The Proposed Panama Canal Treaties

Senate of this ludicrously inept document, the Panama Canal Treaty, which unfortunately the executive department is seeking to foist on the citizens of the United States and on the Congress?

But, Mr. President, George Kennan must be given due credit for recognizing what has seemingly eluded the leading active-duty military thinkers in our Defense Establishment. George Kennan accurately points out that the Panama Canal Treaty will not be a panacea guaranteeing our freedom from insurgent attack on Panama Canal installations or on U.S. Forces in the Isthmus of Panama. If the Canal Zone is already indefensible as many would have us believe, how much more indefensible will it be when the U.S. military presence is reduced to 4 bases, as against some 14 now and limited, more or less regardless of the cir.cumstances, to present strength.

With deference to Mr. Kennan's peculiar perception of this fact, it does not take a visionary or a great military planner to be able to see that U.S. Forces-when confined to four small bases and associated military areas-are going to be particularly vulnerable to harassing attacks designed to hasten our withdrawal from Panama. Mr. Kennan seems to acknowledge that such attacks would be likely should the proposed treaty be ratified and should the United States thereby signal its complete lack of resolve to defend and protect the Canal.

In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary, Lt. Gen. Dennis McAuliffe, Commander in Chief of the Southern Command, including Panama, stated the mission of his troops as follows:

"The principal mission, sir, is that of defending the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone ***”

Thereafter, I pursued a line of questions which I am satisfied got answers demonstrating the present defensibility, not indefensibility, of the canal and laying to rest the myth that the canal cannot be defended by our forces in their present posture. Mr. President, Senators should find General McAuliffe's testimony decisive on this subject and, therefore, I quote from the pertinent record from the hearing:

Senator ALLEN. I assume, then, that if you concluded that you were unable to perform the mission of defending the Panama Canal you would so report to the Pentagon, would you not?

General MCAULIFFE. Absolutely. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator ALLEN. Have you made any such report since you have been assigned there?

General MCAULIFFE. No, sir.

Senator ALLEN. I would assume, then, that you feel that you are adequately -equipped and manned to perform that mission.

General MCAULIFFE. Again, if I may, Mr. Chairman, my answer is dependent upon the threat scenario. However, under the kind of threat scenarios that I see today or in the immediate future I can tell you that I have an adequate force to carry out this defense mission.

Senator ALLEN. Should you not be prepared for just routine defense, but for any emergency? We have seen our various bases attacked in the past by enemy nations. Should we not be able to react successfully to any conditions?

General MCAULIFFE. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we are well trained and prepared to react to any contingency.

This is the general in charge of the defense of the Panama Canal in answer to the question of whether or not the canal is defensible.

Just to clarify my statement about needing reinforcements, let me say that my forces are able to react and I think, do an adequate job of defending. However, sooner or later in an emergency period, that relatively small force may be over-committed. Hopefully, within those couple of days or whatever period of time we may be talking about we might be able to bring in additional forces to help meet the requirement.

So ends the portion of the testimony to which I have alluded.

So, Mr. President, the canal is now defensible, but, as George Kennan points out, should this treaty be ratified, U.S. forces will more or less find themselves boxed up in small enclaves subject to terrorist attack by dissident elements in Panama and subject to the inflammatory polemic which has characterized pronouncements of the Panamanian Government and government-controlled press ever since the seizure of power by dictator Torrijos. Would such conditions present an emergency situation for which military reinforcements would be

required? Would the United States be permitted to reinforce under the provisions of paragraph 5, article IV of the proposed treaty? Or would we prefer simply, as suggested by Mr. Kennan, to bug out?

Let us not kid ourselves, Mr. President. We do not solve a defense problem with this proposed treaty; we create instead a nightmare with a predictable result.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, would the distinguished Senator not suggest the absence of a quorum at this time?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, I withhold my suggestion. I yield the floor.

OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE-THEY JUST OBEY

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 21, 1977-S15231]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-No. 6

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, last week I had occasion to speak from time to time on matters involving the proposed Panama Canal treaty and the proposed neutrality treaty for the Canal Zone. In my study of the terms of both treaties, I have relied heavily on Panamanian interpretations of the various documents involved inasmuch as the Panamanian negotiators have been somewhat more candid with the Panamanian National Assembly than our own negotiators have been with the U.S. Congress.

Too, Mr. President, the information we gathered as to the interpretation that the Panamanians put on these treaties is of vital concern to the Senate in reaching a determination as to whether it shall advise and give its consent to the ratification of these treaties. Because of the fact that there has been no meeting of the minds between the two countries, the treaties would, in effect, be completely worthless if we had one interpretation and the Panamanians had another.

I might add also, Mr. President, that the dictator-controlled Panamanian Press, in many respects, has set forth more real information on this subject than has our own press. Over the weekend, I ran across an informative editorial in a U.S. newspaper, this week's Army Times, and this editorial does deserve high commendation for its very accurate assessment of one facet of the executive department's propaganda offensive for ratification of these treaties.

The Army Times editorial is entitled "Using the Chiefs"-having reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff-and it points out the double standard, the inconsistency, and the impropriety of chastising military personnel on the one hand for speaking out against the policies of the executive branch yet coercing them on the other hand to speak out in favor of such policies. The editors of Army Times apparently share my own deep conviction that the professional military cannot be permitted to intervene publicly in politics and that grave danger is posed by deliberate misuse of the military for political advantage.

Army Times states its disapproval in this manner:

"One of the reservations we have about the administration merchandising of the treaty is the early use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to promote ratification.

"In addition, JCS chairman Gen. George S. Brown, supposedly on his own accord, met with ranking military retirees in the Washington area in an attempt to win their support for the treaty.

"We accept the contention that the chiefs acted out of honest conviction in their protreaty effort. But their presence among political figures who are endorsing the treaty is cause for concern. Critics of the pact already are charging that the military leaders acted out of loyalty to the Commander in Chief. Brown has denied the charge but probably has not laid it to rest.

"We would rather have seen the military views given in that forum instead of the White House extravaganza preceding it."

I might state that while the Joint Chiefs have endorsed the treaty, four former Chiefs of Naval Operations have come out in strong opposition to the treaty, showing the direct contrast between those who are still on the payroll and in active military service who may have one view, but their equally distinguished colleagues, many of them, and certainly four former Chiefs of Naval Operations, have come out against the treaty.

You know, Mr. President, we have just recently been treated to the public spectacle of a senior military commander in Korea being summarily relieved of command for remarks thought inconsistent with the executive department's apparent determination to abandon South Korea, yet almost in the same breath we have had paraded before us assorted active-duty generals and admirals, all chorusing in unison the praise of the President and endorsing to a man this strategically disastrous treaty proposal. The irony, at least, has not been lost on the editors of

Army Times who see danger in this obvious politicizing of the role of the military decisionmakers.

I again quote the Army Times:

"It is fair, in our view, to criticize the President for the service leader's participation in the pre-debate ‘education' effort."

I welcome an education effort, educating the American people about these treaties, because the more they find out about the treaties, in my opinion, the harder and the more determined will the opposition of the American people be to the treaties.

"When general officers have spoken out on other national policy matters, he and his representatives have been quick to remind them of the bounds of their military responsibilities."

"He," in this case, is the President.

"In this case, however, the military leaders are showing approval of administration policy, not opposition. The difference may be difficult to explain and may result in some erosion in the military's traditional political neutrality."

Mr. President, I do believe that the fair and dispassionate views of our leading military officers should be considered by the Congress, but I trust the Members will recognize the unseemliness of ballyhooing active-duty military support for the new treaties, when such support is so obviously generated by a desire for job security and personal advancement rather than out of loyalty to the national interest of the United States, at least as I perceived it.

Mr. President, from time to time I have spoken out against these treaties, and I have pointed out reasons for my opposition. I am going to continue, week in and week out, until this matter comes before the Senate, with the approval of the distinguished majority leader and his graciousness in getting me this time, to speak out against these treaties and to give a backlog of information showing that approval by the Senate of these treaties will be contrary to our national interest.

I believe that the education process which the executive department is going to carry on in connection with trying to sell this treaty to the Senate and to the American people will be counterproductive insofar as getting approval of the treaties is concerned; and that public opinion will be stronger and stronger, as time goes on, against the treaties.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial to which I referred be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

USING THE CHIEFS

The administration's selling job on the new Panama Canal treaty has to be one of the major political spectaculars of recent memory.

While Congress was on vacation in August, the President worked to rally support for the pact among legislators, key people in the former administration, union leaders, governors, business people and others. The signing brought more heads of foreign governments to Washington than have been here since the last state funeral.

The political activity gives the impression that the treaty is about to take effect. In fact, it still faces Senate ratification and what amounts to House endorsement through approval of related money bills. Heated debate on the issue is predicted.

The administration's effort may be good political strategy, but it tends to raise questions. If the treaty-actually two treaties are involved-is good, it may be asked, why the hard sell and why, until now, the lack of specifics?

We don't pretend at this point to know whether the treaty is the best arrangement the U.S. can make with Panama. Senate hearings and debate should' provide light as well as heat on the issues involved. But it should be evident that overwhelming pro-treaty arguments are going to have to be made to persuade lawmakers and perhaps a majority of the American public that the U.S. should relinquish its Canal rights.

For many Americans the treaty surfaces at the wrong time. The U.S. has: "lost" a war in Asia, and is preparing to withdraw ground combat forces from South Korea. Negotiating away American rights on the canal comes as the final straw.

One of the reservations we have about the administration merchandising of the treaty is the early use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to promote ratification.