A STATEMENT BY WILLIAM J. ROGERS, PAST NATIONAL COMMANDER, THE AMERICAN LEGION, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SEPTEMBER 15, 1977

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee on International Relations: It is a distinct pleasure for me to appear before you today representing the American Legion. Needless to say, we are each aware of the thousands of inches of newsprint and the hours of television coverage which have been devoted to the proposed Panama Canal Treaty in the past month. My reason for appearing before you today is two-fold: first, to represent the viewpoint and position of the American Legion as adopted by our recently concluded 59th National Convention and my observations in traveling during 12 months throughout the United States and Panama. Secondly, I will spell out-objectively and dispassionately-what our concerns are and why we object to this specific treaty.

During these past 12 months, it has been my honor and privilege to visit all of the Departments of the American Legion. We have a department in every state and territory making up the United States. At each meeting, without exception, our members were concerned about the possibility that the United States Government would relinquish sovereignty of the U.S. Canal Zone and Canal. Furthermore, we would give it to a dictatorship in Panama which runs contrary to our natural instincts as American citizens.

Today, I have come to speak for our four million members of the American Legion and the American Legion Auxiliary. We represent miners in West Virginia; grain growers in Illinois and Iowa; energy producers of Texas; machinery manufacturers in New York; and shipping industry of all states where rivers and harbors open to the sea altogether we represent a composite and microcosm of the United States. For most of us in the American Legion and all our citizens are either buyers or sellers of commodities passing through the Panama Canal.

Moreover, all of us are dependent on the protection of the U.S. Navy to control the seas surrounding our country in the center of the Western Hemisphere. Quite frankly, the main thrust from every Legion Post was the same, deep apprehension about the proposed Treaty with Panama. Not the least concerned were our Legion Posts in the U.S. Canal Zone. Did the United States really intend to abandon its citizens to a dictatorship? If so, what did the United States stand to gain from such a giveaway?

I don't think it will come as a surprise to the members of this committee, but I think it may come as a surprise to certain of our leaders in the Executive Branch and to certain of our national cartoonists in recent weeks, but the typical Legionnaire, who also happens to be the typical American, understands the Panama Canal situation. The average Legionnaire understands the facts and the realities of standing straight for what is right, and objecting to something which is wrong and not in the American interest.

Though we have opposed any treaty which would surrender U.S. control and ownership since 1960, Legionnaires throughout the country have been given both sides of the picture. In The American Legion Magazine, which goes to every member, we invited the top spokesman for the Republic of Panama, Ambassador Gonzalez Revilla, to state the case for the Panamanian government. The Ambassador's position to transfer ownership of the Zone and Canal to Panama was printed in full in the October 1976 issue of our magazine. Congressman Daniel Flood was invited to state the case for U.S. sovereignty in the same issue.

At our National Convention recently completed in Denver, we invited Ambassador Sol Linowitz to come and to take as long as he liked to state the case for giving the U.S. Zone and Canal to Panama. As you know, Ambassador Linowitz is articulate and knowledgeable on all the issues as the U.S. negotiator, and presented the Administration's viewpoint to our Foreign Relations Commission for well over an hour.

Since this was the major issue to be decided by our National Convention in 1977, we decided to set the Panama resolution aside from other foreign policy

considerations and vote on it separately, by roll call department by department if necessary, so we could be sure that the National Convention did not trespass on the will of our members, so we would know the real vote.

After the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Commission, Dr. Robert P. Foster, seated here beside me, read the resolution, the convention members in a voice of one, called out for a vote. The vote to oppose giving the U.S. Zone and Canal away was unanimous. Although there were over 3,000 delegates representing the 2.7 million members of our organization, there was not one dissenting vote! The silence of the "nays" was as persuasive as vocal shouts of the "yeas." The truth is that The American Legion has expressed its collective judgment. The full text of that resolution is appended to my statement today.

I will now discuss the reservations and objections which we have to this proposed treaty. The first is the strategic and military importance of continued U.S. control of the Canal and the Canal Zone. At the onset, we realize that the United States has a one-ocean Navy with a global responsibility.

Today all but 13 of the ships in the U.S. Navy-the exception being the large aircraft carriers can pass through the Canal. Moreover, we, along with the Congress, must be "forward looking" and long-range prognosticators regarding the true effects now and in the future of the proposed treaty. As each of you are aware, we have made a national commitment to the "mini-carrier” concept. And, when they come on line in 3-5 years, I have been assured by the Navy that they can traverse the Canal, making the Canal even more important in a military sense in the years ahead.

Hanson Baldwin has recently written: "It is ironic, indeed, that in an era when the U.S. Navy needs the Canal to a greater degree than at any time since the end of World War II, Washington is considering its abandonment. The Navy today is in the same strategic bind it was in prior to World War II: It is a one-ocean Navy (in size and power) with two-ocean responsibilities. We are outnumbered in submarines and surface ships by the Soviet Union, and, more than at any period since 1945, the Navy must have a quick transfer capability between Atlantic and Pacific in order to meet sudden crises.

"General V. H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.), writing in the summer 1975 issue of Strategic Review, summarized the Canal's naval importance: "In truth the Panama Canal is an essential link between the naval forces of the United States deployed in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. It is only because of the waterway that we are able to risk having what amounts to a bare-bones, one-ocean Navy." "During the Vietnam War about 98 percent of all supplies for our forces were shipped by sea; of this total, approximately 33 percent were loaded in East and Gulf Coast ports and transited the Canal. The volume of military-sponsored cargo in the four years from 1964 to 1968 increased, for dry cargo, by some 640 percent and for petroleum products by about 430 percent. And the number of U.S. Government vessels (chiefly naval) transiting the Canal increased from 284 in 1965 to more than 1,500 in 1968."

Within the military community, and among the retired and active military, there is great diversity of opinion. In addition to the historic letter of four distinguished Chiefs of Naval Operation, including the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, saying that the proposed Treaty is contrary to the security interests of the United States, we are hearing from many military leaders and the majority of these opinions, like the majority of our citizens, are opposed to the give away of the Zone and the Canal.

From a military viewpoint, a commander never gives away strategic territory which he may have to fight to regain. The U.S. Canal Zone is strategic territory. All the military, both active and retired, agree on that point.

From an economic perspective, the Canal is vital to United States interests. In 1975, approximately 14,000 ships transited the Canal of which 45 percent originated in the United States and 23 percent were bound for the United States. No other nation even approaches the invaluable, economic stake which we have in the Canal. However, the Canal is important to all maritime commercial nations since 96 percent of the world's merchant fleet can transit it.

The Canal is just this year assuming an additional commercial importance to the United States as Alaskan oil begins to flow. When the Alaskan pipeline reaches its full capacity, it will yield 1.2 million barrels of oil a day. The west coast of the United States can accommodate only 700,000 barrels a day. This means that approximately 500,000 barrels a day cannot be used on the west coast, and must be transported to the east. No pipeline has yet been constructed across the United States, and the trip around the Horn, as has been demonstrated,

is not economically feasible. Unhindered use of the Panama Canal is critical until an adequate pipeline can be constructed.

Moreover, at the present time, the United States has an over-all investment in Panama of $7 billion. By the year of our total evacuation under the terms of the Treaty, the interest will have grown to $9.3 billion. To add insult to injury, the Treaty proposes that we pay some $50 million per year, plus about $350 million in economic and military aid to have the Torrijos group take over the territory and property.

Contrary to popular argument, control of the Canal by the United States serves the best economic interests of the people of Panama. In 1976, U.S. agencies purchased over $29 million worth of goods in Panama, and we paid over $108 million in wages to non-U.S. citizens. United States private investments amount to 50 percent of the capital investment in Panama. And U.S. employees spent $39 million there.

In the Preamble to The American Legion Constitution, we pledge to "safeguard the principles of justice, freedom and democracy" in 1977 terms this translates into human rights. As this Committee is aware, Panama is a dictatorship, or in the words of Ambassador Bunker before Congressman Murphy's committee, an "authoritarian" government.

The aspect of the Torrijos government which is most significant, is that it is a repressive dictatorship. Freedom House, the respected organization which ranks countries on the basis of human rights, gives Panama the lowest rating in Latin America. Panama received the same 1977 rating on political and civil liberties as the Soviet Union, and was rated even lower than Cuba.

Gen. Torrijos came to power in Panama by a coup and is governing without the consent of the people. The truth is that since Gen. Torrijos participated in the overthrow of Panama's constitutional government by gunpoint in 1968, 1.6 million people have lost their human rights. There is no political party except the Communist Party, called the People's Party, El Partito del Pueblo. Furthermore, the monies from Panama Canal annuities do not go directly to the people, the money goes to the Torrijos power group.

As you are probably aware, the Panamanian constitution requires a plebiscite vote of the people for ratification of any new Treaty, which will be held on October 23. The said irony is that the controlled and censored Panama press— "guided" in the terms of our chief negotiator-will never give a full and objective account of the Treaty to the Panamanian people.

Another concern which we have is the political association and economic stability of the government in Panama. On the economic side; under Gen. Omar Torrijos, Panama's national debt has grown from $167 million to $1.5 billion. The debt service alone will consume 39 percent of that country's budget this year. Panama's Department of Planning indicates that to refinance loans coming due, together with the $139 million deficit, a total of $323.6 million will be required. Obviously, Panama cannot financially afford to have the Treaties rejected either.

Politically, Panama's Omar Torrijos has alined himself with the most repressive pro-Communist regimes in this hemisphere-those of Cuba's Fidel Castro, Jamaica's Michael Manley, and Guyana's Forbes Burnham. According to U.S. Information Agency, Torrijos issued a communique last April with pro-Arab terrorist dictator Col. Moammar Qaddafi of Libya denouncing what they called "Zionist aggression by Israel." The communique was issued at the end of a weeklong visit by Torrijos to Libya, for the purpose of creating close economic and political ties between the two countries.

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten stated in their nationally syndicated column on June 16 that they had evidence that this Torrijos-Qaddafi meeting had also resulted in a secret deal between Libya and Panama to give Arab extremists a foothold in the Americas and to cooperate with the Arab boycott against Jewish manufacturers.

Torrijos has also busied himself with making closer political and commercial ties with the Soviet Union. Again, according to the U.S. Information Agency, top officials from the Soviet Politburo and Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party visited Panama last June. Almost immediately after the Soviet Politburo team left Panama, a Soviet commercial delegation headed by Nikolai Zinoviev arrived and concluded a major Soviet-Panama commercial agreement with the Torrijos regime. This agreement, according to news reports in the Torrijos-controlled newspaper Critica, could result in the opening of a Soviet bank to run Soviet commercial activities throughout Latin America, as well as a series of other multi-million-dollar-trade and construction projects with Panama.

Whether it was a Treaty of intent or as pact of infinite promise, we don't know. The treaty was signed by Omar Torrijos' brother-in-law, Marcelino Jaen, and Soviet leader Nikolai Zinoviev who is also listed as a KGB agent. After the signing, Panama's Jaen declared the Soviet treaty "*** is an event of deep historic signing, not only for our country, but for the American continent as well, who are always facing strong forces that represent a philosophy that is contrary to the destiny of Latin America."

Of deepest concern is Torrijos' close ties with Fidel Castro and Cuba. Cuba under Castro continues to aggressively export and pursue communist domination and control of other nations. Just this past week-end, the New York Times reported that 4,000 more Cubans were sent to Angola recently to "stabilize the nation's most serious crisis since the 1976 civil war." The 4,000 Cuban troops would increase Cuban troop strength in Angola to 19,000. This to me clearly indicates that Castro hasn't backed off one inch from his declared goal of communist domination of the Western Hemisphere and the world.

Also of concern is the reliability of the Panamanian dictator to live up to what he signs. Panama has violated the present Treaty at least 11 times during the past two years. These violations included such militant acts as the Panamanian National Guard taking up positions in December 1975 within the U.S. Zone; attempting to arrest and actually shooting a citizen in the U.S. Zone in January 1976; setting off bombs and explosions in the U.S. Zone in October 1976, and capturing a vessel, the Sea Wolf, which was operating inside Canal Zone waters and burning and desecrating our United States flag.

Our Ambassador has protested such lawless Treaty violations, but one must question the wisdom of appeasing and making further concessions to a government whose recent history is pockmarked with deliberate violations of the current Treaty. If our current Treaty with Panama is being violated on a routine basis, where is the logic that such attitudes and behavior will improve between 1977 and 1999, the magic year when Torrijos is supposed to get everything, lock, stock and barrel?

I would like to turn now to the question of United States sovereignty. Many of the arguments for the switch in sovereignty and much of the conscious or subconscious motivation for it stem, in part, from ignorance or distortion of the manner in which the Panama Canal territory was acquired by the United States and of the wording of the original Treaty of 1903.

Contrary to these assertions from public officials who should know better, we did not steal the Canal, nor does Panama have residual, titular, or any other kind of sovereignty over it. The United States bought the Canal territory-a strip across the Isthmus of Panama some 50 miles long and 10 miles wide-at a cost to the American taxpayer that far exceeded the cost of the Louisiana Purchase, the Mexican cession, the Florida Purchase, the purchase of Alaska, or any other territorial acquisition.

Despite current contentions by the State Department that the 1936 Treaty revisions recognized Panama's sovereignty over the Canal Zone, it is clear that in both wording and intent the Treaty actually re-emphasized the sovereignty, in perpetuity, of the United States.

History and the law appear to indicate in no uncertain terms that there is no merit whatsoever to the concept that the Treaty of 1903 vested so-called titular sovereignty or residual sovereignty in Panama. The wording is clear and unequivocal: "The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control" of the Canal Zone. "The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned . . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority."

One cannot transfer sovereignty unless one exercises it. The United States has, and will retain until Congress decides otherwise, complete sovereignty and control over the Canal Zone in perpetuity.

Even Gen. Torrijos in his remarks following last Wednesday's signing acknowledged United States sovereignty and I quote: "What nourished the hopes of Panamanians for the recapture of their sovereignty was their feeling that the North American people fundamentally harbored no colonial aspirations,” (emphasis added).

I will now turn to the Treaties and the accompanying Annex and Protocol. This analysis is based upon the limited time in which these Treaties have been available to this layman and I urge each member of this Committee to scrutinize these documents.

(1) Sovereignty is the crucial factor in the new Treaties. Both the Prologue to the Canal Treaty, and at least six other times in the document, Panamanian sovereignty over the U.S. Zone and the Canal is acknowledged. As I stated earlier, once Torrijos is granted sovereignty all other questions are irrelevant.

(2) According to recent analysis of the Treaty, should Panama abrogate the Treaty, the United States would have no legal basis in international law to maintain its position in the former Canal Zone.

(3) Article II, Section 1, of the Canal Treaty specifies that it should "be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of the two parties." However, it would appear that the Executive Branch is seeking ratification of the treaties without seeking enabling legislation from the House of Representatives to transfer real properties, appropriation of funds and perhaps other legislation which is not spelled out, as required by the Constitution of the United States. This by-passing of the House of Representatives appears to be an usurpation of legal powers which is clearly conveyed to the House by the Constitution.

(4) Article XII, Section 2(b), states that "during the duration of this Treaty the United States of America shall not negotiate with third states for the right to construct an inter-oceanic canal on any other route in the Western Hemisphere, except as the two parties may otherwise agree." In plain terms, the United States has surrendered its rights to negotiate for a competing canal elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere unless it has Panama's consent.

(5) Article V of the Canal Treaty directs that employees of the Panama Canal Company, their dependents and other American nationals should "abide by the laws of the Republic of Panama and abstain from any activities in competition with the spirit of this Treaty." This Article also directs that they abstain from any political acts in the Republic of Panama. As I stated earlier, there are American Legion Posts in the Canal Zone and I am deeply concerned about forcing American citizens to submit to a dictatorship and their surrender of rights as Americans.

(6) Article IX, Section 3, recognizes the right of ownership of improvements to realty but does not recognize the right to own real estate. While we do not know how many Americans own property in the Canal Zone, if any, it would appear that this Article condones or perhaps authorizes exappropriation of property by the Panama government.

(7) Article XIII relates to payments to Panama for the right to operate the Canal. One such payment of $10 million per year from profits is cumulative which means there is a possibility that we could, over the 23 year period of the Treaty, end up owing the Panama government $230 million.

Additionally, I have strong reservations and objections to the Neutrality Treaty: (1) Only Article IV of this Treaty bears upon U.S. responsibility concerning the neutrality of the Canal and the entire document is so vague as to be virtually meaningless. In my lay reading of the entire Neutrality Treaty, I find no assurance that the United States can intervene to assure the neutrality of that vital area.

(2) Article III (e) states that "vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of all nations. shall at all times be entitled to transit the canal." This statement assures the passage of warships through the canal of nations which may be at war with the United States.

(3) Article VI, Section 1, states that vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of the United States and the Republic of Panama "will be entitled to transit the canal expeditiously." The exact meaning of the word "expeditiously" is vague at best. Moreover, Article VI, Section 1, of the Neutrality Treaty appears to be in direct conflict with the protocol accompanying the treaty which states that vessels of all nations will be insured permanent access to the canal "on the basis of entire equality."

In brief summary, an evaluation of the facts about the Treaty have brought us Louisiana. Below Baton Rouge the river has natural depths exceeding 120 feet to the day of the signing, September 7, 1977-a bad day for the United States. United States military and national security losses are sufficient to reject the treaty. We are giving up our naval fleet flexibility at a time when we have fewer than 400 ships in the entire United States Navy. Economic losses of the United States are difficult to calculate, but logic dictates that U.S. consumers and exporters are going to pay the toll increases. Additionally, the cost to the United States taxpayer is in the billions. Moreover, someone will pay the billions of dollars owed international bankers by the Torrijos government. It will not be Panama. The Torrijos government is living on borrowed money and borrowed time.