be asked, Should not the same rule apply when several companies supply the same community?

It would seem so, within reasonable bounds, for as has been heretofore noted, such was the position taken by Lord ELLENBOROUGH, years ago, in a case which has since been many times cited with the greatest respect: Allnut v. Inglis, 12 East. 527.

The leading American case in point is that of Shepard v. The Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 539. The company had the ex-: clusive right of supplying the city of Milwaukee with gas. The plaintiff, a merchant doing business on a street containing one of the defendant's mains, fitted up his establishment with the necessary pipes and fixtures for lighting the same with gas. He applied to the said company for a supply, tendering at the same time, five dollars in advance payment therefor. He was required as a condition precedent, to sign the printed "rules and regulations" of the company. He declined to do so. The company refused to waive the point, and suit was brought to recover damages suffered by the plaintiff because of such refusal to supply. After discussing the question at great length, the court decided that a company of this sort is bound to furnish a supply under such reasonable regulations as it may choose to impose. To act capriciously as to who should be supplied, would, of course, be an abuse of a company's franchise: Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush. 60; Price v. The Riverside L. & I. Co., 56 Cal. 431.

Rules and regulations: Must be fair and reasonable. Thus, one requiring a written application from persons desiring to become patrons of a gas company, has been held to be a reasonable rule; but it has also been decided that the secretary and general superintendent of such company, who acts for the company in relation to furnishing consumers with gas, may waive such regulation and bind the company: Shepard v. The Milwaukee G. L. Co., 11 Wis. 234. But when the application is so connected with an agreement to abide by certain illegal rules and regulations, that a person cannot sign the former without being bound by the latter, there is no obligation to sign the application, and the company by presenting the application in that shape, waives the right to insist that an application should have been made in another shape. And furthermore, where

the company refuses to supply a person with gas because he declines to sign such application, it has been decided that it is not incumbent upon the applicant to repeat his demand each month, for a supply of gas, in order to entitle him to damages for a non-supply during the time it is wrongfully withheld from him.

If the officers of the company afterwards change their purpose, they should notify the would-be consumer to that effect: Shepard v. The Milwaukee G. L. Co., 15 Wis. 318.

To require a deposit, is a reasonable regulation: Wright v. Colchester Gas Co., 30 Gas. J. 336; Samuel v. Cardiff Gas Co., 18 Gas. J. 192; Shepard v. Milwaukee G. L. Co., 6 Wis. 539; Williams v. Mutual Gas Co., 52 Mich. 499; Ford v. Brooklyn G. L. Co., 10 N. Y. Supreme Ct. R. 621. A deposit of one hundred dollars has been deemed reasonable in amount, where sixty dollars worth of gas was used per week. The courts will imply a contract to supply gas where a deposit has been made, and enforce it, when called upon: Williams v. Mutual Gas Co., 52 Mich. 499.

It has been held that a gas company may insist that all governors shall be connected at least one foot from each meter, and that directions as to the care and treatment of meters, may be made and enforced: Foster et al. v. The Trustees of the Philadelphia Gas Works & The City of Philadelphia, 12 Phila. 511; and furthermore, it has been held that a consumer will be bound by a reasonable agreement, signed by him, to allow the officers and employees of a gas company, from which he obtains his supply, to inspect and have the care of pipes upon his premises, whether he read the same or not: Wright v. Colchester Gas Co., 30 Gas. J. 336. Such visits, however, must be made at stated times and with notice: Shepard v. Milwaukee G. L. Co., 6 Wis. 539.

A rule which provides that water rents "shall be payable halfyearly in advance, on the first days of April and October, and if not paid twenty days thereafter, five per cent. additional will be charged, and that if not paid with the addition, within two months, the attachment will be cut off, until the rent, al: expenses of cutting off and putting on, and the rent for an additional half-year be paid," has been held "unreasonable and oppressive:"

Dayton v. Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77. Neither can a regulation be enforced which provides "that after water or gas has been admitted into the pipes and fittings of a consumer, the same must not be discontinued or opened, either for alteration or repairs, or extension, without a permit from the company; the party violating the regulation to be held liable to pay treble the amount of the damage occasioned thereby:" Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 539. It has also been held that the requirement of a gas or water company, that meters shall be placed upon the main pipes supplying apartment buildings, instead of the smaller pipes of the individual occupants thereof, is unjust and unreasonable: Young v. Boston, 104 Mass. 95. Such a company is not bound to furnish separate meters, however, unless there are separate and independent service pipes to connect with each meter: Ferguson v. The Metropolitan Gas Light Co., 37 How. Pr. 189.

Meters: The question arose in an English case as to the conclusiveness of the meter as to the gas consumed. The evidence went to show that meters registered correctly when at correct level; that they registered in favor of the company at high water level and in favor of the consumer at low water level and that bills were less when dry meters were in use. And it was held that consumers must take proper care of their meters: Preston v. Hayton & Raby Gas Co., 25 Gas. J. 889.

It was decided in a New York case where the obligation to take the meter as the measure of the gas consumed, rested upon a contract which the plaintiff required the householder to enter into before it would supply any gas, that such householder would not be bound by the registration of the meter if it had not been tested and certified to by an inspector. That it could not be looked upon as a reliable standard of measurement if this had not been done: The Manhattan Gas Co. v. Flamme, 12 N. Y. Weekly Dig. 245.

It has been held that where a gas inspector could easily have discovered that a meter had been tampered with, but failed to do so, for a considerable time, the company could recover nothing for the gas which passed through it, unregistered, previous to the date upon which the discovery was made: Imperial Gas Co. v. Parker, 5 Gas. J. 372. And where an action was brought

to recover the price of gas, the defendant claiming that he had ceased to use it, although he acknowledged that he had not given notice of the same to the company, his meter showing a consumption of several thousand feet, it was held that, although the Parliamentary Act made the registration of the meter, prima facie evidence of the quantity consumed, a preponderance of evidence to the contrary would be conclusive: Alliance and Dublin Consumers Gas Co. v. Taaffe, 27 Gas. J. 206.

Where a suit was brought to recover for gas not registered, the meter having been so tilted that the water ran out, the jury found for the plaintiff company for the estimated amount that had passed through the meter: Victoria Docks Gas Co. v. Burton, 16 Gas. J. 103. It is the duty of a gas company to keep its meters supplied with water: Hacker v. London Gas Light Co., 32 Gas. J. 781. And where a water meter is placed in a building with the consent of its owner under an ordinance granting such privilege, and specifying that under such circumstances "the water board may charge a rate for water used, based upon the registration of the meter, in place of the specific rate which applies where no meters are in use," an assessment for water used during any given quarter, is collectible, even if it amounts to a much larger sum than would have been the case, had the meter never been put in use: Parker and Another v. Boston, 1 Allen, 361. It has furthermore been held that the board of public works of a city cannot charge certain consumers with expensive meters, put in to regulate the supply for which rent will be charged, without the consent of such consumers, nor impose the penalty of cutting off the water, in case the said consumers refuse to accede to the demands of such board, in said respect: State ex rel. Red Star Line Steamship Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City, 45 N. J. L. 246; s. c. 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 233.

Where nothing is to be found in the charter of a gas company, conferring the right to charge meter rents, a subsequent Act, which provides that "no gas company shall have the right to charge rent for meters, when five hundred cubic feet per month have been consumed," is binding upon such company: The State v. Columbus Gas Light and Coke Co., 34 Ohio State, 572.

The question has come up in England, as to who should

measure water and gas consumed, the company or the consumer, and it was decided, that "it is not correct to treat the company as supplying the consumer, but it is the consumer who is entitled to draw off from the main, what water or gas he requires," and that it was the place of the consumer to supply the necessary registering apparatus. And furthermore, that such measurement could only be effected by a meter or some equally accurate instrument: Sheffield Water Works Co. v. Bingham, L. R. 25; Ch. D. 443.

But is was held in another English case, that in default of a legislative act, consumers should not be compelled to put in meters: Sheffield Water Works Co. v. Carter, L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 632, and this would seem to be the most reasonable view to take.

In several Louisiana cases, it was conceded, that the quantity of water used by large manufacturing concerns could be ascertained with reasonable accuracy by keeping a record of the coal consumed, the basis being, one gallon of water to each pound of coal. It was observed by the presiding judge in one case, that no more reliable data could be obtained, although the method seemed more favorable to the supply company than to the consumer: Levy v. Water Works Co., 38 La. An. 28; Ernst et al. v. N. O. Water Works Co., S. Ct. La., May 9, 1887.

Cutting off supply: The usual course of the companies in case of disputed bills, is to promptly cut off the supply; but it is well settled that an injunction will lie, enjoining such action, pending a judicial investigation.

It was held in one case of considerable interest, that the cutting off gas would be in the nature of irreparable mischief, for, as it was observed by the presiding judge, "the use of gas in cities has become almost as great a necessity as the use of water," and an illegal deprivation of one or the other, and particularly where such use is for ordinary domestic and family purposes, would cause such damage as to call for the interposition of a court of equity: Sickles v. Manhattan G. L. Co., N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1882; 14 Cent. Law J. 301; and upon a subsequent motion to continue the temporary injunction granted in the above case, the same doctrine was again laid down with much emphasis: Sickles v. Manhattan G. L. Co., 64 How. Pr. 33.