"The committee considered the matter further in executive session February 9 and without objection ordered the convention favorably reported to the Senate. "The convention will not result in any costs to the United States.

"The 1914 treaty has long since outlived its usefulness, if it ever had any. The 1970 report of the Atlantic-Pacific Inter-Oceanic Canal Study Commission [to which I have just referred] emphatically rejected a possible canal route through Nicaragua. There is nothing to be gained by continuing the old treaty in force and a good deal to be lost in terms of our political relations with Nicaragua. The committee therefore recommends that the Senate advise and consent to ratification of the convention terminating the 1914 treaty."

Mr. President on pages 2484-2485 of the Congressional Record for February 10, 1971, there is a further explanation of the matter which will be voted upon shortly and the reasons why the Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously recommended ratification to the Senate.

Mr. Cook. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield for a question? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. Cook. Is it not true that the United States has never exercised any rights or options granted by the 1914 convention, including any use of the Corn Islands? Mr. MANSFIELD. None whatsoever.

Mr. Cook. I thank the Senator from Montana.

(The following remarks by Senators Tower and Cotton, made later in the day, are printed at this point in the Record by unanimous consent.)

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, it is no secret that troubles in the Caribbean are increasing and that the strategic importance of base rights in that area is greater now than at any time since the end of World War II. Our current rights in Nicaragua, which date from the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1914, could be exercised should an emergency situation arise in that area, or should the balance of power be adversely affected on our southern approaches. Our naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba is currently one of our main bastions of defense in the Caribbean; however, it must be recognized that this is a sensitive area and events could hinder normal operations out of that base. Our current rights in Nicaragua would become very important should such events befall us in Cuba.

The strategic considerations, Mr. President, are very important in deciding what we should do with regard to the proposed abrogation of the BryanChamorro Treaty; however, there are other matters which must also be considered. We are currently considering what should be done in regard to the Panama Canal.

There are some proposals to build a canal through Colombia; others advocate modernization of the present canal. My own thought is that for the present we should complete and modernize the existing Isthmian Canal, which can be done at a fairly moderate cost. Nevertheless, by approving the Convention before us today, we are precluding options which are currently open to us. At the present, the only alternate site to Panama to which we have rights is Nicaragua. There has been considerable talk about acquiring rights of Colombia for building a canal; however, we do not now have these rights and with no other options open to us, it could be difficult to acquire them. In addition, when the Panamanians know that we have no real alternative to the Panamanian site in deciding where to build a possible new canal, their bargaining position will undoubtedly harden.

Mr. President, I am as desirous as anyone of good relations with our neighbors to the south. Indeed, I am proud of the fine relationship that we have developed and improved over the years with Mexico, a nation with which my State of Texas shares much common heritage. For many years, we have had a fine relationship with Nicaragua and for most of that time the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty has been in effect. I cannot see why the continuation of this treaty, at least until we have decided what we are going to do in the Isthmian Canal situation, will prevent the United States and Nicaragua from continuing this most desired cordial relationship. Therefore, I feel that I must vote against this abrogation of the rights of the United States at this unsettled time; I believe that this Convention could better be considered when the situation in the Caribbean is more stable and our direction is regarded to the Isthmian situation is more clear.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, the only reason I wish to make a brief statement concerning my position and my vote on this treaty is that 2 years ago, representing the Committee on Commerce; and in company with representatives of the

House of Representatives, I made a trip to Panama and, under the guidance of Canal Zone officials and those military officials who had been working with the Commission studying possible canal routes, spent several days, during which time we started over a proposed alternate route for a sea level canal in Panama, parallel to the present canal, and also over a proposed route just over the line in Colombia for a sea level canal.

During that time, as we were briefed on the problem, it was the position of those who had studied it-a position entirely consistent with the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations-that the proposed Nicaraguan route, for which we have treaty privileges, was more expensive, less practical, and the most unlikely to be resorted to of any of the proposed routes, and that construction of such a sea-level canal would necessitate the removal of a considerable number of the inhabitants. It was also emphasized that while the most favorable route would probably be through Colombia, with the situation that confronted us and the attitude of Panama as well as the attitude, to a lesser extent, of Colombia and other nations in that region, we might find it extremely difficult to acquire rights in case something happened regarding the present canal; that to acquire rights to a parallel canal in Panama, considering our relations there now, would be extremely difficult and it might be difficult to acquire the most favorable one also, which would be in Colombia. It was their attitude that it would be unfortunate if we surrendered the rights we have in Nicaragua, unless or until we were able to obtain some assurances of obtaining rights to build a canal either in Panama or in Colombia, should it become necessary or desirable.

So, while the unanimous report of the Committee on Foreign Relations is completely true in its statement regarding the remote possibility of our ever exercising our rights in Nicaragua, the fact is that I was thoroughly indoctrinated and convinced during the time we were down there and on the scene, and consequently I felt it necessary to vote against the treaty at this time because I had a feeling it was not timely to do so now, and that some effort should have been made at least to look toward securing some alternative rights, probably in the most favorable route, in Colombia; hence, I was compelled to vote against this treaty.

CONVENTION WITH NICARAGUA TERMINATING THE BRYAN-CHAMORRO TREATY OF 1914

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Weicker). The hour of 3 o'clock having arrived, the Senate will now proceed to vote on the resolution of ratification of the Convention with Nicaragua terminating the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1974, Executive L-91st Congress, second session, to be immediately followed by a vote on the Extradition Treaty with Spain, Executive N-91st Congress, second session. The yeas and nays having been ordered the clerk will call the roll on the first treaty.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh), the Senator from California (Mr. Cranston), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Eastland) the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Hollings), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. Hughes), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Humphrey), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Inouye), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Long), the Senator from Washington (Mr. Magnuson), the Senator from Montana (Mr. Metcalf), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Montoya), the Senator from Maine (Mr. Muskie), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Pell), and the Senator from California (Mr. Tunney) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGee), the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss) and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McIntyre) are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Jordan), is absent because of illness.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. Hughes), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. Humphrey), the Senator from Washington (Mr. Magnuson), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGee), the Senator from Maine (Mr. Muskie), and the Senator from California (Mr. Tunney), would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Allott), the Senators from Arizona (Mr. Fannin and Mr. Goldwater), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Hansen), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. Griffin), the Senators from Oregon (Mr. Hatfield and Mr. Packwood), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Percy), and the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. Young), are necessarily absent. The Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Fong) is absent on official business.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Mundt) is absent because of illness. If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Allott), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Hatfield), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Hansen), and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Mundt) would each vote "yea." The yeas and nays resulted-yeas 66, nays 5, as follows:

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, there are 66 yeas and 5 nays. Two-thirds of the Senators present and voting having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

TWENTY-FOUR SPEECHES BY SENATOR

JAMES B. ALLEN (ALABAMA)

NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE TO DEFEND CANAL

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 12, 1977-S14653]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-No. 1

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, in the September 11 issue of the New York Times appeared a most interesting and informative article by Capt. Paul B. Ryan, USN retired, a research associate at the Hoover Institute, Stanford University. From this article it can be seen that there are two areas, at least, in the Panama Canal Treaty on which the American negotiators placed one construction and the Panamanians placed another construction.

Both of these provisions or the construction of both of these provisions is most important to the rights the United States would have in the event this treaty is approved by the Serate.

The first has to do with the right of the United States to defend the canal. The article points out: "But does this ostensibly forthright interpretation of treaty terms-"

That is, the United States would have the right to defend the canal-"which presumably protect vital United States strategic interests, coincide with that held by Panama? The answer is no, if you listen to its chief treaty negotiator, Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, who analyzed the treaty's provisions at a news conference in Panama City on Aug. 24.

"Dr. Escobar's comments were broadcast by radio and subsequently published in the Daily Report of our Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Surprisingly, Dr. Escobar's astonishing views, which directly contradict the White House's, appear to have been given very little publicity or entirely overlooked by the United States news media.

"Dr. Escobar roundly rejects the Carter Administration's claim that the United States may send in troops."

Mind you, this was the chief negotiator on the part of the Panamanians. Quoting from his interview: "The treaty does not establish that the United States has the right to intervene [that is, send in troops] in Panama," he said. He denied that the treaty gives the United States the right to decide when neutrality is violated or not. Neither, in his view, do United States warships have the right to expeditious transit without conditions.

"As Dr. Escobar inelegantly put it: 'If the gringos-"

Referring to the people of the United States-"with their warships say, 'I want to go through first,' then that is their problem with the other ships there. Presumably, Paramanian officials would look idly on while United States Navy captains, during an international crisis-"

And that is a word for war or close proximity-"haggled with merchant skippers for a place at the head of the waiting line of ships. So much for the United States right to unimpeded transit and the defense of the waterway!"

"Faced with Panama's refusal to allow 'privileged passage,' the Americans finally accepted the term 'expeditious transit,' in order, said Dr. Escobar, to 'sell' the treaty to the Pentagon. 'Now they [the United States diplomats] could explain that this means privileged passage. *** Do not believe that we mean that," he emphasized.

So you have two different constructions placed on two different sections of the treaty one, the right of the United States to defend the canal, and Dr. Escobar says the United States will not have the right to say when the neutrality is being violated nor, he says, does she have the right to send in troops.

How are we going to defend the canal if we do not have the right to say when neutrality is in danger or if we do not have the right to send in troops? So if they do not have a meeting of the minds, Mr. President, if the Panamarians and

the United States negotiators differ on these two most important points, how is it we can say this treaty is in the best interests of the people of the United States?

So I am hopeful, of course, when this matter does come up-and I see the distinguished majority leader here on the floor-I am hopeful, even though the distinguished majority leader says he wants to carry this matter over until next year, it will be brought up this year, and that the Senate will be allowed to express its will, that is, decide to give or not to give its advice and consent to the treaty.

So I am hopeful we can have action on this treaty this year. But if we do not have a meeting of the minds between Panama and the United States as to what these important provisions mean-these are just two of them, I do not know how many other instances there are-but this is Dr. Escobar himself saying he has a difference of opinion with the U.S. negotiators, so if we do not know what the treaty means, if there is a sharp difference of opinion about what it means, how can the Senate be called upon to give its advice and consent to the approval of this treaty?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be placed in the Record, and also an article this morning in the Washington Post by Congressman Philip Crane: "Our Standing in the World Would Diminish”; and an article by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Helms, in the Washington Post of this morning, "This Alternative to the Carter Proposals."

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Sept. 11, 1977]

THE CANAL TERMS, ARGUED FROM DIFFERENT PREMISES

(By Paul B. Ryan)

STANFORD, CALIF.-In his frenetic blitz to gain public approval of the two Panama Canal treaties, President Carter has stressed that he wishes to dispel misinformation by laying out the facts. Thus, he and his chief negotiators, Ellsworth Bunker and Sol M. Linowitz, repeatedly have assured the public that the United States would have the permanent right to defend the canal by sending troops into Panama in time of crisis. Additionally, the White House says that United States warships would have "the permanent right to transit the canal expeditiously and without conditions, for an indefinite period."

But does this ostensibly forthright interpretation of treaty terms, which presumably protect vital United States strategic interests, coincide with that held by Panama? The answer is no, if you listen to its chief treaty negotiator, Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, who analyzed the treaty's provisions at a news conference in Panama City on Aug. 24.

Dr. Escobar's comments were broadcast by radio and subsequently published in the Daily Report of our Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Surprisingly, Dr. Escobar's astonishing views, which directly contradict the White House, appear to have been given very little publicity or entirely overlooked by the United States news media.

Dr. Escobar roundly rejects the Carter Administration's claim that the United States may send in troops. "The treaty does not establish that the United States has the right to intervene [that is, send in troops] in Panama," he said. He denied that the treaty gives the United States the right to decide when neutrality is violated or not. Neither, in his view, do United States warships have the right to expeditious transit without conditions.

As Dr. Escobar inelegantly put it: “If * * * the gringos with their warships say, 'I want to go through first,' then that is their problem with the other ships there." Presumably, Panamanian officials would look idly on while United States Navy captains, during an international crisis, haggled with merchant shippers for a place at the head of the waiting line of ships. So much for the United States right to unimpeded transit and the defense of the waterway!

Were these wildly different interpretations known to the United States negotiators during the talks? As Dr. Escobar told the newsmen, these points had been thrashed out with the Americans but Panama had stood firm against their demands.