[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 6, 1977-S16607]

THE PANAMA CANAL

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, we have already read and heard a great deal of public comment on the proposed new Panama Canal Treaty. Certainly there will be more to come. The issue is both controversial and emotional. Regardless of the position we take, every Member of the Senate will be obliged to weigh his position carefully and to provide detailed answers to his constituents.

In that context, I think my colleagues might find useful a brief response written by Lawrence Brown, editor of the Nation's Center News, published in Buffalo, S. Dak., to a reader who wanted to enlist Mr. Brown and the News in the effort to prevent the giveaway of the Panama Canal.

This is not one of the best known newspapers in the country, and Mr. Brown, who is in the sheepherding as well as in the news business, makes no claim to being an authority on the subject. He does, however, make one argument that I have not seen explained so lucidly or sensibly in all of the other commentary and official documentation I have seen on the subject. He writes:

“*** neither Panama, Russia nor any other country have any plans to move the canal to any other part of the world. So it is quite apt to remain where it is, and we still have the option to negotiate or fight our way through it regardless of whether we keep title or not."

Mr. Brown then suggests that there just might be several more important issues on which South Dakotans could better spend our energies and talents.

Because I think it will be helpful to my colleagues both in reaching a judgment on the Parama Canal issue and in explaining their positions. I ask unanimous consent that this exchange-both the reader's letter and the Nation's Center News response-be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Nation's Center News, Sept. 16, 1977]

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

DEAR LAWRENCE, I am writing concerning the proposed “give away” of the Parama Canal to which I am totally opposed. To ratify this treaty the administration is going to need a % majority vote in the U.S. Senate. Our two Senators must hear our voices regarding this insane abandonment of U.S. property. For this reason I am urging you to join me in the Citizen's Committee to Save OUR Canal. Our initial objective is to obtain signatures opposing the ratification of this treaty. I am enclosing for your effort, a petition to our Senators which I hope you will circulate in your area immediately and return it to me as soon as possible. Also, you will find enclosed some facts that will explain my concern over the Canal's "give away." If you should want more information or need additional petitions please contact me immediately at the above number.

Lawrence, the message we have simply got to get to those people in Washington is that regarding our canal, "we bought it, we paid for it, we built it, and we damned well intend to keep it."

Let me hear from you soon!

Your friend in the cause of freedom, Dale Bell, Box 315, Tinton Rd., Spearfish, S.D. 57783.

P.S. Lawrence, ary amount of financial assistance you or any of the petition signers could help us out with will be most appreciated.

Dear Dale, for the past 3 or 4 months there has been an article on one side or the other of this Panama thing in nearly every paper you pick up. I have never been to Panama and have no particular hankering to go now, so I'm certainly not an authority on the subject.

But from what I have read, it appears to me that Panama is like an ole hound dog that used to catch rabbits but now, only wants to eat and bite at the fellow

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that owns it. If we give it away we haven't lost much, and if we keep it, we can expect more problems than dividends.

The big new cargo ships can't go through the canal and its foreign trade importance to us has declined to 1 percent of our gross national product. Our own East Coast-West Coast trade is about 7 percent, and it is not a big strategic thing to our 2-ocean navy.

Besides that neither Panama, Russia nor any other country have any plans to move the canal to any other part of the world. So it is quite apt to remain where it is, and we still have the option to negotiate or fight our way through it regardless of whether we keep title or not.

South Dakota and agriculture across the nation has an economic and strategic problem 10 times as big as Panama, and if we have time and desire to raise money and circulate petitions we should be working for our bread, butter and future. The nation has an energy shortage. American agriculture has a grain surplus that could easily be converted to energy via grain alcohol. What better food bank could this country have than maximum ag production with the surpluses going to alleviate as much of world hunger as the world is willing to pay for, and the balance going to alleviate our independence on overseas oil?

Dale, in reply to your last paragraph I say, "To Hell with Panama. Let's do something for the industry that feeds this country the best and cheapest in the history of humanity and has the added ability to solve part of our energy problem and serve some of mankind in other parts of the world."

[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 7, 1977-S16618]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, the Senate has now begun hearings on the proposed Panama Canal Treaties and, Members of the Senate are hard at work studying the texts of the treaties and familiarizing themselves fully with the issues involved.

Although the Senate will not vote on the treaties for several months, this kind of detailed and lengthy preparation is very important because the Panama Canal issue is closely tied to the economic and security interests of our Nation.

The primary focus of Senate attention should be on the actual terms of the treaties and whether they provide adequate protection for U.S. interests.

However, there is one issue outside of the terms of the treaties which should also be fully considered by the Senate and that is the manner in which the treaties were negotiated.

The negotiations leading to those treaties actually began in January of 1965 after serious riots in Panama against the U.S. presence in the Canal Zone.

Ever since that time, negotiations have taken place under the cloud of renewed violence, and every administration since then has cited the prospect of violence as a reason for negotiating a new treaty which would give control of the canal to Panama.

The Carter administration has relied heavily on this argument in its efforts to achieve Senate ratification of the proposed canal treaties.

Just last week in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of the treaties U.S. negotiator Sol M. Linowitz used phrases such as "smoldering dispute" and "troubling and festering presence" to describe the situation under the existing treaty.

Mr. Linowitz said:

"The simple fact is that if we do not agree upon treaties which are mutually agreeable and acceptable, the time may come when we may find ourselves in the position of having to defend the Canal by force against a hostile population and in the face of widespread condemnation by the countries of Latin America and even the rest of the world."

These same kinds of arguments were made by earlier administrations. President Johnson, in fact, used the argument of impending violence extensively in seeking congressional support for draft canal treaties which were negotiated in 1967.

Many Members of Congress were unimpressed with President Johnson's argument and felt, instead, that the President was submitting our Nation to Panamanian blackmail. Congressional opposition prevented those draft treaties from ever being submitted to the Senate for consideration.

Now, with the completion of new treaties this year, charges are again being made that the United States has negotiated under duress and that the United States is responding to "blackmail."

The Carter administration denies this stating that "the United States has not responded to pressure."

Recently, this denial was echoed by a Member of the Senate who said there was no connection between the Government of Panama and threats of violence.

In fact, he said that the specter of violence was "raised not by responsible Paramanians but by Americans." That Senator went so far as to say that President Omar Torrijos had "specifically rejected violence."

What are the facts?

General Torrijos, the Panamanian dictator, as recently as May 7 of this year. was quoted in the Panamanian newspaper Matutino as saying that if peaceful efforts to reach an agreement fail, Panama has other nonpeaceful alternatives. On that same day the EFE wire service quoted General Torrijos as saying that if the negotiations do not succeed, North Americans in the Canal Zone will find themselves "without water, without light, and without a canal."

One year earlier, on March 7, 1976, General Torrijos in an interview on Colom(385)

bian radio warned that the Panamanians "would have to resort to the violent stage" if the treaty negotiations fail.

The Panamanian dictator was quoted in May 30, 1976, Los Angeles Times as saying:

"We are also prepared to follow the Ho Chi Minh route if necessary. That means terrorism, guerrilla operations and sabotage in a national liberation war to regain our territory."

Going a step further, Torrijos said in a November 1975 interview in the Atlas World Press Review:

"I told them (the Panamanian students) that if there were an uprising, if there were terrorism, I as commander of the National Guard would have two options: to crush them or lead them, and I can't crush them."

Thus, by rejecting the alternatives of crushing an uprising, Mr. Torrijos was announcing his candidacy to lead one.

These kinds of threats were uttered during the course of recent negotiations by other Panamanian officials as well. The Panamanian Ambassador to the United States, Nicolas Gonzales-Revilla, in an interview in the April 1977 edition of the American Legion magazine stated that

"It is a fact that the U.S. presence makes sabotage and violence inevitable." Even Panama's chief negotiator Romulo Escobar Bethancourt raised the specter of violence in a speech before the Panamanian Assembly just 1 month ago. He said that if the U.S. Congress does not ratify the treaties "this country will take another course. This country will take a course of violence.

The threat of violence now seems to be the major argument of treaty proponents in the attempt to achieve Senate ratification of the treaties.

These threats have come from Panamanian officials and they are being fervently repeated by treaty advocates in an effort to win Senate ratification. The American people should be aware of this.

Without the specter of violence, is it likely that the United States would ever have to come to the point that its negotiators would be willing to accept a treaty which gives away so much?

Over the years, Panama has repeatedly pressured for changes in the 1903 treaty, but the United States maintained that it would not surrender its rights as conferred by the 1903 treaty.

In 1923, when faced with Panamanian agitation for renegotiation Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes stated to Panamanian officials that

"It was an absolute futility *** to expect any American administration, no matter what it was, any President or any Secretary of State ever to surrender any part of these rights which the United States had acquired under the Treaty of 1903."

Apparently Secretary Hughes did not foresee the give away philosophy now so prevalent in our Government.

In the 1950's, the United States started making significant concessions to Panamanian demands.

Now, just a few years later, we have come all the way to a draft treaty which relinquishes all of the United States rights acquired under the 1903 treaty and replaces them with very limited U.S. rights of a limited duration.

Mr. President, the Senate must make a decision with regard to the treaties which have been submited by the President.

That decision should be based primarily on the content of the treaties and an assessment of how well they guard the interests of the United States.

However, the Senate should not ignore the circumstances which have surrounded the treaty negotiations and should not be swayed by treaty advocate raising the specter of violence as a reason for approving the treaties.

Furthermore, the emphasis on threatened violence shows the real weakness of other arguments being advanced in favor of the treaties.

I say that making concessions under threats of violence will only lead to more threats and more concessions-not just in Panama, but around the world. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has 3 minutes remaining. Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Virginia yields back his time.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, Mr. Allen, I believe, has an order for 10 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. That is correct.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent that I may be allotted that time. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[From the Congressional Record, Oct. 7, 1977-S16718]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY SHOULD BE AMENDED OR WITHDRAWN Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the morning papers carry a report that the State Department is seeking clarification of Panama Canal Treaty provisions from Panamanian officials. They are looking for public reassurances that the United States will have recognized defense rights under the treaty on permanent neutrality, and that we will have the right to priority passage during periods of crisis. It seems they finally woke up to the fact that the Senate is not prepared to ratify this treaty so long as these rights are ambiguous.

ASSURANCES NOT ENOUGH

But the Senate will not settle for verbal assurance on our defense rights under the treaty. We do not want pacifiers, we want protection. The treaty is a contract. And the only way to clarify a contract is to make its language as clear and precise as possible.

I have followed the established procedure for doing this, in introducing amendments and reservations to an ambiguous treaty. However, if the State Department is unwilling to accept the idea of congressional modification, maybe they should withdraw the treaty now, renegotiate with the Panamanians, and then resubmit the document to Congress.

It is specially troubling to me to think that if the State Department cable revealing serious disagreements between the United States and Panama over the meaning of the treaties had not been revealed, the Senate might have proceeded to ratify an agreement seriously damaging to U.S. security and economic interests. We would have done so, ignorant of vital information hidden under a State Department security blanket.

The State Department says it is maintaining a continuing dialog with Panama to seek clarification of differing interpretations of treaty provisions. While the department is looking for reassurances on U.S. rights to defend the canal and to gain priority passage through the canal, Panamanian statements to this effect will probably not be forthcoming until after the October 23 plebiscite in Panama. I have no doubt that words of reassurance will flow fast and free after the Panamanian vote is over. But that will not explain away the understandings that top Panamanian officials are attaching to the treaties today. If they say one thing now, and another next month, how can we place confidence in their verbal assurances?

The proper course now is congressional modification. If the administration cannot accept this, then they should take the initiative and go back to the negotiating table now.

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