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confronted Pétain in the last days of February, 1916. few days after he reached Verdun his army had accepted as their watchword, "They shall not pass"-an old Garibaldian cry which they had made their own. Pétain's strategy was to sell the Germans such parcels of ground as he could spare, at tremendous cost to them, and meanwhile to wait for the great new British Army in the north to get ready on the Somme for its first offensive of real magnitude. Verdun became the graveyard of German hopes. Nothing in French history is finer than its story. Pétain was the soul as well as the brains of that epic.

After Verdun the politicians chose a lieutenant of Pétain's instead of Pétain himself, to replace Joffre, who had grown old and weary. It was an unfortunate choice, and Nivelle's failure at the Aisne in April and May, 1917, for the moment shook the morale of the French army as well as that of the French nation. After that Pétain was chosen to reorganize the army and restore confidence. He transformed the situation in such fashion that, in a few months, the army was able to win a new victory at Verdun and Pétain obtained a shining success at the Aisne by taking Fort Malmaison. He suffered afterward from the rapid growth of the reputation of Foch. That the Allied commander-in-chief was the greater soldier will probably be the judgment of history, but that he owed much to the loyal and competent aid of Pétain was unmistakable. They worked in complete harmony at all times and this was a tribute to the patriotism of each. Not one of the three Marshals created in this war could have been suspected of the smallest selfish ambition. Magnificent as were their achievements, those of the civilian and republican, Georges Clémenceau, probably were as great. Without Clémenceau not even Foch could have saved France and brought about the German capitulation in the forest near Senlis.

Pétain's appointment as Marshal of France was made just as he was marching with his army into Metz. It was characteristic of the stern, grave way in which France entered into the war that she should have appointed no Marshal at its outbreak. The Marshal's baton was there waiting for some one, but it had first to be won by some extraordinary achievement. It had not been so in other times. Napoleon III fairly encumbered the French army with Marshals, appointed for no great services, and there was an additional drop of bitterness in the French cup of defeat in 1870, in the fact that the men who were so easily surrounded, played with, and beaten by the Germans, were all Marshals of France. It was a Marshal who surrendered Metz, and a Marshal who commanded the army which surrendered at Sedan. France then learned her lesson. She determined in this war to make no man a Marshal unless he compelled

her to do so, and three men had now compelled her. Joffre did not get his baton until he had retired from leadership and his fame was forever secure. Pétain did not get his until he had marched into Metz at the end of the war. In Foch's case France was hurried into giving him a Marshalship while yet there was a chance of defeat; because he had been made Generalissimo he had to have the highest rank. This stern rule had made the title of Marshal of France the most glorious in the military world; there was now no other that touched it. The three men were not merely worthy of being in a class with the first Napoleon's Marshals, but surpassed them, for there was some poor timber in that generally glorious list, some names that are now almost unremembered while no Frenchman will ever forget the names of Joffre, Foch, and Pétain.

Pétain was Commander-in-Chief of the French armies, as Haig was of the British, Cadorna and Diaz of the Italian, and Pershing of the American. Properly speaking, Foch had not been a French General at all since he became Generalissimo. He was the commander of all the Allied armies, and responsible, not to France, but to the Allied War Council at Versailles. He was the General of the Allies, as Pétain, Haig, Pershing, Cadorna, and Diaz were the generals respectively of the French, British, American, and Italian armies. Some time before this, ill-advised admirers of Pétain had demanded a Marshal's baton for him for his superb direction of the French armies, but they were quietly put aside. Afterward they were glad because now Pétain had received the compliment of getting his "Well done" at the end of a series of victorious campaigns, and at the moment when he was performing the physical act of restoring Metz to France-Metz, which had been surrendered basely by one of the lesser Napoleon's marshals nearly fifty years before.30

Pétain when the war broke out was preoccupied with training officers. Altho fifty-nine years old in 1916, his mental and physical vigor made him appear younger. His brigade in making the long retreat from Charleroi to the Marne in 1914 had repeatedly harassed the enemy with savage ferocity. Just before the battle of the Marne he was promoted to command a division and later was chosen to command an army corps at Arras. Carency, a masterpiece of German defensive work, considered impregnable, but taken in 1915 by Pétain, was a brilliant local victory. In September, 1915, he served with distinction under Castelnau in Champagne. The war had found Pétain a retired colonel, noted for strategic ability. It was Joffre who made him a brigadier-general. In September, 1914, he was a general of division and passed rapidly on to army corps commander 30 The Times (New York).

and army commander. The Allied offensive in Artois and the success won in Champagne owed much to Pétain.

In December, 1917, when Joffre was made a Marshal of France and the question of his successor at the front arose, Pétain seemed destined to have the post. He was then in command of the armies of the center, comprising the front between Soissons and Verdun, but apparently Pétain's adherence to the principle of having absolute field command, independent of political interference, stood in the way of his selection, and the appointment went to Nivelle. How much power Pétain insisted on wielding, and whether it included command of all the Allied armies and the economic dictatorship of France, was not disclosed, but his later appointment to supreme command was not looked on by those who knew' Pétain as indicating that he had made a surrender of this principle.

Pétain was a soldier's soldier who did not care for politics and politicians. Tall, broad-shouldered, virile, and blue-eyed, he was a man of few words, cold energy and. iron will, and his calm demeanor covered resources of power and determination. His stonelike expression frequently relaxed into a rather whimsical smile, and, on occasion, he could speak with a warmth of eloquence which, devoid of all fine phrasing, nevertheless carried his every word straight to the heart. His poilus adored him despite his uncompromising firmness; he was fair in his judgments and he knew just how to mingle with his men. By his mere presence and tact he calmed all the agitation which followed the offensive of April, 1917, the causes of which are well known to-day and could easily be guessed then. His record as a thorough reorganizer included much work in rebuilding the French forces. Inexorable in discipline, going to the length of meting out the death sentence, he at the same time was held in the highest esteem by the rank and file for brilliant military qualities. Soldiers followed him devotedly and the people of France had great faith in him. One of the finest things said by any commander in the war was said by Pétain. When a French army, in 1918, was about to occupy German soil, he warned the poilu against reprisals. "So act," said he, "that the enemy will not know which to admire more, your heroism in battle, or your conduct in victory."

WILLIAM S. SIMS, ADMIRAL OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

It was said of Admiral Sims that, much as the quiet order of Admiral Dewey at Manila "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley," had gone into history, so probably would stand some words of Sims, who, on arrival at Queenstown in the early summer of 1917 with a fleet of American destroyers, when asked by the British com

mander how soon he would be ready for duty, replied calmly: "We can start at once." The high place which Sims acquired with the British was strikingly emphasized soon afterward when the Admiralty transferred to him chief command of the Allied naval forces in Irish waters during an absence of the ranking British Admiral. That responsibility was an important one, for it meant protecting the big liners that were plying between America and Great Britain. Sims had sometimes been called "L'enfant terrible of the American Navy." He was outspoken, had a way of breaking through red tape and "speaking out in meeting"-at least when he thought criticism would be of benefit to the Navy. At a formal dinner in London, in 1910, Sims declared that, if England should get into the war which then seemed imminent, the Navy of the United States would be found fighting beside the Navy of Great Britain, his exact words as reported being: "If ever the time comes when the British Empire is menaced by an external foe, she can count on every dollar, every ship, and every drop of blood of her kindred across the sea!" After this sentiment had reached the Kaiser, Germany promptly entered a protest to Washington. The President disavowed the country's sympathy with the statement, and Sims was reprimanded. Sims had himself achieved his advancement in the Navy despite all the traditional handicaps. By hard work and unflagging zeal, he had demonstrated his capability and his capacity for taking the initiative. He knew fully the military value of personality and popularity. Possessing personality in marked degree he was in that sense akin to Admiral Sir David Beatty, of whom a British sailor exclaimed after the battle of Jutland, "Confidence in David? Why, we'd go to hell for David!"

Sims failed grievously when as a boy he sought admission to Annapolis, but this did not dishearten him; it only made him determined not to be refused again, and so he set to work to master the subjects in which he had been most deficient. Once more he presented himself and was accepted. Devotion to duty, uncommon fearlessness and an ambition to see our Navy the best in the world, were leading characteristics of his. Sims had a thorough knowledge of the service and the courage to impress his opinions upon those in authority, even when this might be unpleasant business. He was a Pennsylvanian, but born in Canada. His father, A. W. Sims, had married a Canadian woman, who lived at Port Hope, Ontario, and there William was born October 15, 1858. He spent his boyhood in Canada, and then his father moved back to Pennsylvania. There were three boys in the family, and when William was seventeen, his father was offered a place for one of them at Annapolis. The others did not care to go and so William had his chance for a

naval career. "It is not saying too much to credit Sims with having pulled the Navy by its own boot-straps high out of a rut in which it once seemed in a fair way to remain," said a writer in the New York Sun. In that way Sims's career ran somewhat alongside of Lord Fisher's. Improvement in gunnery had always been one of his main hobbies. Another was efficiency, with promotion by merit and not by years of service. He was typically cosmopolitan. Probably no man in the American Navy had known intimately so many ranking officers in European fleets. He was well-known in the naval circles of London, Paris, and Petrograd, and everywhere welcomed because of his personality and his professional attainments.30a

ALFRED VON TIRPITZ, GRAND ADMIRAL OF THE GERMAN FLEET

Germans had their own word for Tirpitz; he was "Tirpitz the Eternal," which freely interpreted meant that among numerous qualities he possest one that was rare in German cabinets; he was the one minister who displayed tenacity in holding his job. No German since Bismarck had held public office so long. The Kaiser had had an endless succession of chancellors, foreign ministers, war ministers and colonial secretaries; but "Tirpitz the Eternal," until he was suddenly displaced early in 1916 on the submarine issue, apparently had a life tenure. With the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February, 1917, however, he returned to power and on him was placed the chief responsibility for the colossal crimes with which that warfare thereafter was carried on. Things that lay on the surface did not really produce this war-neither the ultimatum to Serbia nor hurried mobilizations, nor the invasion of Belgium. Back of all these stood in succession a long series of events which as deeply affecting national interests, ambitions, and fears, had changed national policies and popular psychology. One fact that probably had most to do in changing the whole morale of the German people within a few years was the German navy, and that meant Tirpitz. He was more than a sailor, politician or administrator; he was a statesman who, for good or ill, fundamentally directed the course of European history.

No longer ago than 1890 Lord Salisbury for lands in Africa had given Heligoland back to the Kaiser-that same Heligoland which in the World War served so effectively as a German naval base. The explanation was simple enough; in 1890 the German Empire had no fighting fleet. For many years afterward Great Britain still unallied with any other Power, could glory in her "splendid isolation." For a generation Russia, silently meditating the over30a Adapted from an article in The Literary Digest.