ufe of to fignify them, and not in refpect of any thing exifting, as made by nature.

633. This all accommodated to the end of Specch THIS is adjufied to the true end of speech, which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions: For thus, he that would difcourfe of things as they agreed in the complex idea of extenfion, and foi dity, needed but ufe the word body to denote all fuch; he that to thefe would join others fignified by the words life, fenfe, and fpontaneous motion, needed but afe the word animal, to fignify all which partook of those ideas; and he that had made a complex idea of a body, with life, fenfe, and motion, with the faculty of reafoning, and a certain fhape joined to it, needed but use the fhort monofyllable man, to exprefs all particulars that correfpond to that complex idea. This is the proper bufinefs of genus and species; and this men do, without any confideration of real effences or fubflantial forms, which come not within the reach of our knowledge when we think of thofe things, nor within the fignifica tion of our words when we difcourfe with others.

$34. Inftance in Contraries.

WERE I to talk with any one of a fort of birds I lately faw in St. James's Park, about three or four feet high, with a covering of fomething between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour, without wings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down like fprigs of Spanish broom, long great legs, with feet only of three claws, and without a tail, I must make this defcription of it, and fo may make others understand me: But when I am told that the name of it is Caffauris, I may then ufe that word to fland in difcourte for all my complex idea mentioned in that defcription, though by that word, which is now become a fpecific name, I know no more of the real eflence or constitution of that fort of anirials than I did before, and knew probably as much of the nature of that fpecies of birds before I learned the name, as many Englishmen do of fwank or herons, which are fpecific names very well known of forts of birds common in Englaud.

ALL VIL 10 $35. Men determine the Sorts. FROM what has been fid, it is evident, that men make forts of things for it being different effences alone that make different fpecies, it is plain, that they who make thofe abftract ideasy which are the nominal effences, do thereby make the fpecies or fort. Should there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold, except malleablenefs, it would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or no, i. e. whether it were of that fpecies. This could be determined only by that abftraét idea to which every one annexed the name gold; so that it would be true gold to him, and belong to that fpecies who included not maileablenefs in his nominal effence, fignified by the found gold; and, on the other fide, it would not be true gold, or of that species, to him who included malleablenefs in his fpecific idea. And who, I pray, is it that makes these diverfe fpecies even under one and the fame name, but men that make two different abstract ideas confi'ting not exactly of the fame collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere fuppofition to imagine, that a body may exift, wherein the other obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableness, fince it is certain, that gold itself will be fometimes fo eager (as artifts call it), that it will as little endure the hammer as glafs itfelf. What we have faid, of the put-ting in or leaving malleablenefs out of the complex idea, the name gold is by any one annexed to, may be faid of its peculiar weight, fixednefs, and feveral other the like qualities; for whafoever is left out or put in, it is ftill the complex idea, to which that name is annexed, that makes the fpecies; and as any particular parcel of matter anfwers that idea, fo the name of the fort belongs truly to it, and it is of that fpecies; and thus any thing is true gold, perfe& metal. All which determination of the fpecies, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making this or that complex idea.

$35. Nature makes the Similitude. THIS. then, in fhort, is the cafe: Nature makes many particular things which do agree one with another, in many fenfible qualities, and probably too in their inter

t

nal frame and conftitution; but it is not this real effence that distinguithes them into fpecies; it is men, who, tak ing occafion from the qualitics they find united in them, and wherein they obferve often feveral individuals to as gree, range them into forts, in order to their naming, for the convenience of comprehenfive figns, under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea, come to be ranked as under enfigns: fo that this is of the blue, that the red regiment, this is a man, that a drill: And in this, I think, confits the whole bufinefs of genus and fpecies.

$ 37

I Do not deny but nature, in the conftant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike, and of kin one to another. But I think it nevertheless true, that the boundaries of the Species whereby men fort them, are made by men, fince the effences of the fpecies, diftinguished by different names, are, as has been proved, of man's making, and feldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from; fo that we may truly fay, fuch a manner of forting of things is the workmanship of men.

$38. Each abfirect Idea is an Effence.

ONE thing I doubt not but will feem very strange in this doctrine, which is, that from what has been faid, it will follow, that each abfiract idea, with a name to it, makes ā diftinct fpecies. But who can help it if truth will have it fo? for fo it must remain till fomebody can show us the fpecies of things limited and diftinguished by fomething elfe, and let us fee that general terms fignify not our abftract ideas, but fomething different from them. I would fain know why a fhock and a hound are not as diftinct Species as a fpaniel and an elephant. We have no other idea of the different effence of an elephant and a fpaniel, than we have of the different eflence of a fhock and a hound; all the eflential difference, whereby we know and diftinguish them one from another, confifting only in the different collection of simple ideas, to which we have given thofe different names.

39. Genera and Species are in order to naming. How much the making of fpecies and genera is in order to general names, and how much general names are neceflary, if not to the being, yet at least to the completing of a fpecies, and making it pafs for fuch, will appear, befides what has been faid above concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. A filent and a ftriking watch are but one fpecies to thofe who have but one name for them: but he that has the name watch for one, and clock for the other, and diftinct complex ideas, to which thofe names belong, to him they are dif ferent fpecies. It will be faid, perhaps, that the inward contrivance and conftitution is different between these two, which the watchmaker has a clear idea of; and yet it is plain they are but one fpecies to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is fufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species? There are fome watches that are made with four wheels, others with five: Is this a fpecific difference to the workman? Some have ftrings and fufees, and others none; fome have the balance loofe, and others regulated by a spiral fpring, and others by hogs brifles: Are any or all of thefe enough to make a specific difference to the workman, that knows each of thefe, and feveral other different contrivances, in the internal constitutions of watches? It is certain each of these hath a real difference from the reft; but whether it be an effential, a fpecific difference of no, relates only to the complex idea to which the name watch is given as long as they all agree in the idea which that name ftands for, and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different fpecies under it, they are not effentially nor fpecifically different. But if any one will make minuter divifions from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to fuch precife complex ideas, gives names that shall prevail they will then be new fpecies to them, who have thofe ideas with names to them, and can, by those differences, diftinguish watches into thefe feveral forts, and then watch will be a generical name. But yet they would be no diftinct species to men ignorant of clock

work and the inward contrivances of watches, vho had no other idea but the outward fhape and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the hand; for to. them all thofe other names would be but fynonymous terms for the fame idea, and fignify no more, nor no other thing but a watch. Juft thus, I think, it is in natural things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or fprings (if I may fo fay) within, are different in a rational man and a changeling, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a changeling. But whether one or both the fe differences be effential or fpecifi-: cal, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or difagreement with the complex idea that the name man ftands for; for by that alone can it be determined, whe ther one, or both, or neither of those be a man or no? $40. Species of artificial things less confufed than natural. FROM what has been before faid, we may fee the reason auhy, in the species of artificial things, there is generally lefs confufion and uncertainty than in natural; becaufe an ar tificial thing being a production of man, which the artificer defigned, and therefore well knows the idea of, the name of it is fuppofed to ftand for no other idea, nor to import any other effence than what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be apprehended: For the idea or effence of the feveral forts of artificial things confifting, for the most part, in nothing but the determi; nate figure of fenfible parts, and fometimes motion de pending thereon, which the artificer fafhions in matters fuch as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof, and fos fettle the fignification of the names, whereby the fpecies of artificial things are diftinguished with lefs doubt, obe fcurity, and equivocation, than we can in things natural, whofe differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our difcoveries.

$41. Artificial things of diflinet Speries. I MUST be excufed here if I think artificial things are of diflinct fpecies, as well as natural; fince I find they are as: plainly and orderly ranked into forts, by different abstract. ideas, with general names annexed to them, as diftinct