MISINFORMATION IN THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 5, 1977-S16358]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-No. 12

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, this is the 12th speech in a series dealing with the proposed Panama Canal treaties. Yesterday I testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and in lieu of full remarks in the Senate on the canal treaties, I obtained unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD my testimoney at the Foreign Relations Committee hearing. Today, Mr. President, I will discuss the historical background against which the United States negotiated the Hay/Bunau-Varilla Treaty, the treaty of 1903, which made possible the construction of the Panama Canal. Frankly, there is so much misinformation on this subject that perhaps the Senate will find advantage in a review of the facts as they actually occurred.

Although an isthmian canal had been contemplated from the time of Cortez, the first significant event leading to the construction of the canal was the treaty of 1846 with Colombia, then known as New Granada. Under the provisions of the treaty, New Granada guaranteed to the United States the exclusive right of transit across the Isthmus of Panama-the State of Panama, which was then a province of New Granada-"upon any modes of communication that now exist or that may be hereafter constructed."

So this language is really the forerunner of the rights and the property rights that the United States gained under the treaty of 1903 "upon any modes of communication that now exist or that may be hereafter constructed." In exchange, the United States guaranteed "positively and efficaciously" the "perfect neutrality" of the isthmus-I repeat, this sort of language goes way back, more than 100 years; the United States guaranteed "the perfect neutrality" of this area "positively and efficaciously," and further guaranteed new Granada's right of sovereignty in the isthmus. Pursant to this agreement, the United States constructed the Panama Railroad, which now crosses the isthmus in the vicinity of the Panama Canal.

The discovery of gold in California in 1848 intensified the interest of the United States in a route across the isthmus. Ultimately, however, the single event which focused the full attention of U.S. citizens on the desirability of constructing a canal was the dramatic 1898 voyage of the battleship Oregon at the beginning of the Spanish-American War from the west coast of the United States around the Horn and into the Caribbean. Our first true modern battleship, the Oregon was in San Francisco when the Maine blew up in Havana Harbor. Victory over Spain in the Caribbean was dependent on the Oregon's presence. The warship was a beautiful and well equipped vessel, and with determined sailing, she did arrive off Cuba in time to play a crucial part in the battle of Santiago Bay. However, the trip took almost 70 days, highlighting the great necessity for an Isthmian Canal for expedited American naval operations. The long voyage of the Oregon was the great catalyst in firming American resolve to sever the continents.

Years prior, in 1850, as a first step, the construction of the Panama Railroad had begun. The railway was finished 5 years later at a cost of $8 million, six times the initial estimate. The world's first transcontinental railroad, its high construction cost which would just be a drop in the bucket compared to the costs today, of course, made it the most expensive rail line on Earth. Nevertheless, at a price of $25 in gold for a one-way ticket, it earned massive profits for its stockholders. Twenty-five dollars in gold, Mr. President, a high price in that day, was nevertheless considered quite a bargain inasmuch as a passenger could thereby reduce greatly the length of time required to remain in Panama during a transit from one ocean to the other. Panama was considered the most unhealthy region in the civilized world, and the less time spent there by a traveler, the better. During the construction of the railroad, for example, more than 6,000 construction work

ers died of cholera, dysentery, yellow fever, malaria, and small pox-all diseases for which there was then no known cure.

So, Mr. President, thanks to this treaty of 1846 with New Granada and thanks to American initiative, the isthmus at Panama was spanned. So we have a long history of operations in Panama, in moving from one ocean to the other, then by railroad and now by canal. Under the terms of the treaty with New Granada, the United States was obliged to keep the railroad open and to protect it against any potential enemy, by force of arms if necessary. As a result, U.S. naval vessels were customarily stationed in the Caribbean off Colon and Panama City.

Way back then, Mr. President, we were given the right to defend the railroad and keep the railroad open. So there is a parallel history between the situation regarding the canal today and the Panama Railroad of a century and a quarter ago.

That is one of the big objections to this treaty today, that it does not properly provide for defense of the canal. The construction of the terms of the treaty are in doubt, with Panama saying one thing and our negotiators saying another. I would say, Mr. President, that the express terms of the treaty would indicate to my mind that the Panamanians have the proper construction of what the treaty

means.

Way back 125 years ago it was provided that we would have a right to defend this method of going from one ocean to another, transiting the isthmus.

Now the point of recalling these facts, Mr. President, is to refute some of the present-day mythology surrounding the history of the efforts of our country in the Isthmus of Panama. The true facts are that the United States was deeply involved in Panama from a very early stage and that the work of the United States has been the critical element in establishing and maintaining safe routes of travel between the two oceans. A reexamination of the history of U.S. efforts in Panama confirms the tremendous investment of life and materiel required of the United States in its great national adventure in the Isthmus at Darien.

Most of us, for example, have forgotten the hard work of Admiral Ammen, who led seven expeditions to Central America between the years of 1870 and 1875 for the purpose of obtaining knowledge about where a canal should be built. Frankly, Mr. President, it was not at all obvious that the best route was the route ultimately taken, and much debate, as well as engineering surveys, ensued from the time of Admiral Ammen's initial expeditions until the time of decision to use the present route. The expeditions of Admiral Ammen were carefully done, and his results formed a basis for future efforts. Commenting on the Ammen expeditions, then President Grant commended the canal project to the American people with the statement, "An American canal, on American soil"—not a bad recommendation and certainly a sound concept.

To be sure, Mr. President, other nations attempted to compete with the United States in efforts to connect the oceans. Most notable of these was the effort made by the French under the leadership of Ferdinand de Lesseps. De Lesseps' claim to fame was considerable since he supervised the construction of the sea level canal at Suez. However, Suez had no relationship to Panama and de Lesseps met with no success when he tried to transpose the methods used at Suez to the pestilentridden jungles of Central America. The French effort collapsed in 1899 amid charges of embezzlement and corruption. Subsequent attempts to renew French construction succumbed rapidly to the returning jungle.

In 1899, after the events of the Spanish-American War, the United States established the Isthmian Canal Commission and placed the agency under the leadership of Rear Adm. John G. Walker. The Commission was charged with selecting a route somewhere across the isthmus and was given the further objective of recommending the type of canal to be built. Nicaragua, not Panama was recommended, and candidly, Mr. President, absent political considerations, the Nicaraguan route may well have been the proper choice and indeed may well be the proper choice now if the United States does choose to construct a sea level canal for the transit of major warships and supertankers.

So, Mr. President, Nicaragua was the preferred route; Nicaragua was viewed as a country with a healthier climate and a more stable government than Panama; Nicaragua had very strong support in the Congress, particularly in the Senate under the leadership of the great Senator from Alabama, John Tyler Morgan. Senator Morgan, of course, is known as the father of the Panama Canal, even though initially he supported th Nicaraguan route. Once the decision was made to construct a canal in Panama, Morgan, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals, threw his full energies into the Panamanian project.

But as I said, Mr. President, initially Nicaragua held the favored route; ultimately, however, at the culmination of was was then known as the Battle of the Routes, Congress on June 28, 1902, passed the Spooner Act to authorize the construction of an interoceanic canal in Panama.

This is in support of the discussion today, as to whether the entire Congress has to pass an act in addition to the Senate giving its advice and consent to the treaty.

You know, Mr. President, back in those days it was thought that the Congress had to authorize the President to take a major step in foreign policy, such as the initiative required to obtain canal rights in Panama. So they did pass this act called the Spooner Act to give to the President the authority to proceed. The Spooner Act involved the acquisition of territory, and we have certainly come a long way since those days because now we have an administration asserting, notwithstanding the clear language of th Constitution, that there is not even a need to obtain congressional authorization to cede U.S. territory to another nation. Yes, Mr. President, we are light-years removed from the way Government was conducted in 1902, even though only 75 years have elapsed.

The Congress gave the President authority in the Spooner Act to acquire from the Republic of Colombia "perpetual control of a strip of land" not less than 6 miles in width from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, and having obtained such property, thereafter to excavate, construct, and "perpetually maintain, operate, and protect thereupon a canal." So the Congress authorized the President to acquire this strip of land, and of course eventually President Theodore Roosevelt did acquire the strip of land. Yet the 95th Congress is being avoided entirely now that the administration wants to give this strip of land

away.

But look at this, Mr. President. The Spooner Act contained some further provisions which should be of interest to the Senate. The President under the Spooner Act was further directed to maintain U.S. "jurisdiction over said strip and the ports at the ends thereof to make such police and sanitary rules and regulations as may be necessary to preserve order and preserve the public health thereon and to establish judicial tribunals as may be agreed upon thereon as may be necessary to enforce such rules and regulations."

The point I am making, Mr. President, is that this canal was no project lightly entered into by the United States. The Congress and people were deeply involved every step of the way. Great forethought went into the negotiations with Colombia and later with Panama. Great forethought went into the conditions under which the United States felt it would be acceptable for the United States to undertake the tremendous financial and human sacrifice that would be required to build this manmade wonder of the world. The matter was debated, studied, fought over, covered extensively in all the periodicals of the time, and only when great national consensus emerged was the project finally initiated.

How much different is the situation we face today. Our people are united in their resolve against these ill-advised, imperfectly drafted, and dangerous treaties, yet the administration and much of the national mass media have joined forces to attempt to ram these proposals down the throat of the Senate, to attempt to revise history, to attempt to reeducate our people-our people. Mr. President, understand already the history of the Panama Canal, because most of them grew up being told in their homes that its construction was perhaps our Nation's greatest peacetime accomplishment.

So, Mr. President, our people are going to have to be reeducated quite a bit if their resolve in opposition to these treaties is to be seriously shaken. It is going to take around-the-clock work by revisionist historians to convince our people that the construction of the Panama Canal was not a glorious achievement representing the very best of what is good about our country, a great work for peace and for humanity, an effort which produced benefits in medical science we are still enjoying today, and an achievement which lifted the Province of Panama from abject poverty, ignorance, and misery to a position of wealth and respect among Central American nations.

Efforts to revise history are well underway. For many months now and with greater and greater frequency, we hear accounts implying that the United States stole the Canal Zone from Panama and somehow, through intrigue, euchred the Panamanians out of their most valuable asset. These accounts conveniently overlook the simple fact that the only asset held by Colombia and later Panama was an accident of geography covered by a jungle into which only the brave or foolhardy dared to tread and from which few emerged.

Tomorrow, Mr. President, I plan to discuss the final events leading to the negotiation of the treaty of 1903, the Hay/Bunau-Varalla Treaty. My purpose will be to explain the circumstances under which the treaty was agreed upon and hopefully to refute the allegations of misconduct on the part of the United States in obtaining our rights in Panama. In my judgment, study of the history of the treaty of 1903 is a worthy pursuit for all of us, because the American people are being told by many that we have something to be ashamed of in our acquisition of the Canal Zone. Mr. President, rather than shame, Americans should feel-and do feel-an immense sense of pride. A reexamination of the history of the period, rather than causing embarrassment, should reinforce our sense of appreciation for a great national achievement and should strengthen already strong resistance to any proposal which would tear down a work well done.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE HAY/BUNAU-VARILLA

TREATY OF 1903

[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 6, 1977-S16462]

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, if there is no objection, this can come out of my allotted time.

I commend the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Tennessee, (Mr. BAKER) and the distinguished Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) for the expression of their views with respect to the differing interpretations placed upon the language of the treaty by the Panamanians and by our negotiators.

I believe, however, I differ somewhat from what I perceive to be the position of the distinguished Senator from Tennessee with respect to the method of curing this grievous wound to the treaties. I do not believe it will be sufficient to exchange notes or exchange correspondence between the negotiators. What we have before the Senate is the wording of the treaties, and any extraneous matter, any interpretation that we gather by exchange of notes or exchange of correspondence is not going to remedy the defect in the conflicting interpretations that the negotiators place on it.

This treaty has been faulted. It contains this serious fault, and the only way to cure the fault would be to amend the language of the treaty-not a reservation, not an understanding, but an amendment of the treaty.

We all know the instability of the Panamanian dictatorship; and whereas we might have some sort of understanding in correspondence and exchange of notes between Panama and the United States as to the meaning of the treaty, suppose there is a change in the government down there. Suppose another dictator comes in. Suppose the force of public opinion down there requires them to repudiate any understanding that is reached as to the meaning of this treaty. Why must we have each nation interpret the meaning of a treaty? The meaning ought to be plain and explicit in the language of the treaty itself.

So to suggest that possibly this needs to be straightened out by statements and correspondence is not going far enough. It cannot be straightened out through exchange of notes by the parties. This treaty must be amended.

What happens after the amendment? It goes back for further negotiations. A new treaty has to be entered into. It has to go through the same process this treaty is going through. But in my judgment it would be folly indeed for us to give our advice and consent to the treaty relying upon an exchange of correspondence or notes between the parties. An out and out amendment, stating exactly what the understanding is, must be insisted upon. I believe that the treaties have been faulted beyond repair. I do not believe that the treaty can recover from the damage that has been done by the disclosure of this conflicting interpretation by the parties.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, if I have any time remaining under the standing order, I yield it back.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Alabama (Mr. ALLEN) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

THE PANAMA Canal TREATIES-No. 13

Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Chair. I have already commented on my views as to the conflicting interpretations placed upon the language of the treaty.

The disclosure of this cable is not the first time that it has been apparent that there is a difference of opinion between the interpretation that the Panamanians place on the treaty and the interpretation that the U.S. negotiators place on the treaty, because Dr. Escobar, their chief negotiator, reported to the Panamanian legislative body these very two points of difference of interpretation: That is, first, on the right of the United States to send in troops to defend the canal, the right of the United States to determine when the neutrality of the canal is in danger, Dr. Escobar says that right is not given under the treaty. Second, Dr.