too well what will be in store for them. Some of our diplomats charge that the Zonians are a privileged caste, reluctant to give up a privileged way of life. In a sense they are privileged-in that same sense that all Americans are privileged to live under the U.S. Bill of Rights, with competent policemen, fair courts, and equal taxation. By forcing them to give up these rights if they wish to continue their jobs, we are breaching the terms of their employment contracts. The treaty does not protect their rights if they choose to leave; they get transfer rights only if their jobs are eliminated. Would it not be sensible to offer a reservation to extend diplomatic immunity to every U.S. citizen employee? The treaty provides for 20 top officials to get immunity; if it is necessary for those 20, why not for all? Including dependents, it would affect 9,400 U.S. citizens in a country of 1.6 million people.

This compares with a total of 18,879 people with diplomatic immunity in the Washington, D.C. area, with a population of 3 million. If this treaty is ratified, the U.S. will become a co-conspirator to deny these employees the civil rights they deserve as Americans. Do our diplomats think that they are the only ones who need privileges and immunities while living in a repressive society?

QUESTION NO. 8: OUR POSITION IN THE WORLD

It is often said that all of Latin America is demanding that we give back the Canal Zone to Panama. But the available evidence is rather scanty. Panama's immediate neighbors, and those Latin American countries given to Marxism, socialism, and expropriation of American investments have found the issue one more excuse to denounce the gringos. But I have been in several Latin American countries-some of the largest and most important ones in South America. I have talked to Presidents, Foreign Ministers, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Without exception they all told me that they were deeply disturbed by the thought of the Canal going to Panama, not only for their economic interests, but because of Torrijos' Marxist leanings. They have told other of our colleagues the same thing. They are all disturbed by the lack of leadership and our apparent surrender of important international interests to a weak country. If we are so concerned about Latin America, why have we not consulted the Inter-American Defense Board with regard to this treaty? The IADB is the only independent multilateral organization concerned with the defense of the Western Hemisphere. It was organized in 1942. Would it not be wise to consult with Latin American defense experts before changing the status of a strategic defense installation?

QUESTION NO. 9: THE BY-PASSING OF THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The final question relates to the State Department's handling of the treaty negotiations. We have a situation where the overwhelming majority of the American people are opposed to giving away the Panama Canal. It has also been clear that substantial portions of both houses of Congress are opposed and have been opposed. Yet instead of dealing honestly with the problem, the State Department has taken the position that Congress can be bypassed. Would it not have been better, given the political problem, for the State Department to have worked through Congress, rather than by-pass Congress?

For example, on the Article IV, Section 3 issue, why did not the State Department go the last mile and seek Congressional authority to dispose of the Canal Zone, instead of denying that authority was needed? For example, why wasn't the Kissinger-Tack agreement submitted to Congress as a joint resolution? It would have required only a majority vote, and the negotiators would have had a clear mandate. Why is the Administration now stating that the House of Representatives need not play a role? Why is Panama being paid benefits out of tolls, by-passing the appropriations process? Why are major military and economic benefits being funnelled through military credits and loan guarantees, by-passing the authorization process? These techniques are not calculated to reassure the American people. They will continue to ask questions and to demand answers.

[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 6, 1977-S16599]

PANAMA CANAL TREATY

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on October 4, I inserted in the Record a State Department cable which corroborated my earlier testimony on the numerous differences in the Panamanian and U.S. interpretation of treaty provisions.

Today, I would like to call attention to an article appearing in the October 5, 1977, edition of The Washington Post entitled, "Canal Treaties Get a Jolt," reported by John M. Goshko, and also an article appearing in the October 5, 1977, edition of the New York Times entitled, "Dole Says U.S. Cable Shows Differences With Panama on Treaties," reported by Graham Hovey.

I ask unanimous consent that these articles be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: [From the Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1977]

U.S., PANAMA DIFFERENCES CITED: CANAL TREATIES GET A JOLT

(By John M. Goshko)

The campaign to win Senate approval of the Panama Canal treaties was given a severe jolt yesterday by disclosure of a document indicating that Panama does not recognize U.S. claims to future military rights in the canal.

A confidential State Department cable made public by Sen. Bob Dole (R.-Kan.) revealed what appear to be major differences in U.S. and Panamanian interpretations of the treaties' provisions for defending the canal.

These provisions refer to the period after the year 2000, when the treaties would transfer control of the canal to Panama. At issue are questions of whether the United States will have the right to intervene militarily against threats to the canal and a right of priority passage for U.S. warships in time of national emergency.

These questions have become crucial to the Carter administration's quest for the 67 votes-two-thirds of the Senate-necessary to get the pacts approved by that badly divided body. Several uncommitted senators have said their votes will depend on whether they are convinced that the treaties secure these rights for the United States.

In testimony last week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and the two U.S. treaty negotiators, Ellsworth Bunker and Sol M. Linowitz, said repeatedly that these rights are safeguarded by the language of the treaties.

Specifically they said that treaty language pledging the United States and Panama "to maintain the regime of neutrality" over the canal gives Washington a permanent right of intervention if it considers the canal threatened.

They also asserted that the provisions calling for "expeditions passage" for U.S. vessels in wartime mean that American ships would "go to the head of the line." The U.S. interpretation of these provisions was fully understood by the Panamanian government, they added.

However, their testimony seemed to be contradicted by the cable released by Dole. It was a message sent to the State Department last week by Ray Gonzalez, deputy chief of the U.S. embassy in Panama. It reported a conversation between the embassy's political counselor and Carlos Lopez Guevara, one of the Panamanian treaty negotiators.

The cable describes Lopez Guevara as being disturbed by Vance's testimony about U.S. intervention rights, and quotes him as saying: "Intervention is simply forbidden by international law. Panama cannot agree to the right of the United States to intervene."

Lopez Guevara also is quoted in the cable as taking exception to statements by Vance and other U.S. officials that Panama's military ruler, Gen. Omar Torrijos, tacitly recognized U.S. intervention rights when he said at the treaty-signing

ceremonies that the agreements could place Panama under the defense umbrella of the Pentagon.

The cable quoted Lopez Guevara as saying that U.S. officials "had made too much of Gen. Torrijos' statement. . . "The general was stating a fact not giving the United States any right to intervene.'

On the question of what the "expeditious passage" clause means, the cable said Lopez Guevara disagreed that it allows U.S. ships to "go to the head of the line." He is quoted as saying that Panama tentatively had accepted the idea of preferential treatment for U.S. vessels early in the negotiations, but later had rejected it specifically in favor of the word "expeditious."

The cable concluded by warning Washington: "We are likely to be faced with increasing irritation over-and perhaps public disavowals of our interpretations. Any assertion which seems to claim a right to intervene in Panama's domestic affairs is almost certain to be challenged here."

That referred to the fact that the treaties have extremely sensitive domestic political implications in Panama as well as in the United States. State Department officials say privately that the language of the neutrality clause and other touchy points were deliberately left vague by both sides to protect the Torrijos regime from charges within Panama that it had surrendered too much to the United States.

However, that has also enabled the treaties' foes in the United States to seize on these ambiguities.

In hammering at this theme, the American critics have been aided by statements of high Panamanian officials-of which Lopez Guevara's remarks are the latest example-that appear to contradict Vance's assurances directly.

That prompted several senators to warn Vance that the treaties' chances of getting past the Senate would be jeopardized unless the divergences in interpretation are clarified. Several said yesterday that the Lopez Guevara statements are further proof of the need to establish that Panama's understanding of the treaties conforms to that stated by the Carter administration.

That, some senators suggested, could be done by a public statement from the Torrijos government or by the Senate attaching legally binding amendments or reservations to the treaty.

Although they have promised to seek clarification. State Department officials privately express unhappiness about both ideas. Torrijos, they note, would find it very difficult from a domestic political standpoint to come out publicly in agreement with the U.S. interpretations; and any amending of the treaties by the Senate would require reopening the negotiations to obtain Panama's consent. The State Department confirmed the existence of the cable, and issued a statement saying "We are assessing the effects of all these statements in the light of the treaty language and a statement of Gen. Omar Torrijos when the treaties were signed on Sept. 7, with the view to determining whether further clarification may be required."

[From the New York Times, Oct. 5, 1977]

DOLE SAYS U.S. CABLE SHOWS DIFFERENCES WITH PANAMA ON TREATIES

(By Graham Hovey)

WASHINGTON, Oct. 4.-Senator Robert Dole, Republican of Kansas, made public today a confidential State Department cablegram that he said demonstrated "vast differences of interpretation" between the United States and Panama on key points in the new canal treaties.

The cablegram, sent from the American Embassy in Panama last Thursday, reported that one of Panamas' negotiators took sharp exception to the Carter Administration's interpretations of the right of the United States to help defend the canal after 1999 and of the "expeditious" passage through the waterway that would be guaranteed to American and Panamanian warships.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and other officials, including military leaders, have told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that under the separate neutrality treaty the United States could do whatever might be necessary to insure access to the canal and its neutrality indefinitely.

They have testified that the "expeditious" passage guaranteed in that treaty meant that United States warships could when necessary "go to the head of the line" for transit of the waterway.

According to the cablegram made public by Senator Dole, an opponent of the treaties "in their present forms," Carlos Lopez Guevara, a veteran Panamanian negotiator, took issue with the head-of-the-line thesis, insisting that expeditious passage did not mean "preferential" transit, which he said the American side had originally demanded.

Mr. Lopez also said, according to the cablegram, that American officials should stop using the term "intervention" to describe this country's rights under the neutrality treaty. "Intervention is simply forbidden by international law," he was quoted as having said. "Panama cannot agree to the right of the U.S. to intervene."

When Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, Panama's Chief of Government, said at the signing of the treaties in Washington Sept. 7 that the neutrality pact left Panama "under the Pentagon's defense umbrella," he was "stating a fact, not giving the U.S. the right to intervene,” said Mr. Lopez, according to the cablegram.

Administration witnesses at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings have repeatedly quoted General Torrijos's statement as confirmation of their claim that under the treaty the United States could always act to protect the neutrality of the canal.

State Department specialists said today they believed Mr. Lopez had meant only to draw a distinction between the right to intervene in Panama's internal affairs, which Washington does not claim, and action to defend the canal's neutrality and accessibility.

"This is a negotiated treaty," an official said. "There is an obvious difference in approach to the same set of words. But I think this is natural and not fatal, and I believe the differences will promptly be narrowed."

But Senator Dole, who did not disclose how he obtained the secret cablegram, said Mr. Lopez's interpretations meant that the Senate "must clarify our defense rights by amendment, not by weak 'understandings' that have no legal and binding effect."

The Kansan, who was the Republican Vice Presidential candidate in 1976, will introduce six amendments and two reservations to the treaties when he testifies tomorrow at the sixth day of hearings by the Foreign Relations Committee. Administration officials have warned that although "understandings" of treaty clauses, attached by the Senate to the instruments of ratification, might be acceptable, amendments or formal reservations would require reopening negotiations with Panama.

Mr. Dole's disclosure somewhat overshadowed the fifth day of hearings, which were marked by heated exchanges about the integrity of Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Strom Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina, leader of a coalition opposing the treaties, said General Brown and the other service chiefs, who have strongly endorsed the Panama treaties, were "under the gun," with their careers at stake, and would be inclined to go along with the President whatever their personal opinions of the pacts.

Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, a member of the Committee, said with some heat that this constituted a denigration of the Joint Chiefs and an attack on the integrity of the opinion expressed by General Brown before the committee. It was "not a contribution to the debate," Mr. Sarbanes said.