not drive up the cost of coal and petroleum products by a wholly unjustified increase in Panama Canal tolls.

There is another aspect of this environmental impact statement which I would call to the attention of the Senate and in particular to the members of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. This one item appears under the heading "United States-Japan Via Cape of Good Hope." It discusses the bulk movement of coarse grains and wheat and soybeans between New Orleans and Japan. The report reads.

"The distance between New Orleans and Yokohama is 9,126 miles via the Panama Canal and 15,762 miles via the Cape of Good Hope, a difference of 6,636 miles. The movement of 2,635,000 tons of soybeans and coarse grains and wheat via the Cape of Good Hope would entail about 16 voyages by a bulk carrier of 183,570 deadweight tons lifting approximately 170,000 tons of cargo. Each voyage would require about 42.4 days and fuel consumption at 15 knots would be 101.5 tons a day."

Senators ought to consider the possible impact on our farm exports if commercial shipping is diverted from the Panama Canal either because of the economics of increased tolls or because of other reasons beyond our control. Will farm exports be decreased because of a decrease in our ability to compete in world markets? Yes, in my judgment, much study should be given to the real world consequences of these proposed toll increases which have been given to us as part and parcel of this disastrous treaty, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that five additional tables from Mr. Whitman's study dealing with diversion of commodities from the canal route be printed at this point in the Record for easy reference by Senators and staff members.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Rearrangement of sources and markets resulting from 50 percent tolls increase [By commodities]

Commodity:

1. Bananas

2. Iron ore-.

3. Petroleum

4. Petroleum products---

5. Iron and steel manufactures__.

Total

Long tons (thousands)

632

627

2, 388

1, 632

195

5,474

The reaction to a tolls increase by rearranging sources and markets in effect eliminates the necessity for moving the cargo involved from one ocean to the other thereby reducing energy consumption that otherwise would be used for that purpose. Obviously, in this aspect, the effect of the proposed increase in tolls is beneficial to the environment.

DIVISION OF COMMODITIES FROM PANAMA CANAL TO SUEZ OR CAPE OF GOOD HOPE RESULTING FROM 50PERCENT INCREASE IN PANAMA CANAL TOLLS (1985)

1 Europe-Far East and Oceania. Because of the shorter distances involved, the movements of general cargo, miscellaneous ores, iron and steel manufactures, and phosphates, aggregating 1,315 tons, between Europe and Japan, Africa and Japan, and Europe and Australia, via Suez or the Cape of Good Hope, will result in less fuel consumption than would movement of the cargo through the Panama Canal.

CARGO DIVERSIONS INVOLVING VOYAGES OF DECREASED LENGTH VIA SUEZ CANAL OR CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

1 Includes 588 tons assuming full impact of cumulative increase on reefers and general cargo ships without consideration of shift of cargo to container ships and bulk carriers.

DIVERSION OF CARGO TO FAR EAST MINIBRIDGE BY 50-PERCENT INCREASE IN PANAMA CANAL TOLLS (1985)

Ships carrying cargo between Japan and East Coast United States ports may proceed directly from Japan to East Coast U.S. via the canal, or move from Japan to the West Coast U.S. and thence to East Coast U.S. via the canal. Cargo moving by the minibridge route moves from Japan to the West Coast U.S. by water and from there to the East Coast by rail. Movements from the East Coast U.S. to Japan follow the reverse pattern. Whether the all-water movement is direct between the East Coast and Japan or via intermediate West Coast ports, the shorter distance involved in the intermodal movement using rail transportation across the United States, results in a substantial saving in energy consumption in the use of that route in comparison to the all-water routes. The distance between Yokohama and New York on the all-water routes indicated is shown in the following table:

Distances Yokohama to New York on all-water routes via Panama Canal

Source: H. O. Doc. 151, with nautical miles converted to statute miles at ratio of 1:1.15. I yield the floor.

TREATIES IF RATIFIED, COULD BE GREATLY ALTERED BY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE SENATE

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 29, 1977-S15889]

THE PANAMA Canal TreATIES-No. 10

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the distinguished majority leader and the distinguished minority leader arranging for me to speak from time to time, at the start of the Senate hearings, on the subject of the Panama Canal treaties.

This is the 10th speech I have given in the Senate on the Panama Canal treaties since the announcement was made that an agreement had been reached between our negotiators and the Panamanian negotiators, and from time to time in the future while this issue remains before the Senate I do plan, with the acquiescence and assistance of the distinguished leaders, to make speeches here in the Senate pointing out the defects, as I see them, in the Panama Canal treaties.

Mr. President, I am obviously greatly troubled with the substantive provisions of the proposed Panama Canal Treaty and the proposed so-called Neutrality Treaty since there are two treaties—but beyond my strong objection to the substance of both treaties, I am also greatly concerned that the treaty drafters saw fit to include so much of the meat of these proposed arrangements not in the body of the treaties themselves-by the way, which is not a very voluminous document-but rather in the associated executive agreements, protocols, and minutes. We have agreements and annexes to agreements and annexes to annexes; we have minutes; we have exchanges of notes between the negotiators; we have protocols, and all of these form a part of the treaties. But the catch is, Mr. President, that these executive agreements can be modified from time to time by executive agreement requiring no assent by the Senate.

So once the treaties are approved, the provisions of the treaties can be greatly altered by executive agreement over which the Senate has no control whatsoever. I am particularly concerned, Mr. President, that the major substantive defense provisions are not actually set forth in the canal treaty in its article IV, which is entitled "Protection and Defense," but appear instead in the proposed executive agreement in implementation of article IV-which is several times as large as the entire treaties themselves. I have that in my hand. Article IV itself does not cover a complete printed page, yet the agreement in implementation of article IV is some 53 pages long excluding annexes and an additional 22 pages of agreed minutes, the minutes themselves having their own annexes.

So if we are going to find out what the Panama Canal treaties really provide, we are going to have to do a whole lot of research, because it is not contained just in the body of the treaties themselves.

Admittedly, some of the provisions contained in these very lengthy documents implementing this very short article IV are provisions which ought not to burden the treaty itself. But, Mr. President, much is in these additional pages which in my judgment should have been set forth in the treaty text rather than in these executive agreements. The Canal Treaty reads:

"The rights of the United States of America to station, train, and move military forces within the Republic of Panama are described in the Agreement in Implementation of this Article, signed this date."

Mr. President, recognize that the rights that are being talked about here are rights to move, station, and train military forces within what is now the Canal Zone. By this one sentence, if ratified, the Senate would turn over entirely to the executive department all future arrangements regarding our defense rights in the Canal Zone, even during the duration of the treaty.

So, Mr. President, in its present form, what does this agreement in implementation of article IV now provide? Already, the executive department proposes in this executive agreement to surrender 10 out of 14 bases-we have 14 bases down there

and we are going to surrender 10 of them right at the outset and to have our forces hemmed in at four relatively small enclaves-and I would encourage Senators, if they have not done so already, to have a look at some of these maps that are contained in the annexes to these executive agreements to get some idea of just how hemmed in our forces are going to be if this treaty is agreed to and implemented. But, Mr. President, beyond this immediate surrender of 10 military bases, what lies down the road? If we turn to article I of the executive agreement in implementation of article IV of the canal treaty, under the heading "Definitions" is the following explanation:

"Defense Sites: Those areas, and the installations within them, which the Republic of Panama by this Agreement permits the United States Forces to use for the specific purposes of the Panama Canal Treaty, and as the two Governments may otherwise agree, a list of which is set forth in paragraph (1) of Annex A of this Agreement."

In other words, they can wipe it all out by subsequent agreement. So these defense sites are already on pretty tenuous ground. If this thing is ratified, a couple of years from now or sooner, the Department of State could agree and they seem to be pretty agreeable with this dictator down there in Panama-the Department of State could agree that it was time to shut down another base. Would they have to come to the Senate for ratification of that decision? No. Would they go to Congress for permission to turn over some more U.S. property to a foreign government? Well, Mr. President, they have shown no inclination to do that with this proposal to give away virtually the entire Canal Zone, notwithstanding the Constitution, so I doubt congressional authorization would be sought for simply shutting down one more base. After all, we would have already closed down 10.

I cannot understand, Mr. President, why it is thought if we have 14 bases now to defend the canal and Canal Zone, why 4 would be sufficient. Is the thought that we no longer have to defend it from the Panamanians and, therefore, we can cut down from 14 to 4 bases? Why is it that the defense of the canal will be so easy after the treaty is implemented? Why does it become so easy unless the bases are there for the defense of the canal against the Panamanians?

I would assume they are not the ones we are defending the canal against, that is, the Panamanians. But under the agreement, the bases would be cut from 14 down to 4.

Now, Senators may not think that this process is contemplated, but I would call attention to executive agreement article IV, entitled "Use of Defense Sites," which is not a part of the treaty but is a part of this proposed executive agreement in implementation of article IV of the canal treaty. Paragraph (1) of this executive agreement article IV reads this way:

"The United States Forces may use the defense sites listed in paragraph (2) of Annex A of this Agreement. * * *"

So we have permissive use of these four defense sites, but let us not be fooled into thinking that that use is contemplated throughout the term of this proposed treaty. Paragraph (2) of this article IV of this executive agreement contains the following language:

"Annex A of this Agreement shall be examined every two years or upon the request of either Government and shall be revised to reflect any agreed elimination or change in areas. The United States Forces may notify the Republic of Panama at any time that the use of a defense site or a military area of coordination or of a specified portion thereof, or other right granted by the Republic of Panama is no longer required. Under such circumstances, said use or right shall cease on the date determined by the two Governments."

This is astonishing, Mr. President. We have already agreed in the body of the executive agreement that we are going to renegotiate it every 2 years or at the request of either government. This treaty is for a proposed term of 23 years. We are going to need negotiators to negotiate this deal if we want to hang onto these defense sites for a term of 23 years with our Government already proposing to negotiate the matter on a biannual basis or upon request.

Would Congress have any say in this matter? No, Mr. President, we will have relinquished effectively any say whatsoever in our military operations in defense of the canal. The Department of State could simply with the stroke of a pen more or less at will wipe out what little they propose to retain.

You know, Mr. President, I am amused by this language in this paragraph (2) in which we are given permission to notify Panama at any time that the right they have granted us to use one of our defense sites is no longer needed. Apparently, someone down at the Department of State thought it was necessary

to give us the option to renounce this so-called right of use given to us by the Panamanians in the event pressure was on to move out before the anniversary date of a biannual renegotiation. Of course, on the other hand, it is conceivable with the political turbulence in the Republic of Panama that some new government in Panama might at a future date wish the United States to stay, but the Department of State has been careful to retain the unilateral right to leave anyway.

The more I review this material that is in the treaty and a whole lot more that is not contained in the treaty, but would nevertheless bind our Government the more I am of the opinion that the Department of State is seeking both to obtain ratification of this proposed treaty and at the same time get absolute control of all future dealings with the Republic of Panama inasmuch as the real substance of our relations with Panama can be modified simpy by amending these executive agreements with no need for consultation with Congress and no need for approval by the Senate.

But Mr. President another motive of the Department of State may have been to bury in these executive agreements some of the more embarrassing terms of this proposed arrangement with Panama. I think that also could well be the case. For example, do the American people know that we would renounce forever the right to place any type of nuclear armament in what is now the Canal Zone? I doubt that they do know that, Mr. President, because that particular provision-this critical major provision-is buried away in paragraph (6) of article IV of the agreement in implementation of article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty.

So it takes some pretty careful reading to find out just what is afoot. Fortunately, we do have time to give complete study to these proposed agreements, and I am confident that the Senate will discharge its responsibilities in ferreting out fully the substance of this proposed deal regardless of how fine the print. Mr. President, I yield the floor.