Faced with Panama's refusal to allow "privileged passage," the Americans finally accepted the term "expeditious transit," in order, said Dr. Escobar, to "sell" the treaty to the Pentagon. "Now they [the United States diplomats] could explain that this means privileged passage. * * * Do not believe that we mean that," he emphasized.

Placed side-by-side Mr. Carter's reassuring assessment and Dr. Escobar's belligerent and cynical evaluation present the apparent paradox of two Governments outwardly reaching an agreement but secretly retaining entirely different perceptions of its provisions. Or is it a case where both negotiating teams assumed that the "real" meaning of the terms could be safely debated after both nations had won ratification from their respective Governments?

Plainly, such a treaty is fraught with peril for future United States operations involving canal transits. The danger of jeopardizing the Navy's use of the waterway was apparent to Presidential candidate Carter and he implied as much during his televised debate on Oct. 6, 1976, with Gerald R. Ford. Mr. Carter said, "I would not relinquish practical control of the Panama Canal Zone at any time in the foreseeable future."

As a former naval officer, Mr. Carter understands, probably better than most people, the need for the United States to retain such "practical control" to permit its Navy to carry out missions worldwide in support of United States diplomatic policies and strategic objectives.

This is particularly true in an era when international tension, as well as miniwars of the Angola type, are much more likely to occur than an allout war.

In the light of Dr. Escobar's dismissal of United States treaty rights, can President Carter really mean what he says?

A poor treaty is worse than no treaty at all. United States diplomacy must serve the national interest, as we have recently been reminded. The Carter Administration should clear up these glaring ambiguities at once. As matters now stand, the American people have no guarantee from Panama for the protection of United States defense and security interests in the Canal Zone.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1977]

THE CASE AGAINST THE CANAL TREATIES

OUR STANDING IN THE WORLD WOULD DIMINISH

(By Philip Crane)

I do agree with my colleague Paul Simon [op-ed, Aug. 30] on one point: The American people would be violently opposed to "giving away" the Panama Canal. But their opposition to what the treaties actually propose will be even greater. We are, in fact, paying the Panamanian government to take away our multibillion-dollar interest in Panama-to the tune of about $50 million per year plus approximately $350 million in economic and military aid!

One supporter of the treaties not mentioned by Simon is the U.S. banking community. Since they have huge sums of money in loans obligated to Panama, they cannot afford to oppose the treaties. Under Gen. Omar Torrijos, Panama's national debt has grown from $167 million to $1.5 billion. The debt service alone will consume 39 per cent of that country's budget this year. Panama's Department of Planning indicates that to refinance loans coming due, together with the $139 million deficit, a total of $323.6 million will be required. Obviously, Panama cannot afford to have the treaties rejected either. In fact, Torrijos' initial request was for a payment of $5 billion plus a $300-million annuity-but he will have to settle for the smaller package now under discussion.

If, as Simon states, our primary interest is keeping the canal open, then he had better study the definition of "open" as understood by Panama. According to Dr. Romulo Bethancourt, head of the Panamanian negotiating team, in a report to the Panamanian National Assembly on Aug. 19, when the U.S. proposed that Panama be obliged to keep the canal permanently open and neutral, Panama cited these grounds for not keeping it open: because of an earthquake, because of a landslide or because the canal was not making money.

I question why we shouldn't be proud of the current treaty, approved by the U.S. Senate in 1904. It granted the U.S. "all rights, power, authority in the Zone... which the U.S. would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign" for an initial payment of $10 million plus an annuity of $250,000-an annuity

that has now been increased to $2.3 million. The Provisional Government of Panama ratified the treaty, as did the Constitutional Government of Panama when it took office in 1904 and reaffirmed all acts of the previous regime. The Supreme Court decision in 1907 on Wilson v. Shaw held that the United States does maintain legal sovereignty and ownership under the 1903 treaty, a ruling upheld in 1972.

Obviously, national pride-for both Panamanians and Americans-is still an issue. But if we base our return of the canal on the fact that the Panamanians "don't like" our having acquired the property, then we had better consider giving Louisiana back to France and Alaska back to the U.S.S.R.

I would like to try to believe that we know the position of the U.S. military brass on the treaty question. But the Singlaub affair has convinced military personnel that they jeopardize their military standing and job security by publicly opposing any administration policies. If military officials in a spot to accurately analyze the risk involved in ratifying a treaty with Panama were free to speak their minds, we could fully assess the validity of apparent U.S. military support for the treaties.

Torrijos' regime created by a coup in 1968-is known for its friendliness with Castro and pro-Communist tendencies. In fact, the Soviets, who do not even have diplomatic relations with Panama, have recently concluded tentative economic and commercial agreements with the country-a foot in the door, as it were. Of course. Panamanian Communists oppose the treaties: They want control of the canal right now. Moreover, Torrijos as director has been a consistent violator of human rights in Panama. In light of President Carter's strident-and laudable campaign for human rights, isn't signing the treaties a blatant act of hypocrisy ?

The canal will be in much graver danger if a treaty is agreed to. First, sabotage is a remote possibility because of the economic importance of the canal to Panama. If we surrender the Zone, the entire Isthmus becomes the focus of international envy and, possibly, combat. Betancourt stated outright in his assembly address that "we are not giving the U.S. the right of intervention." Moreover, the neutrality agreed to is not one "so only the U.S. ships travel through peacefully" but it is one "so that all ships of all flags in the world travel through peacefully *** communist * * * fascist *** monarchy." Under these terms, Panama is simply inviting the wolf to dine at his own table.

Simon is absolutely correct: The United States is a leader in the Free World. But, if we relinquish the canal our power and standing in Latin America and throughout the world would diminish. This is particularly true in light of recent retreats from other spots on the globe. How can it be termed "moral" to pull the rug out from under the Panamanian economy at a particularly feeble moment in its history? During 1976 the United States infused over $29 million into Panama by direct purchases from U.S. government agencies; over $108 million in wages to non-U.S. citizens employed in the Zone; over $39 million in personal expenditures by U.S. employees-not to mention major construction, obliteration of yellow fever, and countless apprentice and job-training programs. In fact, per capita income in Panama is currently the highest in Central America-thanks to you-know-who. Actually, I do share Simon's sincere hope that the "sensible" answer to this crucial question holds forth. That sensible answer, in my opinion, is sound rejection of the proposed treaties.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1977]

THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE CARTER PROPOSALS

(By Jesse Helms)

Let someone say it: What happens if the Panama Canal treaties fail? Does it mean the collapse of relations between the United States and our Latin American friends or a new beginning?

I believe in the new beginning, one that can mean an end to the tortured distrust and falsity so characteristic of our relations with Latin America in the past 30 years. Not only have we failed to make good the promised unity of the Rio Treaty of 1947, but we also have ignored profound changes that have taken place in the past 10 years.

We have ignored, for example, the painful effort of most of the southern continent to exorcise the double menace of terrorism and Marxism. We have treated as pariahs those proud countries that have been engaged in the difficult task of restoring social justice to shattered civil societies and of recreating their authentic cultural traditions and religious values. And now, at the moment when President Carter's advisers suddenly feel the need to create a showplace tapestry of unity against which to display the dubious transaction with Panama, these same nations are suddenly recognized and brought forward, much as doty old relatives might be brought down from the attic for dinner on Christmas Day. This is the same kind of exploitation of which our Latin friends have complained in the past.

The very premises of the Panama treaties are based on the shaky foundations of outmoded ideologies. No one really believes that the United States can be convicted of that rhetorical offense of the 1950s, colonialism. Panama and the Panama Canal were born together as if Siamese twins, under separate sovereignties, but yoked together for life. Those who question the legitimacy of that joint birth must question the legitimacy of both.

The treaty proponents speak of "the year 2000," as though any transfer of power will take place in another era, or perhaps in another galaxy. The fact is, "the year 2000" is only 23 years off. To imagine the dramatic shift in the world balance of power that can take place in the next 23 years, one need only reflect on the massive shifts of power in the past 23. One notes, for example, the dramatic rise in Soviet offensive strategic missiles and the Soviets' parallel effort to build a naval force capable of dominating the seas-not to speak of the strategic waterways that connect the seas.

Despite assurances to the contrary, the texts of the proposed treaties show that practical control passes to the Republic of Panama as soon as the United States gives up its sovereign rights. We would be, in effect, strangers in a strange land. Whoever controlled Panama would control our right to defend the canal. The power relationships in the treaty would be inverted. We would become a pyramid standing on its point.

Would the treaties be worth more than the paper they are written on? As the British found out, an agreement in principle to get out on a fixed date usually means that the date gets moved up in practice. Moreover, the task of supporting an inverted pyramid will crush any free Panamanian government. Terrorism and civic unrest are tools in the worldwide phenomena of subversion and do not depend upon reasonable pretexts. We must not imagine that Panama will be exempted from bloodshed and violence if we ratify these treaties, rather, we must expect intensified efforts to bring the pyramid down.

The United States would then be faced with a dilemma; whether to violate Panama's independence with another Dominican Republic-style incursion or whether to cut and run away from a handful of expiring treaty rights no longer workable in a revolutionary environment. Either way, Panama would lose, and so would we. That is why there is no overwhelming sentiment in the Senate to approve these treaties.

What is the alternative?

On June 30, I spent 40 minutes alone with President Carter discussing what might happen should the treaties he has proposed not be approved by the Senate. On Aug. 19, Sen. Strom Thurmond, Sen. Orrin Hatch and I had a similar discussion with President Lakes of Panama. I assured both Presidents that it would be a mistake to interpret a vote against the treaties as a vote against the people of Panama. On the contrary, those who oppose the treaties want to work with the Panamanian people in an even closer relationship, but there is no practical way to do this unless we retain our sovereign rights in the Canal Zone.

I proposed to both Presidents that a work such as the major modernization of the Panama Canal would provide an investment of substantial sums in our future relationship with Panama. It would be more than just an investment. in our own sovereign territory; the terms of the program would be mandated to ensure broad Panamanian participation across the social spectrum, to upgrade education and skills-training for the people, to provide detailed managerial experience and to set up ventures with Panamanian firms.

REMARKS TO THE LEADERSHIP AND OPENING STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS REGARDING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 13, 1977-S14729, S14810]

A MATTER CALLING FOR A MEASURED AND HURRIED DECISION

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for yielding. I feel that the issue of the Panama Canal treaties is the most important issue that has come before the Senate during the some 9 years that I have been in the Senate.

Based on my reading of the treaties and my recognition of the importance of the Panama Canal to our economic security and our national security, I plan to vote against the treaties. I do not believe it is in the best interest of our Nation or our people that the treaties be entered into.

Personally, I had hoped that the matter could be disposed of this year and that the Senate and Congress would stay in session this year until the matter could be disposed of.

I might state that I feel that full and complete debate of these issues could be held in the Senate and I feel that under article IV, section 3, paragraph 2 of the Constitution it is requisite that the issue be determined by both Houses of Congress because it is necessary that there be congressional action to dispose of property of the United States.

Of course, I readily acceded to the wishes of the distinguished majority leader, but I would like to comment that I do not believe there is going to be any attempt to filibuster this issue. I think that it should come to a vote, and I feel that the arithmetic involved would indicate that there be no filibuster because it takes only 60 votes to invoke cloture and 67 votes to give advice and consent as to the treaty. Furthermore, a filibuster if successful would merely leave the treaty in a state of limbo and it could be brought up at any time. But I do feel that full, complete, and lengthy debate should take place on this issue. I had hoped that time would be found this year to dispose of the matter. The distinguished majority leader having stated that the matter will not be brought up until next year, naturally, I would abide by his judgment and certainly make no effort to see that the treaties are brought before the Senate.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Alabama for his comments.

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-No. 2

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, on September 8, 1977, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers conducted the third in a series of hearings it has scheduled to investigate constitutional and other issues related to the proposed Panama Canal treaties. As chairman, I opened the hearing with a statement which addressed my concern, and the concern of the overwhelming majority of Alabamians, over provisions of the treaties and over the ultimate effect they would have on the security of our country.

Mr. President, I believe these treaties are among the most important issues ever to come before the U.S. Senate. Certainly it is the most important single issue that the Senate has faced since I have been a Member. It is an issue that must be, and will be, debated at length, and all of the arguments must be clearly made and understood, not only by Senators but by all Americans. So that Senators may know of my position, I ask unanimous consent that my opening statement at the September 8 hearing be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES B. ALLEN

The Subcommittee on Separation of Powers is convened this morning to continue the Subcommittee's investigation of Constitutional issues arising out of the new proposed Panama Canal Treaty. I am certain that most of those present this morning are aware of the central Constitutional issue under investigation; however, perhaps I should again reiterate the proposition which is the focal point of this inquiry.

Article IV. Section 3, of the Constitution of the United States provides that Congress "shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." The power given to Congress in that clause appears to be exclusive and, if it is an exclusive power, then the Executive is prohibited from entering into a treaty disposing of U.S. territory except with express Congressional authorization, that is, authorization by both Houses of Congress in addition to Senate approval through the treaty ratification process.

Additionally, members of the Subcommittee are also deeply concerned that the Executive Department has reached certain financial agreements with the Panamanians for substantial financial assistance outside of the context of the provisions of the treaty itself. These financial agreements, if not embodied in the treaty, will not be subjected to the normal treaty ratification process which would otherwise be the case.

The Subcommittee has further learned that the Congressional appropriations process itself may in large measure be circumvented in the implementation of proposed financial arrangements with Panama but that nevertheless substantial sums of money are proposed to be made available to Panama by unilateral Executive Branch action. The Subcommittee will therefore diligently continue to seek testimony on the full intentions of the Executive Department with respect to separately negotiated financial and banking arrangements with the Republic of Panama.

Finally, in continuing its work the Subcommittee will seek to determine the extent to which the operative provisions of the Executive Department proposal are embodied in the executive agreements rather than in actual treaty language. There are, of course, in fact two treaties-the proposed Panama Canal Treaty itself and an additional treaty which purports to provide for the neutrality of the Panama Canal. Unfortunately, these treaties are in no way to be construed as the whole agreement. Both treaties are accompanied by very lengthy executive agreements which actually contain the substance of the deal struck with Panama. These executive agreements, once implemented, would be subject to renegotiation-and we find this astonishing-every two years.

This Subcommittee, I am sure, shares a concern of many that Congress will relinquish forever any control over this country's relation with the Republic of Panama if the Executive Department is authorized to enter into a plenary relation with Panama based not, in reality, on treaty law but rather based on executive agreements authorized by treaty law but subject to change at the whim of the Executive. In short, the Subcommittee wishes to establish by its inquiry the extent to which the Executive would be given a blank check by the new proposed treaties to amend, interrupt, abrogate, or replace entirely the lengthy accompanying substantive executive agreements.

I have just returned from Alabama where in the course of the August recess I met with citizens in 37 counties. These meetings were held in most instances at the County Court House; they were widely announced and well attended. One topic was invariably raised. Notwithstanding drought, unemployment, inflation, high energy prices, low farm prices, and a host of other subjects which could easily have been foremost in mind, virtually every group I encountered wished to know the answer to one question-would the United States, in fact, give away the Panama Canal Zone? Of the thousands I spoke with almost no one favored a policy of surrender in Panama.

Many are saying that the people need education and that with education they will come to support the giveaway of the American Canal in Panama. In my judgment, the true state of affairs is the exact opposite. Further knowledge will only strengthen the resolve of the people, and in my judgment, our all-wise federal establishment could itself well stand some education from the American citizen who has the wisdom to see the obvious fact that the Panama Canal is vital to the economic stability and military security of the United States . . . from the American citizen who has the common sense to recognize the lunacy of paying billions to an unstable pro-Marxist dictatorship for taking over billions in prop