President is in error upon this point, which is the major premise of his argument, his conclusions fall to the ground, and, therefore, owing to its great importance I now present to you a line of precedents taken from the text-writers that establish the true doctrine in this regard, and in doing so I desire to say that I am only referring to the principle ones, and that a volume could be filled with them if it became necessary to give the whole of them.

With regard to the contracts of an individual born in one country with the government of another, most especially when the individual contracting is domiciliated in the country with whose government he contracts and formed the contract voluntarily, for his own private emolument and without the privity of the nation under whose protection he has been born, he has no claim whatsoever to call upon the government of his nativity to espouse his claims, this Government having no right to compel that with which he voluntarily contracted to the performance of that contract. (Mr. John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Mr. Salmon, April 29, 1823.)

The Government of the United States is not bound to interfere to secure the fulfillment of contracts made between their citizens and foreign governments, it being presumed that before entering into such contracts the dispostion and ability of the foreign power to perform its obligations are examined, and the risk of failure taken into consideration. In cases of personal hardship and loss, however, like the present, the Department does not decline forwarding a statement of the grievance, with a recommendation of the claim, to the friendly offices of the Minister of the United States. (Mr. Marey, Secretary of State, to Mr. Fowler, July 17, 1856.)

The people who go to these regions (South America) and encounter great risks in the hope of great rewards must be regarded as taking all the circumstances into consideration, and can not with reason ask their Government to complain that they stand on a common footing with native subjects in respect to the alleged wants of an able, prompt and conscientious judiciary. We can not undertake to supervise the arrangements of the whole world for litigation, because American citizens voluntarily expose themselves, to be concerned in their deficiencies. (Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, to Mr. Burton, April 28, 1866.)

Citizens of the United States who take up their abode in a foreign country and enter into contracts with the citizens or public authorities there are presumed to make their engagements in accordance with, and subject to the laws of the country where the obligations imposed by the contract are to be fulfilled, and are ordinarily remitted to the remedies

afforded by those laws for the redress of grievances resulting from breaches or nonfulfillment of such contracts.

Instances may sometimes occur in which there has been a denial or miscarriage of justice in the courts. In such cases the good offices of the Department may properly be invoked on behalf of the claimant. The claims now in question are not deemed to be of a character which calls for such interposition. (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Wing, December 9, 1873.)

The claimants in this case stand in the relation of parties to a contract into which they voluntarily entered with the Government of Brazil against which they now seek indemnity for losses sustained, resulting, as it is said, from acts of that Government alleged to be in contravention of their contract. It is a well-established rule of this Government that in such cases the parties are remitted for the redress of injuries resulting from any breach or disregard of the contract to the laws of the country in which the agreement was entered into and where it is to be performed. This rule, so far as known, is one generally recognized by other civilized powers. (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Pratt, July 17, 1875.)

This Government does not interfere diplomatically to enforce claims of actual citizens of the United States arising out of contracts voluntarily entered into by them. When a contract is made by them under such circumstances the person is expected to have considered the ability and the readiness of the other party to carry out the contract. In this case particularly such instructions could not be issued. (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Swann, May 4, 1876.)

A breach of contract virtually entered into between a citizen of the United States and a foreign government with which this Government holds diplomatic relations, is not regarded as ground for official interference on behalf of the citizen. (Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, to Mr. Thomas, September 12, 1878.)

In regard to claims of that character (contracts), it is a rule of universal acceptance and practice that the person thus voluntarily entering into a contract with the government of a foreign country or with the subjects or citizens of such foreign power, for any grievances he may have or losses he may suffer resulting from such contract, is remitted to the laws of the country with whose government or citizens the contract is entered into for redress. (Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, to Mr Logan, March 22, 1881.)

We must draw a careful and well-defined distinction between contracts and torts, not technical, but in international procedure, differing from each other just as clearly as they do under the strictest rules of common-law plead

ing. We have and will exercise the right of intervention whenever a foreign government tortiously deprives an American citizen of his property, his liberty, or his life and declines to afford him proper redress therefor. This distinction has been so well taken by one of the most eminent men who has occupied the position of Secretary of State that it is well to quote his language in support of this proposition:

It has not been customary for this Department officially to interfere in behalf of citizens of the United States who may have entered into contracts with foreign governments, which the latter may not have fulfilled. The Department has usually limited its interposition to authorizing the proper diplomatic agent of the Government abroad to use his personal good offices toward obtaining relief for the claimant. The reason for this policy is that claims based on contract are supposed to stand upon a very different footing from those which arise from injuries to person and property committed by the authorities of any foreign government. (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Bassett, June 27, 1870.)

By adopting a foreigner, under any form of naturalization, as a citizen, this Government does not undertake the patronage of a claim which he may have upon the country of his original allegiance or upon any other government.

To admit that he can charge it with this burden would allow him to call upon a dozen Governments in succession, to each of which he might transfer his allegiance to urge his claim. Under such a rule the government supposed to be indebted could never know when the discussion of a claim would cease. All governments are, therefore, interested in resisting such pretensions. I infer from the memorials of Mr. Vigil and of the legislature of New Mexico, that the claims to which you refer arose from contracts, expressed or implied, with the Mexican Government. Our long-settled policy and practice has been to decline the formal intervention of the Government, except in cases of wrong and injury to person and property, such as common law denominates torts and regards as inflicted by force, and not the results of voluntary engagements or contracts.

In cases founded upon contract the practice of this Government is to confine itself to allowing its Minister to exert his friendly good offices in commending the claim to the equitable consideration of the debtor without committing his own Government to any ulterior proceedings.

It seems to me that the President is equally in error, if we are at all to be controlled by usage or precedent, in stating that

the seizure of a custom-house and a blockade is equivalent to the seizure of territory within the meaning of the Monroe doctrine, and that it is our duty to interfere in Central and South America if foreign governments attempt to enforce their rights by this method. In the first place, as I have attempted to show, strictly contractual claims will not be asserted by any such process, and foreign governments recognize this rule just as well as we do, the exceptions being where there is a discrimination of justice or where there is a condition of lawlessness and a failure to comply with the usages of civilized society. If the citizens of foreign governments are subjected to a tortious invasion of their rights with the connivance of any of the Republics of Central or South America, and after every effort made to obtain indemnity without avail, foreign governments proceed to place the revenues of the offending government under their control so as to obtain redress, I deny that there is any seizure of territory within the meaning of the Monroe doctrine to invoke our interference, and I will give you now three striking illustrations in which this very process was resorted to and in which we never asserted any right to intervene or ever made the claim that under the Monroe doctrine it was within our duty or province so to do.

The first incident is that of Mexico. The English claim originated in tort. Under the orders of Miramon a body of rioters had broken into the residence of the British legation, plundered its vaults, and had taken a large amount of money, the property of English citizens. The claim of France was also one for indemnity for wrongs committed by Mexico.

In this connection I direct your attention to an important communication sent by Secretary Seward on August 23, 1862, to Mr. Dayton, the American minister in Paris, which reads as follows:

This Government, relying on the explanations which have been made by France, regards the conflict as a war involving claims by France

which Mexico has failed to adjust to the satisfaction of her adversary, and it avoids intervention between the belligerents.

Of course, we know that these explanations were false, and that the Emperor Napoleon was then engaged in the treacherous attempt to place an Austrian archduke upon the Mexican throne. What I want to emphasize, however, is that the correspondence of Mr. Seward proves that there was no reference whatever to the Monroe doctrine, and no attempt to interfere with the proceedings that the European governments had undertaken to enforce their rights until within a brief period before the time that Maximilian landed at Vera Cruz. Not only this, but afterwards, and after the close of our civil war, Mr. Bigelow, our minister to France, who succeeded Mr. Dayton, absolutely agreed to recognize Maximilian upon the withdrawal of French troops from Mexican territory.

This incident establishes what I am contending for, and that is that the Monroe doctrine does not come into operation until there is an actual attempt upon the part of foreign governments to subvert republican institutions upon this hemisphere.

The next incident is one of extreme weight and consequence in this connection. The seizing of Venezuelan war vessels and the bombardment of Venezuelan ports by Great Britain and Germany have been cited by Mr. George F. Tucker, of the Bosto Bar, in his excellent treatise upon the Monroe doctrine, one of the most instructive and concise expositions upon the subject that I have ever read, as one of the first attempts in history to enforce commercial demands by virtual acts of war. Why did we not interfere in this case? This was an excellent opportunity to put the new doctrine into practical execution. We desisted because Great Britain and Germany both assured us that it was not their purpose to take permanent possession of Venezuelan territory. Under the new dispensation it was a casus belli, and it comes distinctly within the President's proclamation. Under the President's well-chosen terms, it was a