Obrázky stránek
PDF
ePub

nefs, and by our own confent to give ourselves up to delufion to believe a lie, for if, flrength of perfuation be the light which matt guide us, I afk how fhali any one diftinguish between the delusions of Satan, and die infpiration of the Holy Ghod? He, can transform h.misf into an angel of light; and they who are led by this fon of the morning, are as fully tatisfied of the ilumination, i. e. are as itrongly perfuaded that they are enlightened by the spirit or God, as any one who is fɔ; they acquiefce and ajoice in it, are acted by it; and nobody can be more fare, nor more in the right (if their own ftrong belief may be judge) than they.

14. Revelation must be judged of by Reaf.n. HE, therefore, that will not give limfelf up to all the extravagancies of delufios and error, muft bring this gaide of his light within to the trial. GOD, when he makes the prophet, does not unmake the man: He leaves all his faculties in their natural state, to cuable him to judge of his infpirations, whether they be of divine original or no. When he illuminates the mind with fupernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural, If he would have us affent to the truth of any proposition, he either evidences that truth by the ufual methods of natural reafon, or clie makes it known to be a truth which he would have us affent to by his authority, and convinces us that it is from him by fome marks which reafon cannot be miflaken in. Reafon must be our lait judge and guide in every thing. I do not mean that we inuit cenfuit reafon, and examine whether a propofition revealed from GOD can be made out by natural princi ples, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it; but confult it we mult, and by it examine whether it be a revelation from GOD or no; and if reason finds it to be revealed from GOD, reafon then declares for it as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her dictates. Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pafs for an infpiration, if there be nothing but the. itrength of our perfuafions whereby to judge of our perfuations. If reafon must not examine their truth of fomething extrinfical to the perfuafions themselves, in

rations and delufions, truth and falfehood, will have ...e fame measure, and will not be poilible to be diftin...ifhed.

$15. Belief no Proof of Revelation.

this internal light, or any propofition which under at title we take for infpired, be conformable to the rinciples of reafon, or to the word of GOD, which is tested revelation, reafen warrants it, and we may fafely eceive it for true, and be guided by it in our belief and Aions; if it receive no teftimony nor evidence from ither of these rules, we cannot take it for a revelation, or much as for true, till we have fome other mark that it 's a revelation, befides our believing that it is fo. Thus we fee the holy men of old, who had revelations from "GOD, had fomething elfe befides that internal light of affurance in their own minds, to teftify to them that it was from GOD. They were not left to their own perfuafions alone, that thofe perfuafions were from GOD, but had outward figns to convince them of the Author of thofe revelations; and when they were to convince others, they had a power given them to juftify the truth of their commiffion from Heaven, and by visible figns to aflert the divine authority of a meflige they were fent with. Mofes faw the bufh burn without being confumed, and heard a voice out of it; this was fomething be fides finding an impulfe upon his mind to go to Pharaoh, that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt, and yet he thought not this enough to authorife him to go with that meflige, till GOD, by another miracle of his rod tarned into a ferpent, had affured him of a power to teftify his mithion, by the fame miracle repeated before them whom he was fent to. Gulcon was fent by an angel to deliver Ifrael from the Midianites, and yet he delired a fign to convince him that this commiflior was from GOD. Thele, and several the like inftances to be found among the prophets of old, are enough to show that they thought not an inward feeing or perfuafion of their own minds, without any other proof, a fuflicient evidence that it was from GOD, though the Scripture

does not every where mention their demanding or having fuch proofs.

$16.

I

In what I have faid, I am far from denying that GOD can, or doth fometimes enlighten mens minds in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite them to good ac tions by the immediate influence and afliftance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary figns accompanying it; but in fuch cafes too we have reafon and the fcripture unerring rules to know whether it be from GOD or no. Where the truth embraced is confonant to the revelation in the written word of GOD, or the action conformable to dictates of right reafon or holy writ, we may be affured that we run no rifk in entertaining it as fuch; because though perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from GOD, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are fure it is warranted by that revelation which he has given us of truth. But it is not the ftrength of our private perfuafion within ourselves, that can warrant it to be a light or motion from Heaven; nothing can do that but the written word of GOD without us, or that standard of reason which is common to us with all men. Where reafon or fcripture is exprefs for any opinion or action, we may receive it as of divine authority; but it is not the strength of our own perfuafions which can by itself give it that ftamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it as much as we pleafe, that may fhow it to be a fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an offspring of Heaven, and of divine original.

K

CHAP. XX.

OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR.

1. Caufes of Error.

NOWLEDGE being to be had only of vifible certain truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving affent to that which is not true.

But if affent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our affent be probability, and that probability confifts in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded, how men come to give their affents contrary to probability; for there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that one man wholly difbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third ftedfaftly believes and firmly adheres to. The reafons whereof, though they may be very various, yet I fuppofe may be all reduced to thefe four:

1. Want of proofs.

2. Want of ability to use them.
3. Want of will to use them.
4. Wrong measures of probability.

§2. 1. Want of Proofs.

FIRST, By want of proofs, I do not mean only the want of those proofs which are no where extant, and fo are no where to be had; but the want even of thofe proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thus men want proofs who have not the convenience or opportunity to make experiments and obfervations themfelves tending to the proof of any propofition; nor likewife the convenience to inquire into, and collect the teftimonies of others; and in this ftate are the greatest part of mankind, who are given up to labour, and enflaved to the neceffity of their mean condition, whofe lives are worn out only in the provifions for living. Thefe mens opportunity of knowledge and inquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes; and their understandings are but little inftructed, when all their whole time and pains is laid out to ftill the croaking of their own bellies, or the cries of their children. It is not to be expected that a man who drudges on all his life in a laborious trade, fhould be more knowing in the variety of things done in the world, than a pack-horfe, who is driven conftantly forwards and backwards in a narrow lane and dirty road only to market, thould be killed in the geography of the country. Nor is it at all more poffible that he who wants leifure, books, and languages, and the opportunity of converfing

with a variety of men, fhould be in a condition to collect thofe teftimonies and obfervations which are in being, and are neceffary to make out many, nay, most of the propofitions that, in the focieties of men, are judged of the greateft moment; or to find out grounds of affarance fo great as the belief of the points he would build on them is thought neceflary; fo that a great part of mankind are, by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world, and the conftitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs on which others build, and which are neceffary to eftablifh thofe opinions; the greatest part of men, having much to do to get the means of living, are not in a condition to look after thofe of learned and laborious inquiries.

§3. Ob. What shall become of those who want them,

anfwered.

WHAT fhall we fay then? Are the greatest part of mankind, by the neceffity of their condition, fubjected to unavoidable ignorance in thofe things which are of greatest importance to them? (for of thefe it is obvious to inquire.) Have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident, and blind chance, to conduct them to their happiness or mifery? Are the current opinions, and licenfed guides of every country, fufficient evidence and fecurity to every man to venture his greatest concernments on, nay, his everlasting happiness or mifery? Or, can those be the certain and infallible oracles and ftandards of truth, which teach one thing in Christendom, and another in Turkey? Or, thall a poor countryman be eternally happy for having the chance to be born in Italy; or a day-labourer be unavoidably loft, becaufe he had the ill luck to be born in England? How ready fome men may be to fay fome of thete things, I will not here examine; but this I am fure, that men muft allow one or other of thefe to be true (let them choose which they pleafe), or elfe grant, that God has furnished men with faculties fufficient to direct them in the way they fhould take, if they will but ferioufly employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them the leifure.

« PředchozíPokračovat »