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things themfelves. For whatever makes the fpecific idea to which the name is applied, if that idea be tea dily kept to, the diftinction of any thing into the fame, and divers, will eafily be conceived, and there can arife no doubt about it.

$29. Continued Exiftence snakes Identity,

FOR fuppofing a rational spirit be the idea of a man, it is eafy to know what is the fame man, viz. the fame fpirit, whether feparate or in a body, will be the fame man.. Suppofing a rational spirit vitally united to a body, of a certain conformation of parts to make a man, whilft that rational fpirit, with that vital conformation of parts, though continued in a fleeting fucceffive body, remains, it will be the fame man. But if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain fhape, as long as that vital union and shape remains, in a concrète no otherwife the fame, but by a continued fuc ceffion of fleeting particles, it will be the fame man: For whatever be the compofition, whereof the complex idea is made, whenever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the fame exiftence continued, preferves it the fame individual under the fame denomination.

B

CHAP. XXVIII.

OF OTHER RELATIONS.

§ 1. Proportional.

ESIDES the before-mentioned occafions of time, place, and caufality of comparing, or referring things one to another, there are, as I have faid, infinite others, fome whereof I thall mention.

Firf, The first shall name, is some one fimple idea; which being capable of parts or degrees, affords an occafion of comparing the fubjects wherein it is to one another, in refpect of that fimple idea, v. g. subiter, fweeter, bigger, equal, more, &c. Thefe relations depending on the equality and excefs of the fame fimple idea, in feveral fubjects, may be called, if one will, proportional; and

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that these are only converfant about thofe fimple ideas' received from fenfation or reflection, is fo evident, that nothing need be faid to evince it.

§ 2. Natural.

SECONDLY, Another occafion of comparing things to gether, or confidering one thing, fo as to include in that confideration fome other thing, is the circumftances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as lafting as the fubjects to which they belong; v. g. father and fon, brothers, coufin-germans, &c. which have their relations by one community of blood, where they partake in feveral degrees; country-men, i. e. those who were born in the fame country, or track of ground; and thefe I call natural relations : wherein we may obferve that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the ufe of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things: For it is certain that in reality the relation is the fame betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the feveral races of other animals as well as men: but yet it is feldom faid, this bull is the grandfather of fuch a calf; or that two pigeons are coufin-germans. It is very convenient, that by diflinct names thefe relations fhould be obferved and marked out in mankind; there being occafion, both in laws, and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under these relations from whence alfo arife the obligations of feveral duties amongst men. Whereas in brutes, men having very little or no caufe to mind thefe relations, they have not thought fit to give them diftinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us fome light into the different ftate and growth of languages; which being fuited only to the convenience of communication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them, andnot to the reality or extent of things, nor to the various refpects might be found among them, nor the different abstract confiderations might be framed about them. Where they had no philofophical notions, there they had no terms to express them: and it is no wonder men fhould

have framed no names for thofe things they found no occafion to discourse of: From whence it is easy to imagine why, as in fome countries, they may not have fo much as the name for a horse; and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horfes than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horfes, but alfo of their feveral relations of kindred one to another.

§ 3. Inftituted.

THIRDLY, Sometimes the foundation of confidering things with reference to one another, is fome act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation to do fomething. Thus a general is one that hath power to command an army; and an army under a general is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. A citizen, or a burgher, is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place. All this fort depending upon mens wills, or agreement in fociety, I call inftituted or voluntary; and may be diftinguished from the natural, in that they are most, if not all of them, some way or other alterable, and feparable from the perfons to whom they have fometimes belonged, though neither of the fubftances, fo related, be destroyed. Now, though thefe are all reciprocal, as well as the reft, and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; yet, because one of the two things often wants a relative name, importing that reference, men usually take no notice of it, and the relation is commonly overlooked: v. g. a patron and client are easily allowed to be relations, but a conftable or dictator, are not fo readily, at first hearing, confidered as fuch; becaufe there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator, or conftable, expreffing a relation to either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a certain power over fome others; and fo is fo far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

§ 4.

Moral.

FOURTHLY, There is another fort of relation, which is the conformity, or difagreement, mens voluntary actions

Book II. have to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think, may be called Moral relation, as being that which denominates our moral actions, and deferves well to be examined, there being no part of knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined ideas, and avoid, as much as may be, obfcurity and confufion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circum ftances, they are framed into distinct complex ideas, are, as has been fhown, fo many mixed modes, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, fuppofing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received, polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once; when we frame these notions thus in our minds, we have there fo many determined ideas of mixed modes: But this is not all that concerns our actions; it is not enough to have determined ideas of them, and to know what names belong to fuch and fuch combinations of ideas; we have a farther and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether fuch actions fo made up are morally good or bad.

$5. Moral Good and Evil.

Goon and evil, as hath been fhown, B. II. Ch. 2o. § 2. and Ch. 21. § 42. are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occafions, or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil then is only the conformity or difagreement of our voluntary actions to fome law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our obfervance, or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call reward and punishment.

$6. Moral Rules.

Or thefe moral rules, or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, there feem to me to be three forts, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and punishments: For fince it would be utterly in vain to fuppofe a rule fet to the free actions of man, without annexing to it fome enforcement of good and evil to de

tørmine his will, we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to fet a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance, with, and punith deviation from his rule, by fome good and evil," that is not the natural product and confequence of the action, itfelf; for that being a natural convenience, or inconvenience, would operate of itself without a law;. 'This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all law, properly fo called.

17 $7. Laws.

THE Jaws that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude or obliquity, feem to me to be. thele three; . The divine law; 2. The civil law; 3. The law of opinion or reputation, if I may fo call it. By the relation they bear to the first of thefe, men judge whether their actions are fins or duties; by the fecond, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.

§ 8. Divine Law, the Measure of Sin and Duty. FIRST, The divine law, whereby I mean that law which God has fet to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men fhould govern themfelves, I think there is nobody fo brutish as to deny : He has a right to do it; we are his creatures. He has goodnefs and wifdom to direct our actions to that which is beft; and he has a power. to inforce it by rewards and punishments, of infinite. weight and duration, in another life; for nobody can. take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchftone of moral rectitude, and by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the most confiderable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether as duties or fins they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the Almighty.

$9. Civil Law, the Measure of Crimes and Innocence. SECONDLY, The civil law, the rule fet by the commonwealth to the actions of thofe who belong to it, is VOL. II. D

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