State constitute the contract. The member has, by express terms, only "the right of appointment" of beneficiary. Even this has its limitations, for he can only appoint from those within certain degrees. of relationship or dependents. The power of appointment must be exercised in strict conformity with the requirements of the Laws of the Association. This right "to designate the beneficiary," while in itself valuable, cannot be transferred. The contract definitely restricts its exercise to the member. Under the provisions of the contract, the member is usually reserved the right to change a beneficiary at any time, and without the beneficiary's consent, if he keeps within the permissible classes and conforms to the method prescribed. Second. The beneficiary has no property right in the Benefit Certificate during the life of the member. The right of the beneficiary is inchoate, a mere gift of expectancy. There is no vested interest in the beneficiary.

Bacon on Ben. Soc., Sec. 291a.

What interest, therefore, has a beneficiary during the member's life?

Coupled together, the member has in a Benefit Certificate only "the property right of designation or appointment" and the beneficiary no "property" or "vested right." Separately, the member and the beneficiary have no assignable interest and it would seem to follow that together they have no larger or different property right in a Benefit Certificate. Nothing plus nothing ought to equal nothing.

A Benefit Certificate, which embraces all the terms and provisions of the contract of which it is only a part, cannot be legally assigned. There are no authorites which we can find to negative this view.

There are, therefore, no legal rights of assignees of Benefit Certificates to be considered. There are, however, equitable rights in assignees of Benefit Certificates as shown by the authorities.

In discussing such rights, let us keep in mind the only property right involved-that of the member to appoint or designate his beneficiary"-and under what circumstances this right may be exercised or surrendered and the effect thereof, in equity.

THE RULE IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS BY BENEFICIARIES VEST NO INTEREST.

Voluntary payment of assessments by the beneficiary without any agreement with the member will not deprive him of the right to change nor entitle the beneficiary originally named to the fund as

against his subsequent designated beneficiary, if the change is made in conformity with the Laws of the Association.

Jory vs. Supreme Council, 105 California 20.
Masonic Mutual Benefit vs. Tolles, 70 Conn. 537.
Bechner vs. Bechner, 104 Ga. 219,

Leaf vs. Leaf, 12 Ky. L. R. 47.

McGrath, 133 Mich. 626.

Spengler vs. Spengler, 65 N. J. Equity 176.

Fisk vs. Equitable Aid Union, 7 Sadler (Pa.) 567.

Heasley vs. Heasley, 191 Pa. 539.

Cade vs. Head Camp, 27 Washington 218.

Preusser vs. Supreme Hive, 133 Wis. 164.

THE STATUS OF BENEFICIARIES CHANGED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN MEMBER AND BENEFICIARY,

Many cases hold that an agreement by the member, for a valuable consideration, with a designated beneficiary, changes the beneficiary's interest in the Benefit Certificate and in some cases converts a nonassignable contract into an assignable one in equity.

We have collected these cases from the several states, as follows:

ALABAMA,

In Stoelker vs. Thornton, 88 Ala. 421, where there was a sale of the Benefit Certificate by the insured to enable him to obtain money for travel as a means of restoring his health, the assignee agrees to pay all subsequent assessments, to which sale the Association assented, substituting the purchaser as the beneficiary in new Certificate, it was held valid and that the purchaser was entitled to receive the entire amount of the Certificate as against the executor of the insured.

CALIFORNIA.

In Grimley vs. Harrold, 125 Cala. 24, an agreement between member and beneficiary was held binding and vested an interest in the beneficiary.

ILLINOIS.

In Jarvis vs. Brinkley, 206 Illinois 544, where an assignment was made by the member and the beneficiary to a creditor who was outside of the permissible classes under the contract, the Court held

that such an assignment although contrary to the provisions of the Statute, was binding in equity and could be enforced by the assignee.

In Crum vs. Sawyer, 132 Illinois 443, the Court held that there was nothing to prevent the member, with the consent of the beneficiary, from assigning to a third party, a Benefit Certificate, if the third party agrees to pay assessments and dues, and such an assignment can be enforced in equity.

In Johnson vs. Van Epps, 110 Ill. 551, where a Certificate was payable to wife and she had died, and the member was not able to keep up further payments thereon, he named one as a beneficiary, having no insurable interest in his life, who in consideration of the designation agreed to furnish him with a home, care for him and pay all subsequent assessments, it was held that such a designation was valid and that the substituted beneficiary was entitled as against the heirs to the entire amount of the Certificate.

Supreme Council R. A. vs. McKnight, 238 Ill. 349, where a person designated as beneficiary had paid dues and assessments in conformity with an understanding with the member that if such payments were made the beneficiary should receive the amount due on the Certificate, it was held that the wife was entitled, but she was required to reimburse the beneficiary designated with the amount of advance with 5 per cent interest.

In Supreme Lodge K. of P. vs. Reyman, 126 Ill. App. 482, where an agreement was made, by which disbursements are made by a party with the understanding that he is to get the proceeds of the Certificate. This gives the party making the disbursements a vested interest in the proceeds although a Certificate is not assignable.

The Supreme Council vs. Tracey, 169 Ill. 123, where a Certificate upon a husband's life was payable to the wife pursuant to an agreement that she should advance him certain moneys and be named as his beneficiary and have the Certificate turned over to her, and the money was so advanced, it was held that the member had no right to change such a designation.

Also McGrew vs. McGrew, 190 Ill. 604.

INDIANA.

In Nye vs. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W., 9 Ind. App. 131, where a Benefit Certificate for $2000 was sold for $300 to one who agreed to pay all subsequent assessments and dues and who was substituted

as the beneficiary, it was held that such an assignment could not be held void as a wagering contract in the absence of proof as to the age or expectancy of life of the insured, where the Constitution and By-Laws of the Society provide for payment of the fund, upon the death of the member, to such person or persons as shall be designated by him.

OHIO.

In Tudor 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 422, it was held that where a member stopped paying dues and assessments on a Certificate payable to his wife and children, and separated from his wife, when the wife. continued to pay them until his death, he had lost the right to change the beneficiaries and the children were entitled to the fund as against the mother of the member, whom he attempted to substitute as beneficiary, although it did not appear that the wife had any agreement with the husband to make the payments.

OREGON.

In Brett vs. Warnick, 44 Oregon 511, the Court approved the rule, where a person becomes a member of a Society under an agreement with the beneficiary named that the beneficiary should pay all assessments and they are paid by the beneficiary, that the beneficiary acquires a vested interest and that the member cannot change without the consent of the original beneficiary. The Court further said, that this being true, there is nothing to hinder the member with the assent of the beneficiary, contracting with a third party, whereby the latter may maintain a vested interest, provided the contract is not such as the Law will not recognize, because contrary to public policy.

KENTUCKY.

In Adams vs. Reed, 18 Ky. Law Reports, 858, it was held that an assignment of the Benefit Certificate by the insured to his mother-inlaw is valid where it was made to entitle her to the amount of such Certificate at the death of the insured, where they lived together as one family, keeping a boarding house and dividing the profits between. them. This was upon the principle that the assignment to one having business relations with the insured is upheld on the theory that the assignee has by reason thereof an insurable interest in the life of the insured.

In Leaf vs. Leaf, 92 Ky. 166, where a wife was designated, it was held that she had a superior equity against an adult child of the member subsequently designated, when the wife by her own means, and with the original Certificate in her possession, paid the assessments, and upon the separation of her husband and herself, their property rights were adjusted upon the understanding that she was to have the benefit of the Benefit Certificate.

MARYLAND.

In Souder vs. Home Friendly Society, 72 Md. 511, where there was an assignment of the Benefit Certificate by the beneficiary, who had an insurable interest in the life of the insured as his creditor, to the creditor of such beneficiary, which was assented to by the insurer and the new Certificate issued to such assignee, the Court held that such assignment was valid and that the assignee was entitled to the entire amount of the Certificate, as such Certificate is a mere chose in action in payment of money, if assented to by the insurer.

In Clogg vs. McDaniel, 89 Md. 416, where there was an assignment of the Benefit Certificate to a creditor of the insured in consideration of the payment by the assignee of all subsequent dues and assessments, such an assignment was held valid and entitled the assignee, as against the original beneficiary, to the entire amount of the Certificate. even though such assignee had no insurable interest in the life of the insured, and especially where the assignment was made because the insured was not able to keep up the payment of dues and assessments. In this case there was nothing in the By-Laws of the Association or in the Statute Law of the State restricting beneficiaries to certain classes.

MASSACHUSETTS.

In Hemms vs. Baker, 161 Mass. 320, the assignment of a Certificate was held valid, where made, with the beneficiary's consent to a third party for value.

MISSOURI,

In McFarland vs. Creath, 35 Mo. App. 112, where there was an assignment of a Benefit Certificate, which was valid in its inception. to one without insurable interest, who subsequently paid the assessments, the Court held that such an assignment could not be regarded as void, unless the agreement between the parties was a wagering contract.