[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 8, 1977-S14425]

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, after careful consideration and study over a number of years, I have concluded that the Panama Canal is of such vital importance to the United States that it would be a serious error to cede it to the Republic of Panama as contemplated in the treaties which will be signed later today.

I have made several trips to Panama to view firsthand the situation there. As recently as August 19-21 of this year, I traveled with Senator HELMS of North Carolina and Senator HATCH of Utah on an inspection trip to view the canal. The more I learn about the situation there, and the more I am able to find out about the treaty to cede the territory and the neutrality treaty and their implications, the more convinced I am that the Senate should reject them.

There are a number of considerations I would like to discuss, among them the defense, political, economic, and legal reasons to oppose ratification of the treaties.

First, I will discuss national defense considerations.

The canal permits a quick two-ocean response by our naval forces to any military emergency. As you are probably aware, four former Chiefs of Naval Operations have so attested in a personal letter to the President. These four great naval strategists, Admirals Anderson, Burke, Carney, and Moorer, have retired from the active service and speak with a free mind uninhibited by political considerations. Their assessment of a canal giveaway, as reflected in the warning to the President, is sobering to say the least. In their letter to the President they warned:

"Loss of the Panama Canal, which would be a serious setback in war, would contribute to the encirclement of the U.S. by hostile naval forces, and threaten our ability to survive."

Approximately 98 percent of our naval fleet can transit the canal. Only our larger aircraft carriers are unable to use it. It is well to bear in mind that the 8,000-mile journey around the Horn adds 3 weeks to interocean transit time and costs 10 times as much as passage through the canal. Clearly, movement of troops or supplies around the Horn is hardly an acceptable alternative to use of the canal. As long as the United States retains sovereignty over and title to the canal, our Government maintains practical control. Under the neutrality arrangement proposed in the treaty, we lose practical control. Not only that, but according to members of the State Department negotiating team who briefed me, we oblige ourselves to guarantee access to our enemies in time of war. For this reason alone, Mr. President, I would urge my colleagues to reject this treaty. Control of territory and access routes is one of the most important elements of successful military strategy. Unless we maintain control, we will be at the mercy of the Government which controls Panama.

Now, Mr. President, I shall turn to the question of the political importance of the canal and to foreign policy considerations.

Closely related to the military importance of the canal is the strategic deterrence which our presence in the canal area provides against Communist initiatives in that part of the world. As our treaty negotiators were reaching the agreement in principle on ceding American ownership and control, the ink was barely dry on a new economic and commercial agreement between Panama and the Soviet Union. Apparently, as our Government prepares to evacuate that part of the world pursuant to the proposed treaty, the Soviets are preparing to move in.

As might be expected, a canal give-away has other implications as well for our foreign policy. Whether this means a further diminishing of U.S. influence throughout the world is of great concern to me. It is part of a pattern of retreat which we have established in Southeast Asia, South Korea, Western Europe, and possibly Taiwan? This misguided direction of our foreign policy engenders consternation on the part of our allies and audacity on the part of our adversaries. Mr. President, we cannot hope to deal effectively with other nations, and certainly not to play a leadership role, if we yield to blackmail. That is the only way to describe the threats of violence in Panama and in the Canal Zone, and

threats of sabotage to the canal, which treaty proponents are broadcasting far and wide, and using as their chief argument for ratification. If the Senate were to ratify a treaty in the face of such threats, it would show the world a craven attitude which is entirely alien to our national character and our history and which would invite further exploitation by others.

Moreover, the present government in Panama is unstable and ill-prepared to run the canal. Panama has had 59 chief executives in 74 years. Under General Torrijos, who has ruled as dictator since 1968, public indebtedness has increased ten-fold, from $167 million to $1.5 billion. It is my prediction that, if the Torrijos regime gains control, such economic ineptitude will bankrupt the canal operation and oblige Panama to call upon other nations to take it over.

Furthermore, the current government there has violated the present treaty 11 times within the past 2 years.

This is not a record which inspires confidence in those of us who are being asked to approve a new, more generous treaty. The aspect of the Torrijos government though, which may be most significant for our purposes, is that it is a repressive dictatorship. Freedom House, the respected organization which ranks countries on the basis of human rights, gives Panama the lowest rating in Latin America. Panama received the same 1977 rating on political and civil liberties as the Soviet Union, and was rated even lower than Cuba.

Freedom House is a nonpartisan organization which the State Department cites in its report to Congress pursuant to the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act. At the time of its last report on January 30, 1977, Freedom House listed as members of its board such eminent citizens as Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, now Director of the National Security Council; former Senator Gale McGee, now Ambassador to the OAS; Senator Jacob Javits; Mr. Roy Wilkins, former executive director of the NAACP; and other notable Americans.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Freedom House table of nations that sets out the comparative survey of freedom among the nations of the world be printed in the Record.1

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

1 The scales use the numbers 1-7, with 1 comparatively offering the highest level of political or civil rights, and 7 the lowest. A plus or minus following a rating indicates an improvement or decline in the rating since the last survey. A rating marked with an asterisk (*) has been changed since the last survey due to reevaluation by the author. This does not imply any change in the country. For further information on the scale and survey see "Freedom at Issue," January-February 1973, p. 2ff.

A free state is designated by F, a partly free state by PF, and a not free state by NF.

? A positive outlook for freedom is indicated by a plus sign, a negative outlook, by a minus, and relative stability of ratings by a zero. The outlook for freedom is based on the problems the country is facing, the way the government and people are reacting to these problems and the longer run political traditions of the society. A judgment of outlook may also reflect an imminent change, such as the expected adoption of a meaningful new constitution.

The name of Dahomey has been changed to Benin. Cambodia is now officially Kampachea.

Mr. THURMOND. In fact, we are about to legitimize the regime of General Torrijos by awarding him the triumph of concluding this treaty.

If the administration were serious about human rights, it would not even negotiate with this man until he held free, open, and honest elections. This is selective morality at its worst.

Now, Mr. President, I shall turn to the economic considerations involved in the current debate. The economic interest which the United States has in the canal, like our defense interest, is so vital to us that we can ill-afford to gamble with it. In 1975, approximately 14,000 ship transited the canal; 45 percent of which originated in the United States, and 23 percent of which were bound for the United States. No other nation has an equal economic stake in the canal. The canal, though, is important to all of the world's commercial nations, since 96 percent of the world's ocean-going vessels can transit it.

The canal is just this year assuming an additional commercial importance to the United States as Alaskan oil begins to flow. When the Alaskan pipeline reaches its full capacity, it will yield 1.2 million barrels of oil a day. The west coast of the United States can accommodate only 700,000 a day. This means that

approximately 500,000 barrels a day cannot be used on the west coast, and must be transported to the east. No pipeline has yet been constructed across the United States, and the trip around the Horn, as has been demonstrated, is not economically feasible. Unhindered use of the Panama Canal is critical until an adequate pipeline can be constructed.

At the present time, the United States has an overall investment in Panama of $7 billion. By the year of our total evacuation under the terms of the treaty, that interest will have grown to $9.3 billion.

Contrary to popular argument, control of the canal by the United States serves the best economic interests of the people of Panama. In 1976, U.S. agencies purchased over $29 million worth of goods in Panama, and we paid over $108 million in wages to non-U.S. citizens. U.S. private investments amount to 50 percent of the capital investment in Panama. And U.S. employees spent $39 million there. If we retain sovereignty and control over the canal, it is my suggestion that we propose a modernization which will mutually benefit the people of the United States and the citizens of Panama. In the past, I have supported the Terminal Lake Third Lock plan. This would provide for approximately $2.5 billion in capital investments over a 5- to 10-year period. In this effort, many Panamanian nationals would be used as subcontractors and the result would be an infusion of American capital into the Panamanian economy. As the canal is modernized, any unneeded land in the zone can be ceded to Panama. It would also be appropriate to make a realistic adjustment in the annuity.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, Mr. President, I turn now to the legal question posed by the current debate.

Article IV, section III, clause 2 of the Constitution unequivocally gives Congress the "power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States."

Congress enacted the Spooner Act in 1902 to provide for the construction and defense of an interocean canal, and pursuant to this act the United States acquired its property rights in the Canal Zone in perpetuity. It is thus my belief that a treaty to cede property rights in the Canal Zone to the Republic of Panama requires prior authorization by Congress.

On the other hand, the State Department contends that under the treaty power clause contained in article II, section 2, the President holds concurrent authority to dispose of U.S. property. The counterargument is that the property clause in article IV limits the treaty power clause where the disposition of property is concerned. That seems to me to be obvious.

Since the Executive claimed the authority, however, to dispose of U.S. property without first seeking prior authorization from Congress, and actually proceeded to do so, I joined with a number of other Senators and Congressmen to seek a declaratory judgment on this significant separation of powers question.

Both the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals in the District refused to consider the merits of the case on the basis that the issue was premature. At that time, they said, we did not know the specifics of any proposed treaty. In June, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari.

Now, Mr. President, we do know the specifics of the treaties. We know, too, that the State Department continues to ignore the the questions of prior authorization and the role of the House of Representatives in disposition of property by treaty.

The only way to settle the questions is to seek a determination by the courts. I am pleased, therefore, to inform the Senate that Senators Jesse Helms, James A. McClure, and I, together with Congressmen Daniel J. Flood, Lawrence P. McDonald and M. Gene Snyder, and William R. Drummond, a resident of the Canal Zone, will again file suit as soon as the President formally sends the treaties to the Senate.

I am further pleased to inform the Senate that five States will join as parties to the action, and that because of the importance and timeliness of the issue, we will seek original jurisdiction in the U.S. Supreme Court. We will be represented by the distinguished attorney, George S. Leonard, of the District of Columbia, who has so ably testified before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the legal problems raised in respect to the Panama Canal negotiations.

It is not the function of our courts to enforce public opinion. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that public opinion is strongly against a giveaway of the Panama Canal. The margin was 3 to 1 in a nationwide poll by Opinion Research Corp., and 9 to 1 in my own poll of South Carolinians.

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Its individual members are also charged with the responsibility of responding to the public will. In this matter, the two responsibilities converge. The disposition of the Panama Canal under the proposed treaty is unwise, unwanted and unconstitutional. I urge the Senate to do all it can to prevent it.

This Senate is charged with the responsibility of protecting the interests of the legislative branch and of monitoring the separation of powers between the three coordinate branches of our Government.

Mr. President, I wish to thank the distinguished Senators who yielded time to me. I now yield the floor.