That every

1

to supersede Section 914, Revised Statutes. thing after a judgment looking to its review in an appellate court is regulated solely by the acts of Congress. Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S., 281. Regulations concerning preserving of exceptions are not governed by State statutes. Chataugay Co. v. Petitioner, 32 L. ed. (U. S.), 511. The means of enforcing a judgment are not within State statutes but Sections 915 and 916, Revised Statutes, U. S. v. Train, 12 Fed., 853. A stay of execution is not governed by State statutes; that Section 916 supersedes 914. Lancaster v. Keller, 123 U. S., 389. Garnishment proceedings will not be followed. Atlantic R. Co. v. Hopkins, 94 U. S., 13. Mandamus proceedings will not follow State practice. Batch Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall., 250. A proceeding to restore records is not within Section 914, Revised Statutes, 3 Biss (U. S.), 307. Whenever Congress has legislated on or in reference to a particular subject involving practice or procedure the State statutes are never held to be controlling. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S., 476.

The judge in submitting a case to the jury may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks necessary to assist them, call their attention to parts of the evidence he thinks important and express his opinion upon the facts; and the expression of such an opinion cannot be reviewed on a writ of error if the charge is fair on the facts and no rule of law is incorrectly stated.

Vicksburg R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S., 545;

U. S. v. 1363 Bags of Merchandise, 2 Sprague, 25, 88.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JURISPRUDENCE, LAW REFORM, AND PROCEDURE.

The Permanent Commission on the Revision of the Judicial System and Procedure in Courts appointed by this Association has absorbed much of the duty formerly devolving on this Committee. For the past two sessions no formal report has been thought necessary from this Committee at all. Perhaps its former recommendations were considered to have reached so great a perfection as to be incapable of improvement. Certain it is that so many legislative changes have been proposed by this Association that have never been acted upon by the Legislature, that it seems wholly inadvisable to indulge in many more at present. Legislative reform moves only in response to a crying need, and along lines on which there is a substantial consensus of opinion. Your Committee believes both prerequisites obtain in reference to the general existence of our City Courts. The want of equity powers, and the irregularities of jurisdiction and practice in these courts are a constant source of embarrassment. They should either be put on a basis of constitutional uniformity, or substituted by more numerous judges and more frequent sessions of the Superior Courts; and we believe the preference is with the latter course. The experiment of frequent sessions of the Superior Court has been made in many counties, and in one entire circuit-The Toombs-and works with eminent satisfaction, grand juries as a rule attending but twice per year, and in some counties where litigation is light, every other term has not even a traverse jury summoned, but serves as an appearance term and a rules day, to hear demurrers and motions and shape issues for trial. We know of no county that has abandoned the plan and returned to two terms per

year.

Attention is called to the provisions of Section 6165 of the Code on the supersedeas of money judgments when carried

up by writ of error. Under the law as written, the supersedeas bond must be filed and the costs paid up "on or before filing the bill of exceptions." Should either be delayed until the day after, no supersedeas exists, and equity cannot interpose to prevent the collection of the money by even a non-resident or an insolvent: Parker v. Shouler, 133 Ga. 696. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 139 Ga. 608. It is intolerable that an insolvent who is unable to repay on reversal, should be permitted to collect money of a defendant who at any time pays the costs and offers to make bond for the condemnation money when the judgment becomes final. Your committee, having had its attention called to this by an actual occurrence, recommends that Section 6165 be amended by permitting the payment of the costs and giving of the bond to be done at any time pending the writ of error, so that an affidavit of illegality might be interposed to prevent the enforcement of the execution. thereafter. This might be effected by adding to the section the words:

"If such bond is filed, and all costs then accrued paid, subsequently to the filing of the bill of exceptions, further proceedings under the judgment shall be stayed till a decision is had upon the bill of exceptions."

Subsection of Code Section 5858 disqualifies as a witness the opposite party as to a transaction or communication when the suit is "instituted or defended by a person insane at the time of trial, or by the indorsee, assignee, transferee or by the personal representative of a deceased person." Following the rule of strict construction prescribed by the act from which the section came, the court has held the disqualification not to apply when the suit was instituted or defended by heirs at law instead of by the personal representative of a deceased person: Oliver v. Powell, 114 Ga. 593(5). On page 601 the attention of the Legislature is called by the Supreme Court to the defect. One might thus, after administration to the heir, deprive him of property which could not have been touched while in the hands of the administrator, or maintain a

suit successfully against the purchaser at an administrator's sale which could not have been maintained against the administrator. Again, only the immediate or first transferee from the deceased person is protected, a second transfer or grant being beyond the protection of the Statute: White v. Jones, 105 Ga. 26, Castleberry v. Parrish, 135 Ga. 528(5). Thus a purchaser of a note or a title from a deceased person might be safe, but could not transmit it to another purchaser, and perhaps not to an heir. Yet again, while it has not been the subject of decision, it appears that the transferee from an insane person, has no protection under the statute as it stands. All this is in manifest contradiction of the purpose and policy of the original act, and every amendment that has been made to it. Your Committee suggests that the statute would be greatly improved if the words "indorsee, transferee or assignee" be stricken, and other words inserted so as to make it read:

"1. When any suit is instituted or defended by a person insane at the time of the trial, or by the personal representative of a deceased person, or by any successor in right or title of such insane or deceased person, the opposite party shall not be admitted to testify in his own favor against the insane or deceased person or his successor in right or title, immediate or remote, as to transactions or communications with such insane or deceased person."

Your Committee recommends that the Legislative Committee be requested to prepare specific bills covering the two matters last mentioned, and present them to the Legislature.

SAMUEL H. SIBLEY, Chairman.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON

INTERSTATE LAW.

The desirability of greater uniformity in the laws of the several States has been annually brought to the attention of this Association, with special emphasis on certain laws proposed by the Commission on Uniform State Laws. Most of these laws have been enacted by the legislatures of some of the States, some by all the States, but Georgia has never taken any action on any of them. The last three reports to this body of the Committee on Interstate Law have been especially good and persuasive. They are, we think, the last word on the subject. They should be studied by the individual members so that the advantages of each proposed law could be explained to the voters and the representatives in the Legislature, that favorable action on them by the legislature may be had. At least some of these proposed laws should be adopted in Georgia to insure that freedom business of to-day demands. Only by a propaganda in the interest of their adoption can we hope to secure the benefits of these laws.

This Committee would renew the recommendations of its predecessors that at least the following of these proposed laws should be adopted in Georgia:

The Negotiable Instruments Act; adopted by every State in the Union save Georgia.

The Uniform Divorce Law. Our society being dependent upon the domestic relation, and the frequent, and sometimes hasty, change of domicile from one State to another, make it imperative that we have one common divorce law.

A uniform law governing the execution of wills and the disposition of property thereunder. As man cannot choose his death bed, the rule in one State governing the execution of his will and the disposition of his estate should be the same in every other State.

There is an intimate commercial relation existing between