erty belonging to the United States. from the American citizen who has the clarity of thought to see the reality behind the sham, the shell game, and the traveling medicine show that has passed for an open discussion of the actual provisions of this proposed new arrangement with Panama.

Perhaps, however, Americans do need education in the fine points of the Panama Canal Treaty. That education has been hard to come by of late because throughout the treaty negotiations a veil of secrecy prevented any useful information being made available either to the public or, in large measure, to the Congress. Perfunctory briefings containing no real substance and seeking no advice, to be sure, were conducted. However, until yesterday most of the information this Subcommittee has been able to obtain on the new Treaty has come from translations of speeches made by the Panamanian negotiators in Panama. By that method we have learned that the Panamanians expect to receive during the next 23 years at least $2.262 billion in cash payments from the United States. The Department of the Treasury, when its representative testified, was apparently unable to advise the Committee of the substance of any negotiations whatsoever with Panama, yet we could read from translated Panamanian documents that the Export-Import Bank plans to lend Panama $200 million, that the the Agency for International Development is to guarantee and no doubt pay off-housing loans in the amount of $75 million, and that the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation is to guarantee $20 million in loans for a new Panamanian development bank-everyone else has a bank in Panama, why shouldn't the Panamanians?

Finally, the Committee has learned no from the Department of Defense but from the Panamanians that $50 million in military aid would be provided to prop up and guarantee the continuance of the military dictatorship now oppressing the people of the Republic of Panama.

But now that the proposed Panama Canal Treaty and neutrality treaty have finally been made public, there are disclosed even more items about which the American citizen should be educated. The American citizen should learn that in addition to all the other massive payments to be made to the Republic of Panama, as the ultimate insult, it is proposed that we pay to the Republic of Panama $10 million a year for providing police services within the territory which would be ceded to Panama. We hope that during his education the American citizen will share our own disbelief and outrage that our great country proposes to cede United States territory to Panama and then to pay Panama for performing the normal functions of government within that same land.

We hope, too, that the American citizen will soon learn that out of 14 military bases now in the Canal Zone, only 4 would remain after implementation of this Treaty and that the 4 retained bases would be under direct Panamanian civil and political jurisdiction, subjecting thereby our Armed Forces to the dictatorial rule of the present Panamanian government. And although it is true that a status of forces agreement will provide some marginal protection to U.S. soldiers in the Canal Zone, the American citizen should learn that in essence our forces will be made subject to a code of laws based on the autocratic rule of one man and devoid of any Constitutional safeguards even remotely resembling those precious American rights now enjoyed within the Canal Zone.

Yes, there is much to learn about this proposal. Does the average citizen now know that the American flag will not be permitted to be flown in a place of honor, even at our military installations, and, according to the speeches of the Panamanian negotiators, will be permitted at our own bases only when inside and when displayed jointly with a Panamanian flag in the position of honor. Perhaps this latter point is trivial, but it typifies this entire proposed agreement . . . our flag in a broom closet and our vital Canal at the mercy of a banana republic.

So, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers does intend to continue its investigation of these issues to insure that all the facts are made available both to the Congress and to the people. We will be, I am sure, greatly aided in our efforts by the witnesses scheduled to appear at today's hearings.

99-592-78-12

CONSTRUCTION OF NEW CANAL IN ANOTHER COUNTRY FORBIDDEN UNLESS PERMITTED BY PANAMA

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 15, 1977–S14953]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-No. 3

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, Senators, I am sure, over the past few days have been studying carefully the details of the Panama Canal Treaty and its associated executive agreements. In my own review of the proposed treaty, one aspect is particularly disturbing to me because it is so obviously unnecessary to the basic provisions of the treaty and because it so totally favors the Panamanian position to the great detriment of our own country. I refer, Mr. President, to the treaty provision forbidding the United States to agree with any other country except Panama for the construction of a new Western Hemispheric Interoceanic Canal, unless expressly permitted by Panama in some further future agreement. The treaty reads in relevant part as follows: "During the duration of this Treaty-"

And that would be the year 2000-"the United States of America shall not negotiate with third States for the right to construct an interoceanic canal on any other route in the Western Hemisphere, except as the two Parties may otherwise agree-"

I find it astonishing that the negotiators for the United States saw fit to preclude any possibility of construction of a new interoceanic canal, perhaps at sea level, without our first obtaining the express consent of a pro-Marxist and highly unstable military dictatorship. Why was this concession necessary? What did we gain from this concession?

I notice with some amusement, Mr. President, that the Republic of Panama purports to grant to the United States of America the right to add a third lane of locks to the existing canal. Inasmuch as the United States already has the right to add a third lane of locks to the existing canal, surely our negotiators did not think that a meaningless concession of that variety was sufficient consideration for giving the Panamanians a veto over any other project we may wish to undertake to connect the two oceans. Certainly, the negotiators for the United States could not have felt that the Panamanian agreement to commit Panama "to study jointly the feasibility of a sea level canal" warranted a countervailing commitment from the United States not to do anything whatsoever without Panamanian permission-but perhaps so. The bizarre behavior of our negotiators has produced other results equally as startling.

In any event, Mr. President, one thing is sure and that is that the Panamanians know they got the best of this bargain. Discussing the sea level canal issue, chief Panamanian negotiator, Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, on August 19, 1977, explained to the Panamanian National Assembly the unilateral benefits of the so called sea-level canal options. Dr. Bethancourt's remarks on the subject are illuminating and are worth studying in full. Instead of obtaining an option to build a sea level canal, our negotiators gave to the Panamanians the option to veto construction of a sea level canal by the United States anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. But here are Dr. Bethancourt's own remarks.

I am quoting them at some length for the benefit of the Senate and the public. I believe we can find out more from the Panamanian negotiators as to what this treaty really means than we find out from listening to our own negotiators. Here is what Dr. Bethancourt, the Panamanian negotiator had to say: "The other problem we-"

Speaking of the negotiators on both sides-"The other problem we discussed was that of the option for the construction of a sea-level canal. In all these years the problem of a sea-level canal was hardly discussed at all at the negotiating table. There were about two talks on this. We discussed this, nothing came out of these discussions and then came the Bogota conference with the presidents." That is, the Presidents of the various countries. "That is where the option

problem really reached a crisis. It reached a crisis because a very direct and continuous communication was established among all the presidents meeting there and President Carter through negotiators Bunker and Linowitz as well as with us through Dr. Giogenes de la Rosa, who was there at the time, and our Ambassador Gabriel Galindo."

This is Dr. Bethancourt, the Panamanian negotiator, talking. Continuing with his remarks; "But they made a proposal to us--"

That is, our negotiators made the proposal to Panama-"But they made a proposal to us on that option and that is why the issue reached a crisis. They proposed that Panama grant them an option to build a sea-level canal without setting any date. Second, they wanted Panama to promise that no other country would construct a sea-level canal."

These are very fine proposals that our people made. Let us see if they won out. "We rejected that proposal in Bogota. We read it to the presidents. That was the proposal brought the previous evening by several of our negotiators and we read it to them. The negotiations between the two countries was practically broken in Bogota. So much so that I remember that at one point General Torrijos told the presidents: "Well, we called this conference several days ago for a celebration of a new treaty and it turns out that we have come for the wake." The struggle between the two countries began in Bogota. And I say the two countries because the rest of the presidents got as involved as if they had been Panamanians. We must really be very grateful to the presidents that met with the general in Bogota. Regarding this problem they acted just like any of us; they even wanted to walk out mad. The Mexican president wanted to get on his plane and leave; he was very furious. They all became Panamanians regarding the option problem.

"When the United States finally realized that there was no way in which an agreement would be reached regarding this option in the terms they were proposing and that the issue had reached an impasse, they asked for a recess. During that recess, we continued our discussions with the presidents meeting in Bogota.

"The Panamanian delegation then prepared a draft which all presidents liked. They said it was correct and fair. We then called the United States, they examined it for a while and finally accepted it. I think that it would be a good idea to read the text of this draft to you so that you will see how the option problem came out. I read:

"Article 3. Possibility of building a third set of locks or a sea-level canal. 'First, the Republic of Panama and the United States of America acknowledge that a sea-level canal can be important for future international navigation. As a result of this, after supporting the treaty of the existing canal and for the duration of this treaty, both countries promise to study jointly the viability of such a canal. In the event that the need for such a canal is viewed favorably, they will negotiate its construction in the terms agreed on by both the countries. This is how the option issue came out. (Applause.)"

This is Dictator Bethancourt, still quoting him.

"As you can see, it is not even an option to build a sea-level canal. It is an option to promise to study the viability of it."

He is letting the cat out of the bag. Mr. President, in his comments there to his people.

"That is the true option. The true commitment is to sit down with the United States to study whether or not it is viable to build a sea-level canal. If the two .countries feel it is viable, they will sit down to negotiate the terms agreed on by the two countries. ***"

You know, Mr. President, this fellow Bethancourt has been very helpful to me in understanding the true implications of the Panama Canal Treaty. From him, I learned the true meaning of the so-called neutrality pact. From him, I learned that the neutrality pact was a sham and of no true benefit whatsoever to the security of the United States. I cannot help but note, Mr. President, in reviewing Dr. Bethancourt's August 19 speech that he explains that the real purpose of the neutrality pact is to propagandize the U.S. Congress and the people of the United States with the myth that the neutrality of the canal will be insured after December 31, 1999. But I would prefer that Dr. Bethancourt answer in his own words the question, "Why this neutrality pact?" He states this: "*** Because they think-"

That is, the United States-"* * * Because they think that maybe in the year 2000 this country will become socialist and will turn into their enemy and they

feel it is better to make sure right now that even if our country becomessocialist-"

Panama, that is "it cannot prevent them from using the canal. To be even more frank, they do not need that neutrality pact to tell them whether or not they may intervene. They need it to show to their Congress in order to be able to tell their Congress: "Look, we are turning the canal over to the Panamanians, but we still have the right to watch over them so they behave." That is the truth. It is a question of their internal policy. They are solving an internal problem regarding a Congress that is largely opposed to these negotiations and which even has members who have not been elected of their own free will, turned into members of the U.S. Congress. They are Panamanians who lived here and in Miami.

I do not know whether that is a substantive loss in translation or not, because I do not know of any Members of the House of Representatives who were not elected of their own free will. I know of no Senator or House Member who was forced to run for the position he holds.

There is a parenthetical statement that that was "as heard," and there was great applause, as shown by the transcript of his remarks.

Mr. President, it strikes me that there is an awful lot of eyewash in these treaties for the benefit of Congress and mighty little in them for the benefit of the United States.

We have obtained a neutrality pact which is meaningless, and we have foregone the right to construct a new canal without the express consent of a gangster dictator. What a spectacle this situation must present to the world-the United States required to seek the consent of a reprehensible and repressive minor autocrat before even undertaking canal discussions with another sovereign nation.

How does that strike the average American? We cannot even negotiate with another country for 23 years about building another canal without the express permission of the Panamanians. It just humiliates the United States.

Before even undertaking canal discussions with another sovereign nation, the United States is surrendering control of a vital international waterway to the Communist advisers of a bandit government.

Mr. President, I have availed myself of this opportunity of discussing two features of the canal treaty. At other times I plan to discuss other sections of the treaty, in order that Members who care to read the RECORD will see the views that I have expressed, and will have a right to consider whether these provisions are in the interest of the United States. I do plan, as does the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. SCOTT), to make other speeches here on the floor of the Senate, in the hope that those who read the Record will be able to see just what is involved, and in hopes that others throughout the country may be advised. Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, I am delighted to yield to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Alabama for the statement that he has made, for his penetrating analysis of Article 12 with regard to the construction of an additional lane or an additional set of locks in the existing canal, and the prohibition against the United States constructing an additional canal at any other spot in the isthmus outside of Panama.

I agree with the distinguished Senator; there seems to be absolutely no reason why our Government should agree with another nation not to construct something outside of their territory.

Frankly, Mr. President, if someone in the committee does not strike that provision of the treaty under the amending process, I believe it should be done on the floor of the Senate and I will be prepared to do so unless another Senator does.

I would like to go further than the remarks of the distinguished Senator has made on the floor today and commend him as chairman of the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee for holding hearings, as he has done, in attempting to find out the legalities of this proposed treaty which has been signed by the President, which was obtained by the State Department. I believe we need reason and we need to determine just how we should proceed. Mr. President, it is basic in the laws of contracts that there be some quid pro quo, that there be some consideration flowing from one party to another. I do not see any quid pro quo in this treaty.

The distinguished Senator from Alabama, and the subcommittee on which I am privileged to serve with him, is attempting to delve into this question.

I would hope, Mr. President, that somehow we can eliminate the emotionalism and do some straight thinking as to what is best for our own Government in

determining whether the Senate should advise and consent to this treaty. I appreciate the Senator yielding.

Mr. ALLEN. I thank the distinguished Senator for his comments. I commend him for his hard work on this issue and the leadership he has exerted in seeking to point out the dangerous provisions, the unfair provisions, in the treaty. I commend him for his work on the Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. I also appreciate his enlightening the Senate and the country on these issues.

The Senator mentioned that there needs to be a quid pro quo in a contract. There also needs to be a meeting of the minds between the contracting parties. Obviously, there is no meeting of the minds on many, but certainly two, very important issues. One is the priority of our ships in the canal. Apparently there is no priority as the Panamanians regard the construction of the treaty. Second is the misunderstanding about the neutrality of the canal; whether we have a right to determine whether their neutrality is in danger; whether we have a right to land troops there or not. The Panamanians say not.

So there is no meeting of the minds here.

The distinguished Senator from Virginia raises another most important point and it will be asked of the Chair at the proper time, though not now, when the treaty is before the Senate.

He feels in the committee, and I feel on the floor certain action should be taken; the committee should strike this provision requiring the United States to get the permission of Panama before even negotiating with another nation for another canal, a sea level canal. I feel reasonably sure that the committee will strike this very dangerous provision, and I feel the Senate will back up the committee. Having seen one of its provisions stricken, and the Senate if it should approve the treaty with major amendments made to the treaty, would that require the execution of another treaty? There are constitutional authorities to the effect that once a treaty is amended it cannot then be approved by the other party without entering into a new treaty. If that be the case, if major amendments are made to the treaty, it may well be that that, in itself, will defeat this treaty, because it will require entering into a new treaty.

It will be an interesting constitutional question about which the Chair will be asked. That question may have to be submitted to the Senate for the Senate's view. That would not necessarily be binding if, in fact, that would vitiate the treaty in the absence of another treaty submitted to both countries.

Mr. SCOTT. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. ALLEN. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. It would appear to me that in the event the Senate does offer amendments and they are adopted by the Senate, and the treaty, as amended, would later be ratified by the Senate, this would influence the executive branch of Government in its efforts to negotiate a new treaty. I feel, quite frankly, Mr. President, that the Senate is somewhat closer to the people of the United States than the executive branch. Certainly, it is closer than the unelected negotiators of this treaty. In fact, no one within our State Department or within our diplomatic corps has had to face the electorate as has each Member of the Senate. I feel someone must speak for the people, and I hope it will be the Senate.

Mr. ALLEN. I thank the distinguished Senator.

There is one other point I would like to make as we suggest guidelines for the consideration of this treaty. I do not foresee here on the floor of the Senate a filibuster against this treaty. I believe there will be a long discussion, a legitimate debate. Though I have not discussed the matter with the leadership, I feel sure that the leadership would not file any cloture petition as long as the debate is legitimate debate. It may last for weeks without being a filibuster. I do not believe a filibuster will ensure, one reason being the difference in what it takes to cut off a filibuster, 60 votes, and 67 votes to approve the treaty assuming all Senators are present.

Far more than that, the reason there will not be a filibuster is if the treaty is defeated by extended debate, the treaty would still remain on the Executive Calendar for the next session of this Congress and for succeeding Congresses, to be brought up by the leadership at any time.

What I am going to be working toward is a vote up or down on the treaty. Once it is defeated by the Senate, it becomes a complete nullity. If other negotiations are held and other treaties are submitted to the Senate, we would have to consider them ab initio. But there will be no filibuster, as such, and no need to invoke cloture.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.