and encouraged such classes by newspaper articles and speeches to murder the authorities of the city, and a murder of a policeman resulted from such advice and encouragement, then defendants are responsible therefor."

No one will venture to question the accuracy of this statement of the law. One who persuades another to commit a crime is himself guilty of the crime if it is committed by virtue of his advice. Thus it has been held that if A persuades B to commit suicide: A is guilty of the murder of B: Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816). It is there said: "The government is not bound to prove that Jewett would not have hung himself, had Bowen's counsel never reached his ear. The very act of advising to the commission of a crime is of itself unlawful. The presumption of law is, that advice has the influence and effect intended by the adviser, unless it is shown to have been otherwise. as that the counsel was received with scoff, or was manifestly rejected and ridiculed at the time it was given." In Regina v. Sharpe, 3 Cox C. C. 233 (1848), Chief Justice WILDE stated the law as follows: "If persons are assembled toge her to the nimber of three or more, and speeches are made to those persons to excite and inflame them, with a view to invite them to acts of violence, and if that same meeting is so connected in point of circumstances with a subsequent riot that you cannot reasonably sever the latter from the incite. ment that was used, it appears to me that those who incited are guilty of the riot, although they are not actually present when it occurs. I think it is not the hand that strikes the blow or that throws the stone that is alone guilty under such circumstances, but that he who inflames people's minds and induces them by violent means

to accomplish an illegal object is himself a rioter, though he takes no part in the riot. It will be a question for the jury whether the riot that took place was so connected with the inflammatory language used by the defendant that they cannot reasonably be separated by time or other circumstances." In this case the defendant was indicted for sedition and riot. He had addressed a large assembly of persons, using very exciting and inflammatory language. Shortly afterwards a large crowd moved towards a church, in which several policemen had been stationed, and began throwing stones and conducted themselves in a violent manner. And to the same effect are the text writers," if one purposely excites another to commit an offence, as if he harangues people, inflaming them to riot, and the of fence is accordingly committed, he is guilty, though he personally takes no part in it :" 1 Bishop's Cr. Law 640.

"Every one who incites any person to commit any crime commits a misdemeanor whether the crime is committed or not." Stephens' Digest of Criminal Law, Art. 47.

An Impartial Jury.—What is an "impartial" jury in the sense in which the term is used in the Constitution? Before considering this question, we shall refer to the subject of challenges, by which the right to an impartial jury may be asserted. The counsel for the anarchists claimed that the trial jury was not "impartial" in the constitutional sense, and that they were prejudiced by the ruling as to their challenges. pears that under the laws of Illinois each one of the eight anarchists was entitled to a peremptory challenge of twenty jurors, making the whole number allowed to the defence one hundred and sixty. Of those called into the jury box, seven hundred and fifty-sev

It ap

en were excused upon challenge for cause, and one hundred and sixty were challenged peremptorily by the defence and fifty-two by the State. Of the twelve jurors finally selected, eleven were accepted by the defend. ants. Before the twelfth juror was taken the defendants had exhausted their peremptory challenges, and he was challenged for cause and the challenge overruled. The claim was asserted before the Supreme Court of Illinois that their peremptory challenges having been exhausted before the panel was finally completed, the court should review the action of the trial court in those cases where challenges for cause were overruled, thus compelling the defence to exercise their peremptory challenges. The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, held otherwise, and declared that it must be made to appear that an objectionable juror was put on the defendants after they had exhausted their peremptory challenges. This ruling accords with the opinion which the Supreme Court of the United States had previously expressed in Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430 (1877), and in Hayes v. Missouri, Id. 71 (1877) and which is reiterated in the particular case. And see to the same effect: Loggins v. The State, 12 Texas Ct. of App. 65 (1882); Holt v. State, 9 Texas Ct. of App. 571 (1880); Bean v. State, 17 Texas Ct. of App. 60 (1884); Steagald v. State, 22 Texas Ct. of App. 488 (1886); Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328 (1875); People v. McGungill, 41 Cal. 430 (1871); State v. Simmons, 38 La. Ann. 41 (1886); State v. Drake, 33 Kans. 151 (1885); Collins v. People, 103 Ill. 21 (1882); State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 379 (1881); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 529 (1880); People v. Carpenter 102 N. Y. 238 (1886); Mimms v. State, 16 Ohio St. 221 (1865); Irwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876); Hartnet v.

State, 42 Ohio St. 578 (1885); State v. Gooch, 94 N. C. 987 (1886); People v. Weil, 40 Cal. 268 (1870); State v. Brown, 15 Kans. 400 (1875); Preswood v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 468 (1872); Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 742 (1853); Morton v. State, 1 Kans. 468 (1863); McGowan v. State, 9 Yerger (Tenn.) 184 (1836); Alfred v. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 581 (1853); Ogle v. State, 33 Miss. 383 (1857); Robinson v. Randall, 82 Ill. 521 (1876).

A case must needs lean on a pretty slender reed which at this day depends for a new trial, on the fact that a challenge for cause was improperly overruled, when the peremptory challenges were not exhausted. There is no ground of complaint in such cases except as to jurors improperly received after the peremptory challenges have been exhausted.

Now, inasmuch as this right of peremptory challenge is the right to reject and not to select jurors, if one of two defendants peremptorily challenges a juror, and the other defendant insists that he is qualified, the juror should nevertheless be excluded: State v. Mзaker, 54 Vermont 112 (1881). And because the right of peremptory challenge is the right to reject and not to select, the ruling of the trial judge in rejecting a juror challenged for cause by the State, affords, of itself, no legal ground of complaint to the defendant: State v. Creech, 38 La. Ann. 480 (1886).

If there are several defendants, each of them is entitled to the statutory number of peremptory challenges, but unless the statute expressly provides otherwise the State will only have the same number it would have if there was only a single defendant: Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. 839 (1854); Wiggins v. State, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 738 (1878). And see Smith v. State, 57 Miss. 822 (1880). In the Wisconsin case explaining the

reason for thus restricting the State's right of challenge in a trial of joint defendants, it says that if the statute should be so construed as to allow the prosecuting officer the statutory number of challenges for each defendant, he could multiply such challenges indefinitely by simply increasing the number of defendants, and that such a construction might defeat the very object and intent of this statute. In Illinois the statutes provide that "every person arraigned for any crime punishable with death or imprisonment in the penitentiary for life shall be admitted on his trial to a peremptory challenge of twenty jurors, and no more;"***"and that the attorney prosecuting on behalf of the people shall be admitted to a peremptory challenge of the same number of jurors that the accused is entitled to:" Rev. Stat. of Illinois, 1855, p. 443, 432. Under this statute there being eight defendants, in this particular case, the State was considered to be entitled to one hundred and sixty peremptory challenges. The addition of several counts to an indictment does not enlarge the number of challenges: Commonwealth v. Walsh, 124 Mass. 32 (1878).

Can the court exclude a juror on its own motion? In State v. Ring, 29 Minn. 78, 81 (1882), the court excluded on its own motion a juror on the ground of general disqualification. No challenge for cause had been made, and the defendant took an exception. The right of the court to do this was sustained, the Supreme Court of Minnesota saying: "It is the duty of the court to supervise, and within proper limits to control, the trial of causes before it, to the end that justice may be administered in reality as well as in form. The parties before the court might desire, from different motives, to accept an

incompetent juror-one entirely unacquainted with our language; but the court is not required to yield its assent to such a proceeding, or take part in such a trial. The parties have the right to challenge for general disqualification; but their neglect to avail themselves of that privilege does not prevent the court from inquiring as to the capacity of a juror to discharge intelligently the duties of his place." In Greer v. State, 14 Texas Ct. of App. 181 (1883), it is announced that a court has no right on its own motion to stand aside a juror acceptable to both parties, unless the juror is one absolutely prohibited by law from sitting as a juror.

It is held that the right of peremptory challenge can be exercised so long as the jury has not been sworn, and notwithstanding a previous declaration of the party challenging that he is satisfied with the jury: Jhons v. People, 25 Mich. 500 (1872); Hamper's Appeal, 51 Id. 71 (1883). But the right cannot be exercised after the jury is sworn: People v. Dolan, 51 Mich. 610 (1883).

In Hayes v. Missouri, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the constitutionality of a State statute providing that in capital cases, in cities having a population of over one hundred thousand inhabitants, the State shall be allowed fifteen peremptory challenges to jurors, while elsewhere in the State it is allowed eight peremptory challenges in such cases. This was held not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The following extract from the opinion in that case will prove of interest: "Originally, by the common law, the crown could challenge peremptorily without limitation as to number. By Act of Parliament, passed in the time of Edward I, the right to challenge was

restricted to challenges for cause. But, by a rule of court, the crown was not obliged to show cause until the whole panel was called. If, when the panel was through, a full jury was obtained, it was taken for the trial. If, however, a full jury was not obtained, the crown was required to show cause against the jurors who had been directed to stand aside; and, if no sufficient cause was shown, the jury was completed from them."

That a jury should be "impartial" requires that the jurors should be free from all bias for or against the accuse 1. And this leads us to inquire what opinions disqualify a juror on the ground that he is not impartial in the constitutional sense? There can be no doubt but that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and which is sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States in this particular case, is almost everywhere recognized at the present day as laying down the correct test by which the competency of a juryman is to be determined, who has an opinion based on newspaper statements. It is quite a common thing for counsel to propound to a juror the question whether he has such an opinion as will require evidence to change it. But, while some courts seem to recognize this as a test, the overwhelming weight of authority does not regard it as a proper test, as no rational person ever has an opinion on any subject which is changed or unmoved except by evidence of some kind. Such a juror is competent if he states that he can fairly and impartially render a verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence. The following cases pass on this question where the opinion is based on newspaper statements: People v. Brown, 59 Cal. 346 (1881); Jones v. People, 6 Col. 456 (1882); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 530

(1880); Montague v. State, 17 Fla. 662 (1880); Duyle v. State, 100 Ind. 259 (1884); Wilson v. People, 94 Ill. 299 (1880); State v. Spaulding, 24 Kans. 1 (1880); State v. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 444 (1885); Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 297 (1850); Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430 (1879); White v. State, 52 Miss. 216, 221 (1876); Ulrich v. People, 39 Mich. 245 (1878); State v. Wilson, 85 Mo. 134 (1884); Bohanan v. State, 18 Nebraska 57 (1885); State v. Carrick, 16 Nevada 120, 126 (1881); State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 407 (1870); State v. Fox, 25 N. J. Law 566, 587 (1856); People v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487 (1886); State v. Collins, 70 N. C. 241, 243 (1874); McHugh v. State, 42 Ohio St. 154 (1884); Traviss v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. St. 597 (1884); State v. Dodson, 16 8. C. (N. S.) 453 (1881); Spence v. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 539 (1885); Kennedy v. State, 19 Tex. Ct. of App. 618 (1885); State v. Meyer, 58 Vt. 457 (1886); Dejarnette's Case, 75 Va. 867 (1881); State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 779 (1884). When the opinion is based on having heard or read evidence given on a former trial, see Pierson v. State, 21 Texas Ct. of App. 57 (1886); Thompson v. State, 19 Texas Ct. of App. 594 (1885); Wade v. State, 12 Texas Ct. of App. 358 (1882); Marion v. State, 20 Nebraska 233 (1886); State v. Culler, 82 Mo. 623 (1884); Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 343 (1875). When the opinion is based on rumors, see Jackson v. State, 77 Ala. 23 (1884); Casey v. State, 37 Ark. 83 (1881); State v. McGee, 36 La. Ann. 206 (1884); State v. Anderson, 5 Harr. (Del.) 493 (1854); State v. Reed, 89 Mo. 168 (1886); State v. Green, 95 N. C. 611 (1886); Conatser v. State, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 436 (1883); Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. 833 (1854); Hutchinson v. State, 19 Nebraska 262 (1886); State v. Boyd, 38 La. Ann.

374 (1886). When the opinion is based on conversation with witness, see Penn v. State, 62 Miss. 450 (1884); Walker v. State, 102 Ind. 502 (1885). When the juror has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, see Smith v. State, 55 Miss. 411 (1877); Harrison v. State, 79 Ala. 29 (1885); Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358 (1886); Jones v. People, 6 Col. 452 (1882); Stratton v. People, 5 Col. 276 (1880); Coleman v. State, 59 Miss. 484 (1882); Spain v. State, 59 Miss. 19 (1881); State v. Leabo, 89 Mo. 247 (1886); State v. Hing, 16 Nev. 307 (1881). In Thompson v. State, 19 Texas Ct. of App. 594 (1885), it is held that when a juror has conscientious scruples against the death penalty he is disqualified, although the statute fixes the penalty at death or imprisonment for life.

In Hutchinson v. State, 19 Nebraska 262 (1886), it is held that unfriendly feeling towards the attorney does not constitute ground for a challenge for

cause.

In Boyle v. People, 4 Col. 176 (1878), it is held that the members of an association formed to check a certain crime, are not per se incompetent as jurors in a trial of one accused of such crime, but that the judge is invested with discretion in such cases. In Commonwealth v. Moore, 143 Mass. 136 (1886), a juror was held incompetent who belonged to a Law and Order League which employed the complaining witness to enforce the law and prosecute offenders.

In

Stoots v. State, 108 Ind. 415 (1886), it is held that a juror is incompetent who admits that he would allow less weight and credit to the testimony of the defendant, if he should testify in his own behalf, than he would if such defendant were not engaged in the business of selling liquor. In Carrow v. People, 113 Ill. 550 (1885), it is held to be no legal objection to the competency of a juror that he does not approve of selling liquor with or without a license.

We cannot refrain from adding in conclusion, that while all may regret the necessity of ever sacrificing human life, there has rarely, if ever, been a case in all our history where the necessity of doing it was as great as in the present instance. We can have but little patience with men who, having fled from foreign oppression, and the hard conditions of society in the Old World, to enjoy the beneficent conditions of life in the New, under a government more considerate of the conditions of the poor than any government the world has known, turn upon us and preach the subversion of human government by the use of the assassin's dagger, dynamite, and the torch. Such men are ingrates and idiots, and worse. They are the greatest criminals that walk the earth, and thanks to the courts and to the governor of Illinois in this case it has been revealed that the "velvet glove of Liberty incases the merciless hand of the law."

HENRY WADE ROGERS.