Vladimir Sukhomlinoff, and Sukhomlinoff chose as his right-hand man, Brusiloff. Thus transferred from the sunny south to the rather forbidding climate of Petrograd, Brusiloff was brought into close touch with the elder Grand Duke Nicholas and with his sons, who were deeply interested in the Cavalry School, as a place both for fine military training and for brilliant social functions.

Brusiloff rose steadily until he obtained command of a section of the Cavalry Guard, the corps d'élite of the Russian army. He developed the theory, then novel in Russia, that the training of an officer in time of peace should conform as closely as possible to the conditions of war, and so demanded from officers under him rigorous tests in horsemanship, including long cross-country rides at night and in bad weather. Remonstrances from the mothers of darling sons threatened with pneumonia and broken necks, were sometimes carried to Court and so made their way to the Emperor, who, at a Court function, would take Brusiloff to task, and Brusiloff would answer: "Very good, your Majesty, I will discontinue the rides if you will guarantee that the enemy will attack us only in sunshine."

During the Japanese war, as the single-track Siberian railroad could take east only one army corps a month, the bulk of the Russian European army never became involved, and so Brusiloff did not see service against Japan. He was one of a group of able, trusted commanders who were held in Europe for use in case any of Russia's neighbors to the west should take advantage of her Manchurian difficulties, as they did, three years later, when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kaiser Wilhelm "stood beside his ally in shining armor." To that incident the present war was in large part directly due, for the act of Austria in thus turning the Berlin Treaty into a "scrap of paper" sank deep into many Russian minds, and among others, into the mind of Brusiloff, who thenceforth looked forward to war as inevitable.

Brusiloff learned how to execute great movements in warfare by knowledge and experience gained while associated with the Grand Duke Nicholas and from visits to grand maneuvers in France. The Grand Duke and Brusiloff both knew French battlefields and the war chiefs of France, and so understood the magnificent spirit and sense of equality that existed in French armies. Joffre returned some of these visits, and was present at a grand Russian maneuver as late as 1913. Brusiloff married early, but was early left a widower, and afterward married the second daughter of Madame Jelihovski, a well-known Russian novelist. The second Madame Brusiloff worked like a Trojan after the recent war began, particularly in hospital and Red Cross work. In 1916, when she

visited her husband and brother at the front, she took from Moscow, Kieff, Odessa, and Vinnitza, four carloads of Easter gifts for soldiers. Brusiloff was then the head of a complete army officered by half a dozen generals.

He had done such fine work at Lublin before the war that he was transferred to Warsaw, then an advance post of the Russian army toward the west, where at that time, General Skalon was in command, while Rennenkampf was in command at Vilna, further north, facing East Prussia, Ruzsky being commander of the military district to the south, which faces Galicia, with headquarters at Kief. Of army centers, Warsaw was the most important. There Brusiloff had an opportunity to think in terms of armies, rather than corps, and to handle considerable bodies of troops. He had two desires unsatisfied, one for an independent command, another for a place close to the frontier. Warsaw, from a military point of view, was badly placed and essentially weak, threatened as it was from both East Prussia and Galicia.

Brusiloff, confident that war was coming, obtained a transfer to Vinnitza, southeast of Warsaw, in the province of Podolia, as Commander of the Twelfth Army Corps, his military standing making it certain that, if war broke out, he would be placed in command of an army which might consist of five or six corps. He was at Vinnitza, at the end of July, 1914, when the Czar began to mobilize his army in order to meet the already far advanced Austrian mobilization. A decisive battle was fought on this line in the opening days of September-before the battle of the Marne and was won by the Russians, being the first great Allied success. Ruzski captured Lemberg, and Brusiloff at the same time captured Halicz, making Russian victory complete. The Austrian army alone never recovered. Only when stiffened by German troops did it ever afterward make any real headway against the Russians. Ruzski fought westward toward Krakow, the capital of Poland, while Brusiloff fought on a line running parallel, some seventy miles further south, being the extreme left wing of the Russian forces which, on the right, touched the Baltic. Przemysl was invested, but not assaulted, because the Russians were already suffering from lack of guns and shells. The Russian army instead swept forward, round the fortress, toward the Carpathians, locking up three Austrian army corps in Przemysl. A strong Austrian force, gathered in eastern Hungary, attempted to relieve the beleaguered garrison, but as it made its way through Lupka Pass, Brusiloff, with his base at Baligrad, met and smashed it, and Przemysl surrendered.

As Brusiloff was afterward fighting his way into the Carpathian

passes, Mackensen gathered on the little Dunajec River, east of Krakow, a vast weight of guns and ammunition with which to carry out his famous drive. He did not try to push back the whole Russian line, but simply sawed at it at a single point; and, by threatening to cut it through, compelled the whole line to move backward, which it did, unbroken and undislocated. Brusiloff had to take his part in the general retreat, but never wholly relinquished Galicia. He remained, in fact, on enemy soil through the first twelve months of the war. In the spring of 1916 he began another campaign with a higher command, a far larger and more vigorous force, vastly greater supplies of guns and ammunition, riper experience, indomitable faith, and with the enthusiasm of a united nation behind him. But of Brusiloff's subsequent career details have already been given in an earlier part of this work.1

GENERAL COUNT LUIGI CADORNA, ITALIAN COMMANDER-INCHIEF

Seldom has a human face been more lined than that of Cadorna, whom the Paris Gaulois, as early as 1916, hailed as one of the great soldiers of the Latin world-the man who, when Italy declared war, went at once to the front as commander-in-chief of her forces and long led them to success, but only to fail in 1917 at Caporetto. Cadorna was a Count, but by no means as impecunious as Italian Counts sometimes have been. He was described in Italian dailies as of the offensive, rather than the defensive, school of strategy, with theories of the art of war in marked antithesis to those of Joffre. Cadorna was one of the highest living authorities on tactics, concerning which his ideas were Frederickian rather than Napoleonic. Frederick II strove first of all for homogeneity in his army, which was a unit before it was anything else, artillery, cavalry, and infantry welded together like links in a chain through a series of drills that made the whole force a simple instrument, responsive to the touch of the master. There could be no raw levies in such a body of men— regiments scraped together in a hurry after the fashion of some of the Napoleonic masses. Cadorna went back to the great days of Prussian militarism for his ideals. He could never wait patiently as Joffre did for the time to fight. He was swift and daring, a dealer of tactical blows, a contriver of strokes, to whom war was an art rather than a science.

Cadorna belonged to one of the most distinguished families in

4 Adapted in the main from an article by Charles Johnson in The Times (New York). Mr. Johnson's wife is a sister of Brusiloff's wife.

Italy. His father, like an uncle of his, had served in the Piedmontese army during the war against Austria and won renown in those campaigns. General Raffaele Cadorna was in his day a tactician who informed the mind of his son with his Frederickian ideas. The son was the Italian Count in perfection. In him we had instead of the bluff good nature of Joffre, instead of the pious simplicity of the Grand Duke Nicholas, the slightly sophisticated good breeding of an Italian who was at home in the two worlds of Rome, the clerical and the political. He belonged, by right of birth and family tradition, to a circle in which a Pope's brother would have been distinguished. He had very little of the modern Roman in tastes and habits, but belonged rather to the rural aristocracy. He early won affectionate admiration by a genial simplicity beneath fine manners, that came, or seemed to come, from the heart. At sixty-five when the war began, he still danced beautifully.

Strive as it might to belittle Cadorna's prestige as a tactician, the Viennese press admitted that he had won a reputation greater among professional soldiers than among masses of Italians. His work on tactics had been translated into German by order of the Berlin General Staff. The book was unique because of the importance it attached to mobility in an army. He was not a soldier who could sit down in a trench and wait. He attached infinite importance to minute knowledge of topographical details and so came to know the frontier between Austria and Italy so well that he could have made a livelihood as a tourist's guide. He carried his passion for topographical detail to such a point that he thought Napoleon's years of success coincided with occasions when he was in a country familiar to him; the Russian campaign became a disaster because he was in an unknown land. thing in modern military Germany which was commendable to Cadorna was the insistence of her general staff on the acquisition of maps of every region in which the Kaiser's forces were ever likely to fight.

The one

The seared visage of Cadorna, the slight stoop in his shoulder, his bleached-out aspect, seemed a result of the physical strain of a long and hard career. He had been almost everything in the shape of an officer that a man could be in the Italian army—a military cadet at Milan and Turin, a lieutenant through grades until at thirty-three he was at the head of a regiment. When little more than twenty-five he began to study German military history, which confirmed him in admiration of Frederick II as one of the few great captains of the world. War became for Italy a grand rush upon the foe. There could be little doubt that what

German papers said with reference to Cadorna was true—that his initiative was so fraught with recklessness, or perhaps one should say with daring, as to involve tremendous risks. On the other hand, Cadorna summed up in his nature a combination of qualities which was Italian instead of German. Cadorna's mind did not impel him to foresee every contingency so precisely that he arranged in advance just what he would do in any event. He was too artistic, too subtle, not to leave something to the inspiration of the emergency itself. There was much in this reasoning that imprest the Parisian press, which gained from Cadorna a decided impression of genius.

He looked like a man of genius to the Secolo, which credited him with an amiable sympathy with anybody about anything. The Italians called that characteristic politeness of the heart, which all agreed that Cadorna had. He was an impressive figure at the royal palace in Rome on great reception days. The gold and the dark blue, red and white of the uniform of his rank brought out his face and form impressively. He wore a mustache finely waxed, and the Queen invariably gave him her hand to kiss, an honor of which she was not prodigal. Cadorna never adapted himself to the gastronomical habits of Roman society, which eats heavily at unusual hours. He rarely dined out, except in the years when he was stationed near Verona. He had a reputation in the service for severity to young officers who danced and dined to excess. He also set his face severely against the motor craze when it broke out among mere lieutenants and poorly paid captains. He made no secret of his belief that the enemy of efficiency in the army was social ambition, which he deemed only a shade better than gambling. His charm of manner and his sweetness of disposition enabled him to put down these and many similar weaknesses among his staff without manifesting the least bruskness. He indoctrinated them with his tactical conceptions and at the same time avoided even the appearance of being obsessed with them. Cadorna made his home at different times in Naples, Genoa, Verona, and Ancona, manifesting in each the easy affability of the Italian aristocrat. Much was said in Italian character sketches of his social gifts. A brilliant talker, with an intuitive perception of the weak points, as well as the strong ones in people he met, Cadorna showed a fine hand in avoiding feuds between Clericals and Anticlericals, which tended to divide Rome. He was credited with the sort of faith that accompanies a temperament naturally artistic. His recreations reflected this artistic impulse, for he was fond of the opera, especially of Verdi's music, and admirers of d'Annunzio insisted that he was one of them. All agreed that his