brought an action on the judgment, and recovered a second judgment, no process being served on the minor. B. caused an execution to be issued to the sheriff of Huntington County, and to be levied on the property of the minor there. The minor filed a bill stating the foregoing facts, charging fraud, etc., and obtained an injunction to stay proceedings on the execution : Vansyckle v. Rorback, 6 N. J. Eq. 234. While an infant is a partner, his acts within the scope of the firm business will bind the firm: Avery v. Fisher, 28 Hun, 508 (an assignment); Bush v. Linthicum, 59 Md. 349. A person against whom, with his partner, proceedings in insolvency have been instituted, cannot avoid them on the ground that his partner was an infant when the proceedings were begun, if the infant was then represented by a guardian ad litem, and has ratified the proceedings after arriving at age: Winchester v. Thayer, 129 Mass. 129. Where a person engaged in business as copartner with another, and ostensibly competent to conduct it, incurs in form the usual liability appertaining to it, and escapes such liability by pleading infancy, it is not a just exercise of discretion to allow him to recover costs after having enjoyed the advantages of the purchase of property by the firm: Yamato Trading Co. v. Hoexter, 44 Hun (N. Y.), 491. Where a father invests his own funds and personal services, or the funds of his children in his hands as guardian arising from an unauthorized sale of their property, in a partnership for their benefit, and the children afterwards seek to enforce the partnership in equity, the other partner cannot avail himself of these facts to avoid the contract: Stein v. Robertson, 30 Ala. 286. Where one, being a widow and natural tutrix of her minor children, and having the posession and administration of the property of her deceased husband's succession during her life, entered into a partnership with the heirs, who were of full age, and slaves and other property of the succession were employed and used by the partnership, held, that the minor heirs were not, and could not be made by their natural tutrix, members of the partnership; and that they, consequently, after her death, had the right to sue for and recover from the surviving partners a debt due them by the partnership before a settlement and liquidation of partnership affairs: Cuillé v. Gassen, 14 La. Ann. 5. To the point that the false and fraudulent declaration of an infant that he is of full age, made at the time of entering into a contract, does not prevent him from avoiding the contract at his election, see Burley v. Russell, 10 N. H. 184; Conroe v. Birdsall, 1 Johns. Cas. 127; Ferguson v. Bobo, 54 Miss. 121; Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40; Norris v. Vance, 3 Rich. 164; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142; Curtin v. Patton, 11 S. & R. 309; Stoolfoos v. Jenkins, 12 Id. 403; Brown v. McCune, 5 Sandf. 224; Ewell's Lead. Cas. 219. Where the principal defendant in garnishment proceedings is a firm, a verdict discharging one of the partners because he is an infant does not release the garnishee: Bethel v. Chipman, 57 Mich. 379. It seems that where two persons have held themselves out as partners, one of them being of full age, cannot be heard to allege, as against the firm creditors, that a contract of partnership was voidable because the other was a minor: David v. Birchard, 33 Wis. 492. Chicago. MARSHALL D. EWELL. ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTH- SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE.10 SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN."1 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY. 12 SUPREME COUrt of new hAMPSHIRE. 13 SUPREME COUrt of oregoN.15 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA." COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.8 SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHU- SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.16 AGENTS. Irrevocable interest, coupled with a power, must be an interest in the thing itself, and not in the product. Hence, the State of Missouri could revoke the appointment of an agent who had given security for the faithful prosecution of a claim of the State against the United States, in consideration of an agreed commission on the amount collected, all expenses to be borne by the agent: State v. Walker, S. Ct. U. S., April 2, 1888; 125 U. S. 339. ATTORNEY-AT-Law. Privilege of counsel to speak defamatory words in his capacity as counsel, in the trial of a cause in a court of justice, is qualified and not absolute, and extends only to such words as have relation to the cause or subject-matter under judicial investigation: Maulsby v. Reifsnyder, Ct. App. Md., June 13, 1888. BILLS AND NOTES. Bankrupt member of a solvent firm cannot be held liable on a firm note, renewed in the same firm name, after his discharge in bankruptcy and withdrawal from the firm, of which notice had been given in a newspaper, but no actual notice given to the payee: Eustis v. Bolles, Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass., March 6, 1888. 1 To appear in 125 U. S. Rep. 10 To appear in 80 Me. Rep. " To appear in 62 Mich. Rep. Patent rights, when paid for by promissory notes, are not interfered with by the Penna. act 12 April, 1872, P. L. 60, requiring the words "given for a patent right" to be prominently and legibly written on the face of the note or other negotiable instrument: such act is not unconstitutional, and, by preventing gross frauds, is a valuable police regulation: Shires et al. v. Comm., S. Ct. Penna., May 14, 1888. CONSTITUTIONAL Law. Drains were authorized by a borough ordinance, without providing for compensation for damages in taking ground in opening them; no statute or other authority provided for the assessment of such damages, but the State Constitution (Art. XVI., § 8) required compensation, and consequently the ordinance was void and an entry to make such drain would be a trespass: Borough of Strasburg v. Bachman, S. Ct. Penna., April 30, 1888. Gifts, as inducement to purchase goods, are improperly forbidden by law, as such an act is not a proper exercise of police power, not being necessary to protect the public health, comfort, and safety; nor of the public policy which forbids lotteries, there being no pretence of a lottery; it is to be distinguished from the Pennsylvania law against oleomargarine, sustained by the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Comm., which was designed to protect the public health from a detrimental manufacture: People v. Gillson, Ct. App. N. Y., June 5, 1888. Liberty, as used in the Constitution clause, "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," means more than mere freedom from physical restraint: it is the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation; some or all of these fundamental and valuable rights are invaded by a law forbidding the seller of food from giving away any other thing as a part of the sale and as an inducement, and such law is invalid: Id. Reputation of a building as a place for the sale of intoxicating liquors is made evidence by the Rhode Island Pub. Stat. chap. 80, § 3: this is within the legislative power to change the rules of evidence, as it is not in conflict with Art. I. § 10, of the Constitution of that State, securing to all persons prosecuted for crimes, the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against them": State v. Waldron, S. Ct. R. I., April 14, 1888. Telegraph companies may be nominally taxed upon the shares of their capital stock where the basis of taxation is the proportion which the length of its lines within the State bears to their entire length. The national statute (July 24, 1866; Rev. Stat. §§ 2563-9) giving telegraph companies the right to run their lines over the public domain, post-roads, etc., is merely permissive, without granting exemption from the ordinary burdens of taxation beyond forbidding such taxation as would interfere with or impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they serve the government. Consequently, the tax, though valid, cannot be enforced by an injunction forbidding the operation of the wires until payment: W. U. Tel. Co. v. Att'y-Gen. Mass., S. Ct. U. S., March 10, 1888; 125 U. S. 530. CONTRACTS. Real estate broker cannot recover commissions for selling land unless he has procured a contract for the sale of the property which could be enforced between the seller and the party whom the broker has procured: Pierce v. Truitt, S. Ct. Penna., February 20, 1888. Receipts are subject to explanation, unless they contain a contract; such contracts are as binding as any agreement regularly framed : hence, a receipt for a promissory note, specifying that the note was given for the purchase of 379 shares of stock of a certain corporation, then held by the person signing the receipt and to be delivered on the payment of the note, is a valid conditional sale or agreement for sale on the performance of the condition: Davison v. Davis, S. Ct. U. S., March 19, 1888; 125 U. S. 90. Restraint of trade for a limited period of time, but unlimited as to place, is void, and no action can be maintained on an agreement for the sale of a business in consideration of $5000 and the covenant in restraint of trade, the parties making no separate valuation of the different elements of the consideration which was therefore entire and inseverable: Bishop v. Palmer, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., April 6, 1888. CORPORATIONS. Stockholder cannot file a bill in behalf of himself and others who might join, against the corporation and its directors, unless he asks for relief, which has been sought within the corporation and refused, or the bill contains such averments as to satisfy the court that there is a sufficient reason for not applying to the corporation before filing the bill: Dunphy v. Traveller N. Ass., S. Jud. Ct. Mass., April 6, 146Mae 475 1888. Subscription to the stock of a proposed business corporation may be procured by a secret agreement of the promoters with the subscriber, to buy from him within one year his stock at the subscription price: this is not a contract between the subscriber and the corporation; the subscriber is bound to pay for his stock; and, where there is no actual fraud, the promoters may facilitate the formation of their company in this way: Meyer v. Blair, Ct. App. N. Y., June 5, 1888. 972 Foreign corporations may be excluded entirely by State laws, unless in the employ of the National Government, or engaged in a business which is strictly commerce, interstate, or foreign, and consequently may be put upon terms of admission into the State when not so excepted; they are not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws; and the corporations of one State are not such citizens as to be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; being artificial and not natural persons: Pembina C. S. M. & M. Co. v. Penna., S. Ct. U. S., March 19, 1888; 125 U. S. 181. CRIMINAL LAW. Abduction from one State by the law officers of another will give no jurisdiction to the criminal courts of the latter State, to try and punish the parties so carried away: State v. Simmons, S. Ct. Kan., May 4, 1888. DAMAGES. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered in a civil action, where the complaint is for wilful removal of soil and destruction of fences: it is not material that the act is not punishable criminally: Greeley, S. L. & P. R. R. Co. v. Yeager, S. Ct. Colorado, May 4, 1888. DIVORCE. Residence is not bona fide obtained, if complainant departed from the State of his residence because dissatisfied with its divorce laws and came into this State, intending only to remain long enough to obtain a divorce and then return: though, if he came intending to remain, the motive for selecting this State would be immaterial : Colburn v. Colburn, S. Ct. Mich., June 15, 1888. EXECUTION. Homestead is a term to be understood in its popular sense as a house where a family resides, without regard to the architecture, or location in the business part of a town, which would make it more valuable as a store, or the leasing of part of the building for mercantile uses, so long as the house is actually, and not nominally, a residence: Bebb v. Crowe, S. Ct. Kan., May 4, 1888. FIRE INSURance. Application for insurance, falsely filled out by the soliciting agent of the insurers, when he had been truthfully told by the applicant, and knew the condition of the premises from personal examination, is not binding on the applicant, though he had signed it after hearing the truthful part read to him, presuming all his answers had been correctly written down. The soliciting agent's acts in writing down the answers were those of the insurers and not of the applicant, and the stipulation, on the face of the application, that all the statements, answers, and descriptions were the acts of the applicant, were an attempt to create, on paper, an agency in the solicitor for the applicant, which, in fact, did not exist: Continental Ins. Co. v. Pierce, S. Ct. Kan., May 4, 1888. |