errors and omissions of our negotiators. Mr. President, I have prepared this amendment for introduction because I believe this amendment, when considered in the Senate, will bring into focus a problem of massive proportion which must be addressed and solved before any new agreement can be entered into with Panama in which it is provided that the United States and Panama will jointly operate and defend the vital Panama Canal.

The proposed amendment, along with the other amendments I intend to offer, will of course be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by my distinguished senior colleague, Senator John Sparkman. I know that the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations will give this amendment together with all others very serious and very careful consideration, and knowing that fact I respectfully suggest to the distinguished chairman of the committee that hearings on this amendment might aid in surfacing information for the committee to enable its members to assess accurately the need for its adoption. In my judgment, this amendment is clearly needed, other amendments are clearly needed, and I hope that these needed amendments will receive the full support and backing of Senators who recognize that the Senate must assume responsibility for putting into these treaties what the Department of State has left out and for taking from these treaties the many provisions negotiated by the Department of State which do violence to our national interest.

I thank the Chair, and yield back the remainder of my time.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT LONGER THAN BOTH

TREATIES COMBINED

[From the Congressional Record, Nov. 8, 1977-S19002]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-No. 24

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, in paragraph 6 of article IV of the Executive Agreement in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty, the following language appears:

"Since the Republic of Panama is a signatory to the Latin American Denuclearization Treaty (Tlatelolco), the United States shall emplace no type of nuclear armament on Panamanian territory."

In my judgment, Mr. President, this provision could have very great adverse effect on the strategic defense posture of the United States, yet this provision has been carefully salted away by our negotiators in this little-known clause in one of the many executive agreements, annexes to executive agreements, annexes to annexes, agreed minutes, protocols, exchanges of letters, and unsigned understandings which in sum contain the real meat of the Panama Canal Treaty rather than the provisions of the treaty itself. So, buried in this obscure executive agreement, which I doubt that more than a handful of people in the country have actually had an opportunity to examine-we find buried in this executive agreement a major military provision directly affecting the strategic defense both of the Panama Canal and of the United States.

Now, I am reasonably sure that the administration, and certainly the Department of State, would assert that this provision buried away here in this lengthy executive agreement could have no adverse effect on the defense of the United States or of the canal and, in fact, I have little doubt that representatives from the Department of Defense might readily parrot the same point of view. Certainly, the leadership down at the Department of Defense has shown no reluctance to follow precisely the lead of the Department of State; but, Mr. President, the Senate of the United States is entrusted with the duty of making an independent judgment with respect to all aspects of these proposed treaties, notwithstanding the various advocacy positions adopted by certain of the departments in the executive branch.

So we have a duty in the Senate to make an independent judgment, based on all of the information available to us, on the effect and on the potential effect of this peculiar and highly significant prohibition hidden away in this executive agreement of some 53 pages-longer than both treaties combined, Mr. President and I am not even including in that page count this 53-page executive agreement. Sharp eyes, Mr. President, are required for this job, I can assure you, but there it is buried away in this executive agreement that the Latin American Denuclearization Treaty would prohibit the United States from having at any time any nuclear weapons in Panama or what is now the U.S. Canal Zone.

On October 31, 1977, this Monday just past, Mr. President, Egyptian authorities refused to allow the British nuclear submarine HMS Dreadnaught to pass through the Suez Canal. This British nuclear submarine was on its way through the Suez Canal on an official voyage to visit Iran. The Dreadnaught was part of a task force on this official visit of state.

You know, Mr. President, if you leave Great Britain by sea and you wish to go to Iran, the best route, rather obviously, is through Gibraltar, through the Mediterranean, through the Suez Canal, and on into the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. You do not have to be much of a navigator to figure that out. But, Mr. President, the British nuclear submarine Dreadnaught is not going to take that route because the Egyptians have let the British know that the canal is not open to the nuclear submarine Dreadnaught. So, Mr. President, if the Dreadnaught is still proceeding to Iran, then the Dreadnaught is going around Africa, and Africa, Mr. President, is a right large land mass. Perhaps we here in the Senate could mark the progress of the Dreadnaught if we could obtain that information. It

might be interesting for us to follow her majestic voyage past the Canary Islands, around the Gold Coast, down into the Bight of Biafra, on around past the Congo, past Angola, past South West Africa, past Capetown, back up around Mozambique, past Madagascar and four or five other countries along the way, past Somalia, and back again where she would have been several weeks or months before at the entrance to the Red Sea-at the other entrance, Mr. President, to the Suez Canal.

So the Dreadnaught, Mr. President has got quite a voyage ahead of her-those nuclear reactors in the Dreadnaught are sure going to work overtime, Mr. President-if she indeed wishes to represent the United Kingdom on this official visit to Iran. I would venture the guess, Mr. President, that the Dreadnaught may find it impossible-nuclear reactor or not-to make her rendezvous there at the entrance to the Red Sea with the other ships of the Royal Navy in this task force en route to Iran. The Dreadnaught is going to have to be a very amazing vessel to catch up with those other non-nuclear-powered ships that the Egyptians did permit to pass through the canal.

Now, Mr. President, I regret as much as anyone the embarrassment which must have been suffered by our good ally, the Government of the United Kingdom. I regret very much that HMS Dreadnaught was forced to wait at the northern end of the Suez Canal for a period of several days while the rest of the Royal Navy Task Force she accompanied was allowed through the canal to complete this official visit to Iran. But, Mr. President, there is a lesson to be learned here for the United States. The lesson is a very clear lesson, and the lesson taught should be heard loud and clear.

Perhaps, therefore, Mr. President, it would be helpful to examine the position in this incident asserted by the Government of Egypt. Egypt, Mr. President, simply told the British that passage of nuclear vessels through the Suez Canal would be barred until the signing of an international agreement on safety measures and security guarantees for such vessels. That was it, Mr. President. That was, at least, the reason the Egyptians gave to the press. No prediction was made about when such an agreement might be signed nor about the number of nations which would be required to sign it. But one thing is sure, Mr. President, and that is that the Dreadnaught did not proceed through the Suez Canal.

I would like to remind the Senate of the voyage of another vessel, the recollection of which I believe should be of value. I refer to the voyage of the battleship Oregon from the west coast of the United States around the Horn of South America and on into the Atlantic and then the Caribbean where the Oregon played a vital role in the victory of the United States in the Spanish American War. There was no Panama Canal then, Mr. President, and every American was caught up in the excitement of the journey of this great warship as she progressed around the entire land mass of South America in an effort to reach the Caribbean in time to affect the outcome of battle in favor of our country. The cruise of the Oregon lasted 70 days, Mr. President, and while I am sure the Dreadnaught is faster than the old Oregon and while I recognize that a different continent is involved, the principles are identical and the distances are equally overwhelming. How long would it be, Mr. President, before the pro-Marxist dictatorship in Panama decided-should these proposed treaties be ratified-how long would it be before the Panamanian dictator decided that it would be convenient to interpret this executive agreement provision I have quoted so as to justify the prohibition of the passage of a U.S. nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed warship? The provision reads this way-and I quote it again because I believe this is an important point which cannot be overlooked, and I might say that I am going to make sure that it is not overlooked because it is a very important point-this provision reads as follows:

"The United States shall emplace no type of nuclear armament on Panamanian territory."

How long would it be before the Panamanian dictatorship interprets the Spanish text of this provision as a prohibition on the passage of U.S. nuclear war vessels? How long would it be before this pro-Communist government in Panama decides that its adherence to the Latin American Denuclearization Treaty makes it imperative to divert all U.S. nuclear warships seeking to transmit the Isthmus of Panama? How long would it be, Mr. President, before this avowed ally of Communist Cuba determines, as have the Egyptians in the case of the British, that U.S. nuclear vessels may not pass through the canal until sufficient numbers of nations have signed some obscure international protocol on even more obscure alleged safety measures and so-called security guarantees respecting the passage of such ships?

On Saturday, Mr. President, I was honored to be the principal speaker at the launching of the nuclear submarine Birmingham (SSN 695). At that time, I expressed the hope that the Birmingham would be a symbol of our determination to resist tyranny and a symbol of the will and might of our good country. I addressed the distinguished guests, Mr. President, but I spoke to the workers in the shipyard when I said, "You have taken cold steel and made it live." I shared their pride in their great accomplishment, and I would share also their sorrow should they see the day when this magnificent vessel they constructed was turned away from her course by a petty gangster dictator who had obtained, through the ineptness and folly of our diplomats, a deathhold on our canal.

This is my final speech in a series of 24 speeches in this session of the 95th Congress, and I thank Senators for the attention they have given my remarks.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a wire service report under date of October 31, relating the Dreadnaught be printed in the Record, together with an article published in the San Diego Evening Tribune entitled "Admiral Opposes Canal Treaties."

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CAIRO, Oct. 31.—Suez Canal authorities have refused to allow the British nuclear submarine Dreadnaught through the canal at the request of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission, the semi-official newspaper Al-Ahram said today.

The report followed a statement yesterday by Egyptian harbor authorities denying any knowledge of the incident.

Al-Ahram quoted a senior Suez canal official as saying transit permission for the 3,588-ton Dreadnaught had been refused because maritime regulations required ample prior notice and the request came at short notice.

The newspaper said Foreign Minister Mohammed Riad would explain the Egyptian position to the British ambassador in Cairo today.

It said Egypt had told all naval powers since 1974 that passage of all nuclear vessels through the canal would be barred until signing of an international agreement on safety measures and security guarantees for such ships.

The British defense ministry said yesterday that the Dreadnought has been at the northern end of the canal since Thursday when the rest of a royal navy task force en route to Iran for an official visit was allowed through the canal.

[From the San Diego Evening Tribune, October 1977]

ADMIRAL OPPOSES CANAL TREATIES

(By Adm. Horacio Rivero)

The central issue can be narrowed to two questions.

Is the Panama Canal important to the security of the United States?

Will the security requirements be satisfied if the U.S. cedes the canal and zone to Panama?

Some proponents of the new Panama Canal treaties have deemphasized the strategic and commercial importance of the canal and its current value to our Navy.

The President, for instance, stated to the press: "Any large ship, an aircraft carrier, for instance, can no longer pass through it" and "In the last 12 months only four or five vessels" have transited the canal.

Ambassador Sol Linowitz, one of the treaty negotiators, in his speech before the American Legion convention August 19, 1977, stated: "It is no longer vital, clearly no longer as useful as it once was for the shifting of combat forces."

The President was obviously misinformed. For it is not "any large ship" but only the 12 attack aircraft carriers, out of a naval inventory of almost 500 ships, that cannot use the canal, and it is not its utilization in normal peacetime that is important to the Navy, but the availability of the canal for redeployment of naval vessels in time of war or in time of crisis or in anticipation of war, as the international situation may demand.

In time of need some of the attack carriers can be redeployed around South America at high speed, taking advantage of their high endurance; those powered by oil might be accompanied by a fast replenishment ship (AOE) to insure their arrival with a full fuel load, while the three nuclear powered ones could proceed on their own at an even higher speed. It is for the other types of naval vesselsthe cruisers, destroyers, submarines, frigates, amphibious and mine warfare ships

and logistic support ships which constitute the bulk of the Navy and do not have the great endurance at high speeds possessed by the attack carriers that the canal provides the greatest benefits. Of course it would be desirable for the attack carriers to be able to use the canal also; this can be made possible in the future by enlarging the canal locks or constructing additional, wider locks alongside the present ones, a project of reasonable magnitude. A sea level canal is not only not required, but would represent a fabulously expensive solution which would result in a canal infinitely more vulnerable than the present one.

A Navy like ours, which has been reduced in size to the point that it cannot be described as a two-ocean Navy, must have one means for quick and timely transfer of its ships from one ocean to the other, as demanded by strategic and operational needs. This is obviously important in wartime but equally important in periods of crisis or of international tension. The strategic mobility which is a characteristic of naval vessels and the ability to utilize this quality that we currently obtain from possession of the Panama Canal balance to a degree the risks inherent in the naval force level deficiencies. Without unquestionable assurance that the canal will be available under all and any circumstances, these risks would loom much larger.

The importance of the canal for "the shifting of combat forces" was well demonstrated in World War II and in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. It has also been shown in time of crisis.

For instance, during the Cuban missile crisis, when military operations to remove the missile by force were at one point imminent, it was possible to reenforce rapidly the Atlantic Fleet with a brigade of Marines from the Pacific, with their armament, ammunition, and full equipment, providing a most valuable addition to the Atlantic Fleet forces. If the canal had been in the hands of a government under Cuban or Soviet influence, or sympathetic to those countries could the safe and timely passage of the ships have been assured in those circumstances? The opinion of Ambassador Linowitz is opposite that of four former chiefs of naval operations, one of whom had previously commanded the Atlantic and the Pacific fleets and later became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In their words: "Contrary to what we read about the declining strategic and economic value of the canal, the truth is that this interoceanic waterway is as important, if not more so, to the United States than ever." It is doubtful if any knowledgeable naval officer would dispute their view.

The commercial importance to the canal is also great but it is secondary to the military aspect. Ships with beam of slightly more than 100 feet cannot use the locks, but they constitute but a small fraction of the merchant vessels of the world. In any event, the passage of both merchant and war vessels in normal time of peace is a matter of convenience, in that it permits the saving of time and money. It is a different matter in time of war, or in preparation for war operations.

The question remains whether the security requirement can be equally well satisfied by a regime of control and occupation different from the existing onethat is if the canal is neutralized and placed under the control of another country and the U.S. military presence is removed, which are the stated objectives of the new treaties.

The proposed Panama Canal Treaty provides for assumption of sovereignty over the Canal Zone by Panama six months after final ratification, but until Dec. 31, 1999, the U.S. will have primary responsibility for the security and defense of the canal and is authorized to maintain forces in the Republic of Panama for this purpose. During that period the U.S. will be in a position to enforce its rights of passage, even if the current for a future Panamanian government should choose to interfere with them, although our ability to prevent or thwart violent action against our personnel and property and against the canal will be substantially reduced because of the absence of the protection of a U.S.-occupied and owned zone. Thereafter only Panamanian military forces would protect the Canal.

The Canal Neutrality Treaty would become effective concurrently with the Canal Treaty and provides that the canal shall be open, both in peace and war, to the war vessels of all nations without distinction, including those of nations at war with the U.S.

From that date the U.S. would not be able legally to deny passage to vessels that may pose a threat to the U.S., and after 1999 it would have neither the legal right nor the inplace military capacity to do so.