those bequests have consequently failed. It results, therefore, that it rests with the Crown to direct the charitable purposes to which they shall be applied."

Fourth. When the gift is wholly general, indefinite in its terms, and points out no specific object or class of objects, and names no person authorized to select any objects, as of a gift merely to "charitable purposes."

Thus, in Attorney-General v. Matthews, 2 Lev. 167 (1675), the gift was to certain persons, in trust, "for the poor in general, forever." Lord Nottingham held "that the Commissioners of Charitable Uses have nothing to do with it, but it was to be determined by the King himself in this court, upon an information by the Attorney-General in behalf of the King." And afterward, "the King directed it should be given to the maintenance of the mathematical scholars in Christ's Hospital." The same case apparently is reported in Finch, 245, under the name of Attorney-General v. Peacock. In Clifford v. Francis, Freem. 330 (1679), the devise was simply "to pious uses," and the rule is thus stated: "When money is given to a charity without expressing what charity, then the King is the disposer of the charity, and a bill ought to be preferred in the AttorneyGeneral's name for that purpose; but if the charity be expressed, then it is in the power of the Commissioners for Charitable Uses." In Attorney-General v. Baxter, 1 Vern. 247 (1648), the gift was of 600 pounds to John Baxter, the author of the Saints' Rest, to be distributed by him amongst sixty pious ejected ministers. On account of the vagueness and generality of the gift, the King, on the information of the Attorney-General, ordered it to be given to Chelsea College. Although this decree was afterward reversed in 2 Vern. 105, on the ground that Mr. Baxter had the power to select the ministers and so it could be made certain, and was therefore valid, yet the principle that the Crown had the sole power of distributing general legacies was not impugned. In Attorney-General v. Herrick, 2 Ambl. 712 (1772), the devise was to the defendant Herrick and others, upon trust, to be applied to "charitable and pious uses." The Lord Chancellor (APSLEY) said, "There is no objection to the uncertainty of the object, for the King may appoint," and he added, "that he had concluded to apply to his Majesty, as

Lord Nottingham did in Attorney-General v. Peacock." And this was done and a decree made accordingly. In Ware v. Attorney-General, 3 Hare, 195, note (1824), the testator devised all the rest and residue "to the poor." Declaration that the residue ought to be disposed of in charity, "as his Majesty shall be pleased to direct," and decree was made "that it be transferred and paid to such person or persons as his Majesty by royal sign manual should be pleased to appoint. One of the most recent and interesting cases under this head is that of Kane v. Cosgrave, 10 Irish R. Eq. 211 (1876). Peter Doyle by his will left 1,400 pounds "all to be given for charitable purposes," but clothed no one with the power of selection. His executor filed a bill for the administration of assets, and suggested a scheme for its distribution. The court declared they could not distribute a fund bequeathed for charitable purposes generally, or approve of a scheme respecting it, unless authorized to do so by letters missive under the sign manual. And the mode of obtaining such royal assent, and the exact form of the letters missive in such cases, is fully set out in the report. This is a very instructive case, and seems to render unnecessary any further discussion of this branch of the subject.

Having thus laid the foundation we come directly to the question, what is the effect of the executors or trustee's death, without having selected any objects of charity? Let us consider the cases which bear immediately upon the proposition thus involved.

Fifth. Where the gift is general in its own terms, but points out some mode by which specific objects may be selected, as by giving a discretion to some person or persons, and such mode of selection entirely fails. Here also the English Courts do not supply the missing discretion by distributing the fund upon a scheme of their own, but turn over the fund to the King to be appropriated under his sign manual. It may be the line has not always been drawn distinctly, for whether the fund is distributed by the court or by the Crown, the result is the same to the heirs, and the mode of distribution is unimportant; and the main question often discussed, is whether the fund goes to charity or to the heirs, and if to the former, the mode or manner of the distribution is not much, if at all, considered. But the

general drift of the cases is plain. Let us consider a few of them.

In Attorney-General v. Syderfen, 1 Vern. 224, cited in 7 Ves. 43 note (1683), the bequest was of one thousand pounds, "to be applied to such charitable uses as he (the testator) had by writing under his hand formerly appointed." After the testator's death, no such writing could be found.

The Ld. Keeper, GUILFORD, said, "It is no question but the charity being now general and indefinite (this writing not being found) the application of this money is now in the King." And by his order, it was given to the mathematical boys in Christ's Hospital. The same principle was involved in the subsequent case of Attorney-General v. Berryman, Dick. 168 (1755) in which C. by will gave five hundred pounds "to be disposed of in charity at the discretion of Dr. Berryman." Dr. Berryman never disposed of any of the fund in his lifetime, but at his death, directed in his will that his brother, the defendant, should dispose of it at his discretion. The executor of the testator filed a bill for instructions to know whether he could safely pay over the money to the defendant. Ld. HARDWICKE, the most consummate equity judge that ever sat in an English Court of Chancery, held the legacy to be a good and subsisting legacy for charity; "but as Dr. Berryman had not executed the trust reposed in him, it rested with the Crown, and therefore recommended it to the parties to apply to his Majesty to dispose of the legacy." This was done and the legacy distributed accordingly. This seems to be a direct answer to the question under consideration, and has never been doubted, so far as our researches extend. In Attorney-General v. Fletcher, 5 Law J. Ch. (N. S.) 75 (1835), the testatrix bequeathed "the rest and residue of her estate to her sister Ann, but the principal and interest of several annuities as they fell in, she gave to charitable purposes which should thereafter be specified, or in default of which, according to the best judgment of the Rev. Dr. John Maddy, the sole executor of her last will." The testatrix died. without having specified any charitable purposes, and Dr. Maddy renounced probate of the will and declined the trusts,

but proposed to nominate the charitable objects of the bequest. Held, that he could not do so, but that "the disposition was not

VOL. XXXVI.-29

by a scheme, but it ought to be disposed of in charity, in such a manner as the King, by sign manual might direct." So in Re Dickason, 3 Hare, 195, note (1837), there was a bequest "to ten such charities as the testator should name, one hundred pounds to each. If he should not name them, then the executors to make the disposition." The testator did not name any charity and the executors declined to act. It was ordered that the executors pay the residue of one thousand pounds "to such persons as her Majesty should by sign manual appoint for the use of such charities, and in such proportions, as her Majesty should under her royal sign manual appoint."

A comparatively recent case in Ireland illustrates the English law in the class of charities we are now considering with great distinctness. There a testator bequeathed his estate "to William Russell to be by him applied for such pious purposes and uses as should appear to him most conducive to the honor and glory of God, and the salvation of my soul." Upon argument, the bequest was held valid in its nature as a charitable bequest, and by consent of the trustee it was referred to a Remembrancer to report a scheme of distribution, but before he made a report, the trustee died. The court decided that although they had thus far acted as a Court of Equity by consent of the trustee, yet that his death entirely changed the case, and that after his death, the distribution of the charity belonged to the Crown: Felan v. Russell, 4 Irish Eq. R. 701; Longf. & Towns. 674 (1842). The argument is better reported by the first reporter, the judgment by the latter. The case is also much in point upon the case supposed. Here the trustee having the discretionary power of selection, died before his scheme of distribution was fully settled upon; in the case supposed, he dies before any plan is attempted. The result reached in these cases cited under this fifth head, seems to be a logical consequence from the rule so well established by the cases cited under the fourth head. For what practical difference can there be, between a bequest absoJutely indefinite in the first instance, and one which becomes so by matter ex post facto, and before any action taken to carry the bequest into effect? In Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 83 (1802), Ld. ELDON declared that it was "very difficult to raise a solid distinction between them." Might he not have used

still stronger language? If a legacy is given "to A. B. for cbaritable purposes" and stops there, without doubt an English court could administer it only under the sign manual. But if it be to A. B. for such charitable purposes as he may select, and A. B. dies before he sees fit to dispose of any of the fund, the additional clause becomes entirely inoperative and impossible, and the same indefiniteness now arises by the death of A. B. as would have existed had he never been named as trustee, or never had any discretion given him to distribute the fund. We may reach the same result by a somewhat different path. It seems obvious that the language used by the testator in the supposed case indicates a personal trust and confidence in the discretion of A. B. Now it is a well settled principle of the law of trusts, that if a gift is dependent upon the discretion of one trustee, it does not devolve upon another, though a successor in the trust. In Hibbard v. Lamb, 1 Ambl. 309 (1755), E. B. by will gave the residue of her estate "to be disposed of in charity to such persons, and in such manner as her (four) executors, or the survivors of them, should think fit." Two of the trustees died, and on a bill to appoint two successors, Ld. HARDWICKE made the appointment, but he said—“The new trustees could not dispose of the residue in charity, for as the testator had conferred that power upon her executors only, the court could not give it to the new trustees."

Of course, if the discretion had been vested in A. B. and his successors, then the rule is entirely different. Then the mode of selection is not exhausted by the death of the first trustee. The testator has provided an endless chain. This was the point of the decision in Lorings v. Marsh, 6 Wall. 337; Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 364. But suppose no such language of perpetuity is found in the will, it means to say, I give the same to A. B. to be disposed of by. him, for such charitable purposes as he may think proper, and if he does not think proper to so dispose of it, I do not give it to charity. If this were distinctly so expressed, unquestionably, even in England, the estate would go to the heirs at law: De Themmines v. De Bonneval, 5 Russ. 288 (1828). One other test may be suggested. Suppose the executor or trustee named in the will, to whom a fund is given to be disposed of by him to such charities