Book II. regia, &c. all united together in an unknown fubftratum; all which ideas are nothing elfe but fo many relations to other fubftances, and are not really in the gold, confidered barely in itfelf, though they depend on thofe real and primary qualities of its internal conftitution, whereby it has a fitness differently to operate, and be operated on by feveral other fubftances.

CHAP. XXIV.

OF COLLECTIVE IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.

§ 1. One Idea.

ESIDES thefe complex ideas of feveral single subftances, as of man, horfe, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath alfo complex collective ideas of subftances, which I do fo call, because fuch ideas are made up of many particular fubftances confidered together, as united into one idea, and which fo joined are looked on as one; v. g. the idea of fuch a collection of men as make an army, though confifting of a great number of distinct substances, is as much one idea as the idea of a man; and the great collective idea of all bodies what foever, fignified by the name world, is as much one idea as the idea of any the leaft particle of matter in it; it fufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be confidered as one reprefentation or picture, though made up of ever fo many particulars.

§2. Made by the Power of compofing in the Mind. THESE Collective ideas of fubftances the mind makes by its power of compofition, and uniting feverally, either fimple or complex ideas into one, as it does by the fame faculty make the complex ideas of particular fubftances, confifting of an aggregate of divers fimple ideas united in one fubftance; and as the mind, by putting together the repeated ideas of unity, makes the collective node, or complex idea of any number, as a fcore or a grofs, &c. fo, by putting together feveral particular fubftances, it makes collective ideas of fubftances, as a troop, an army, a fwarm, a city, a fleet; each of

which every one finds that he reprefents to his own mind by one idea, in one view; and fo under that notion confiders thofe feveral things as perfectly one, as one fhip or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men fhould make one idea, than how a man fhould make one idea; it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men, and confider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular all the diftinct ideas that make up the compofition of a man, and confider them all together as one.

§3. All artificial Things are collective Ideas. AMONGST fuch kind of collective ideas are to be counted the most part of artificial things, at leaft fuch of them as are made up of diftinct fubftances; and, in truth, if we confider all these collective ideas aright, as army, conftellation, univerfe, as they are united into fo many fingle ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind, bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and difcourfe of them, united into one' conception, and fignified by one name. For there are no things fo remote, nor fo contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of compofition, bring into one idea; as is vifible in that fignified by the name unierfe.

B

CHAP. XXV.

OF RELATION.

1. Relation what.

ESIDES the ideas, whether fimple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themfelves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the confideration of any thing, is not confined to that precife object: It can carry any idea as it were beyond itfelf, or at leaft look beyond it, to fee how it ftands in conformity to any other. When the mind fo confiders one

thing that it does, as it were, bring it to, and fet it by another, and carry its view from one to the other, this is, as the words import, relation and respect; and the denominations given to pofitive things, intimating that refpect, and ferving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the fubject itself denominated to fomething diftinct from it, are what we call relatives; and the things fo brought together, related. Thus, when the mind confiders Caius as fuch a pofitive being, it takes nothing into that idea, but what really exifts in Caius; v. g. when I confider him as man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species man. So likewise, when I fay Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare confideration of man, who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name bufband, I intimate fome other perfon; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate fome other thing in both cafes my thought is led to fomething beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into confideration. And fince any idea, whether fimple or complex, may be the occafion why the mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, though ftill confidered as diftinct; therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation; as in the above mentioned inftance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occafion of the denomination or relation of hufband; and the colour white, the occafion why he is faid whiter than freeftone.

$2. Relations without corelative Terms, not easily per

ceived.

THESE, and the like relations expreffed by relative terms that have others anfwering them, with a reciprocak intimation, as father and fon, bigger and lefs, caufe and effect, are very obvious to every one, and every body at first fight perceives the relation. For father and fon, hufband and wife, and fuch other corelative terms, feem fo nearly to belong one to another, and through custom do so readily chime and answer one another in people's memories, that, upon the naming of either of

them, the thoughts are prefently carried beyond the thing fo named; and nobody overlooks or doubts of a relation, where it is fo plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give corelative names, there the relation is not always fo eafily taken notice of. Con cubine is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as wife; but, in languages where this, and the like words, have not a corelative term, there people are not fo apt to take them to be fo, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between corelatives, which feem to explain one another, and not to be able to exift but together. Hence it is that many of thofe names, which, duly confidered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty founds, must fignify fome idea which is either in the thing to which the name is applied; and then it is pofitive, and is looked on as united to, and exifting in the thing to which the denomination is given; or else it arifes from the refpect the mind finds in it to fomething diftinct from it, with which it confiders it; and then it includes a relation.

3. Some feemingly abfolute Terms contain relations:* ANOTHER fort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or fo much as external denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance of fignifying fomething abfolute in the fubject, do conceal a tacit, though lefs obfervable relation. Such are the feemingly positive terms of old, great, imperfect, &c. whereof I fhall have occafion to fpeak more at large in the following chapters.

§ 4. Relation different from the Things related! THIS farther may be obferved, that the ideas of relation may be the fame in men who have far different ideas of the things that are related, or that are thus compared; v. g. thofe who have far different ideas of a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father; which is a notion fuperinduced to the fubftance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man, whereby

he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what he will.

$5. Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject.

THE nature therefore of relation confifts in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which comparison, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of thofe things be removed or cease to be, the relation ceafes, and the denomination confequent to it, though the other receive in itself no alteration at all; v. g. Caius, whom I confidered to-day as a father, ceases to be fo to-morrow only by the death of his fon, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object to which it compares any thing, the fame thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the fame time; v. g. Caius, compared to feveral perfons, may truly be faid. to be older and younger, stronger and weaker, &c.

6. Relation only betwixt two Things.

WHATSOEVER doth or can exift, or be confidered asone thing, is pofitive: And fo not only fimple ideas and fubftances, but modes alfo are pofitive beings, though the parts of which they confift are very often relative one to another; but the whole together, confidered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing, which idea is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of divers parts, and under, one name, it is a pofitive or abfolute thing or idea. Thus a triangle, though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a pofitive abfolute idea. The fame may be faid of a family, a tune, &c.; for there can be no relation but betwixt two things confidered as two things. There muft always be in relation two ideas, or things, either in themfelves really feparate, or confidered as diftinct, and then a ground or occafion for their comparison.

$7. All Things capable of Relation. CONCERNING relation in general, thefe things may be confidered: