These are opinions of both cabinet officers and our highest court made near the time we acquired the zone and the exhaustive study of authorities made by the Library of Congress in its paper dated August 4, 1977. The only rationale I know for persons presently holding positions within the executive branch of government to deny that we hold title or sovereign rights in the Canal Zone is to close ranks in support of a treaty signed by the President.

I wonder if each Senator early in his school experience didn't learn that the United States acquired the Canal Zone, rid the area of disease, constructed the canal and has operated it under the American flag since the beginning of this century. At a time when world domination is being sought by a form of government entirely different from our own, it appears untenable to give away this vital artery of commerce, to pay Panama for taking it and to commit ourselves to defend it.

This view is shared by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1970 to 1974, who testified before the Senate subcommittee on separation of powers. Toward the end of his testimony on July 22 of this year, Admiral Moorer made these statements: "Surrender of U.S. sovereignty over the Canal would inevitably lead to the transformation of the entire friendly character on the Carribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Everything would depend on the attitude of those who held sovereignty and ownership. . . . I might say that in military affairs there is no substitute for ownership of the territory and the ability to control or to deny the waters and the airspace."

Of course, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Moorer retired as our number one military officer and is in a position to candidly express his opinion at this time and I believe we can well understand the hesitancy of some active members of our military forces publicly disagreeing with their Commander-in-Chief. We need only to reflect on General Singlaub being called back from Korea and being reassigned because of a candid statement made by him and the rebuke of General Starry by the Secretary of the Army to realize that active duty officers and even civilian government officials are not entirely free to express opinions contrary to the administration's position.

Before these rebukes, however, on March 11, 1977, during a closed session of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services, Admiral Maurice Weisner, presently Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or in other words, the Commander of all of our Armed Forces for one half of the globe, with headquarters in Hawaii, responding to specific questions regarding the importance of the canal to the United States. This testimony is reported at page 2378 of the hearings on military procurement for the fiscal year 1978 and I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to include the page in the RECORD. He was asked for his views as to the importance of the Panama Canal; whether there would be any adverse effect on his command if the Panama Canal were not under the control of the United States. Let me quote his response: "I can see adverse effects. Senator Scott. It takes considerable time to move items by sea from the East Coast to the Pacific. Without the Panama Canal, you are adding 3 weeks' time in shipping critical items such as ammunition from an East Coast port rather than from a West Coast port."

Then I asked the Admiral if he would see a need for an increase in our naval strength if we did not control the Panama Canal. Admiral Weisner responded: "Yes, we would have to put these critical items being shipped by sea over a greater area." This, of course, is a response of an active duty military commander before the Singlaub affair.

Returning briefly now, Mr. Chairman, to the conclusion of the testimony by Admiral Moorer before the Judiciary Committee, he states, and I quote: “Anyone in this country who thinks that Soviet Russia is not staring down the throat of the Panama Canal is very naive, and I think it says something to note that the Soviets understand the importance of the Panama Canal apparently far more than many in our own country."

On September 8th of this year, retired Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. also testified before our Subcommittee on Separation of powers and I am quoting this 4-star Admiral: "From my combined military experience which includes Europe, Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean and the United Nations, it is my conviction that U.S. interests are best served by keeping the canal, by retaining undiluted sovereignty over the U.S. Canal Zone." He added (and again I quote: "Finally, I would like to re-emphasize the importance of the June 8, 1977 letter of the four greatly distinguished chiefs of naval operations to the President that was quoted in the testimony of Admiral Moorer. Their conclusions reflect a vast

background, including combat experience, and are more pertinent today than ever. Retired military officers are completely free to voice their inner-most convictions. Active duty officers have an obligation to support the policies of their commander-in-chief."

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that this committee will call more retired military officers in whom you have confidence and who are free of constraints from their commander-in-chief and ask their candid, personal opinions on the dangers of our Government parting with title to the Canal and the gradual turnover of full control to the Republic of Panama.

Mr. Chairman, we sometimes hear that Latin America favors the transfer of title and control of the Canal Zone from the United States to Panama but I have taken two trips to Latin America this year and have had the opportunity to talk with chief executives and other principal officials of a number of Latin American countries, with embassy personnel, with intelligence officers, with American citizens, as well as foreign nationals within the countries visited.

In Colombia I learned that because of kinship with an adjoining Latin country, Colombian officials do favor the transfer of the canal but are very much concerned about the contemplated increase in tolls, stating that the only practical way to transfer material from one part of their country to another is through the canal. Brazilian officials didn't seem to have any real concern regarding the proposed transfer, referring to it as a matter between the United States and Panama, Perhaps this is because Brazil fronts on the Eastern coast of the South American continent and is not among the prime users of the canal.

In Argentina, officials indicated that they did not make extensive use of the canal but expressed fear that it might come under communist control.

Chilean officials were even more concerned of the possibility of Communist influence or control of the canal indicating that 95% of their commerce used the canal and that they could not afford an increase in tolls or to have this vital artery subject to direct or indirect control by Communists. Chilean officials indicated that our contemplated action in giving up the canal appeared to be contrary to the best interest of the world community and they would much prefer that we retain complete control of the canal.

In Peru, we again heard that Panama was a neighboring country and because of this they favored the transfer to Panama. However, officials indicated their country would suffer greatly if the tolls were raised as appears to be inevitable if the treaties now under consideration are ratified. Contrary to some suggestions, officials of every South American country visited indicated that there would be no repercussions from their country if the Senate failed to ratify the treaties. Within the Canal Zone itself, we heard the strongest opposition and the greatest fear of communism. American citizens complained of violation of human rights, they spoke of lack of expertise and management ability, of the differences between salaries within the zone and the Republic of Panama. Many indicated that they would not continue to work within the Canal Zone if it came under the control of Panama.

I inserted a detailed statement of the Panamanian trip in the August 4, 1977 Congressional Record and included a statement by the heads of various civic groups within the Canal Zone. Should any Senator have any doubt about the feeling of American citizens living in the Canal Zone, he might want to refer to this statement. It concludes, and I quote: "for ourselves as U.S. citizens living and working thousands of miles from our homeland, we can say, 'pack us up tomorrow. We're ready to go.' But for the sake of U.S. commerce and the U.S. national interests in general in the western hemisphere we urge you to examine the proposed treaty in minute detail.

We urge you to visit here for more than three days, to observe the situation with your own eyes and not to depend solely on briefings by U.S. or Panamanian Government officials. The new treaty with Panama will have long-range repercussions that coming generations will have to live with; we urge you not to ratify a new treaty solely because the State Department, says that a treaty is the cure-all to problems with Panama. The Russia-Cuba axis and the American electorate are waiting to see which way the treaty goes. A hasty decision on the part of our Congressmen without giving deep and thoughtful study to the question would please the former and infuriate the latter."

Now, Mr. Chairman, on this question of Communist influence, Mr. Charles Conneely, a member of the professional staff of the Armed Services Committee, and myself talked privately in a number of Latin American countries with Embassy officials, with military intelligence officers, with CIA officials, with both Ameri

can citizens and foreign nationals about the possibility of Communist influence. We first visited in Panama and were somewhat skeptical, or thought perhaps the Americans living within the zone might tend to exaggerate the question of Communist influence. Yet, the statements they made were verified in private conversations with the American intelligence community in various Latin American countries. In acting upon this treaty we may well be considering not only future control of the Canal Zone but future control of the Caribbean.

Therefore, it would seem important enough to the defense of our own country and that of the free world to have military and civilian intelligence officials, both active and retired, to testify under oath in closed sessions regarding Communist influence, within Panama and other nations of Latin America. Time after time we heard the names of leading political figures in Panama identified as Communists and were told that there were strong Communist influences throughout the Panamanian Government, I call these statements to the attention of the committee because of their repetition by so many people during our South American visit and suggest that the committee endeavor to ascertain the truthfulness or falsity of their allegations.

I believe the committee and the Senate will want to consider these factors in determining whether to advise and consent to the treaties.

My own opinion, Mr. Chairman, is that these treaties should be defeated. But I would hope that the administration could then be encouraged to negotiate an arrangement for joint control by the United States, Panama and a limited number of Latin American countries but with ownership of the Canal Zone remaining in the United States.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee: I come before you today not to give you some pre-set opinions of my own, but to raise some questions which I have not yet seen fully answered by the distinguished witnesses who have appeared before you. I would not be candid if I did not admit that the texts of the treaties have done little to convince me that the basic principles of the Kissinger-Tack agreement of 1974, upon which the treaties are based, are themselves adequate to support the national interest. But no one can prudently adopt an attitude of a closed mind. Indeed, should the treaties pass-and I hope they do not-it will still be best that all aspects of the treaties and their implications be fully aired, and fully understood by all concerned. I therefore raise these questions today in the hope of creating an intelligent dialogue.

QUESTION NO. 1: THE REAL ISSUE

Let us take the slogan, frequently heard, “our true national interest is in the continued use of the Canal, not in ownership." Is not the real question rather whether the continued use of the Canal will be better protected by the present treaties or by the proposed new treaties? Will we be better able to keep the Canal open, safe, and efficient under the present system where we exercise exclusive command and control over a clearly demarcated area, or will it be easier to keep it open, safe, and efficient under the mixed administrative system with a combined defense and interlocking, overlapping areas of responsibility?

QUESTION NO. 2: U.S. SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANAL ZONE

Let us now take the question of what kind of control we actually have there. Is it really true that the United States does not exercise full rights of a sovereign in the Canal Zone? I am distinguishing the rights of a sovereign from the rights of a property-owner. Sovereignty is not some abstract concept like title. It means power. The 1903 Treaty is quite explicit. We exercise absolute power in perpetuity; Panama specifically quits claim to any exercise of power in perpetuity. I would like to ask the distinguished Committee if it has found any statement by the United States Congress, by any U.S. President, or by any U.S. Secretary of State or any international agreement with Panama, previous to the KissingerTack Agreement of 1974-which specifically abrogates our rights to the exercise of sovereignty as found in the 1903 Treaty. Is there a single statement of this kind? QUESTION NO. 3: U.S. OWNERSHIP OF THE CANAL ZONE

There is a similar problem with regard to ownership. As you know, this is a separate problem from sovereignty. Many people today are making statements 99-592-78-25

that we do not even own the Canal Zone. But that is obviously not true. Does not the record show that we acquired property in the Canal Zone by four different methods:

First, by a grant in perpetuity of national lands of the Republic of Panama, for which we paid $10 million;

Second, by purchase from the bankrupt French canal enterprise of lands held in fee simple, improvements, equipment, concessions, and stock in the Panama Railroad, $40 million.

Third, purchase in fee simple of individual tracts held by private owners, as well as payments to squatters who held rights through adverse possession, $4 million.

Fourth, recompense to Colombia for her reversionary rights in the French concession, $25 million.

Is it therefore not true that we bought it and paid for it? Did not the U.S. Supreme Court in 1907, in a holding which has never been reversed, declare that it was hypocritical to contend that our title was imperfect? Did not the Court say, and I quote:

"The fact that there may possibly be in the future some dispute as to the exact boundary on either side is immaterial. Such disputes not infrequently attend conveyances of real estate or cessions of territory. Alaska was ceded to us forty years ago, but the boundary between it and the English possessions east was not settled until within the last two or three years. Yet no one ever doubted the title of this Republic to Aalska." (204 U.S. 32-33)

I would further point out to this distinguished Committee that the United States Congress has always treated the Canal Zone as U.S. territory within the meaning of its authority in Article IV, Section 3. Congress serves directly as the legislature for the Canal Zone. Under Article IV, it has erected a District Court, and a Canal Zone Court. The laws which we make for the several States apply or do not apply to the Canal Zone as we see fit. Congress has the right to determine that under Article IV. For example, the question of citizenship for persons born in the Canal Zone was raised here the other day as though that were a test of U.S. sovereignty. The fact is the Congress has the authority to determine the requirements for citizenship. And if you look at 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a), you will find that the definition of the term "United States" specifically includes the Canal Zone for the purposes of the law of citizenship.

QUESTION NO. 4: WILL WE HAVE REAL CONTROL

It is of course clear that Panama will exercise complete sovereignty in the area of the present Canal Zone as soon as the treaty goes into effect (except for a few transition items). But is not the effect of the treaty upon U.S. ownership nothing other than a scheduled timetable for nationalization of U.S. property-nationalization, incidentally, without compensation? We turn over some properties immediately; we turn over others on schedule. We receive nothing in return.

Even though the last parcel is not turned over for 23 years, is it really true that we will have any effective control over those properties and their operation? I note that according to the terms of the treaty, there will have to be a reduction of some 20% of U.S. citizen employees within five years. At present we have 3,395 U.S. citizen employees: 567 of these are in so-called "security" positions necessary to the preservation of civil order and to the continuity of canal operations under emergency conditions. Many of the civil order positions will be abolished and the duties turned over to the Panamanian National Guard; others are among the high-salaried, skilled and executive positions that will be sought by Panamanian nationals. Will not practical control, as distinguished from theoretical control, rapidly diminish simply through attrition?

And as for the legal structure of the proposed Panama Canal Commission, I note that it will be an agency of the U.S. Government, but that its board of directors will be composed of five U.S. nationals and four Panamanian nationals. I have been unable to find any precedent for an operating agency of the United States government with such a strong participation of foreign nationals. Perhaps this Committee can find some; if they exist, they should be studied carefully. Will the United States be able to maintain objective control of the Commission's operations when foreign nationals are privy not only to all decisions, but also to all proprietary information and financial accounting?

In addition to the Board of Directors, the treaty and its annexes provide at least six other boards: The Combined Defense Board, the Joint Commission on Environment, the Panama Canal Consultative Committee, the Coordinating Com

mittee for the Implementation of Article III (Operations and Management), the Coordinating Committee for the Implementation of Article IV (Combined Defense), and the Ports and Railroads Committee. There may be more that I overlooked. In each of these, the representation on both sides is equal. The U.S. does not have a majority on any of them. Is this not setting up a situation where there could easily be a stalemate over policy, or even a diplomatic incident? Do we really control these operations?

QUESTION NO. 5: DEFENSE

The same situation exists with regard to defense. The Senate Armed Services Committee is already studying the many problems which abound in this area carefully, and I will not take the time of this committee with specific issues. But is not the very concept of combined defense the fatal flaw that makes these treaties untenable? The fundamental premise of the proposed treaties is that our present status is no longer viable because of the threat of sabotage from disgruntled Panamanians. But after we surrender our sovereign command and control, retaining only an undefined "primary responsibility" for defense, will we not be totally indefensible against the sabotage of dissidents? The treaties make our supposed vulnerability worse, not better. Will that improve our defense?

QUESTION NO. 6: THE TORRIJOS REGIME

A second fundamental premise is that the treaties will eliminate or reduce Panamanian dissidence, giving us the cooperation of a friendly Panama. But human nature is not so tractable. The treaties make us partners with a regime that is seriously flawed in many respects. There is a serious body of evidence that General Torrijos and his immediate family are heavily involved in controlling the flow of cocaine and other drugs from South America to North America and other markets. The General wields enormous personal power; he is not responsible to anyone. Although there are many military regimes in Latin America, most are composed of military juntas who took power reluctantly in the midst of social and economic chaos.

There was no such overwhelming reason when President Arias was thrown out after ten days of office. If you look at Article 277 of the 1972 Constitution of Panama, you will see the full extent of just those powers to which Torrijos admits to having. In practice, the Torrijos government is arbitrary and corrupt. By becoming a full partner, indeed, even the guarantor of this regime, do we not open the door for future agitation, particularly when the mixed administration and combined defense arrangements offer so many opportunities for misunderstandings and agitation? There is fruitful ground here for infiltration, subversion, and the overthrow of the Torrijos government by outside forces determined to control Panama and, through Panama's sovereignty, the Panama Canal.

Moreover, the background of Torrijos himself is not encouraging. Although he is probably too undisciplined and self-seeking to submit directly to Communist control, it is well known that his parents were active Communists, and that he and his brother and sister were active members of the Communist youth movement. Perhaps that is why he has gathered men around him of the same stripe; mercurial, Marxist, anti-American. Several of the negotiators themselves have been in and out of the Communist Party. Torrijos and his advisors continue to express admiration for the Cuban revolution and for Libya's Qaddafi. They have formally aligned Panama with the so-called Third World group. Even if the Torrijos regime is not overwhelmed by Communists, is this the kind of government that is going to be cooperative and friendly to our interests and our interpretation of the treaties?

QUESTION NO. 7: THE U.S. EMPLOYEES

Even those who believe that the Canal should be given to Panama will admit that the Canal's outstanding record is attributable to the dedication, loyalty, pride, and morale which the employees of the Canal have shown in their work. This is particularly true of the U.S. citizen employees. Even if Panamanians are to be phased into their jobs, we still cannot operate the Canal and train Panamanians without their assistance. Yet a recent poll indicated that 62.8 percent say that they will not remain under Panamanian jurisdiction.

These are the Americans who know the Torrijos government best. A substantial percentage of them are intermarried with Panamanian families and understand