with chief executives and other principal officials of a number of Latin American countries, with embassy personnel, with intelligence officers, with American citizens, as well as foreign nationals within the countries visited.

In Colombia I learned that because of kinship with an adjoining Latin country, Colombian officials do favor the transfer of the canal but are very much concerned about the contemplated increase in tolls, stating that the only practical way to transfer material from one part of their country to another is through the canal. Brazilian officials didn't seem to have any real concern regarding the proposed transfer, referring to it as a matter between the United States and Panama. Perhaps this is because Brazil fronts on the eastern coast of the South American continent and is not among the prime users of the canal.

In Argentina, officials indicated that they did not make extensive use of the canal but expressed fear that it might come under Communist control.

Chilean officials were even more concerned of the possibility of Communist influence or control of the canal indicating that 95 percent of their commerce used the canal and that they could not afford an increase in tolls or to have this vital artery subject to direct or indirect control by Communists. Chilean officials indicated that our contemplated action in giving up the canal appeared to be contrary to the best interest of the world community and they would much prefer that we retain complete control of the canal.

In Peru, we again heard that Panama was a neighboring country and because of this they favored the transfer to Panama. However, officials indicated their country would suffer greatly if the tolls were raised as appears to be inevitable if the treaties now under consideration are ratified. Contrary to some suggestions, officials of every South American country visited indicated that there would be no repercussions from their country if the Senate failed to ratify the treaties.

Within the canal zone itself, we heard the strongest opposition and the greatest fear of Communism. American citizens complained of violation of human rights, they spoke of lack of expertise and management ability, of the differences between salaries within the zone and the Republic of Panama. Many indicated that they would not continue to work within the canal zone if it came under the control of Panama.

I inserted a detailed statement of the Panamanian trip in the August 4, 1977 Congressional Record and included a statement by the heads of various civic groups within the Canal Zone. Should any Senator have any doubt about the feeling of American citizens living in the Canal Zone, he might want to refer to this statement. It concludes, and I quote: "for ourselves as U.S. citizens living and working thousands of miles from our homeland, we can say 'pack us up tomorrow. We're ready to go.' But for the sake of U.S. commerce and the U.S. national interests in general in the western hemisphere we urge you to examine the proposed treaty in minute detail. We urge you to visit here for more than three days, to observe the situation with your own eyes and not to depend solely on briefings by U.S. or Panamanian government officials. The new treaty with Panama will have long-range repercussions that coming generations will have to live with; we urge you not to ratify a new treaty solely because the State Department says that a treaty is the cure-all to problems with Panama. The Russia-Cuba axis and the American electorate are waiting to see which way the treaty goes. A hasty decision on the part of our Congressmen without giving deep and thoughtful study to the question would please the former and infuriate the latter."

Now, Mr. Chairman, on this question of Communist influence, Mr. Charles Conneely, a member of the professional staff of the Armed Services Committee, and myself talked privately in a number of Latin American countries with embassy officials, with military intelligence officers, with CIA officials, with both American citizens and foreign nationals about the possibility of Communist influence. We first visited in Panama and were somewhat skeptical, or thought perhaps Americans living within the zone might tend to exaggerate the question of Communist influence. Yet, the statements they made were verified in private conversations with the American intelligence community in various Latin American countries. In acting upon this treaty we may well be considering not only future control of the Canal Zone but future control of the Caribbean. Therefore, it would seem important enough to the defense of our own country and that of the free world to have military and civilian intelligence officials, both active and retired, to testify under oath in closed sessions regarding Communist influence, within Panama and other nations of Latin America. Time after time we heard the names of leading political figures in Panama identified as Communists and were told that there were strong Communist influences throughout the Panamanian government. 99-592-78—23

I call these statements to the attention of the committee because of their repetition by so many people during our South American visit and suggest that the committee endeavor to ascertain the truthfulness or falsity of these allegations.

I believe the committee and the Senate will want to consider these factors in determining whether to advise and consent to the treaties.

My own opinion, Mr. Chairman, is that these treaties should be defeated. But I would hope that the administration could then be encouraged to negotiate an arrangement for joint control by the United States, Panama and a limited number of Latin American countries but with ownership of the Canal Zone remaining in the United States.

[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 6, 1977-S16461]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY CABLE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I want to take just a few minutes to comment on a matter of grave concern to me and-I hope-to many of my colleagues. That is the question of just how far this administration is prepared to go to protect itself from embarrassment over the proposed Panama Canal Treaties.

On Monday of this week, I was handed a copy of a September 29 State Departmen cable which gave me great cause for concern. The cable contained information-previously unavailable to either the Senate or the general public-which conflicted with testimony presented by key administration witnesses on the canal treaties last week. That was testimony on American rights under the proposed treaties to protect our defense interests.

The cable verified what many of us suspected all along: That American and Panamanian negotiators have far different interpretations of just what rights we would keep under the permanent neutrality treaty provisions.

Since this vital question bears directly on the Senate's decision as to whether the treaties should be ratified, I felt it should be brought to the attention of the Foreign Relations Committee. And since the administration has been promoting an entirely different interpretation of these treaties before the American people, I felt they were entitled to know the full story, as well.

Yesterday, State Department sources contacted the Ethics Committee staff to inquire as to whether my action in releasing the cable might have violated some Senate rule or ethic. I resent and reject that clear effort at intimidation.

A "CONFIDENTIAL" CABLE

My copy of the cable indicated it had been classified "confidential" and for "limited distribution." Why it was classified in this way, I cannot begin to understand.

The cable contained no military secrets. Instead, it described a Panamanian negotiator as "disturbed" over descriptions of the treaties being promoted by American officials. It was obvious that its release would in no way endanger our national security. In fact, its release appeared more likely to enhance our national security by revealing just how much the treaties jeopardize our interests in the Panama Canal passageway.

So why was this cable-which directly contradicted administration testimony on treaty "protections"-to be so carefully guarded from Congress and the public? I am forced to conclude that this cable was classified for narrow, short-term political advantage. Contradictory information about America's defense rights under the treaties was being concealed under a questionable "confidential" classification. If this was not intentional misuse of a "national security" cover, then it was at best an error in judgment that deserved correction.

Whatever became of the "open government" that our President promised during his campaign last year? If there is one thing that the people of this Nation have learned from the mistakes of the past, it is that political coverups at the highest levels of Government are themselves hazardous to our national security. Indeed, we should ask: Just whose confidence was at stake in this "confidential" cable? Was it the administration's or was it the confidence of the American people in the integrity of administration spokesmen?

Whether intended to advance a cause, or to prevent political embarrassment, government coverups have no place in the American system.

PUBLIC ACCESS TO FACTS

What else do we not know about the proposed Panama Canal treaties? What else is being "glossed over," because full disclosure might embarrass the Carter administration? I believe the State Department should provide the Senate with copies of all documents, memorandums, and cables, I might say, as requested by

the distinguished minority leader on more than one occasion, anything exchanged between our two countries during the negotiations. And I commend the Foreign Relations Committee and the distinguished minority leader, Senator Baker, for their repeated efforts to obtain these materials.

In my opinion, the greatest danger that could arise from the Panama Canal issue would be in giving the public too little information about these treaties, not too much.

I challenge the Carter administration to lay all its cards on the table, and let the American people judge for themselves whether or not the Panama Canal treaties are worthy of their support. Only then can the Senate proceed confidently in its ratification responsibilities next year.

Mr. President, I yield.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished junior Senator from Kansas for his statement this morning, for his interest in this matter, and for his service to the country.

On the first day of the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee I indicated that I had decided not to decide how I will vote on those treaties until those hearings were finished.

At that time Secretary Vance, Ambassador Linowitz and Ambassador Bunker testified. I brought to the attention of those three gentlemen certain statements attributed to high Panamanian officials which seemed at variance with their interpretation, the American interpretation of the treaties, particularly the neutrality treaty as suggested by the Senator from Kansas.

At that time I suggested that the Foreign Relations Committee and indeed the Senate itself as a full constitutional partner in this matter should have full access to the negotiating transcripts, the minutes, the cable traffic, the Presidential review memoranda, and any other document in the possession of the executive department that would aid and assist our reconciling the apparent difference in the interpretation between the American point of view and the Panamanian.

I also said then that if that information was not forthcoming I felt it would seriously prejudice and jeopardize the final advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of these treaties.

Mr. President, the disclosure yesterday of this cable by the Senator from Kansas, which I think was appropriately brought to the attention of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, intensifies the absolute requirement that the Senate be given access, on whatever reasonable conditions the executive department may require, to the source matrial that will enable us to decide how the Panamanians view the interpretation of these treaties, particularly on two points:

One, the expeditious passage through the canal of American war vesselswhether or not that is privileged, priority, or routine; and two, the right of the United States to intervene unilaterally to protect the regime of neutrality after the year 2000 as contended by the U.S. negotiators and interpreted by the administration.

Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Kansas has done a great service in highlighting this problem.

Moreover, I believe that now, in the face of this new information, it is imperative that the administration give the Senate full access, freely and voluntarily and without any concern for separation of powers or executive privilege or any other legalism, to the source data and material that will permit the Senate as a constitutional partner to make its judgment on these treaties.

Mr. President, I have still not made up my mind on how to vote on these treaties. I am not threatening, I deplore the action of the administration in contacting the Ethics Committee yesterday and I say to them now that if that is the game they are going to play, these treaties are going to be in for a tough time. I have still not made up my mind, but unless the President of the United States and the Secretary of State decide to give the Senate the material we need to make an honest judgment, now that this matter has been brought to our attention, I believe there is no chance that these treaties will be approved.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished minority leader, and I will say that I do not understand why the State Department finds it necessary to contact the Ethics Committee to see if the Senator from Kansas may have violated something. It seems to me that they may have violated the confidence of the American people by not disclosing the very documents the Senator from Tennessee has been trying to obtain for 2 or 3 weeks.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the Senator.

[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 6, 1977-S16562]

DOUBTS ABOUT THE CANAL TREATIES

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, Jr. Mr. President, several weeks ago the chief Panamanian negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaties, Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, addressed his National Assembly.

In that address he described the terms of the treaties and gave his interpretation of the meaning of several controversial provisions.

Mr. Escobar's interpretations do not square with those of the Carter administration and this divergence of interpretation has become a major focus of Senate concern.

An article in the October 8 issue of Human Events discusses the effects of the Escobar statements and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATE REMAINS SKEPTICAL ABOUT PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee kicked off the hearings on the Panama Canal treaties last week, but the Administration, despite trotting out its heavy artillery-Secretaries Cy Vance and Harold Brown and Joint Chiefs Chairman George Brown-ran into some serious skepticism, even from such liberals as Senators Clairborne Pell (D.-R.I.) and Clifford Case (R.-N.J.).

Both Pell and Case are up for reelection next year, so that may help to explain their attitude, but there is no question that important doubts about the wisdom of the new treaties exist among many of the senators who have been called upon to give their approval.

What clearly bothers senators the most are the astonishing interpretations placed upon the treaties by Panama's chief negotiator, Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, who is clearly emerging as the Administration's No. 1 hurdle to ratification. In close to half-a-dozen instances-many of them disclosed in these pages previously-Escobar has directly contradicted our own negotiators on crucial

points.

Indeed, so alarming have Escobar's statements been-and so unsatisfactory the responses of Secretary Vance and negotiator Sol Linowitz-that both Pell and Sen. Howard Baker (R.-Tenn.) have now demanded to see the negotiating minutes and other written documents for the purpose of finding out whether the Panamanians actually place the same interpretation upon these pacts as does the United States.

Baker, in fact, told Linowitz that he should get the current government officials in Panama to repudiate Escobar's explanations of the treaties, hinting that his decision to vote for or against them may hinge on such a repudiation.

The Administration, however, has not been eager to meet Baker's demands in any area of his concerns, and whether it will do so is problematical.

Just how evasive the Administration was in regard to the Escobar matter was brought out in the give-and-take between the senators and U.S. officials.

Sen. Case, for instance, raised with Vance the meaning of the "expeditious" passage provision in the neutrality treaty. Vance said it meant that U.S. vessels of war and auxiliary vessels will be entitled to go through the Panama Canal ahead of ships from other nations. But Case pointed out that Escobar specifically denied this to the Panamanians.

Linowitz then cut in: "*** I think too much is being made of a statement that was made by the negotiator in Panama which has not been repeated. ***" In other words, Linowitz thought "too much" was being made of the words of none other than Panama's chief negotiator!

When Baker pressed Linowitz later on in the day about Escobar, Linowitz shifted ground somewhat, this time saying he and other Administration officials had been "disturbed" by what the Panamanian was saying.

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