thus anfwering those powers, they are what they should be, true ideas: Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falfehood, if the mind (as in moft men I believe it does) judges thefe ideas to be in the things themselves; for God, in his wifdom, having fet them as marks of diftinction in things, whereby we may be able to dif cern one thing from another, and fo choose any of them for our uses, as we have occafion, it alters not the nature of our fimple idea, whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itfelf, or in our mind only, and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light, after a certain manner, to be in the violet itself; for that texture in the object, by a regular and conftant operation, producing the fame idea of blue in us, it ferves us to diftinguish, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that diftinguishing mark, as it is really in the viclet, be only a peculiar texture of parts, elfe that very colour, the idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact refemblance: And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that caufes in us that idea; fince the name blue notes properly nothing, but that mark of distinction that is in a violet, difcernible only by our eyes, whatever it confifts in, that being beyond our capacities diftinctly to know, and perhaps would be of lefs ufe to us, if we had faculties to difcern.

$15. Though one Man's Idea of blue fhould be different from another's.

NEITHER Would it carry any imputation of falsehood to our fimple ideas, if by the different ftructure of our organs it were fo ordered, that the fame object should produce in feveral mens minds different ideas at the fame time; v. g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the fame that a marigold produced in another man's, and vice verfa: For fince this could never be known, because one man's mind could not pafs into another man's body, to perceive what appearances were produced by thofe organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names, would be at all confounded,

115 or any falsehood be in either; for all things that had the texture of a violet, producing conftantly the idea which he called blue, and those which had the texture of a marigold, producing conftantly the idea which he has conftantly called yellow; whatever thofe appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to diftinguish things for his ufe by thofe appearances, and understand and fignify thofe diftinctions marked by the name blue and yellow, as if the appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from thofe two flowers, were exactly the fame with the ideas in other mens minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the fenfible ideas produced by any object in different mens minds, are most commonly very near and undifcernibly alike: For which opinion I think there might be many reasons offered; but that being befides my present business, I fhall not trouble my reader with them, but only mind him, that the contrary fuppofition, if it could be proved, is of little ufe, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life; and fo we need not trouble ourfelves to examine it

§ 16. First, Simple Ideas in this Sense not false, and why. FROM what has been faid concerning our fimple ideas, I think it evident, that our fimple ideas can none of them be falfe in refpect of things exifting without us: For the truth of these appearances, or perceptions in our minds, confifting, as has been faid, only in their being anfwerable to the powers in external objects, to produce by our fenfes fuch appearances in us, and each of them being in the mind, fuch as it is, fuitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it reprefents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to fuch a pattern, be falfe. Blue or yellow, bitter or fweet, can never be false ideas; thefe perceptions in the mind are just such as they are there, anfwering the powers appointed by God to produce them, and fo are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be misapplied, but that in this refpect makes no falfehood in the ideas, as if a man ignorant in the English tongue should call purple scarlet.

$ 17. Secondly, Modes not falfe.

SECONDLY, Neither can our complex ideas of modes in reference to the effence of any thing really exifting, be false; because whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern exifting, and made by nature; it is not fuppofed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath, nor to reprefent any thing but fuch a complication of ideas as it does: Thus when I have the idea of such an action of a man, who forbears to afford himself fuch meat, drink and clothing, and other conveniencies of life as his riches and eftate will be fufficient to fupply, and his station requires, I have no falfe ideas, but fuch an one as reprefents an action, either as I find or imagine it, and fo is capable of neither truth or falsehood: But when I give the name frugality, or virtue, to this action, then it may be called a falfe idea, if thereby it be fuppofed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of speech, the name of frugality doth belong, or to be conformable to that law, which is the ftandard of virtue and vice.

18. Thirdly, Ideas of Subftances when falfe. THIRDLY, Our complex ideas of fubftances, being all referred to patterns in things themselves, may be falfe: That they are all falfe, when looked upon as the reprefentations of the unknown effences of things, is fo evident, that there needs nothing to be faid of it: I fhall therefore pafs over that chimerical fuppofition, and confider them as collections of fimple ideas in the mind, taken from combinations of fimple ideas exifting together constantly in things, of which patterns they are the fuppofed copies; and in this reference of them, to the exiftence of things, they are falfe ideas: 1. When they put together fimple ideas, which in the real exiftence of things have no union; as when to the fhape and fize that exift together in a horse, is joined, in the fame complex idea, the power of barking like a dog; which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a falfe idea of an horfe. 2. Ideas of substances are, in this refpect, alfo falfe, when from any collection of fimple

ideas that do always exift together, there is feparated, by a direct negation, any other fimple idea which is conftantly joined with them. Thus, if to extenfion, folidity, fufibility, the peculiar weightinefs, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixednefs than is in lead or copper, he may be faid to have a falfe complex idea, as well as when he joins to thofe other fimple ones the idea of perfect abfolute fixednefs: For either way, the complex idea of gold being made up of fuch fimple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed false; but if he leave out of this his complex idea, that of fixednefs quite, without either actually joining to, or feparating of it from the reft in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea rather than a false one; fince though it contains not all the fimple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exift together.

19. Truth or Falsehood always fuppofes Affirmation or

Negation.

THOUGH, in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking, I have fhowed in what fenfe, and upon what ground our ideas may be fometimes called true or falfe, yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cafes where any idea is called true or falfe, it is from fome judgment that the mind makes, or is fuppofed to make, that is true or falfe: For truth or falsehood, being never without fome affirmation or negation, exprefs or tacit, it is not to be found but when figns are joined or feparated, according to the agreement or difagreement of the things they ftand for. The figns we chiefly use are either ideas of words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propofitions. Truth lies in fo joining or feparating these representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or difagree; and falfehood in the contrary, as fhall be more fully fhowed hereafter.

$20. Ideas in themfelves neither true nor falfe. ANY ided then which we have in our minds, whether. conformable or not to the existence of things, or to any ideas in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this

alone be called falfe: For these representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really exifting in things without, cannot be thought falfe, being exact reprefentations of fomething: Nor yet if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be said to be false representations, or ideas of things they do not reprefent: But the mistake and falfehood is,

§ 21. But are falfe; 1. When judged agreeable to another man's Idea, without being fo.

FIRST, When the mind, having any idea, it judges and concludes it the fame that is in other mens minds, fignified by the fame name, or that it is conformable to the ordinary received fignification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not, which is the most ufual mistake in mixed modes, though other ideas alfo are liable to it. § 22. 2. When judged to agree to real Exiftence, when

they do not.

SECONDLY, When it having a complex idea made up of fuch a collection of fimple ones, as nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a fpecies of creatures really exifting, as when it joins the weight of tin, to the colour, fufibility, and fixedness of gold.

§ 23. 3. When judged adequate, without being fo. THIRDLY, When in its complex idea it has united a certain number of fimple ideas that do really exift together in fome fort of creatures, but has also left out others as much infeparable, it judges this to be a perfect complete idea of a fort of things which really it is not; v. g. having joined the ideas of fubftance, yellow, malleable, moft heavy and fufible, it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixednefs and folubility in aqua regia are as infeparable from thofe other ideas or qualities of that body, as they are one from another.

§ 24. 4. When judged to represent the real Effence. FOURTHLY, The mistake is yet greater, when I judge that this complex idea contains in it the real effence of any body exifling, when at least it contains but fome few of thofe properties which flow from its real effence and confti