res judicata where the state courts had previously made an adverse determination of his underlying claim, even though a federal habeas court had later granted him relief on habeas corpus.

The answer to this contention is that the respondents here sought no damages, but only equitable relief-restoration of their good-time credits and our holding today is limited to that situation. If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy. Accordingly, as petitioners themselves concede, a damages action by a state prisoner could be brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies. Cf. Ray v. Fritz, 468 F. 2d 586 (CA2 1972).

The respondents next argue that to require exhaustion of state remedies in a case such as the one at bar would deprive a state prisoner of the speedy review of his grievance which is so often essential to any effective redress. They contend that if, prior to bringing an application for federal habeas corpus, a prisoner must exhaust state administrative remedies and then state judicial remedies through all available appeals, a very significant period of time might elapse before the prisoner could ever get into federal court. By that time, no matter how swift and efficient federal habeas corpus relief might be, the prisoner might well have suffered irreparable injury and his grievances might no longer be remediable.

It is true that exhaustion of state remedies takes time. But there is no reason to assume that state prison ad

ministrators or state courts will not act expeditiously. Indeed, new regulations established by the New York Department of Correctional Services provide for administrative review of a prisoner's record in the institution shortly before the earliest possible release date, 7 N. Y. Codes, Rules & Regulations § 261.3 (b)," and, as previously noted, state judges in New York actually sit in the institutions to hear prisoner complaints. Moreover, once a state prisoner arrives in federal court with his petition for habeas corpus, the federal habeas statute provides for a swift, flexible, and summary determination of his claim. 28 U. S. C. § 2243.12 See also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286 (1969); and Hens

11 That section provides that each inmate's file "shall be considered not more than three nor less than two months before the earliest possible date he would be entitled to consideration for parole or conditional or other release if that date depends upon the amount of good behavior allowance to be granted (based upon the assumption that he has earned all good behavior allowances that can be granted)." 12 That section provides

"A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

"The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

"The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.

"When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

"Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. "The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny

ley v. Municipal Court, ante, at 349-350. By contrast, the filing of a complaint pursuant to § 1983 in federal court initiates an original plenary civil action, governed by the full panoply of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That such a proceeding, with its discovery rules and other procedural formalities, can take a significant amount of time, very frequently longer than a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is demonstrated by the respondents' actions in the present case. Although both Rodriguez and Kritsky initiated their actions before their conditional-release dates, the District Court did not reach its decisions until three and 10 months later, respectively-in both cases well after the conditionalrelease dates had passed. Only in Katzoff's case was there a speedy determination, and his action was not initiated until after his alleged release date.

In any event, the respondents' time argument would logically extend to a state prisoner who challenges the constitutionality of a conviction that carried a relatively

any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

"The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

"The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require."

See also 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (e):

"If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in such State court proceeding to support the State court's determination of a factual issue made therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the record pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such determination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is unable to produce such part of the record, then the State shall produce such part of the record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so by order directed to an appropriate State official. If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of the record, then the court shall determine under the existing facts and circumstances what weight shall be given to the State court's factual determination."

short sentence; and yet such a prisoner is clearly covered by § 2254 (b). Arguably, in either case, if the prisoner could make out a showing that, because of the time factor, his otherwise adequate state remedy would be inadequate, a federal court might entertain his habeas corpus application immediately, under § 2254 (b)'s language relating to "the existence of circumstances rendering such [state] process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." But we need not reach that issue here.

Principles of res judicata are, of course, not wholly applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d). See Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224, 230 (1924). Hence, a state prisoner in the respondents' situation who has been denied relief in the state courts is not precluded from seeking habeas relief on the same claims in federal court. On the other hand, res judicata has been held to be fully applicable to a civil rights action brought under § 1983. Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Assn., 431 F. 2d 1209, 1211 (CA6 1970); Jenson v. Olson, 353 F. 2d 825 (CA8 1965); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F. 2d 709, 716 (CA8 1964); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F. 2d 257 (CA7 1963). Accordingly, there would be an inevitable incentive for a state prisoner to proceed at once in federal court by way of a civil rights action, st he lose his right to do so. This would have the unfortunate dual effect of denying the state prison administration and the state courts the opportunity to correct the errors committed in the State's own prisons, and of isolating those bodies from an understanding of and hospitality to the federal claims of state prisoners in situations such as those before us.13 Federal habeas corpus, on the other

13 This isolation, of course, will not occur if the prisoner is required to proceed by way of federal habeas corpus, with its exhaustion requirement. For "exhaustion preserves the role of the state courts in the application and enforcement of federal law: Early federal intervention in state . . . proceedings would tend to remove

hand, serves the important function of allowing the State to deal with these peculiarly local problems on its own, while preserving for the state prisoner an expeditious federal forum for the vindication of his federally protected rights, if the State has denied redress.

The respondents place a great deal of reliance on our recent decisions upholding the right of state prisoners to bring federal civil rights actions to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972). But none of the state prisoners in those cases was challenging the fact or duration of his physical confinement itself, and none was seeking immediate release or a speedier release from that confinement the heart of habeas corpus. In Cooper, the prisoner alleged that, solely because of his religious beliefs, he had been denied permission to purchase certain religious publications and had been denied other privileges enjoyed by his fellow prisoners. In Houghton, the prisoner's contention was that prison authorities had violated the Constitution by confiscating legal materials which he had acquired for pursuing his appeal, but which, in violation of prison rules, had been found in the possession of another prisoner. In Wilwording, the prisoners' complaints related solely to their living conditions and disciplinary measures while confined in maximum security. And in Haines, the prisoner claimed that prison officials had acted unconstitutionally by placing him in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure, and he sought damages for claimed physical injuries sustained while so segregated. It is clear, then, that in federal questions from the state courts, isolate those courts from constitutional issues, and thereby remove their understanding of and hospitality to federally protected interests." Note, Developments in the Law-Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1094 (*