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No man is fo wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no fpare time at all to think of his foul, and inform himfelf in matters of religion. Were men as intent upon this as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none fo enflaved to the neceflities of life, who might not find many vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge.

§4. People hindered from Inquiry. BESIDES thofe whofe improvements and informations are ftraitened by the narrowness of their fortunes, there are others whofe largenefs of fortune would plentifully enough fupply books and other requifites for clearing of doubts, and difcovering of truth; but they are cooped in close by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of thofe whofe intereft it is to keep them ignorant, left, knowing more, they should believe the lefs in them. There are as far, nay, farther from the liberty and opportunities of a fair inquiry, than thofe poor and wretched labourers we before fpoke of; and, however they may feem high and great, are confined to narrowness of thought, and enflaved in that which should be the freeft part of man, their understandings. This is generally the cafe of all those who live in places where care is taken to propagate truth without knowledge; where men are forced, at a venture, to be of the religion of the country, and muft therefore fwallow down opinions, as filly people do empirics pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do but believe that they will do the cure; but in this are much more miferable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refufe fwallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone, or to choofe the phyfician to whofe conduct they would truft themfelves.

§ 5. 2. Want of Skill to use them.

SECONDLY, Those who want fkill to use thofe evidences they have of probabilities, who cannot carry a train of confequences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and teftimonies, making' every circumftance its due allowance, may be eafily

mifled to affent to propofitions that are not probable. There are some men of one, fome but of two fyllogifms, and no more, and others that can but advance one step farther. Thefe cannot always difcern that fide on which the ftrongest proofs lie, cannot conftantly follow that which in itfelf is the more probable opinion. Now that there is fuch a difference between men, in refpec of their understandings, I think nobody who has had any converfation with his neighbours will queftion, though he never was at Westminster-hall, or the Exchange, on the one hand, nor at Alms-houfes, or Bedlam, on the other. Which great difference in mens intellectuals, whether it rifes from any defect in the organs of the body, particularly adapted to thinking, or in the dullness or untractablenefs of thofe faculties for want of ufe, or, as fome think, in the natural differences of mens fouls themselves, or fome or all of these together, it matters not here to examine; only this is evident, that there is a difference of degrees in mens understandings, apprehenfions, and reafonings, to fo great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm, that there is a greater diftance between fome men and others, in this refpect, than between fome men and fome beafts. But how this comes about is a fpeculation, though of great confequence, yet not neceflary to our prefent purpose.

§ 6. 3. Want of Will to use them.

THIRDLY, There are another fort of people that want proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but becaufe they will not use them; who, though they have riches and leifure enough, and want neither parts nor other helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot pursuit of pleasure, or conftant drudgery in business, engages fome mens thoughts elfewhere: Lazinefs and of citany in general, or a particular averfion for books, ftudy, and meditation, keep others from any ferious thoughts at all; and fome out of fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour thofe opinions which beft fuit their prejudices, lives, and defigns, content themselves without examination to take upon truft what they find

213 convenient and in fashion. Thus most men, even of those that might do otherwife, pafs their lives without an acquaintance with, much lefs a rational affent to probabilities they are concerned to know, though they lie fo much within their view, that to be convinced of them they need but turn their eyes that way. But we know fome men will not read a letter which is fuppofed to bring ill news; and many men forbear to caft up their accounts, or fo much as think upon their eftates, who have reafon to fear their affairs are in no very good pofture. How men, whofe plentiful fortunes allow them leifure to improve their understandings, can fatisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low opinion of their fouls, who lay out all their incomes in provifions for the body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and fplendid outside, and would think themselves miferable in coarse clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedly fuffer their minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald livery of coarfe patches, and borrowed fhreds, fuch as it has pleafed chance, or their country tailor (I mean the common opinion of those they have converfed with), to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreafonable this is for men that ever think of a future ftate, and their concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do fometimes; nor fhall I take notice what a fhame and confufion it is, to the greatest contemners of knowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know. But this at least is worth the confideration of thofe who call themfelves gentlemen, that however they may think credit, refpect, power, and authority, the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet they will find all thefe ftill carried away from them, by men of lower condition who furpass them in knowledge. They who are blind will always be led by thofe that fee, or elfe fall into the ditch; and he is certainly the most fubjected, the most enflaved, who is fo in his understanding. In the foregoing inftances, fome of the caufes have been fhown of wrong affent, and how it

comes to pafs, that probable doctrines are not always received with an affent proportionable to the reasons which are to be had for their probability; but hitherto we have confidered only fuch probabilities whofe proofs do exift, but do not appear to him that embraces the

error.

§ 7. 4. Wrong Meafures of Probability, whereof. FOURTHLY, There remains yet the last fort, who, even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the conviction, nor yield unto manifeft reafons, but do either iriy, fufpend their affent, or give it to the lefs probable opinion: And to this danger are thofe expofed, who have taken up wrong meafures of probability; which are,

1. Propofitions that are not in themfelves certain and evident, but doubtful and falfe, taken up for Principles. 2. Received Hypothefes.

3. Predominant Paffions or Inclinations.

4. Authority.

$8. 1. Doubtful Propofitions taken for Principles. FIRST, The first and firmeft ground of probability, is the conformity any thing has to our own knowledge; efpecially that part of our knowledge which we have embraced, and continue to look on as principles. Thefe have fo great an influence upon our opinions, that it is ufually by them we judge of truth, and measure probability to that degree, that what is inconfiftent with our principles, is fo far from palling for probable with us, that it will not be allowed poffible. The reverence borne to thefe principles is fo great, and their authority fo paramount to all other, that the teftimony not only of other men, but the evidence of our own fenfes are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to thefe cftablifhed rules. How much the doctrine of inmate principles, and that principles are not to be proved or questioned, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one truth cannot contradict another; but withal I take leave alfo to fay, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a principle, to examine it strictly, and see

whether he certainly knows it to be true of itfelf by its own evidence, or whether he does, only with affurance believe it to be fo upon the authority of others; for he hath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his affent, who hath imbibed wrong principles, and has blindly given himself up to the authority of any opinion in itself not evidently true.

§ 9.

THERE is nothing more ordinary, than that children fhould receive into their minds propofitions (efpecially about matters of religion) from their parents, nurfes, or those about them, which being infinuated into their unwary as well as unbiaffed understandings, and faftened by degrees, are at last (equally, whether true or falfe) rivetted there by long custom and education, beyond all poffibility of being pulled out again; for men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and finding thofe of this fort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories, not having observed their early infinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as facred things, and not to fu ffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned: They look on them as the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by GOD himfelf, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falfehood, and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controverfies,

§ 10.

THIS opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once established in any one's mind, it is eafy to be imagined what reception any propofition fhall find, how clearly foever proved, that fhall invalidate their authority, or at all thwart with thefe internal oracles; whereas the groffeft abfurdities and improbabilities, being but agreeable to fuch principles, go down glibly, and are easily digefted. The great obftinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quite contrary opinions, though many times equally abfurd, in the various religions of mankind, are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable confequence of this way of reafoning

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