Any uniform law will interfere with some of the plans of nearly every society, but if no such law is agreed upon, laws framed to curb, restrain and in some cases crush are sure to be drafted by those who do not understand and appreciate fraternalism. The fraternal societies are an integral part of the civilization of this nation of home builders. They weld the ties of union. They "grapple" us together "with hoops of steel." They blend the millions into one common brotherhood. It is worth while for every society to sacrifice something for the good of all. If we work together and secure uniform legislation, we shall discover that it is worth more than it cost, and this congress will prove that it remains true to the objects stated in its constitution. Nothing else can do so much for the "benefit, protection, improvement, and upbuilding of the fraternal beneficiary system." RIVAL CLAIMANTS FOR THE SAME FUNDS, RESIDING IN DIVERS JURISDICTIONS. By W. Holt Apgar. Read Before Law Section, August 18, 1913, Chicago, Illinois. Possibly there is no question quite so troublesome to the counsel for fraternal beneficiary societies, as claims made for moneys payable upon the death or disability of the member by different parties who reside in different jurisdictions, the process of the court not extending to these different jurisdictions so as to permit the society to pay its money into court, and to have the rights of all the rival claimants determined in one action. From inquiry of various counsel for different associations, I learn that all of them have, at one time or another, met this problem, and I find that the most of them have succeeded in disposing of the matter without bumping squarely up against the question as to what they would have to do, provided the claimants would not adjust their demands, or consent to have some one court determine their rights. One case in particular recurs to the mind of the writer in which the member belonged to a local lodge in New York City. The member died in New Jersey. The beneficiary resided in Connecticut, and the rival claimant did business in New York and resided in New Jersey. Being quite will satisfied that I could not secure jurisdiction over the claimants, in either of the three states, an attempt to adjust the differences between the rival claimants and persuade each party to yield somewhat of their claims, resulted in an amicable adjustment and proper releases. At that time the law of New Jersey was pretty thoroughly considered, and it was my belief that by filing a bill of interpleader in New Jersey and paying the money in our court of chancery, I would have been able by publication and personal service outside of the state (such as our statute provides in case of absent defendants in equity proceedings) to have secured a decree in New Jersey; that this course would have been considered binding in New Jersey; but I never was able to find out just what Connecticut, the home of one of the claimants, would have done with that decree, had suit been brought in Connecticut, and this decree of interpleader in New Jersey pleaded in bar, with the statute of New Jersey showing how a defendant could be made a party by publication and personal service outside of the state. My research, however, for this paper has given me the knowledge. It was intimated to me by some of the attorneys in the matter that if the Connecticut court should have thought that the New Jersey court awarded the money to the proper party, that then it might have been sustained, but otherwise it would not have been. My examination of the questions would seem to indicate that we must first determine whether a bill of interpleader in such cases would be a proceeding in rem. C. Y. C. says that a bill of interpleader is not a proceeding in rem, and it seems there is no way to compel a non-resident claimant to come in and interplead. 23 C. Y. C., page 4. It cites several English cases and one Pennsylvania case. Walsh vs. Rhall, 6 Kulp (Pa.), 483. This case, however, observes a distinction which I also find in an Illinois case, "Coe vs. Garvey, 130 Illinois, Appellate Court, page 221," to the effect that at the time the rule for interpleader was filed, the money had not been paid into court. The Pennsylvania Judge says: "The Insurance Company is a New York Corporation. At the time the rule for interpleader was granted, indeed when it was made absolute, the money had not been paid into court, therefore, the court had no such jurisdiction of the fund as would give it jurisdiction to compel a non-resident claimant to abandon his suit in the jurisdiction of his domicile and subject his claim to the judgment of this court." And he refers to the case of Scott vs. Noble, 72 Pa. 115. But none of these cases refers to interpleader suits. The first being an action in debt, where an attempt was made to serve the summons in Massachusetts. The second a suit in foreign attachment. And the third a divorce proceeding. In the case of Coe vs. Garvey, supra, Mr. Justice Puterbaugh, writing the opinion of the appellate court, says: "We understand the law to be that in order that a judgment or decree of one state may be recognized and enforced in a sister state, it is necessary that the court which rendered the same should have been possessed of authority to render such a judgment, and should have had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy, and, where the judgment is said to be given effect as a judgment in personam, that the parties should have been subject to, or brought within its jurisdiction. "13 American and English Ency. Law, 988." "Further that a judgment in personam against a non-resident without actual service or voluntary appearance, but based upon constructive service by publication, will be regarded as void, and a mere nullity, and that only a proceeding substantially in rem can be had on such service. "Black on Judgments, 906." "A determination of the question, as to whether a proceeding by bill of interpleader, such as the present one, is a proceeding substantially in rem, will be decisive of the propriety of the decree here involved. "Appellants contend that in as much as the fund in controversy is peculiarly within the jurisdiction and control of the court, and the sole object and purpose of the proceeding is to determine the rights of the parties to such fund, and no decree in personam, even for costs, being sought or necessary, and the decree to be rendered would operate only against the fund or res in controversy, the proceeding is substantially a proceeding in rem, and that constructive or substituted service is all that is essential. "If the property in controversy could be said to be within the jurisdiction and control of the court, there would be force in appellants' contention. So far as property situated within its jurisdiction is involved, a court has jurisdiction to decree concerning it and all parties and those claiming through or under them are bound, notwithstanding no jurisdiction is obtained of their persons by personal service or voluntary appearance. "Williams vs. Williams, 221 Ill. 541." "The offer made by appellee in his bill to pay a certain sum of money into court, and asking leave to do so, clearly constituted an offer from which he was at liberty to withdraw at any time before the decree, by dismissing his bill. "The proceeding was unlike an ordinary proceeding affecting real estate situated within this state, nor was it similar to the proceeding to establish a lien, by attachment, garnishment, or otherwise, against a thing belonging to a non-resident within the jurisdiction of the court whereby such thing or property only is affected. "It was, therefore, not a proceeding in rem, nor in the nature of such, and a bill against non-resident defendants who had neither been served with process within the state, nor entered their appearance in the state, would have been a mere nullity. "Gary vs. Aid Association, 87 Iowa, 25; 50 N. W. 27." In Williams vs. Williams, 221 Ill. 546, Mr. Justice Hand, writing for the Supreme Court of Illinois, says: "It is next contended that the Superior Court, for the want of personal service upon defendant was without jurisdiction to require the defendant to convey the undivided one-half of said lands to the complainant, and to enter a personal decree against the defendant for the amount due the complainant. |