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It is conceivable that the senatorial battle might be preempted by events in Panama; Torrijos's throne is propped up by bayonets and his position and the economy and social structure of Panama are unstable. But whatever the specific course of events in Panama, the argument that the transfer of sovereignty would promote stability, insure a friendly Panamanian government, and secure vital U.S. strategic interests seems groundless in the light of existing conditions.

CONCLUSION

In considering the vital issue of the future of the Panama Canal, two fundamental questions should be asked.

(1) Can the Republic of Panama operate, maintain, improve, and defend the canal without external aid and with equitable treatment for all shipping?

The answer, to anyone who has studied canal problems, is clear. Panama could undoubtedly physically operate the canal, with the help of sizable numbers of the present American employees. This initial period of operation might cover several years, during which U.S. employees would be gradually replaced and outside aid phased out. But Panama clearly does not have the economic or technical capability to maintain—much less to improve and modernize—the canal without massive external financial and engineering aid. Unless it has complete authority (which means sovereignity) over such expenditures, the United States should not provide such aid. “Internationalization" of the canal, a term which has a beguiling ring, would be, in reality, a cover for some form of collectivized control or consortium, with Communist and/or Third World influence probably predominant. The canal, U.S.-owned and operated, is an asset to our strategic interests. But the canal, controlled and operated by a nation or nations actively or potentially hostile to our way of life, is a menace to our security. And, given the ideological instability of past Panamanian governments and the example of the Suez Canal, it seems highly unlikely that, with Panama nominally sovereign over the canal, the “big ditch" would be truly and perpetually neutral or its longterm operation efficient.

(2) Would transfer of sovereignty to Panama impair the U.S. strategic position in the Caribbean?

Again, the answer is clear. U.S. control and U.S. influence in this vital backdoor area—already impaired by the extension of Communist power and influence outward from Cuba and by our past defeats and retreats around the worldwould be fatally weakened. We cannot insure control without sovereignty; the mere phrase is doublespeak. We cannot provide military security for the canal without sovereignty; to attempt it would be to accept responsibility without authority.

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 21, 1977-S15314]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I have before me a news article written by John Chamberlain for publication in The Florida Times-Union and published in the August 19, 1977, edition. Mr. Chamberlain's analysis of the terms of the Panama Canal treaties is informative and one with which I totally agree.

The Panama Canal is vital to our national security and economic well-being. President Carter is attempting to persuade the American people to put both in jeopardy in order that Panama be appeased. In view of the importance of this issue to the U.S. Senate and the American people, I ask unanimous consent that this excellent analysis by Mr. Chamberlain be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Jacksonville (Fla.) Times-Union, Aug. 19, 1977]

GUANTANAMO SURRENDER NEXT

(By John Chamberlain)

The Carter Administration pulled a fast one when it divulged the major points of its proposed new Panama Canal Treaty during a Congressional recess. This meant it would be days before the opposition, including Democrats as well as Republicans, could form its lines for putting pressure on 17 more or less undecided Senators who are still needed to block the treaty, which must have 67 votes to pass.

There must also be House of Representatives concurrence, a requisite for treaties that dispose of U.S. property.

The treaty, as set forth by our negotiators, contains its superficially resassuring features. We do not propose to relinquish all control of the canal until the year 2000. By then the present Panamanian dictator, Omar Torrijos, will be overthrown or dead. We can be sure the face of the world will be changed almost unrecognizably in 23 years.

Brezhnev will be gone, Jimmy Carter (if the fates are kind to him) will be sitting on a porch in Plains, Ga., shelling peanuts. Ronald Reagan may still be riding a horse but be will no longer be a political force unless Geritol develops some unsuspected properties.

By 2000 there may not be much Alaskan oil left to put in big tankers that can't get through the canal anyway.

So why, since many of us won't even be around in 2000 A.D., isn't it the mark of expedient wisdom to leave the long-term future of the canal up to our children, along with the six trillion of debt obligations that we have already bequeathed to them?

The reason why this is a stupid question is that Marxists of every stripe regard the fight over the treaty as a test of will in a struggle that is not going to be postponed to 2000.

The Panamanian Marxists have already made blackmail claims on us to compensate for artificially low canal fees. Our willingness to give up sovereignty over the sublime engineering feat that our technology (and our tropical medical hygiene) made possible where the French canal builders had failed will not be lost on Fidel Castro, who will surely be raising the question of our Caribbean base in Guantanamo.

The Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley, who has welcomed thousands of Cubans to his country to run such things as a "people's militia," will be putting in more phone calls to Hanava. The Washington-based Council for Inter-American Security, which has excellent correspondents, speaks of Jamaicans staring with awe at closed circuit television replays of Panamanian youth being trained in

warfare, singing and shouting Marxist slogans. This is the sort of thing that dictator Torrijos looks upon with complaisance, even if it is "unofficial" insofar as his government is concerned. It makes it look as though we were quitting the canal out of fear.

Some of the still officially_undivulged terms of the Treaty which I saw circulating last week at an Inter-American Symposium at the University of Miami in Florida would seem to indicate that many of the attributes of Canal Zone sovereignty are scheduled to be relinquished to Panama long before 2000. U.S. citizens working for the Department of Defense or whatever authority will be operating the canal will be required to have Panamanian visas on ID cards. U.S. Customs employees will lose their jobs immediately.

There could be a five-year rotation plan for canal employees recruited in the U.S. for "noncritical" jobs (pilots and marine engineers would, fortunately, be another matter). PX and Army commissary privileges would be discontinued after five years, with no compensatory cost-of-living subsidy from the U.S. government.

In short, the treaty would make it unpleasant for U.S. citizens to take jobs in the Canal Zone. With U.S. police jobs being turned over to Panamanians, who knows how many Castroites would be telling Americans where to park their cars or when to put out their lights?

We are told that the Canal Treaty must be accepted if Latin America as a whole is to be appeased. This is arrant nonsense. There is only worry in the West Coast Latin countries (Chile and Peru with their copper, Ecuador with its bananas) lest a Panamanian-owned canal, presumably “nationalized,” should hike the canal tolls. When Brazil and the Argentine complain of Yankee "imperialism" these days, they have Carter's selective statements on "human rights" in mind, not the U.S. engineers who kept watch on the Canal's Gaillard cut and Gatun dam.

The Senate, if it is seeking to know the truth about Latin American opinion, should find some means of conducting honest polls all the way from Guatemala to Cape Horn. An honest poll might disclose a yearning for a "users' control" of the Canal after 2000.

Everyone knows what happened to the Suez Canal when the "users" lost sovereignty there.

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 22, 1977-$15399]

THE PANAMA CANAL

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I urge all within and without the Senate to read the remarkable statement on Panama just made public by our esteemed colleague from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS).

Senator Hollings was one of the numerous Senators who in the last Congress cosponsored the resolution that warned the State Department against negotiating a treaty with Panama.

He was one of the numerous Senators who copsonsored the resolution in the last Congress who has refrained from cosponsoring the resolution in this Congress.

And now, after reading, thinking, listening, asking, studying, and traveling to Panama to make a penetrating examination of all the factors at close hand, Senator Hollings has come out for ratification of the Panama Treaty.

He set forth a careful, detailed and thoughtful dissertation of all the steps and stages he went through as he came to his decision, and the reasons and thought processes that led him to his conclusions, in his September newsletter to his constituents.

I ask unanimous consent that Senator Hollings statement be printed in the RECORD, and I urge that it be read with care equalling the care with which it was written.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE PANAMA CANAL

Do you want to give the Panama Canal away? NO! I don't either. Nor does President Carter. If President Carter's treaty is not giving it way, what is it doing? Keeping it to use! Given the present circumstances, the two new treaties are the only reliable and fair way for the United States to keep the Canal to

use.

We all start by agreeing that the Panama Canal is important to the United States, both from a commercial standpoint and from a strategic standpoint. We all start by agreeing that the Canal should be continuously open and continuously in use. The debate centers on how best to keep it open and operating, so that our commerce can flow and our Naval fleets can remain mobile.

After looking at this question from every angle, listening to both sides over the years, and visiting Panama for another first-hand look, I join all our recent Presidents, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a bipartisan group of political leaders in supporting Senate ratification of the treaties. They are the best safeguards for an open Canal, and they guarantee America's continued access and continued freedom of transit permanently.

If this treaty prevented our ability to use or defend the Canal, it would be different. But it does no such thing. On the contrary, the United States continues to operate and defend the Canal until the year 2000. After 2000, we retain the right to intervene to guarantee the Canal's accessibility to U.S. shipping. Let's be practical. The Canal is like an airplane-it is no good unless it can be used. We can go out and squat in the airplane, but unless we can fly it, the plane is of no use. So title to the Canal is not the issue. The problem is the unimpeded right to use it. Does the treaty give the United States the permanent, unimpeded right to use the Canal? Are we guaranteed freedom of transit even after 2000? A few days ago in Panama when President Demetrio Lakas was asked these questions, he answered "Yes" to both. Returning home and checking, Article IV of the treaty provides it, and Dictator Torrijos states in Washington, "we are agreeing to a treaty of neutrality which places us under the protective umbrella of the Pentagon."

Why, then, all the hubbub? Two main reasons. First, we have not yet fully learned the lesson of Vietnam. A decade there should have convinced us that

people do not like foreigners in their country. The Vietnamese did not like it. The Panamanians do not like it. But failing to recognize this, the treaty opponents see no problem. They think the whole thing is a scheme of the State Department, and all we need to do is prove title or sovereignty and the treaty will be defeated. Secondly, we feel frustrated. The cry is, "We lost in Vietnam; we lost in Angola; we are pulling out of Korea; we talk about abandoning Taiwan. We have given away too much and 'detented' too much, and just once we should stand up and say-'NO!" This was exactly my reaction ten years ago when former Secretary of the Navy Robert Anderson came before our Commerce Committee to testify on a proposed new treaty for the Canal. “We bought the Zone, we built the Canal, we paid for it all. Why should we want a new treaty?" Secretary Anderson said quietly, "We made a bad treaty. The people of Panama have never accepted it and now they are ready to lay down their lives for their country." "Baloney" was the reaction. America's sovereignty must be protected at all costs. In 1967 in Vietnam, it was becoming difficult to explain to next-of-kin how their sons were being sacrificed for U.S. sovereignty. But in Panama-it could be explained easily. This feeling permeated a glowing newsletter about U.S. "sovereignty" five years ago. But the legal opinions to support sovereignty were not forthcoming.

President Lyndon Johnson had conferred with former Presidents Eisenhower and Truman and the three Presidents agreed we needed a new treaty. When President Nixon and President Ford also endorsed the idea, everyone began to wonder. Nixon had ignored the State Department and Ford would like to have ignored State if his conscience would allow him. Ronald Reagan was giving him a fit and it would have been a lot easier for Ford if he could just stand up and say "No" on the Panama Canal. My conscience hurt-and in another newsletter last year, it was pointed out that we did not have sovereignty, and the need was emphasized to rid ourselves of the vestiges of the "Ugly American" in the Canal Zone by relinquishing separate courts, the commissaries, special stores, etc. But, the newsletter concluded, the United States should make sure

that we will be in charge of the Canal both five years and 50 years from now." Previously, I had joined in the Panama Canal resolution putting Henry Kissinger on notice. We never knew what he was up to and it was thought healthy to let him know that some of us in the Senate were watching. In January of this year, with Henry gone, there was no need to co-sponsor the resolution.

Today I am better informed-reading "The Path Between the Seas" by David McCullough a 698 page historical account of how we created the Republic of Panama after Colombia, the sovereign, refused to ratifiy our treaty. Talking and listening at length to Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Linowitz, who was President Johnson's Ambassador to the Organization of American States-hearing the joint Chiefs of Staff, including General Brown, the Chairman, and General Jones, head of the Air Force-talking more recently with Army Secreary Alexander after his return from a trip to the Canal Zone-traveling to Colombia, Argentina, Peru and the Canal Zone, meeting with their Presidents-talking in Brazil to the Foreign Minister and the President of the Brazilian Senate and with many other officals-talking with the Economic Minister and Secretary of Commerce in the Republic of Panama-meeting with a group of Zonians, people living in the Canal Zone-lunching with American business leaders who had lived from two to twelve years in Panama City-outside the Zone-traveling with the U.S. Governor of Panama over the entire Canalbeing briefed all along by Lt. General Dennis P. McAuliffe, the U.S. Commander of the Canal Zone-spending an evening with the U.S. Ambassador to Panama Jorden, meeting with a former prisoner of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. With the exception of some of the Zonians, they agree to a man that the Senate should ratify the treaty. Even the Zonians emphasize that the treaty ought to be "modernized."

There must be a good reason for all of these leaders plus six American Presidents to favor a new treaty. The good reason, of course, is an appreciation of the true character of America. Some think our strength lies in our military might alone. But America's power lies in its solid stand on the principle of self-determination. Having lost 56.000 for this principle in Vietnam, it is appalling that some would suggest we now lose Americans to deny the principle in Panama.

Much is proclaimed about building the Canal-but so little said about building the Republic of Panama. If ever a country should be stamped, "Made in

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