seriously sought, no agreement would have been negotiated which provided for the massive cash payments to Panama now contemplated. Finally, Mr. President, had the advice of the Senate been seriously sought, no treaty would have been concluded which violated basic American constitutional principles by denying to the House of Representatives a role in a proposed cession of U.S. territory. But, Mr. President, the advice of the Senate was not sought, and now that the lesson has been learned, I sincerely hope and trust that the President of the United States will recognize that an error has been made and will take the corrective action I suggest.

Few, of any of us would assert that no new treaty with Panama should be concluded under any circumstances, but, Mr. President, not these treaties-not these treaties.

The mistakes made in this instance are not novel. As many Senators in this Chamber today undoubtedly recall, perhaps from their own experience, in the past the executive department made a practice of including Senators in negotiating delegations sent to foreign lands on missions undertaken for the purpose of discussing important treaty relations. Unhappily, that sound practice has fallen out of use. But never before in the history of our country has the Senate been so completely excluded from any participation in the negotiating process, nor has the Senate ever been so completely denied a role in giving its advice to the President on such an important and critical foreign policy matter of great national significance; never before has the Department of State so completely insulated the President from the Senate and from the people, as has been done in negotiating these proposed arrangements with Panama. The exclusion of the Senate and the Congress and the people has been total.

The only past situation which might be said to be even remotely comparable was President Woodrow Wilson's decision to ignore the advice of the Senate in negotiating and signing the Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of World War I. The result of that mistake is well known. President Wilson, a leader whom I have always admired as a great statesman-I was born on his birthday, I will say— made the serious error of assuming he could present the Senate of the United States with the Treaty of Versailles to establish the League of Nations and, on the strength of his own popularity, insist upon its approval. Wilson is reported by some to have stated to Senators in a meeting at the White House during consideration of the Treaty of Versailles :

"I do not wish to see an "i" dotted or a "t" crossed."

The result, of course, was that he saw the complete defeat of what he considered to be his greatest potential contribution to the history of man and nations. One of the 14 points which President Wilson set forth as a basis for the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles was that he would support only "open covenants openly arrived at." In that respect, at least, President Wilson demonstrated his great statesmanship by recognizing the impropriety of secret negotiations of secret agreements touching the vital interests of a democratic state. A gangster dictatorship and the Government of Panama is thought by many, including myself, to be a gangster dictatorship is able to operate behind closed doors and, indeed, could not operate in the glaring light of public disclosure. But, Mr. President, our country is a free nation composed of free citizens, and negotiations by our Government, regardless of subject matter, must be open to debate and full discussion in all forums. In a free country open and frank discussion does not impede foreign policy negotiations; in a free state, open discussion guarantees honesty in relations with foreign states and insures that the executive department does not take a position in foreign policy inconsistent with the will of the people and, therefore, not supportable in action.

The President has belatedly taken a half-step in the right direction by seeking the consultation of certain Senators in devising so-called clarifying language to clear up only two of many grave flaws in these treaties. But, Mr. President, let us not participate in the charade of pretending that clarifying language can resurrect these dead instruments. These documents are inherently flawed. No amount of understandings with the present dictator of Panama can correct the clear language of these treaties which deny to the United States basic rights vital to our security and commerce.

Even an understanding reached with a legitimate foreign government could not correct the clear unambiguous language of these treaties which denies to the United States the right to intervene to insure the neutrality of this strategic canal and which would put our warships in an emergency on the same footing with merchant vessels carrying bananas, because the Panamanians say our war

ships are just going to have to get in line with the other ships. We do not have any priority. So we cannot accept this, of course.

Even an understanding with a legitimate democratic government could not correct these flaws. How, then, can we expect a so-called understanding reached with a bankrupt government composed of political criminals and petty intriguers, of Communists and Communists dupes, of profiteers, racketeers, and smugglershow can we except an understanding reached with a government of that ilk to have any validity in the eyes of the people of a free republic governed by freely elected representatives? So, please, spare us the charade.

Let us have instead a frank decision that these documents must be withdrawn. Let us have instead an effort thereafter to negotiate openly with the advice of the Senate, with the participation of the Congress, and with the informed consent of the American people to the end that new proposals may be submitted to the Senate in a form to which the Senate can in good conscience give its consent. In that process let us reeducate our negotiators and let the people be.

If these treaties are not withdrawn, then certainly Senators would find it proper to continue a detailed analysis of each and every provision of the treaties, of the executive agreements, of the annexes to the executive agreements, of the notes, of the protocols, of the maps, of the appendices, and of all the other documents and evidence bearing on this subject. The major flaws have already surfaced; yet if need be, much work remains to be done; if need be, many questions must be answered; if need be, the full light of public knowledge must illuminate every nook and cranny of these complicated documents and of the complicated procedure by which they were negotiated. I hope that process will not be necessary. Certainly, we have learned enough already to warrant the step I recommend. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

BRILLIANT U.S. NEGOTIATORS IN DIPLOMATIC COUP SECURED "CONCESSION" ALREADY PROVIDED IN 1903 TREATY

[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 12, 1977-S 16987]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-No. 15

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, this is the 15th speech I have made on the Senate floor in opposition to the Panama Canal Treaties. I do not believe that in the course of my remarks I have been redundant, because there are so many defects in the treaties that I have been able to point out something new in each of the speeches I have made.

Mr. President, during my testimony in opposition to the Panama Canal Treaties before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, one of the distinguished members of the committee, Senator, SARBANES, raised an issue to which I have since given considerable study. The distinguished Senator inquired whether Panama could now grant to a third country the right to construct a canal between the Caribbean and the Pacific through the territory of Panama, excluding obviously the United States territory comprising the Canal Zone. I did not then know the answer to the distinguished Senator's inquiry, although I did indicate that to the best of my knowledge, the treaty of 1903 did contain some provision affecting the ability of Panama to grant a canal concession to a government other than the United States. Having since looked into the matter, I can now report that under article V of the treaty of 1903, the United States has already in perpetuity a monopoly on any interoceanic canal construction across Panama, either inside or outside the Canal Zone.

Mr. President, the Department of State has repeatedly touted the brilliance of our negotiators in securing from the Panamanians an alleged agreement not to construct any new canal in the territory of Panama without the consent of the United States, at least not until after the year 1999. This so-called major diplomatic coup is embodied in article XII, paragraph 2 of the canal treaty wherein appears the following:

"The United States of America and the Republic of Panama agree on the following:

"(a) No new interoceanic canal shall be constructed in the territory of the Republic of Panama during the duration of this Treaty, except in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, or as the two Parties may otherwise agree;" That is in the proposed new treaty.

I find this provision ambiguous, but the Department of State asserts that our negotiators obtained this so-called concession from the Panamanians in return for our incredible agreement not even to negotiate with a third state for the construction of a new interoceanic canal anywhere in the Western Hemisphere without express Panamanian consent. In other words, Mr. President, the Department of State asserts that the quid pro quo for our agreement not to construct any new canal except in Panama without the consent of the Panamanian dictator-the quid pro quo for that incredible concession is, or purports to be, this clause I have just quoted, which allegedly would prevent the Panamanians from constructing a canal with Soviet assistance or the assistance of some other unfriendly government.

But, Mr. President, the United States already, in perpetuity, can prevent any third nation from constructing a new canal in the territory of Panama. So we have gained absolutely nothing from this supposed Panamanian concession. They are not conceding anything. It is already provided in the 1903 treaty. Mr. President, the plain fact is that the Department of State has set up a sham argument to justify its folly in allowing the Panamanians to tie our hands throughout the term of this proposed canal treaty and to excuse the-and I am going to be blunt about this, Mr. President-to excuse the stupidity of requiring the consent of a petty dictator before the United States of America can even negotiate with another nation for an interoceanic canal in the Western

Hemisphere. This purported justification, this quid pro quo, is a sham because it is not a concession made to the United States by Panama, simply because the United States already has full authority to insist that no other nation construct in Panamanian territory a canal between the oceans.

Article V of the Isthmian Canal Convention of 1903, the Hay/Bunau-Varilla Treaty, reads as follows:

"The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity a monopoly for the construction, maintenance and operation of any system of communication by means of canal or railroad across its territory between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean."

Mr. President, there is no ambiguity there. When treaties were drafted in those days, the documents spoke for themselves. The executive department in those days apparently did not have much tolerance for sloppy draftsmanship, but we here in the Senate today feel somewhat like Wendy and John wandering around in never-never land, trying to figure out just what these proposed new treaties actually do mean.

Mr. President, the Senate did not have that problem in 1903, and there is no doubt that under the treaty of 1903, the United States can already insist that no third nation construct a new canal in Panama. In addition, Mr. President, there can be no doubt that the right given to the United States, the monopoly given to the United States, is in perpetuity.

I might add parenthetically, Mr. President, that although the treaty of 1955 did in some respects modify article V of the treaty of 1903, the modifications in the treaty of 1955 only affect the monopoly given to the United States over railroads constructed between the two seas and do not in any way affect our existing monopoly with respect to any new strategic interoceanic canal which might be contemplated. Incidentally, too, Mr. President the treaty of 1955 itself, in extinguishing the provision of article V with respect to railroads, still provides as follows:

"In view of the vital interest of both countries in the effective protection of the Canal, the High Contracting Parties further agree that such abrogation is subject to the understanding that no system of interoceanic communication within the territory under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama by means of railroad or highway may be financed, constructed, maintained, or operated directly or indirectly by a third country or nationals thereof, unless in the opinion of both High Contracting Parties such financing, construction, maintenance, or operation would not affect the security of the Canal."

Therefore, even after allowing the abrogation of article V of the treaty of 1903 insofar as it affected railroads, our negotiators in 1955 nevertheless insisted that the United States be given a veto over any proposed construction of any railroads or, for that matter, highways, which connected the two oceans and which might in the judgment of the United States adversely affect the security of the canal.

Mr. President, Senators ought to review these past treaties-and I am sure many, if not all, have already done so- because a review of these past treaties shows the great care that negotiators for the United States have taken-at least up until now-in protecting the security of this vital international waterway. Our negotiators in the past have not taken lightly their responsibility to secure to the United States the control and defense of the Panama Canal, because our past negotiators have fully recognized the dire adverse strategic impact of permitting the effective control of the Panama Canal to fall into the hands of another nation or for that matter even permitting the effective control of any means of transit through the Isthmus of Panama to fall under the control of any power unfriendly to the United States.

But we have a new breed of negotiators working for us now, Mr. President, and they have seen fit to negotiate away our right to construct a sea level canal or a second canal in Nicaragua or in any other country, for example, in Mexico, at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, all in return-and I use that term advisedly-all in return for the sham concession of the Panamanians in agreeing not to permit another country to build a canal in Panama for the 23-year term of the proposed Canal Treaty. Quite a concession, Mr. President. We extinguish a monopoly in perpetuity and they agree, in a rather loosely drafted provision, that no new canal will be constructed in Panama except in accordance with the terms of the proposed Canal Treaty-terms which do not in themselves forbid Panama to grant to the Soviet Union or some other country a right to construct a canal in Panama even within what is now the Canal Zone.

Then, too, Mr. President, Senators should note that the proposed Canal Treaty would abrogate entirely the treaty of 1955 which grants to the United

States de facto control over the construction in Panama of interoceanic strategic highways or railroads which might in some way tend to damage the security of the canal or harm the security interests of the United States. Should this proposed Canal Treaty receive Senate consent, nothing whatsoever, even during the 23-year term of the treaty, would prohibit the Marxist dictatorship in Panama from entering into an agreement with Cuba, or with the Soviet Union, or with Red China, or with East Germany, or with North Korea, or with any other regime now opposed to the interests of our country-nothing-nothing would prevent Panama from agreeing to the construction of a major strategic highway or rail system with corresponding port facilities at either terminus for the purpose of threatening whatever defense forces of the United States might remain in Panama during this proposed 23-year term of surrender.

The good work of the conscientious negotiators for the United States who have represented us in the past in dealings with Panama would pretty much go down the drain if these treaties are implemented. The careful drafting of so many past treaties, protocols, and conventions designed to protect our strategic position in Panama would be, with the stroke of a pen and a two-thirds vote in the Senate, destroyed for all time.

The provisions of these proposed treaties which would destroy this past good work have not received to date sufficient attention. In our rush to examine the provisions of the treaty purporting to give us rights to defend the canal and rights to maintain the neutrality of the canal, many of us have overlooked the grave damage done to the existing fabric of our relations with Panama by the wholesale abrogation of virtually all important agreements reached with Panama over the past 74 years. Using more or less a meat-ax technique, our negotiators have wiped the slate clean, eliminating presumably both the good and the bad by specifically abrogating the treaty of 1903, the treaty of 1936, the treaty of 1955 and:

“All other treaties, conventions, agreements, and exchanges of notes between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama, concerning the Panama Canal which were in force prior to the entry into force of this Treaty; and ***"

In other words, anything good in the past treaties will be wiped away, any concessions made are going to be wiped out, and we are going to start anew.

Listen to this, Mr. President, just to make sure there are no scraps or pieces around that might protect the interests of the United States:

"Provisions concerning the Panama Canal which appear in other treaties, not just these particular treaties with direct reference to Panama but in other treaties, conventions, agreements, and exchanges, "conventions, agreements and exchanges of notes between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama which were in force prior to the entry into force of this Treaty."

So that ought to pretty much do the job, Mr. President. Whatever has been done on behalf of the United States during this 74-year period is going down the tubes. Part of the package is the provision giving to the United States a monopoly over canal construction in Panama. Also stated for elimination are the provisions allowing us a right of refusal over any strategic interoceanic communications system which might damage the national security interests of our country or pose a threat to the canal.

Finally, Mr. President, Senators might rightly insist that we must have gained something in return for abrogating or nullifying three-quarters of a century of diplomacy. In my judgment, we have gained only ambiguous provisions which can be interpreted as either party chooses-either to commit the Panamanians not to construct a new canal with Soviet aid only during the 23-year term of the proposed canal treaty or to permit construction of a new interoceanic canal in Panama not inconsistent with the terms of the new proposed treaty, which terms do not in and of themselves prohibit such construction and which terms, with complete clarity, only commit the United States and Panama to study jointly the feasibility of a new sea level canal project.

Thus, Mr. President, we receive again only ambiguities to replace ironclad protections. Perhaps this proposed provision is interpreted by the present Panamanian Government in the same manner it is interpreted by our own Department of State. But what of it? The Panamanians have thus far shown little inclination to accept the interpretations given to these documents by the Department of State, and even assuming there has been a meeting of minds on this particular provision, its lack of clarity would no doubt be a seed of dispute planted in the fertile soil.

I thank the Chair, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.