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the signing of the two treaties on September 7, 1977. But, Mr. President, when it later became obvious that the Senate would not allow the matter to be hazed over or swept under the rug, the proponents of the two treaties apparently thought that it would be wise to seek some clarification to allay the concerns of many of us here in the Senate, to assuage our feeling that the two documents ought to be capable of reasonable interpretation by reasonable men, to come up with the same interpretation and to persuade the citizens of the United States that these ambiguities would, in subsequent years, not be resolved in favor of the Panamanian interpretation with consequent disadvantages to our own national security. The unsigned clarifying document, however-and Senators, of course, know that this so-called agreement between Dictator Torrijos and President Carter was not signed-caused more problems than it solved and has thrown us into even deeper confusion in our attempts here in the Senate to ascertain the actual meaning of these truly mystifying provisions.

I regret to say, Mr. President, that a new element of further confusion has been gratuitously thrown into the brew by Dictator Torrijos. Apparently, Mr. President, a few days ago on October 21, 1977, Dictator Torrijos-in addition to again threatening the Senate in veiled terms with an armed attack on the canal should the Senate fail to ratify these treaties-in addition to the frequently heard threat, Torrijos in Panama made the following interesting comment giving his interpretation of the just-announced, unsigned communique. I quote what Torrijos said:

"I don't want the canal unprotected but I don't want them (the Americans) to overprotect us to the point of interfering with our lives. I want to establish a system where we press a button here and a bell rings there when the attack is greater than our ability to handle it. I wouldn't say it's a right the U.S. hasI'd say they are obligated to come to the defense of the canal.

"On these terms, we understood one another. Then we drew up in two minutes exactly what we wanted: You don't interfere in our internal matters, and leave me a button I can press in Panama, and then I want a loudspeaker at strategic command that they will hear when I do press the button."

So, Mr. President, this does not sound like much of a right we have obtained here in these treaties or in this subsequent so-called clarifying document. This is not much of a right if we are unable to take any action until a petty Marxist dictator elects to "press a button" to put American troops into action to look after his needs as he sees them. Not much of a right indeed, Mr. President.

In fact, on close analysis I would call this particular interpretation given by Dictator Torrijos an interpretation which would in practice impose an obligation on the United States to shore up his dictatorial regime rather than an interpretation which would grant to the United States, as I believe the majority of the Senate desires, a right to guarantee the neutrality of the canal with such appropriate military action as the United States, in accordance with its constitutional process, might itself unilaterally decide.

So we still have the question as to who reaches the decision for military presence by the United States. Torrijos says he is the man that presses the button, and that we do not have any right to determine when it is necessary for us to take action.

It is my contention that the United States should be allowed, at such times as it feels the canal is in danger, to have the right to send troops in to protect the canal.

The last thing, Mr. President, that I trust any of us would like to see given to Dictator Torrijos is the ability to "push a button" to commit U.S. troops to battle, and certainly, Mr. President, this is indeed a curious concession made to Torrijos if he does secure by these treaties the right to demand the presence of U.S. forces as it may suit his own interest, while the United States must wait idly by for the dictator's summons when the vital interests of the United States are being sacrificed to some yet-undisclosed Marxist project endangering the operation of the canal.

In other words, Torrijos sees the treaty and the unsigned agreement between him and President Carter as giving him the sole right to decide when American troops can come in to defend the canal, but he might be the aggressor himself. The Panamanians might decide to nationalize the canal, to take it over, and exclude U.S. shipping, U.S. warships. Naturally, he would not press a button, as he called it, to summon U.S. troops.

So we do not have any meeting of the minds yet, no matter how highlytrumpeted the unsigned agreement.

What is going to happen, of course, is to amend the treaty, which I will get to in a moment.

Finally, Mr. President, in my judgment, the Senate ought to take note of the fact that the Panamanian plebescite for ratification of these treaties has already occurred. Naturally, therefore, there can be no binding legal effect given now to any extraneous signed executive agreement incorporating, or perhaps further clarifying, as they say, the so-called clarifying document already issued. Simply stated, a new signed executive agreement purporting to lay this matter to rest could have no binding legal effect since it would not have been in existence at the time of the Panamanian plebescite and since, therefore, the Panamanian people could not have been aware of its terms prior to their favorable vote for ratification.

Mr. President, the only way these questions can be resolved properly is for the Senate to undertake the duty of amending these treaties with precise language which sets forth exactly the rights of the United States, both with respect to priority passage for war vessels and as regards intervention to defend canal neutrality. Only by amendment and by subsequent renegotiation with Panama can the present impasse be resolved in a legally binding manner and in a manner which can form the basis for decent future relations with Panama. We cannot rely on the theory that might makes right. Our future rights must be clearly expressed if we are to avoid criticism in some future age for exerting power in excess of our internationally recognized legal authority. Additionally, Mr. President, only by precise amendment of these two provisions and of the many other ambiguous provisions found throughout both treaties-only by this careful process of amendment can the Senate discharge its full responsibility to the people of the United States to insure the complete protection of our vital national security interest in the Panama Canal and in any other strategic waterway which might be constructed between the two seas.

PRESENT DRUG TRAFFIC NOT FORESEEN IN

EXTRADITION TREATY OF 1904

[From the Congressional Record, Nov. 2, 1977-S18390]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-No. 23

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, having used most of my time, I ask unanimous consent that my 23d speech on the Panama Canal, 21 of the others having been delivered on the floor, and I believe I inserted in the RECORD

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point? Mr. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. RORERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Alabama would like to have some additional time on his speech, I will be glad to yield to him on my time.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, on Thursday, October 13, 1977, I addressed the Senate on the subject of a report in the Washington Star that the Department of Justice had confirmed the existence of a sealed narcotics indictment in the eastern district of New York against Moises Torrijos, brother of the Panamanian dictator, Omar Torrijos. At that time, I went into some detail in describing the events in 1971 which appear to have led to the indictment of Moises Torrijos sometime during the year 1972, and I noted-as have others-the peculiar fact that Moises Torrijos found it inconvenient to come to the United States for the gala signing of the proposed Panama Canal treaties, notwithstanding his brother's position as Panamanian Chief of State or his own governmental positions as an Ambassador and as the current Panamanian information officer for the proposed canal treaties. More particularly, I expressed my own continuing concern that the U.S. Department of Justice may not be pursuing vigorously the prosecution of Moises Torrijos because of political considerations.

Now, Mr. President, the purpose of a sealed indictment is to keep secret from the person indicted the fact that he is under indictment until such time as the individual is within the jurisdiction of the State seeking his prosecution. But, Mr. President, once the existence of an indictment has become a matter of public knowledge and indeed once the person indicted is personally aware of the fact of his indictment, there is absolutely no good purpose served by continuing to cloak in a veil of secrecy the specifics of the offenses charged.

So, I would hope that the Attorney General will soon see fit to unseal this secret, sealed indictment against Moises Torrijos so that the American people can be made aware of the detailed charges made against him. The American people have very properly been made aware in great detail of the charges made against Tongsun Park, and certainly the same standards should apply in this particular case. So I would hope that the indictment against Moises Torrijos will be made public, either by the Department of Justice or by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and I would hope that it would not be necessary for interested parties to petition the court for information on this subject which should be of great interest to the citizens of the United States. Certainly, Mr. President, no claim could now be made that Moises Torrijos is unaware of his indictment inasmuch as that fact has been widely reported here in the United States and, I might add, Mr. President, because presumably Moises Torrijos has known of this indictment for some time-in fact, has probably known of this indictment from a time very soon after it was handed down by the grand jury there in the eastern district of New York. So, Moises Torrijos knows of this indictment and very probably knows of the details of this indictment. Yet, the American people have been kept in the dark. And I do feel that this is a subject about which the people of this country should be advised

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inasmuch as this subject does appear to touch on the conduct of high government officials of a government with which the United States would jointly operate and defend this vital national asset, the Panama Canal.

You know, Mr. President, the year following the negotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1903, our Government took the prudent step of negotiating with Panama a document entitled "A Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Criminals." This Extradition Treaty of 1904 provides the mechanism for the extradition of persons charged with or convicted of certain specific enumerated crimes. Mr. President, we do not know the details of the charges against Moises Torrijos, so it is difficult to determine from reading the language of the Extradition Treaty of 1904 whether that treaty would provide for extradition of Moises Torrijos to the United States. But we do not have the same problem here that we have in the case of Tongsun Park because we do at least have an extradition treaty with Panama for the extradition of criminals, and we do not have a treaty with South Korea for that purpose.

But, Mr. President, the Department of Justice has not seen fit to exercise the rights of the United States under this treaty of 1904 to seek the extradition of Moises Torrijos. So it must follow that the crime or offense charged against him is not one of the crimes or offenses enumerated in the extradition treaty. And indeed, Mr. President, if you do examine the treaty of 1904 in detail, as I have done and as I am sure many other Members of the Senate have done since this case came to light, you will find that among the 13 categories of crimes enumerated in the extradition treaty, the treaty does not cover trafficking in drugs.

I suppose, Mr. President, the the reason for that omission is relatively simple. In 1904, the United States was not beset by the problems and the tragedies generated by and associated with the lives and activities of some 400,000 heroin addicts. In 1904, it was possible to walk the streets of Washington, D.C., or New York City late at night without fear of violent attack by a heroin addict desperate to obtain the means to support his deadly habit. In 1904 the suicide rate among teenagers was not escalating by a factor of 300 percent as it has done in the United States over the past decade, nor in 1904 were significant numbers of soldiers and sailors in the Army and Navy subverted and destroyed by addiction to hard narcotics. So in 1904 our negotiators did not give extradition for trafficking in drugs very high priority.

But this, Mr. President is not 1904; this is 1977, and our country continues to lose ground in its grim and unsuccessful struggle against the drug trade. This is 1977, Mr. President, and our country continues to see the fabric of its society rent by the venality of drug profiteers.

Some elitist leaders of oppressed foreign populations might assert that drug addiction is a problem confined to ghettos and, therefore, not a problem worthy of serious attention or significant moral concern. But, Mr. President, the horror of a death from addiction to heroin, the horror or drug-motivated violent crime cannot be dismissed on those false grounds by the people's representatives in the Congress of the United States. Our duty is to strike against this disease at every opportunity.

In 1971 and 1972, the Subcommittee on the Panama Canal of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries conducted a careful investigation of drug trafficking in the Republic of Panama. A briefing at that time given to the subcommittee by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs contained the following information:

"Panama is one of the most signficant countries for the transshipment of narcotic drugs to the United States. Its geographic location facilitates the illicit traffic because it is a terminus for air and sea transport. Additionally, domestic and international telecon facilities are well developed. The significance of Panama is evidenced by the fact that during the past twelve months, 641 pounds of heroin were seized in the United States which had transited through Panama. This 641 pounds consists of only four single seizures and does not include seizures of less than 100 pounds."

I regret to report, Mr. President, that my own study of this subject indicates to me that little, if anything, has changed since the time that information was provided. But to illustrate the magnitude of the problem, Mr. President, I should also quote the following passage from the same report of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs:

"It is clear that the Republic of Panama has not and is not paying sufficient attention to narcotic enforcement activities to achieve notable results. This may be due to high level apathy, ignorance and/or collusion.”

So, Mr. President, this matter of the involvement of high Panamanian officials in trafficking in heroin has, therefore, been the subject of official concern for some time, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which is now the Drug Enforcement Administration, was seeking without much success as far back as 1971 to obtain the full cooperation of the Government of Panama in rooting out these wrongdoers who were and are creating such enormous suffering here in the United States.

As early as September of 1971, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was conducting narcotics information training for the members of the Panamanian Central Narcotics Unit, and before the end of 1971 the Bureau had extradition treaty to include drug violations. Unfortunately, Mr. President, that agreement to examine the feasibility of an extradition treaty for drug offenses had about as much effect as would this agreement in these proposed treaties to examine the feasibility of a sea level canal. In other words, Mr. President, they agreed to study the feasibility of traditing drug offenders, and they did not agree to anything else.

And now it is 1977, and in spite of intense diplomatic negotiations on every imaginable subject, we still have no treaty for the extradition of drug traffickers, not that anyone should be particularly surprised inasmuch as the brother of the Maximum Leader down there would presumably be one of the first to be extradited. So we are not surprised, Mr. President, but many of us are outraged because we in the United States still have the problem of 400,000 heroin addicts being fed on heroin funneled through Panama.

Mr. President, even though the negotiators for the United States do not seem to have given this subject a second thought, the negotiators for the Republic of Panama were concerned-very concerned-about treaty provisions affecting jurisdiction of offenses involving trafficking in drugs. In fact, Mr. President, the negotiators for the Republic of Panama were so concerned about the treatment of drug offenses and the jurisdiction of Panama over drug offenders that they insisted that Panama be given in the proposed Panama Canal Treaty primary jurisdiction for all crimes involving the trafficking of drugs even within what is now the Panama Canal Zone and even if the offender were a U.S. national.

This specific assertion of jurisdiction of offenses involving trafficking in drugs is set forth in article XIX of the executive agreement in implementation of article III of the Panama Canal treaty, and it is also set forth, with respect to military personnel in article VI of the executive agreement in implementation of article IV of the treaty. In bothe cases, it is also clearly specified that an individual charged by U.S. authorities upon their request.

I am sure all Senators share my hope that Panama is insisting on jurisdiction over crimes involving trafficking in drugs out of a genuine desire to suppress the drug trade rather than from the more base motives which might be inferred from some of the revelations of the past weeks and months, but the point is, Mr. President, no provision whatsoever in these proposed treaties is made for the extradition of drug offenders who are sought by the United States and who have obtained refuge in Panama. This omission has occurred notwithstanding the many thousands of Panamanians residing in the United States who travel frequently between the two countries, this omission has occurred notwithstanding also the many U.S. citizens with dual Panamanian citizenship, and this omission has occurred notwithstanding the fact that as far back as 1971 the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs obtained the agreement of the Government of Panama to examine the feasibility of obtaining drug offense extradition rights-notwithstanding all these factors, our negotiators have not provided in these proposed treaties for this important extradition provision.

As I have often noted, Mr. President, I can see virtually nothing in these treaties which accrues to the benefit of the United States. Why, at least, could we not have obtained the right to extradite drug offenders who are charged with violating our laws and who are found in the Republic of Panama? After proposing to give to Panama one of our most valued national assets and after proposing to pay to Panama several billion dollars for taking the gift, I do find it more than passing strange that we could not even obtain an agreement from Panama that narcotics offenders could be extradited.

So, Mr. President, I hope we can rectify this shortcoming. I propose to amend the pending Panama Canal treaty to provide for the mutual extradition of persons charged with or convicted of trafficking in drugs. I have prepared this amendment as one of a series of amendments I intend to propose to correct the

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