the Panama Canal Commission be pledged as collateral for loans from the U.S. Treasury or from the always-accommodating international commercial banks, using international bond sales or other devices designed to raise capital to feed the appetite for profit of the Panamanian dictatorship and international banks. Mr. President, in my judgment based on my study of Panamana's record in the international capital market, we would expect to see dictator Torrijos knocking on the door of the large banks almost immediately, if he has not already pledged the revenue of our Canal to secure new loans to cover the massive debt owed by his bankrupt regime. In this process, Mr. President, we can expect neither the bankruptcy of dictator Torrijos nor the bankruptcy of the international banks, but we could expect further demands on the U.S. Treasury to cover the spend thrift activities of both.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN PANAMA

A FARCE

[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 26, 1977-S17751]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-No. 19

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, one of the principal dangers which would face the United States should the Senate give its advice and consent to the proposed Panama Canal treaties is the possibility-indeed, the probability-that some future government in Panama would repudiate the treaties on grounds that the treaties had been negotiated by an illegal dictatorial regime not authorized to act on behalf of the Panamanian people. The argument would be that the acts of the overthrown dictator of Panama should not be allowed to bind the new legitimate Panamanian Government and hence that any previous actions taken by the dictator would be ultra vires and therefore voidable. A future government could well take the position, and with some justification I would think that Dictator Torrijos was no more authorized to act on behalf of Panama than was the Frenchman Bunau-Varilla.

Of course, Mr. President, in my judgment Bunau-Varilla was the properly designated representative of the Government of Panama and the treaty of 1903 was legally ratified by the Constitutional Constituent Assembly of Panama even prior to ratification in the U.S. Senate, so I do believe that the treaty of 1903 is a binding document, but in the eyes or hindsight of many Panamanians, the treaty of 1903 was improperly procured. I am, therefore, only relating what I believe to be the likely opinion of Panamanians in future years with respect to any treaties which might be promulgated under the rule of the present military dictatorship. But, Mr. President, the possibility of future Panamanian repudiation of these proposed treaties is not simply my speculation. On August 31 at a press conference held here in Washington, representatives of the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights made an emphatic statement. And something that does not exist down in Panama at the present time is, of course, human rights for the citizens of Panama. Representatives of the Panamanian Committee for Human Rights are outside Panama, of course, and they are seeking to influence the decisions of the Government there with respect to the granting of human rights to the people of that country.

This Committee on Human Rights stated emphatically that Omar Torrijos did not speak for the Panamanian people and if democratic institutions returned to Panama, no treaties negotiated by the dictator would be recognized as binding. That does not mean, Mr. President, that a future government would return to the status quo that existed at this time. That means that they being in control of the canal would keep the canal under such conditions as they set, certainly as to the right of the United States to defend the canal and the right of prior passage. They would not give the canal back. I do not mean that when I say they would repudiate the treaty, but they would take whatever they already had and seek to get a whole lot more.

These are the people who might well return to positions of authority should Dictator Torrijos be deposed.

Somewhere along the line these dictators fall by the wayside. They do not stay in forever. Some have long periods of prosperity and incumbency, but sooner or later the people catch up with them and they are deposed, and I predict that is what will happen to Torrijos unless he is undergirded by these treaties and the economic benefits that come to his regime from the tens of millions of dollars each year that would go into his coffers, some $70 million a year from the canal

revenues.

Again, Mr. President, on October 11, Dr. Winston Robles, a leader of the Panamanian exile community in southern Florida, stated to the House Committee on International Relations, and I quote his statement:

"All governments that come to power by force try to give legitimacy to their origins and legality to their malpractices. In 1972 Torrijos dictatorship called elections for a 'Constitutional Assembly." With all political parties and activities proscribed, except the government party 'Movimiento Neuvo Panama' and the 'Partido Del Pueblo' (Moscow oriented communist party), and absolute control of newspapers, television and radio stations, it was not surprising that the government won 504 of the 505 carefully screened 'representatives." "

So if they could win 504 out of 505 representatives to the assembly it is quite obvious that they could have bettered the 2-to-1 ratio in favor of the Panama Canal treaties in the plebiscite that was held last Sunday in Panama. They saw fit to say that it was a 2-to-1 margin. Obviously if they had said, as they very well could have, that it was 100 to 1 that would make the U.S. Senate and the people of the United States skeptical of the bona fides of the election result.

So, they decreed that it was 2 to 1. They could just as easily had it 100 to 1. If it had been 100 to 1, it might have caused the Senate to look with some skepticism on the treaties, for if they were so heavily balanced in favor of Panama we might have a closer look, but if it were just a 2-to-1 margin in favor of the treaties it looks as if maybe Panama did not get such a good deal after all.

That apparently was the thought process of the dictatorial regime.

So, Mr. President, it is pretty clear that the norms of democracy observed in Panama represent nothing but a farce played to the world audience. It is crystal clear that these people in this constitutional assembly are solidly under the thumb of the gangster dictator and equally clear that they have little or no choice as to what course of action they collectively or individually choose to follow.

But, Mr. President, Dr. Robles continues to describe the actions taken in 1972 in Panama designed to give some semblance of legitimacy to the Torrijos dictatorship. He continues to describe this so-called constitutional assembly: "This selected, rather than elected, assembly held its first meeting October 1, 1972. A week later the 'new constitution' was approved without discussion and the 'constitutional assembly,' even to the surprise of its members, found itself transformed into a ‘Legislative Assembly'-but one without power to legislate." That is the type of government they have down there, showing it is completely under the thumb of the dictator. What we have here then, Mr. President, is a so-called constitutional assembly transformed into a legislative assembly which is something akin to a debating society with appointed members selected by the dictator but without any power to legislate. This unelected body was therefore established under a constitution designed primarily to uphold the facade of legitimacy while giving the substance of power to one man. But here is what Dr. Robles has to say:

"The new constitution subordinates the legislative, executive, and judicial power to the National Guard. It eliminates the separation of powers and places the legislative power in a 'Legislative Council' composed of the Cabinet Ministers and any number of members appointed by Torrijos. It also states that Torrijos is the 'Maximum Leader'."

Maximum leader, Mr. President. That means that power may be shared with appointed lackeys, but at the bottom line only one man decides. No separation of powers, Mr. President, and no power outside the dictatorship, for that matter. That points out the importance of our own Senate and House of Representatives insisting on maintenance of the powers delegated to each by the U.S. Constitution.

Here is what Dr. Robles has to say about the reason for going through the motions of adopting this unusual constitution:

"The Constitution exists only for 'cosmetic' reasons and does not impose in practice any limits to the use and abuse of the governmental powers. This concentration of dictatorial powers, without parallel in the constitutions of any other Latin American country, does not give, however, a complete idea of the real power that the dictator and the National Guard exercise. For example, the Article 29 of the Constitution prohibits expatriation, but several hundred Panamanians live in exile and are not allowed to return to their country."

So, Mr. President, these Panamanians who have managed to escape to a country where they are able to state their views without at least any immediate fear of reprisal have got a very low opinion of Dictator Torrijos and, consequently, an even lower opinion of the legal effect or validity of any treaty negotiated by him. I might add, Mr. President, that Dr. Robles' view is one that I also

share inasmuch as I believe it to be inappropriate for the United States to enter into a treaty relation calling for partnership in the joint operation and defense of a strategic waterway with a government whose leaders are either criminals or the associates of criminals. Dr. Robles made the same point when he described life in Panama to the members of the House Committee on International Relations:

Today Panamanians live in constant fear. Telephones are tapped, mail intercepted, houses searched in the dark of night, people arbitrarily arrested, and the population intimidated by an organization of paid informers. This government, its officers and its friends are involved in all kinds of legal and illegal businesses. The involvement of high ranking officers in drug traffic is well known. And I might say, Mr. President, that we have seen some hints of the extent of that involvement in previous discussions here on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere. Certainly the American people should be alerted to the character of this Government that the Department of State has seen fit to treat so handsomely and with such great deference.

Yet, Mr. President, much has been made in our own media here in Washington about this so-called plebiscite conducted on Sunday, October 23, in Panama, but listen to Dr. Robles' explanation of the legal effect of this plebiscite. And before quoting him, Mr. President, I would like to remind Senators that Dr. Robles is a lawyer of great international standing and certainly the foremost authority on the Panamanian Constitution. Here is Dr. Robles' analysis of the legal effect of the Panamanian plebiscite :

"The Panama Constitution provides that any Canal Treaty must be 'submitted' to a national plebiscite. However there is a confusion. The plebiscite does not have any binding effect because the power to approve a treaty belongs to the Assembly of District Representatives-(Article 141 of the Constitution). The plebiscite is an expedient to give the treaty the appearance of a popular approval. However, what kind of a plebiscite can be held without a free press, without freedom of assembly, and without freedom of thought and expression? What is the value of a plebiscite under the constant manipulation of information by the government-controlled press, radio, and television?

With questions like that being asked, Mr. President, this plebiscite then is not going to be a very solid foundation for a new treaty, at least not in the eyes of some subsequent, freely constituted, legal Panamanian Government.

Dr. Robles also points out that it does not really matter whether the plebiscite was conducted freely or not because, and I quote his remarks:

"The plebiscite is a simple problem for the Panamanian government. It does not matter how many vote aye or nay. What matters is who is going to count the votes."

So the results of this plebiscite could very easily have been tailored, Mr. President, to achieve the best public impact. And public impact is pretty important to our Department of State. You know, Mr. President, the U.S. Embassy in Panama had a study prepared by a Mr. John L. Jackley on the subject, "The Impact of the New Canal Treaty." In addition to much other advice, Mr. Jackley suggested to our diplomats the following:

"A lot of good press would be essential for success: In this situation we could make good use of the controlled press situation of the isthmus. If it doesn't work, no propaganda would sell it. But it can be given at least an initial breath of promise through skillful manipulation of the available media."

So it has been recommended, Mr. President, to the Department of State that the controlled press down there in Panama be utilized to full advantage to rig the results of this plebiscite. And you know, Mr. President, for the best psychological impact here in the United States, they would not want a 100-percent vote that would be too obvious; they would want a vote showing some significant opposition but overall strong approval-and that is about what we have gotten out of these results reported from Panama.

Mr. President, with the Department of State being advised "to make good use of the controlled press," certainly we ought to be able to understand the feeling of the Panamanians who wish to see their country free, and certainly we ought to be able to understand their feeling that any deal negotiated with Dictator Torrijos is not binding and is in itself a threat to the prospect that Panama will ever regain freedom.

"Panamanians do not want to replace a bad treaty with one that is going to be imposed with Torrijos playing the same role that Bunau-Varilla played in 1903. The new treaty does not solve 'the causes of conflict' between the two countries.

On the contrary, it adds a few new ones, as, I am sure, many members of Congress are aware. However in this ever-changing world, permanent does not mean eternal. Sooner or later the dictator will fall. Then the treaty is going to be rejected by Panamanians and their governments and all the resentment against the dictatorship will be reflected in the future relations between Panama and the United States."

And that is the bottom line, Mr. President, Sooner or later the dictator will fall, and sooner or later any treaties negotiated with the dictator would be by the Panamanian people completely and properly repudiated, and the United States will be blamed correctly for perpetuating a dictator whose time is already past.