Goethals as offering the best site. This arrangement would have enabled lakelevel navigation from the Atlantic locks to the Pacific, with a summit level anchorage at the Pacific end of the canal.

Regrettably, Stevens was under great pressure to start active construction. Advocates of the sea-level proposal, stung by their defeat in congress, and also opponents of any canal at all, were ready to take advantage of any change in the approved program as evidence of weakness in the high-level plan. Together, these two forces represented a political and economic power that could not be ignored. Stevens' foundation investigations, necessarily made in haste proved unsatisfactory, and he did not dare to jeopardize the project by further delay. On Aug. 23, 1906, apparently confident that this important question would rise again, he voided his plan but retained it on file, and proceeded with the approved plan for separating the Pacific locks, which he did not personally favour.

Later, after Stevens left canal service, Maj. William L. Siben, a member of the commission with a keen appreciation of marine needs in the design of navigational works, made more extensive explorations. Finding adequate foundations, he likewise, on Jan. 31, 1908, recommended the consolidation of all Pacific locks in three-lifts at Miraflores to provide a Pacific terminal lake, but his well-reasoned proposal was not approved, and the canal was completed with two sets of Pacific locks, separated by Miraflores lake.

Construction and Completion, 1907-14.—With canal type decided, construction organization effected, and a greater part of the plant installed by July, 1906, real progress started. Thus, Stevens was able to assure the press in 1906 that the canal would be completed in 1914 and formally opened by Jan. 1, 1915.

On Jan. 30, 1907, after having brought design and construction to a point where work was in "full swing" and success a certainty, Stevens submitted his resignation to the president. Despite that action, however, Roosevelt, on Mar. 4, 1907, in recognition of his tremendous contributions, appointed him as chairman of the Isthmian Canal commission, making Stevens the first to hold the combined positions of chairman and chief engineer.

Stevens was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Goethals, an outstanding army engineer, who, with his associates, civilian as well as military, ably brought the project to completion substantially in accord with the Stevens plan. Such changes as were made, though important, were nonbasic. These included widening the bottom of Culebra cut from 200 ft. to 300 ft., increasing usable lock dimensions to a width of 110 ft. and length of 1,000 ft., with a depth to permit passage of ships drawing 40 ft. in salt water, rerouting the Panama railroad around Gold hill, relocation of locks from Sosa hill to Miraflores, and redesign of Gatun dam. Other members of the Isthmian Canal commission on April 1, 1907, were Maj. David D. Gaillard, Major Sibert, naval civil engineer Harry H. Rousseau, Lieut. Col. William C. Gorgas, Jackson Smith and J. C. S. Blackburn. Later changes included Lieut. Col. H. F. Hodges (1908-14) to succeed Smith, Maurice H. Thatcher (1910-13) to succeed Blackburn and Richard L. Metcalfe (1913-14) to succeed Thatcher. Gaillard died on Dec. 5, 1913, without a successor.

The building of the Panama canal, one of the greatest engineering feats in the world, was indeed a monumental and unprecedented achievement. Its subsequent success, in both peacetime and during war, entitle all who, in significant manner, participated in its planning, construction, sanitation and civil administration, to the highest honours. The canal was first opened to traffic on Aug. 15, 1914. 7. Principal Engineering and Construction Projects After 1914

The Isthmian Canal commission, abolished on April 1, 1914, was succeeded by a highly centralized permanent operating organization authorized by the Panama Canal act of 1912, known simply as The Panama Canal. Though free, under the law, to choose the governor from any source, Pres. Woodrow Wilson, in recognition of the services of Colonel Goethals, appointed him as the first governor of The Panama Canal.

The canal was launched into its era of operation under Governor Goethals, who served until late 1916 after the early slide crises. Goethals chose his principal engineer assistant as his successor and established a tradition of succession, by advancement, that lasted until 1952.

Madden Dam and Power Project, 1919–35.-Faced with the problems of an unusually dry season, 1919-20, requiring conservation of water for lockages and maintenance of channel depths, and later by a great flood in 1923, endangering the waterway, together with growing traffic, congress authorized the first important

step toward increasing canal capacity, the Madden Dam and Power project Completed in 1935, it provided more water for lockages, controlled floods, improved navigation and supplied additional power.

Third Locks Project, 1939-42.-The second step toward greater capacity was for a third set of locks. Because of naval needs, in the critical period preceding World War II, congress, on administrative recommendations, authorized the Third Locks project, at a cost not to exceed $277,000,000. The proposed layout contemplated a new set of larger locks, 1,200 ft. long and 140 ft. wide, with 45 ft. navigable depth, near each of the existing locks but at some distance away with the new locks joined with existing channels by means of by-pass channels. At the Atlantic end, the project duplicated existing arrangements. At the Pacific end, however, the proposed channel, in addition to duplicating its faulty layout, contained three sharp bends of 29°, 47° and 37° in succession from north to south. Work started in 1940 and was pushed vigorously until suspended by the secretary of war in May 1942 because of shortage of ships and materials more urgently needed elsewhere for war purposes. No excavation was accomplished at Pedro Miguel; that at Gatun and Miraflores was substantially completed. A total of $76,357,405 was expended.

Terminal Lake-Third Locks Plan, 1942-43.-Fortunately, suspension of work on the Third Locks project occurred while there was still time for canal officials to re-examine it in the light of needs demonstrated by war-operating experience. These studies served to emphasize that the separation of the Pacific locks and failure to provide a summit-level lake at the Pacific terminus were fundamental errors of design, with Pedro Miguel locks as the principal obstruction to optimum canal operating conditions.

Out of the studies, including an evaluation of the sea-level idea, grew what proved to be the first comprehensive proposal for the economic increase of capacity and operational improvement of the Panama Canal-the Terminal Lake-Third Locks plan. It proposed the physical removal of Pedro Miguel locks, consolidation of all Pacific locks near Aguadulce, elevation of the intermediate Miraflores lake water level from 54 ft. to that of Gatun lake to create a summitlevel anchorage at the Pacific end of the canal to match, as far as possible, that in the Atlantic end. It would also include raising the summit level to its highest feasible height of approximately 92 ft., enlarging Gaillard cut and constructing a set of larger locks. Essentially, this was the same plan originated by De Lépinay, and later recommended by Stevens and Sibert.

Officially submitted and publicly presented in the Caanl Zone, it aroused wide interest among engineers and maritime agencies, including the secretary of the navy, who, on Sept. 7, 1943, submitted it to the president. Soon after, in 1944, it was approved in principle by the governor of The Panama Canal and recommended to the secretary of war for thorough investigation, and later, in 1945, it was approved in general before the congress by a succeeding governor for the major modification of the existing waterway in preference to completing the original Third Lock project. A 1949 congressional investigation reported that it could be accomplished at comparatively low cost.

The Terminal Lake-Third Locks plan, being an enlargement of the existing facilities that does not call for additional land or waters, is covered by current canal treaties and does not require negotiation of a new one, a paramount diplomatic consideration.

Sea Level Plan, 1945–47.—The spectacular advent of the atomic bomb in 1945 injected new elements into the canal picture. At the request of Canal Zone authorities, congress enacted public law 280, 79th congress, approved Dec. 28, 1945, authorizing the governor of The Panama Canal to make a comprehensive investigation of the means for increasing its capacity and security to meet future needs for interoceanic commerce and national defense, including consideration of canals at other locations. This was the first time the terms "security" and "national defense" had been embodied in any Panama Canal statute.

The report of the inquiry with security and national defense as paramount considerations, recommended only the sea-level plan for major canal construction, initially estimated in 1947 to cost $2,483,000,000, a figure later substantially increased. Though the report covered the Terminal Lake-Third Locks plan, which it did not recommend, it offered a relatively minor program for improvement of present installations as a preferred alternative to the major operational improvement of the existing waterway as recommended in 1943 by the secretary of the With the exception of the two canal terminals, the 1947 sea-level plan would

navy.

provide a virtually new Panama canal of 60 ft. minimum depth in navigation lanes and of 600 ft. width between sloping sides at a depth of 40 ft. on a new alignment somewhat removed from the present channel. The plan also provides a tidal lock (200 ft. by 1,500 ft.) and a navigable pass at the Pacific end, many miles of flood control dams on both sides of the projected canal, diversion channels and spillways. Some of its features are not covered by current international conventions and would require a new treaty with Panama, with further concessions, attendant indemnity and increased annuity charges.

The report of the investigation failed to receive presidential approval. Transmitted to the congress on Dec. 1, 1947, without comment or recommendation, its submission, however, led to a recurrence of the 1902 and 1906 debates over route and type with almost identical arguments, but on the basis of the newer term, "security," rather than the old term, "vulnerability."

In voluminous discussions, many leading engineers, nuclear scientists and other experts challenged the assumptions on which the principal 1947 recommendations and estimates rested. The congress took no action until 1957, when an independent inquiry into the entire subject of increased facilities for interoceanic transit was authorized and a special board of consultants appointed.

Sea Level Plan, 1964-70.-Its final report of June 1960 included estimates for the Terminal Lake-Third Locks plan ($1,020,900,000) and the Sea-Level plan ($2,537,000,000) exclusive of any Panamanian indemnity. The board emphasized that the Sea-Level plan would present many constructional problems including interruption to traffic. A plan for a lake and lock canal at Nicaragua ($4,095,000,000) as an alternate route was submitted without definite recommendation. This report, otherwise inconclusive, recommended the entire canal situation be reviewed in 1970 or earlier if warranted. Congress, on administrative request, by act approved Sept. 22, 1964 (78 Stat. 990), authorized further investigations to determine the feasibility and most suitable site for a canal at sea level between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and subsequently fixed the reporting date as Dec. 1, 1970.

Meanwhile, the 1947 report served to focus governmental attention on administrative problems of the Panama canal.

8. Reorganization and Policy Determination.

On June 30, 1948, the Panama Railroad company was reincorporated as a federal corporation and, on Feb. 28, 1949, the house of representatives authorized an investigation into the organization and financial aspects of the Panama canal enterprise.

All recommendations growing out of this inquiry were implemented except that for transfer of responsibility for canal supervision from the secretary of the army to the secretary of commerce, which the president delayed for further study. The resulting Act of Congress, public law 841, 81st congress, approved Sept. 26, 1950, known as the Thompson act, created the Panama Canal company and the Canal Zone government. Effective July 1, 1951, the act started major administrative changes, including a break in 1952 in the traditional selection for appointment as governor. The law requires that transit tolls be established at rates to operate the canal enterprise on a self-sustaining basis, a fundamental principle in canal policy with far-reaching implications for its future. 9. Panama-U.S. Relations.

Because of the previous history of Panama as a land of endemic revolution, the framers of the 1903 treaty, in order to guarantee political stability essential for future efficient operations of the waterway, insisted on its perpetuity, sovereignty and protective clauses. Subsequent events fully substantiated the wisdom of these 1903 treaty provisions, which remain largely unchanged. The canal was no sooner opened to traffic in Aug: 1914, than the United States applied another provision of this treaty, that of obtaining additional lands. During World War I, in which Panama participated, the United States took possession of several areas of land, and in 1919 acquired a group of islands. Friction over this and other issues led to an attempt in 1926 to revise the convention of 1903. but Panama refused to sign any agreement. The attempt was renewed in Oct. 1933, when Pres. Harmodio Arias conferred in Washington with the U.S. president. Their basic agreement was refined and incorporated in four treaties, signed March 2, 1936. At the insistence of Panama, the United States was relieved of the obligation to guarantee the independence of the republic and renounced the right to acquire any additional lands and waters outside the Canal Zone. By limiting the use of the zone commissaries to persons employed on the canal and

the railroad, the negotiators sought to dissipate a long-standing grievance. It was agreed that Panama was to operate port facilities at Colón and Panama City, that equal opportunities between Panamanian and American employees should be observed, and that the United States should increase the annuity from $250,000 to $430,000. Agreement was also reached on constructing a transisthmian highway. The weakening of the diplomatic structure was further advanced in the 1955 Eisenhower-Remón treaty, which provided for the annual U.S. payment to Panama to be increased to $1,930,000, for equal pay for equal work to Panamanians and U.S. citizens (effective 1958), for Panamanian concerns to be placed on an equal footing with U.S. companies in contract bidding, for the construction of the Thatcher Ferry bridge across the Pacific end of the canal, and for the transfer of certain real estate properties to Panama; the U.S. obtained a 15-year lease for a military base at Rio Hato. The effect of these treaties has been the withdrawal of canal activities to the limits of the Canal Zone and the curtailment of activities within the zone.

The policy of the Canal Zone authorities in the ensuing years was to improve the living conditions of the Panamanians working in the zone and to make changes in the physical features of the canal that would benefit trade in general and Panama's well-being in particular. But these changes lacked the emotional appeal that was attached to the display of the Panamanian flag.

In 1958 and in 1959 the Canal Zone was invaded by Panamanians intent on raising their flag there, and in the latter year their attempt was turned back with injuries. President Eisenhower reviewed the Panamanian claim with sympathy, and in 1960 agreed to the raising of the Panamanian emblem at one point in the Canal Zone as evidence of titular sovereignty (never defined). From this beginning the United States made further concessions until the two flags were displayed almost equally.

A dispute over this very concession between Panamanian and U.S. students at the Balboa high school on Jan. 9, 1964, caused considerable deterioration in relations between the two countries. The subsequent mob assaults on the Canal Zone produced a number of deaths, injuries by the score, and great property damage requiring the use of U.S. army units and a temporary replacement of civilian by military rule in the Zone. The U.S. embassy was evacuated, and many Americans left their homes for the sanctuary of the Canal Zone. Normal diplomatic relations were restored on April 3. In December U.S. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson proposed the negotiation of three new treaties with Panama concerning the existing canal, a new canal at sea level, and U.S. bases, and both countries appointed negotiators for such purpose. Late in 1965 the presidents of the U.S. and Panama announced that they had agreed to abrogate the 1903 treaty and that the new treaty would recognize Panama's sovereignty over the Canal Zone. In June 1967 the two presidents announced the completion of the negotiations but the treaties were not signed because of public opposition in Panama and congressional opposition in the United States. This outcome, together with growing traffic, led to strong demands in the Congress for the major operational improvement and increase of capacity of the existing canal according to the Terminal Lake-Third Locks proposal, which does not require a new treaty with Panama.

See PANAMA: History for further aspects of Panama-U.S. relations; see also references under "Panama Canal" in the Index.

Bibliography.-Isthmian Canal Commission, 1899-1902, Reports: International Board of Consulting Engineers, 1906, Report; Board of Consultants, Isthmian Canal Studies, Report on Long Range Program for . . . Panama Canal to H.R. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries dated June 1, 1960 (H. Rept. 1960, 86th Congress); Governor of The Panama Canal, Report. on Means of Increasing Capacity March 16, 1939 (H. Doc. 210, 76th Congress); “Report on Proposal for Elimination of Pedro Miguel Locks, Panama Canal, Jan. 17, 1944," Congressional Record, vol. 102, pt. 8, p. 10757 (June 21, 1956); “Report on Isthmian Canal Studies under Public Law 280, 79th Congress 1947," summarized in Am. Soc. Civ. Engs. Trans., vol. 14, pp. 607-790 with discussion, pp. 797-906 (1949); Bureau of the Budget, "Panama Canal and Panama Railroad," Report on Organization and Operation, Jan. 31, 1950 (H. Doc. 460, 81st Congress); Panama Canal Company-Canal Zone Government, Annual Reports; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations: The American Republics, annual volumes; Report on United States Relations with Panama, compiled by Rosita Rieck Bennett (H. Rept. 2218, 86th Congress); Comptroller General of the

United States, Annual Reports; Hon. Daniel J. Flood, Isthmian Canal Policy Questions (H. Doc. 474, 89th Congress) (1966); Hon. Thomas E. Martin, "Panama Canal: Terminal Lake Modernization Program Derived from World War II Experience," Congressional Record, vol. 103, pt. 12, p. 16,501 (Aug. 29, 1957); Hon. Strom Thurmond, "Hand List of Panama Canal Treaty Statements," Congressional Record, 90th Congress, vol. 113 (Aug. 15, 1967), and other Senate addresses, 1967-68; Hon. Clark W. Thompson, "Isthmian Canal Policy of the United States-Documentation, 1955-64," Congressional Record, vol. 110 (Sept. 2, 1964); Miles P. DuVal, Jr., "The Marine Operating Problems, Panama Canal, and the Solution," Am. Soc. Civ. Engs. Trans., vol. 114, p. 558 (1949); "Isthmian Canal Policy-An Evaluation," U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc., vol. 81, p. 263 (March 1955); Brig. Gen. Henry L. Abbot, Problems of Panama Canal (1907); Ira E. Bennett et al., History of the Panama Canal (Builders Ed.) (1915); Adolphe Godin De Lépinay de Brusly, "Note on the Practical Solution for Crossing the American Isthmus," Congrès International d'Etudes du Canal Interocéanique . . . du 15 au 20 mai, 1879, Compte Rendu des Séances, pp. 293-99 (1879); Miles P. DuVal, Jr., Cadiz to Cathay, 3rd ed. (1968), And the Mountains Will Move (1947); Almon R. Wright, “Defense Sites Negotiations Between the United States and Panama, 1936-1948," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 212; Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals et al., The Panama Canal: an Engineering Treatise. 2 vol. (1915); Maj. Gen. William C. Gorgas, Sanitation in Panama (1916); William I. Sibert and John F. Stevens, The Construction of the Panama Canal (1915); D. C. Miner, The Fight for the Panama Route: the Story of the Spooner Act and the Hay-Herrán Treaty (1940).-(M. DuV.; A. R. W.)

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