, and a forwardness to prefcribe to their opinions, is a conftant concomitant of this bias and corruption of our judgments. For how almost can it be otherwife, but that he fhould be ready to impofe on others belief, who has already impofed on his own? Who can reasonably expect arguments and conviction from him, in dealing with others, whofe understanding is not accuftomed to them in his dealing with himself, who does violence to his own faculties, tyrannizes over his own mind, and ufurps the prerogative that belongs to truth alone, whichis to command aflent by only its own authority, i, e. by and in proportion, to that evidence which it carries with it ?

3. Force of Enthusiasm.

UPON this occafion I fhall take the liberty to consider a third ground of aflent, which with fome men has the fame authority, and is as confidently relied on as either faith or reafon; I mean enthusiasm, which, laying by reafon, would fet up revelation without it; whereby in effect it takes away both reafon and revelation, and fubftitutes in the room of it the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and affumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct.

4. Reafon and Revelation. REASON is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light, and Fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: Revelation is natural reafon enlarged by a new set of difcoveries communicated by GOD immediately, which reafon vouches the truth of, by the teftimony and proofs it gives that they come from GOD. So that he that takes away reafon,

to make way for revelation, puts out the light of and does much-what the fame, as if he would pers a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the mote light of an invifible ftar by a telescope.

The 101 tỷ 540 Rife of Enthufiafm. IMMEDIATE revelation being a much easier way for m to establish their opinions, and regulate their cools than the tedious and not always fuccessful labour ( ftrict reafoning, it is no wonder that fome have be very apt to pretend to revelations and to perfuade the felves that they are under the peculiar guidance of He ven in their actions and opinions, efpecially in thote: them which they cannot account for by the ordinary m thods of knowledge, and principles of reafon. He we fee, that in all ages, men, in whom melancholy mixed with devotion, or whofe conceit of themfehe has raised them into an opinion of a greater famili with GOD, and a nearer admittance to his favour the is afforded to others, have often flattered themselves wit a perfuafion of an immediate intercoufe with the Den and frequent communications from the Divine Spiri GOD, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlightes the understanding by a ray darted into the mind imme diately from the Fountain of light: This they undes ftand he has promised to do; and who then has fo good a title to expect it as those who are his peculiar people, chosen by him, and depending on him?

§ 6. Enthusiasm

THEIR minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless opinion comes to fettle itfelf itrongly upon their fancies, is an illumination from the fpirit of GOD, and prefent ly of divine authority; and whatfoever odd action they find in themselves a ftrong inclination to do, that inpulfe is concluded to be a call or direction from Heave, and must be obeyed; it is a commiflion from above, and they cannot err in executing it.

THIS I take to be properly enthufiafm, which, though founded neither on reafon nor diviné revelation, but rifing from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain,